PŪRVA-MĪMĀMSĀ

IN ITS SOURCES

By

Mahāmahopadhyāya Dr. GANGANATH JHA

Edited by

Dr. S. RADHAKRISHNAN

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EDITED BY

S. RADHAKRISHNAN, LL.D., F.B.A.

I

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1964. ARAS HINDU UNIVERSITY

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BY

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WITH A CRITICAL BIBLIOGRAPHY BY
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GENERAL PREFACE

At a time when civilisation is in peril and schemes of social reconstruction are in the air, it is wise to know what the seers of the past have said on the deeper problems of thought and life. The question of the nature and destiny of man, the purpose of society, its relation to the individual are near and intimate to each one of us. But only a select few care to spend the greater part of their lives over them and fewer still their whole lives and energies. But these few, whatever divergent answers they may seem to have found, stand high above ordinary humanity and have struggled to heights which have been gradually won for us. Man is a teachable animal, and by a sympathetic study of the past gropings and stumblings of mankind, he can avoid, though not error, at least its repetition.

In India the problems of philosophy and religion have occupied for centuries an important place. While the leaders of philosophy have attempted to solve the riddle of existence, the teachers of religion have sought to supply us with an ordered scheme of life. The story of Indian thought gives us an important chapter, in what Lessing calls, the education of the human race. What is noteworthy is not the painful ignorance natural to a world over which generations of wild men have swept but the attempt to rise out of that ignorance. The greatness of the ancient thinkers of India is that they struggled persistently and often successfully to discover the spiritual values which enlarge the mind and add to the beauty of life. The progress of man, it is generally admitted today, is a continuous victory of thought over passion, of tolerance over fanaticism, of persuasion over force.

In this series, it is proposed to bring out studies of ancient Indian classics and thought by competent scholars who have looked at them with new eyes and greater freedom. We are

proud that the first volume is by that great scholar Mahamahopadhyaya Dr. Sir Ganganatha Jha. His refined, gentle and retiring nature, combined with his wide culture and intense seriousness gave us the impression of one who lived the religion he professed and this volume by him is a masterpiece of completeness, clearity and compression.

15th April, 1942. S.R.

PREFACE TO THE VOLUME

The idea of a History of Indian Philosophy first dawned upon my mind when I began a study of Mādhavāchārya's-Sarvadarśanasamgraha in the year 1908. This idea deepened when as Curator of the Government Oriental MSS. Library at the Deccan College Poona, in 1912, I was called upon to make a Descriptive Catalogue of Sāmkhya and yoga MSS., as well as to complete the work of my predecessor in the office, Dr. S. K. Belvalkar, on Nyāya and Vedānta MSS., and to see through the press proofs of the Descriptive Catalogue of Veda and Brāhmaṇa MSS. When he was away on study leave for a Doctor's Degree at Harvard, Dr. Belvalkar in his studies of Greek and European Philosophy at Harvard was also contemplating a similar History of Indian Thought. I was very happy to see that our ideas had entirely coincided, and when he returned to India at the beginning of the last war, we made a scheme of a History of Indian Philosophy and submitted it to the Bombay University, under whose patronage two volumes have appeared, and a third may appear sometime hence. It was apparent, however, after we had spent a number of years on this scheme, that the work of a History of Indian Thought was a task to be attempted only on a co-operative basis. In the meanwhile, works from the pen of Sir S. Radhakrishnan and Dr. S. N. Das Gupta had already appeared. So, when at the First Philosophical Congress at Calcutta Sir S. Radhakrishnan and myself met together in 1925, we formulated a scheme for an Encyclopædic History of Indian Philosophy on behalf of the Academy of Philosophy and Religion, which had been founded in 1924. This scheme received the support of many great scholars in and outside India, but there came in the way another difficulty, namely, that of adequate financial support for such a large undertaking. It was due to this particularly, that an adequate fulfilment of the task remained pending. One volume of the Series was published years ago; another,

though ready, could not be brought out on account of financial stringency: but this volume which was first projected on behalf of the Encyclopædic History and which was undertaken by the late Dr. Sir Ganganatha Jha is being offered to the world to-day.

2. When Sir S. Radhakrishnan, the Raja Saheb of Aundh, and myself met at Nagpur for the session of the Indian Philosophical Congress in 1937, we discussed fully a scheme for an Indian Library of Philosophy and Religion. It was first decided to offer this series for publication to some European Publishers, as that would have given due publicity to the volumes in the Series all the world over. The second great World-War, however, intervened. In the meanwhile, Sir S. Radhakrishnan fortunately accepted the Vice-Chancellorship of the Benares Hindu University, and it was decided to publish the Series under the ægis of the B.H.U. The Academy had projected years ago volumes on Indian Philosophy as well as on Philosophy of Religion, which it was thought could well be incorporated in the scheme of the Library of Indian Philosophy and Religion, of which Sir S. Radhakrishnan kindly consented to be the General Editor. It is no wonder, therefore, that as Director of the Academy I should have felt great satisfaction in handing over the volumes projected on behalf of the Academy to be taken over by the Library of Indian Philosophy and Religion, and exclaim as an ancient Seer exclaimed long ago "जातो ममायं विशदः प्रकामं प्रत्यर्पितन्यास इवान्तरात्मा." Accordingly, Dr. Ganganatha Jha's volume, which was written originally for the Encyclopædic History, was offered to this new Series as it first publication. Other volumes from the Encyclopædic History which might be ready could also be incorporated in this new Series, as well as a large number of other volumes on Philosophy and Religion in general. A large number of young scholars have also come into prominence during the interim, and I am sure that the series would prosper exceedingly under the editorship of an eminent scholar like Sir S. Radhakrishnan, and under the wings of the B.H.U., Is it too much to hope

that donors and Princes who have contributed so much to the great buildings in B.H.U. would see that the publication work, which, in a sense, is more durable than works in marble, is duly endowed, so as to enable the B.H.U. to discharge its supreme cultural and spiritual function ?

3. A tragic interest attaches to the production of this volume. It is about three years since this Mīmāmsā volume has been in the printers' hands, but on account of various difficulties, the publication of the volume has been delayed so long. Dr. Sir Ganganatha Jha had desired that this volume might see the light of day during his lifetime. But it was not to be ! The main body of the volume was already in print, but the Critical Bibliography as well as the Prefaces had to be written and printed. The Taj was not built in a day ; and a monumental work like this is bound to take some time for its proper production. I had announced in my preface to Dr. Jha's Vedānta Lectures published by the Allahabad University, that a great work from his pen was coming, and that it would be the consummation of Panditji's life-work, and so it has been. I do not know that there has been any scholar in the whole length and breadth of India who has worked on the Philosophy of Mīmāmsā so much and so intently as Dr. Sir Ganganatha Jha has done. His translations of the Śloka-vārttika and Tantra-Vārttika, as well as Sabarabhāṣya, have been monumental. A pinnacle was required to be placed on the edifice and the present work, summing up in a philosophical manner the teachings of the great Mīmāṁsaka philosophers, supplied the much needed desideratum. It is no exaggeration to say that if reincarnation may be regarded as valid, Dr. Ganganatha Jha might be taken to be an *avatāra* of Kumārila. His Doctorate thesis was on Prabhākara no doubt, but the consummation of his life's work was in the exposition of the philosophy to Kumārila, which bas not been attempted by anybody hitherto. Like Kumārila, Sir Ganganatha Jha left his mortal body on the banks of the Ganges at Prayāga. To me personally, as it was to many an eminent Doctor, it was a wonderful sight to

see the Panditji sitting up in a Yogic posture throughout the entire last month of his life without pause. It was a feat which could be accomplished by rarely any person during the last stages of his life. When Dr. Umesha Mishra and myself had been to pay our respects to the Revered Panditji just six hours before he passed away—alas! we did not know that it was our final visit to him, nor that it was the final visit that he granted consciously to anybody—he appeared to us, and we shall long cherish the impression, that he was a "lion among philosophers", roused from his *Samādhic* slumber and speaking consciously to us. The mainstay of his final programme must have been the powerful support which he received from his moral and spiritual life, led continuously through a period of more than seventy years. Like Kumārila, he was the great connecting link between Mīmāmsā and Vedānta. Born in Videha, there is no doubt that he must have reached Mukti of the Videha type!

4. It was a noble act on the part of the Raja Saheb of Aundh to have contributed to the publication of this volume Shrimant Balasaheb Pant Pratinidhi, B.A., knows the value of such a work more than almost any other Prince. The powerful support which he gave to the work of the Academy has enabled it to endures long, while his final gift to the Academy, and, through it to the Library of Indian Philosophy and Religion, has been the endowment for this volume. Leading a life of absolute self-abnegation, with every pie of his hard-earned money devoted to sublime causes, with a rare interest in works of Art of which his Acropolitan Museum at Aundh will remain a standing example for generations to come, with the princely donations which he has given to the cause of Indian Literature, History and Culture, with a rare love for his subjects and their constitutional welfare, Shrimant Raja Saheb of Aundh stands out as a prominent personality among the Princes, the sum total of whose achievements within the gamut of his finance is hard to achieve by any other Prince similarly situated. I am sure that Shrimant Balasaheb has laid the philosophic

world under very deep obligation by his gift for the publication of this volume.

5. To Pandit Amaranatha Jha, I am indebted in the publication of this volume more than I can say. From the very inception of the idea of the publication, his help in the matter has been immense. I have to thank him for having kindly consented to my request to write an Introductory Note to this volume. If the revered Panditji had been living, no doubt he would have done it himself, as he did in the case of the Allahabad University publication of his Vedānta Lectures. Nevertheless, as an ancient Indian adage would have it, "आत्मा वै पुत्रनामासि" has a great truth underlying it, and it is only in the fitness of things that a person so highly situated as Pandit Amaranatha Jha, so filial, so devoted and so reverential to his father's lifework, should represent the Panditji in a personal Introductory Note to this volume. Pandit Kśetresha Chandra Chattopādhyāya has been the *primum movens* of this publication. Had it not been for him, it would not have been possible to arrange so adequately for the printing of this difficult work, and it would be hard to exaggerate the very keen interest which he has taken throughout the whole course of its publication. Dr. Umesh Mishra, like a loyal pupil and Teacher's son of the Panditji, has at least partly paid his debt to his Teacher by the Critical Bibliographical Note which he has written for the volume, and the framework of which Panditji had seen and approved of during his life-time. Dr. Umesha Mishra's reference to the Maharashtra Pandit Gāgābhaṭṭa, the Coronation Pre-ceptor of Shivaji, who completed the Ślokavārttika of Kumārila, would please all Maharashtra scholars not a little. The Indian Press have accomplished this task in the entire spirit of a labour of love. They have never looked at this publication from the business point of view. They understood the greatness of this work of the revered Panditji, and they have given us of their best in the production of this volume. A work like this represents, in true Mīmāṁsā style, a great work of Sacrifice. Different *Ṛitaviks*, representing

different functions, are required for the completion of such a Sacrifice ; and to all the above our deepest thanks are due for the consummation of the *Avabhṛitha* ceremony which has thus been reached through their combined and devout assistance.

Allahabad, R. D. RANADE.
17th March, 1942.

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

It is Professor Ranade's wish that I should write a few introductory words. I had the privilege of collaborating with my father in his revised translation of the *Kāvyaprakāsha* and in the edition of the poet Chandra's *Maheshavānī*. Unfortunately, my own leanings have always been for literature and drama, and my philosophical attainments, in spite of the valuable opportunities I had at home, are nil. I cannot, therefore, say anything useful about this work. But as a child I remember the daily labours of my father both at home and at the residence of Mahamahopadhyaya Pandit Chitradhara Mishra. I remember the care with which he used to correct the proofs of the *Tantra-vārttika* and *Shlokavārttika* as they came from the Asiatic Society of Bengal. Indeed, I cannot recall any time when he was not reading or writing. At College he had to teach, unaided, all the six classes, from the Intermediate to the M.A. ; he had to work at Boards and Committees, Senate and Syndicate ; at Benares he had heavy administrative duties as Principal of the Sanskrit College, Superintendent of Sanskrit Studies, and Registrar ; on coming back to Allahabad, he had charge of the reorganised University, which for five years controlled the affiliated colleges also ; he was head of a large family ; towards the closing days of his life, he suffered several domestic bereavements. But during the entire period of forty years, over which I can look back, I do not remember a single day when he was without his books and when he was not engaged in literary work. And it was not all philosophical work. He contributed regularly to the *Leader* "Musings of an Idler", in which he discussed almost every topic under the sun, religious, educational, social, political. As a member of the Council of State, he took a leading part in its deliberations. He delivered several Convocation Addresses. He delivered presidential addresses at the Oriental Conference and the Philosophical Congress. He delivered a series of lectures on

Poetry for the Hindustani Academy, and a series of Hindi lectures for the Patna University. The only light reading he indulged in for relaxation was in biographical literature. We, who were so much younger and had more energy, marvelled at his industry and his versatility. In his last days he was anxious that his work on Mīmāmsā should appear early ; he was anxious about the Introduction which he had undertaken to contribute to his revised translation of the *Chhāndogya Upanishad ;* he was anxious to correct the last portions of the proofs of the *Vivādachintāmaṇi*, which he had translated for the "Gaekwad Oriental Series". He had no other anxieties. He was ready and willing to depart. It is the pious privilege of the survivors to see to the publication of the last works which, despite feeble health and failing sight, he had completed.

December 10, 1941. AMARANATHA JHA.

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श्रीः

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTORY AND BIBLIOGRAPHICAL

Students of Indian Literature have long been conversant with the term '*Ṣaḍ-darshana,*' 'Six Systems of Philosophy'. One cannot however fail to observe that this is a misnomer. It is true it is an old term; we read, for instance, in the *Mahānirvāṇa-tantra*—

षड्दर्शनमहाकूपे पतिताः सर्वजन्तवः ।
परमार्थं न जानन्ति पशुपाशनियन्त्रिताः ॥

Even here however the 'Six Systems' are spoken of somewhat vaguely and deprecatingly.

Though the expression has the sanction of long usage behind it, it appears to have been not known in ancient times. This is clear from the fact that in the enunciation of the various branches of literature which a seeker after truth was advised to study, there is no mention of the '*six darshanas*'; and also it does not occur in the list of the several '*vidyāasthānās*', *subjects of learning*, provided by the Ancients. For instance, (1) we have the following list in the *Chhāndogya Upaniṣad* (7.1.2)—

'......The Ṛgveda, the Yajurveda, the Sāmaveda, the Atharvaṇa, the Itihāsa-Purāṇa, the Veda of the Vedas, the Rites of the Fathers, Mathematics, Science of Portents, Science of Time, Logic, Ethics and Politics, Etymology, Science of the Veda, Science of Elementals, Science of War, Astronomy, Snake-charming and Fine Arts'.

(2) *Yājñavalkya* in his *Smṛti* provides the following list of subjects of learning—

पुराणन्यायमीमांसाधर्मशास्त्राङ्गमिश्रिताः ।
वेदाः स्थानानि विद्यानां धर्मस्य च चतुर्दश ॥

where we find mentioned only '*Nyāya*' and '*Mīmāmsā*', standing respectively for *Reasoning* and *Investigation.*

(3) The Great *Vāchaspati Mishra* (ninth century A.C.) is known to have written important works on all the *Darshanas*; he himself enumerates his works as—

यन्न्यायकणिका[1]-तत्त्वसमीक्षा[2]-तत्त्वबिन्दुभिः[3] ।
यन्न्याय[4]साङ्ख्य[5]योगानां[6] वेदान्तानां[7] विबन्धनैः ॥

where we do not find the mention of the regular 'Six Systems'.

(4) *Rājashēkhara-Kāvyamīmāsā* (tenth century A.C.) speaks of '*Vāṅmaya*', *Literature,* as consisting of *Purāṇa, Ānvīkṣikī, Mīmāmsā* and *Smṛtitantra;* where we miss the names of *Sāṅkhya, Yoga, Vedānta* and *Vaishēṣika.*

(5) *Jayanta-Bhaṭṭa* in his *Nyāyamañjarī* (tenth century A.C.) speaks of '*Ṣaṭ-tarkī,* 'the Six Theories'; but includes under the name, *Mīmāmsā, Nyāya, Sāṅkhya, Ārhata, Bauddha* and *Chārvāka,* The names of '*Vedānta,*' '*Yoga*', '*Vaishēṣika*' are absent here.

(6) *Vishvasāratantra-Gurugītā* (twelfth century A.C.) speaks of the 'Six Systems', as those of *Gautama, Kaṇāda, Kapila, Patañjali, Vyāsa* and *Jaimini* Here alone we find the well-known 'Six *darshanas*'.

(7) *Haribhadra Sūri* (twelfth century A.C.) mentions the following—*Bauddha, Naiyāyika, Sāṅkhya, Jaina, Vaishēṣika* and *Jaimini;* here we miss the names of '*Vedānta*' and '*Yoga*'.

(8) *Jinadatta Sūri* (thirteenth century A.C.) names the following—'Six *darshanas*'—*Jaina, Mīmāmsā, Bauddha, Sāṅkhya, Shaiva* and *Nāstika;* here we miss the names of *Nyāya, Vaishēṣika, Vedānta* and *Yoga.*

(9) *Rājashekhara Sūri* (1348 A.C.) names *Jaina, Sāṅkhya, Jaiminīya, Yoga, Vaishēṣika* and *Saugata.* Here we do not find the names of *Vedānta* and *Nyāya.*

(10) *Mallinātha's* son (fourteenth century A.C.) speaks of *Pāṇini, Jaimini, Vyāsa, Kapila, Akṣapāda* and *Kaṇāda;* here we miss the *Yoga.*

Thus we find that till so late as the fourteenth century the name '*Ṣaḍ-darshana*', 'Six Systems of Philosophy', had not become stereotyped as standing definitely and specifically for the Six Systems now known as *Sāṅkhya, Yoga, Nyāya, Vaishēṣika, Mīmāmsā* and *Vedanta.* The old division was into the two broad lines mentioned by *Yājñavalkya,* under the names '*Nyāya*' and '*Mīmāmsā*', the term '*Nyāya*' *stands* for what we understand by *Reasoning, Argumentation,* and '*Mīmāmsā*' for *Investigation, Deliberation.*

The first step towards both these lay in the preparing of the ground for investigation; and it was necessary at the outset to lay down the 'means' that are available to the investigator for 'knowing' things; this was essential for all sound and valid 'knowledge', which was the sole purpose of all Investigation. Thus it was that 'Nyāya', 'Reasoning', came in as the first essential; and this is the reason why the consideration of the *Means of Knowledge, Pramāṇas,* became the starting point of our philosophical works.

From the earliest times, man has made a distinction between *Matter*—regarded, roughly, as what is tangible,—and *Spirit*—what is not tangible. Man has all along recognised this distinction between the 'visible,' which meets the Eye, and the 'invisible', which is beyond the reach of the senses and is yet *felt* to be there. This well-recognised distinction we find stressed in the system which we know as the '*Sānkhya*'. In the other group known as the *Nyāya*, we find expounded in detail the means and methods for the ascertaining of the real nature of things, both *material* and *spiritual*; this expounding is done on the basis of common-sense, and the aid of supernatural means of knowledge is not emphasised. The third group known as '*Mīmāmsā*, deals entirely with spiritual truths, which are not amenable to any ordinary means of knowledge—being cognisable only through the *Reliable Word*, Revelation.

It is not easy to find proper justification for the later rigid division into the 'Six Systems'. These 'Six Systems' have been held to be—(1) *Sāṅkhya*, (2) *Yoga*, (3) *Nyāya*, (4) *Vaishēṣika*, (5) *Mīmāmsā*, and (6) *Vedānta*. As a matter of fact, however, there is ample justification for the view that we have only *three* 'systems'. and each of these three is presented to us in the form of a *pair*; each member of the pair being complementary to the other.

For instance, *Sānkhya* and *Yoga* form one pair; the theoretical philosophy is supplied by the former and the practical method of realising these philosophical truths are taught by the latter. It is for this reason that in the older literature, both of these have been called '*Sāṅkhya*'; and it was only later on, when people began to prefer analysis to synthesis, that the former came to be known as 'the *Sāṅkhya without God*', and the letter, as '*Sāṅkhya with God*;, the postulating of the '*Ishwara*,' Lord, God, being the important point where the two sister-systems differed; though it was not noted that 'God' had no place in the *philosophy* of the *Yoga*—He being posited there only as the object of devotion and meditation, leading up to final *Samādhi*, Absolute Communion.—The *Nyāya* and the *Vaishēṣika* form the second pair; though the case of these two is somewhat different from that of *Sāṅkhya* and *Yoga*. The *sūtras* of both *Nyāya* and *Vaishēṣika* contain 'philosophical' matter; though even here much of the philosophical matter has been taken for granted by the *Nyāya*, as expounded in the sister-system; the *Nyāya-bhāṣya* has clearly declared that such of the *Vaishēṣika* doctrines as have not been actually denied in so many words by the *Nyāya-sūtra* should be taken to be accepted by the *Nyāya*—(*Nyāya-Bhāṣya* on 1.1.4.) That these two systems are mutually complementary is shown by

the fact that the avowed aim of the *Nyāya-sūtras* is found to be the propounding of a scheme of investigation and discussion regarding philosophical truths; as in their opinion, knowledge acquired otherwise remains shaky until it is corroborated by such investigation and discussion. These two systems have, since early times, been coalescing to such an extent that it is sometimes difficult to ascertain whether a certain manual written during the last two or three centuries is to be classed as '*Nyāya*' or '*Vaishēṣika*'. Lastly as regards the *Mīmāmsā* and the *Vedānta*, there has never been any justification for regarding them as two distinct 'systems of Philosophy', They have always been, and continue to be, known as '*Pūrva*' (Preliminary) *Mīmāmsā* and '*Uttara*' (Final) *Mīmāmsā*. *Pūrva-Mīmāmsā—i.e.*, *Mīmāmsā* proper—has never claimed to be a '*Darshana*', a system of Philosophy. In fact, so far as the *Sūtra* is concerned, it does not take cognisance of any philosophical topic except that of *Pramāṇa;* and these also are brought in only negatively, to show that *Dharma* is not within the purview of the ordinary *Pramāṇas*, Perception and the rest. The commentators have introduced such topics as the 'Soul' and the '*Apūrva*,' but only as corollary to its main theme of '*Dharma*', Duty of Man; if there is no Soul and no *Apūrva*, there can be no point in performing *Dharma*, one's *Duty;* hence these have been set forth by the later exponents; the Soul has been specially emphasised; but regarding any detailed investigation and consideration of this Soul, the older writers have deliberately referred the enquirer to the '*Vedānta*'. Says *Kumārila* at the end of his *Ātmavāda*, in the *Shlokavārtika*—

इत्याह नास्तिक्यनिराकरिष्णुरात्मास्तितां भाष्यकृदत्र युक्त्या ।
दृढत्वमेतद्विषयः प्रबोधः प्रयाति वेदान्तनिषेवणेन ॥

The term '*Nāstikya*' (Atheism) in Indian Philosophy stands for the view that 'there is no *Soul*, there is no region other than the physical' (vide *Nyāya-Bhāṣya*); subsequently it came to stand for the view that 'there is no *God*'.—The term '*Vedānta*' originally stood for the Upaniṣad-section of the Veda, the study whereof, as bearing upon the *Soul* and cognate subjects, is incorporated in the *Brahmasūtras of Bādarāyaṇa*.—We are alive to the fact that later on differences cropped up between the two '*Mīmāmsās*'; but they always appertained to minor details; on the main issues, there has not arisen any serious controversy. *Vedānta* proper finds its ultimate sanction in the *Vedic texts;* and as regards the authority and interpretation of these texts, it accepts the conclusions of the sister-system; in fact, for all practical purposes, the Vedānta accepts the *tenets* of the

Mīmāmsā ; hence the statment by the Vedāntin—'*Vyavahārē Bhaṭṭanayaḥ*'. [For examples of मीमांसान्याय-s adopted and used by Vedāntins see the last Chapter.]

The above facts also account for the designation of *Mīmāmsā proper* as '*Pūrva*' and that of *Vedānta* as '*Uttara*'. For the *enquiry into Brahman—Brahmajijñāsā,*—which can be carried on only on the basis of Vedic texts,—it is essential (*a*) that the authority and reliability of the Veda should be established beyond doubt,—and (*b*) that certain methods of interpreting those test should be elaborated, in order to avoid confusion in the course of the study of the vast mass of Vedic material. Both these requirements have been met by *Mīmāmsā proper ;* and it is on the basis of the *Pūrva*, Preliminary, *Mīmāmsā* that the Vedāntin has raised the edifice of *Vedānta proper*, which, on that account, is called *Uttara, Final, Mīmāmsā.* And it is interesting to note that on the subject of the nature of the Soul and of Final Liberation, *Mokṣa*, the final aim of men, there is not much difference between the views of the great *Mīmāmsaka* (*Kumārila*, for instance) and the Great *Vedāntin* (*e.g., Shaṅkara*).

This interrelation and interdependence between the two *Mīmāmsās*, has been clearly indicated by *Shaṅkarāchārya*, in his *Shārīraka-bhāṣya*, on Sūtra 3.3.53. The *Adhikaraṇa* beginning with this *Sūtra* is meant to establish the existence of the *Soul* as something distinct from the Body. A preliminary objection is raised to the effect that "this matter has been already dealt with in the *very begining of the Shāstra*, where the Existence of the Soul as the *Enjoyer* of the results of acts has been established". And this objection has been answered by the following statement—"it is true that it has been so established by the *Author of the Bhāṣya* (*Shabara*), but nothing has been said on the point by the *Author of the Sūtra ;* while in the Vedānta-Sūtras under explanation (3.3.53. *et seq.*), the *Author of the Sūtra* itself has dealt with it directly ; and it is clear that what *Shabara Svāmi* has declared in Adhyāya I of his *Bhāṣya*, he has derived from the present *Vedānta-Sūtra* itself ; and it is for this reason that when the *Revered Upavarṣa* (the '*Vṛttikāra*, of *Pūrva-Mīmāmsā*) found it necessary,—in course of his work on the First, Preliminary, Investigation,—to prove the Existence of the Soul, he contented himself by saying that he was going to explain this under the *Shārīraka* (Vedānta-Sūtra) ; in the present connection we are going to discuss the Existence of the Soul in relation to the *Upāsanās*, acts of worship and mediation, that have been enjoined in the Veda ; and we are doing this for the purpose of showing that the question of the Existence of the Soul has a bearing upon the *entire Shāstra*—the *whole Philosophy*

(of *Mīmāmsā*, with its two parts, *Karma* or *Pūrva*, Mimāmsā and *Uttara* Mīmāmsā)".

The words and expressions used in these passages are significant. (1) The *Purva-Mīmāmsā* has been referred to as '*Shāstrapramukha*, Beginning of the Shāstra' ;—(2) it is again referred to as '*Prathama-Tantra*, the Preliminary Investigation' ;—(3) the *two Mīmāmsās* together have been spoken of as '*Kṛtsna-Shāstra*', 'the whole Philosophy'.

The interdependence and interrelation of the two *Mīmāmsās* is further indicated by the following facts :—

(*i*) The immediate purpose of both the *Mīmāmsās* was to save the *Vaidika Dharma* from the onslaughts of the *Bauddha* and other *Non-Vaidika Dharmas*.

(*ii*) *Kumārila* holds that the *Ātman* is *eternal*—different from the body, the sense-organs and Buddhi—(*Shlokavārtika*—*Ātma*, 7.) It is imperishable. (*Ibid.*, 147.)

(*iii*) *Ātman* is *omnipresent*—(*Tantravārtika*—Translation, p. 516).

(*iv*) *Ātman* is '*jñānashaktisvabhāva*', (of the nature of consciousness), eternal, omnipresent, (*Shlokavārtika*—*Ātma*, 73.)

(*v*) *Ātman* is 'of the nature of pure consciousness' (*Tantravārtika*—Translation, p. 516. Text, p. 381, l. 5.)

(*vi*) As regards the *parama-puruṣārtha*, summum bonum, and its attainment, *Kumārila's* view is thus summed up—(See *Tantravārtika*—Text, pp. 240-241, Translation, p. 321).

(*a*) Knowledge of *Ātman* helps the Man, as also the sacrificial performance.

(*b*) Such Vedic texts as—'*Ya ātmā apahatapāpmā vijaro vimṛtyuḥ vishoko vijighitso' pipāsaḥ satyakāmaḥ satyasaṅkalpaḥ so 'nvēṣṭavyaḥ sa vijijñāsitavyaḥ,*'—'*Mantavyo boddhavyaḥ*'—'*Ātmanamupasīta*' '*Sa sarvāñshca lokānāpanoti tarati shokamātmavit*'—'*Sa yadi pitṛkāmo bhavati saṅkalpādevāsya pitaraḥ samuttiṣṭhanti tena pitṛlokamabhisampadyatē*'—'*Sa khalvevam yo veda*, etc. etc'.—There are two kinds of 'aims' attainable by man, *Happiness* and *Final Deliverance* (the Highest Good) ;—they are attained by means of pure self-knowledge obtained by means of Enquiry and Reflection ;—the 'Highest Good' consists in 'absorption into the regions of Brahma'.

Though what is said in *Shlokavārtika* (*Sambandhā-kṣepaparihāra*, 103-104) as to 'the knowing of Soul' not being enjoined 'for the purpose of Final Deliverance' would appear to be inconsistent with the above from *Tantravārtika*,—yet in reality it is not so. The explanation is given by the *Nyāyaratnākara*, which says that there are two kinds of 'self-knowedge' taught in the Upaniṣads,—one which discriminates the *Ātman* from the Body, etc., and the other, which helps in Meditation, etc.—It is the former that is spoken of as not leading to 'Final Deliverance'; as its sole purpose lies in convincing the man that there is an ever-lasting Entity within him for whose sake the sacrifices are to be performed. That this is so is made clear by the statement that 'there is no other result save the attainment of Heaven'.—This apparently refers to the result of sacrifices. Certainly *Kumārila* cannot be taken as holding that there is no other result save Heaven; in several passages he has spoken of *Mokṣa*. The conclusion is that *Mokṣa* is attained through the second kind of 'self-knowledge'.

(*viii*) To crown all, we have the declaration at the end of *Ātmavāda* in *Shlokavārtika* to the following effect—'Thus has the author of the Bhāṣya, with a view to refute Atheism, established, by means of reasonings, the existence of *Ātman*, : conviction regarding this becomes strengthened by a careful study of the *Vedānta*'.

Of course one cannot ignore the later controversies that arose between the followers of the two teachers: specially in regard to '*Karmakāṇḍa*'—*i.e.*, the Vedic texts bearing upon the *active* aspect of *Dharma*,—which the later Vedāntin insisted upon regarding as almost valueless,—quite unmindful of the fact that the Great Āchārya has repeatedly asserted that the due performance of the said *active* aspects of *Dharma* is absolutely essential—specially for the purification of the mind, without which no real progress can be possible towards the attainment of *Jñāna*. In fact it was in this reconciliation between the two schools of thought that lay the value of work of *Shaṅkarāchārya*, in whose system there is scope for both, within their own special spheres. The following passage from the *Shārīraka-Bhāṣya* (on *Sū*. 4.1.8.) clarifies the entire viewpoint of *Shaṅkarāchārya*.

'We accept as settled the following conclusion:—All acts of permanent obligation—accompanied or not accompanied by knowledge—which have been performed before the rise of the ultimate True Knowledge,—either during the present life or in previous ones,—all such works act as means of the extinction of evil dessert obstructing the attainment of True Knowledge,— and thus become the cause of such attainment, subserving

the more immediate causes, such as *Shravaṇa, Manana,* etc. These Acts therefore operate towards the same ultimate result as the Knowledge of *Brahman*'.

As regards the special field occupied by *Mīmāmsā proper, Jaimini* in his *Sutrās* has propounded the subject of his enquiry as *Dharma* (Sūtra 1),—then he sets forth his idea of what *Dharma* (Duty of Man) is,—where we are told that it consists in *what has been enjoined in the Veda as conducive to welfare* (Sūtra 2);—he then explains why the ordinary means of Cognition, Perception, Inference and the rest, cannot be of much use in this connection (Sūtra 4);—and how the *Revealed Word* can be the only infallible guide in this matter (Sūtra 5),—and proceeds in the rest of Pāda i, to explain how and why the 'Revealed Word', which is the *Veda*, is to be accepted as an infallible source of knowledge; —this is followed in the rest of *Adhyāya* I, by a detailed examination of the question as to what portions of the Veda are to be regarded as actually laying down, enjoining, what should be done and what should not be done.—Having thus cleared the ground in the first *Adhyāya,* Jaimini proceeds, in the remaining eleven *adhyāyas,* to set forth in detail the methods of understanding the import of Vedic texts.

It will be seen that for *Jaimini*—in fact for all Indian philosophers,—the connotation of the term 'Dharma' is very much wider than that of its usual rendering, 'Religion'; it stands for *the whole duty of Man,* the performance of which is conducive to his welfare—here, *in this world, during present life, as also* elsewhere, after death.

Unfortunately for us, the examples that Jaimini and his commentators chose for illustrating the rules of interpretation were all drawn from sacrificial rituals. Naturally, during their time, every serious student was familiar with these rituals and hence these were regarded as providing most suitable examples. Latterly, however, sacrificial ritual has gradually all but disappeared from the life of the Hindus: and this has led to the neglect of the study of the *Mīmāmsā-Shāstra* itself. Attempts were made off and on to illustrate the more important of Jaimini's Principles (*Nyāyas*) by means of examples drawn from the practices current among the later Hindus; and we have a number of manuals, called '*Adhikaraṇa-Kaumudī*'—by *Devanātha Thakkura* and *Rāmakṛṣṇa* among others—where the Principles are illustrated by examples drawn from other fields of human activity.—All along however these *Mīmāmsā Nyāyas* have continued to exercise their due influence on other matters,—in fact, on all matters that are affected by the right interpretation of authoritative texts.

This has been specially manifested in the domain of Law; and decisions of even modern courts of law have been found to be influenced by these *Nyāyas* of Jaimini. One glaring instance of the application—rather misapplication—of one of these is afforded by the judgment of the Privy Council which has declared the adoption of an only son to be *legal*, on the authority (misunderstood) of a *Mīmāmsā Nyāya*. It is as follows :—

Gautama has declared—'One should not give away, nor adopt, an only son,—because he serves the purpose of the perpetuation of the line of his ancestors.' This sentence contains two statements—(a) 'One should not adopt, or give away in adoption, an only son', and (b) 'He serves the purpose of perpetuating the line'; the latter sentence is meant to provide a reason for the prohibition contained in the former statement. In a Bombay case, it was argued by an eminent lawyer,—and the argument was ultimately accepted by the Privy Council,—that the first statement cannot be mandatory, because an injunction or a prohibition which is sought to be justified by reason cannot be mandatory. In support of this view reliance was placed upon an *adhikaraṇa* of the *Pūrva-Mīmāmsā* (Sūtra 1.2.27) and the case was decided accordingly; the prohibition was *not* mandatory, hence the adoption of an only son is *not illegal*; ever since this view has prevailed. —Even a cursory examination, however, of the *Adhikaraṇa* concerned will show that the legal authorities have entirely misunderstood the *Nyāya* concerned. What the *Nyāya* really stands for is that—'When a certain sentence consists of two statements,—one in the form of an Injunction or Prohibition, and another in the form of a reason in support thereof,—no mandatory force attaches *to the latter statement*',—That such is the Nyāya as propounded in *Mīmāmsā* can be found out by any one who comes to look into any of the authoritative works on *Mīmāmsā*—from *Shabara* downwards.—Incidentally it may be pointed out that the lawyers concerned did not take the trouble to find out if there were other texts bearing on the question. As a matter of fact, there is at least one other text which prohibits the said adoption—and does *not* adduce a reason for it. *Shaunaka* has declared—नैकपुत्रेण कर्तव्यं पुत्रदानम्प्रयत्नतः—'The man with an only son should carefully avoid the giving away of the son'. (Vide *Hindu Law in Its Sources*).

We thus see that there are no 'Six Systems' of Indian Philosophy; there may be *three*, but they are all collectively conducive to the welfare of man. For instance, the *Sāṅkhya* teaches men the first essential distinction between Matter and Spirit, and shows that the latter is the more important

of the two, the former only subserving the purposes of the latter :—

पुरुषविमोक्षनिमित्तं तथा प्रवृत्तिः प्रधानस्य—says the *Kārikā*. The *Yoga* provides the method duly leading to the realisation of this pre-eminent truth ;—the *Nyāya-Vaishēṣika* provides the ratiocinative factor,—the method of proving to the sceptic the correctness of the said distinction between Matter and Spriti ; and finally, we have the two *Mīmāṁsās* which together lead us on to the realisation of the *Highest Truth*,—that all is *one*, there is no multiplicity or plurality, which is all purely illusory and so forth. The ultimate sanction for this Truth rests in, is provided by, the Revealed Word of the Veda, and the exact import of this Word is understood with the help of certain broad principles expounded in the *Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā-Sūtras*.

BIBLIOGRAPHY OF THE PŪRVA-MIMĀMSĀ

We have seen how and why it was found necessary to evolve a methodology for understanding the true import of Vedic texts. The earliest work that is available to us on this subject is the *Sūtra* of *Jaimini*.

As regards the date of these *Sūtras*, nothing definite can be known. These ancient *Sūtrakāras* are found to be referring to each other ; *e.g.*, *Jaimini* mentions *Bādarāyana* (*Mī Sū.* 1.1.5) and *Bādarāyaṇa* mentions *Jaimini* (*Brahma-Sūtra* 3.2.40). All attempts, therefore, that have been made to fix the dates, or coin the chronology of these systems have been futile and unconvincing.

This work, as generally known to us, consists of *twelve Adhyāyas ;* but there is a belief,—which appears to have some foundation,—that there are four more *Adhyāyas* of the '*Jaiminīya-Sūtra*' known as the '*Saṅkarṣa-Kāṇḍa*'. Indeed a work bearing this title was actually published at Benares in 1894 ; it consists of the *Sūtras* of *Jaimini*—said to be *Adhyāyas* 13, 14, 15 and 16—along with a comparatively recent commentary called *Bhāṭṭa-Chandrikā*, by one *Bhāskara Bhaṭṭa*. References to the '*Saṅkarṣa-Kāṇḍa*' of *Jaimini* are found in *Rāmānuja's Shrī-bhāṣya* under 3.3. That this '*Saṅkarṣa-Kāṇḍa*' or simply '*Saṅkarṣa*' as he calls it, was commented upon by *Shabara* is clear from the *Shabara*; *Bhāṣya* itself ; under Sū. 10.4.32 and 12.2.11, the *Bhāṣya* contains the words '*Saṅkarṣē vakṣyatē*, and '*Saṅkarse vakṣyati*'. On looking into the *Sūtras* as printed in the *Saṇkarṣa-Kāṇḍa*, we find that the first point of *Shabara's* reference (under 10.4.32) appears under *Sūtra* 14.4.20 of the *Saṅkarṣa*, where we meet with the *Sūtra* वनस्पतिस्विष्टकृद्विकारत्वात् and the words of *Shabara* under reference are स्विष्टकृद्विकारश्च वनस्पतिरिति सङ्कर्षे वक्ष्यते । The second point

of reference, however, is not equally clear. The words of *Shabara* (under 12.2.11) are—औषधार्था अवहननार्था वा यथा पत्नीति सङ्कर्षे वक्ष्यति. In the *Saṅkarṣa-Kāṇḍa,* the only passage relevant to this appears to be under 13.1.11. But the identity of these two is not quite clear. There is a manuscript of the *Saṅkarṣa-Kāṇḍa* in the Adyar Library—with the *Bhāṣya* of *Devasvāmī.*

Anyway, this printed *Saṅkarṣa-Kāṇḍa* does not appear to bear any signs of being the उपासनाकांड, 'Section of Veda dealing with Worship and Devotion', which the Editor, the late *Mahā. P. Rāmamishra Shāstrī,* calls it in the footnotes at the end of his edition of the *Shāstradīpikā ;* wherein he quotes *Rāmānuja's* assertion regarding *Jaimini's Sūtra* consisting of *sixteen Adhyāyas ;* the four concluding ones apparently constituting the said उपासनाकांड. From the clear reference to the वनस्पतिस्विष्टकृत् noted above, the printed संकर्षकांड, would appear to be the संकर्ष mentioned by *Shabara,* and the additional four *Adhyāyas* of Jaimini, mentioned by *Rāmānuja,* must be totally different from the संकर्षकांड,—if it deals, as P. *Rāmamishra* says it does, with the उपासनाकांड.

In fact, the printed commentary declares at the very outset as follows : "In the foregoing twelve discourses the sage has expounded a few principles of interpretation, based upon the distinction of acts into 'Primary' and 'Secondary ;' the following four discourses are going to bring together a few stray Vedic texts and determine their exact meaning by means of the same principles ; hence (*i.e.,* because these deal with stray texts), there is no need here to point out the contextual connection of each topic with what has preceded it".—Of the *Sūtras,* however, the printed commentary provides the *Pratīkas,* the opening words, only.

An attempt might be made to obtain some idea of the contents of these four Discourses with the help of the printed commentary and also the older commentary by Dēvasvāmi, a manuscript of which has been obtained from Madras, with the help of Dr. C. Kunhan Raja,—only if we could fix the text of the *Sutras* also.

The *Mīmāṁsā-Grantha-Prakāshaka-Samiti* of Poona is advertising the publication of what it calls the '*Siddhānta-bhāṣya* (*Saṅkarṣa-Kāṇḍa*)'. —On enquiry we learn that this also is the commentary by Dēvaswāmī.

The twelve Adhyāyas—styled '*Dvādashalakṣaṇī*'—of these *Sūtras* were commented upon by several writers ; the oldest of these known to us—but by name only—and also by a detailed exposition of his views by *Shabara,* —is *Upavarṣa,* who has been reverentially spoken of by *Shabara* (and also

by *Shaṅkarāchārya*) as '*Bhagavān Upavarṣaḥ*'. This same *Upavarṣa* has been generally identified with the '*Vṛttikāra*', whose views have been set forth in detail in the *Shabāra-Bhāṣya ;* though doubts have been raised in regard to this identification.—Other commentators, known to us so far only by name, as mentioned in some of the more important works, are—(1) *Bhartṛmitra ;* mentioned by the *Nyāyaratnākra* of *Pārthasārathi* and the *Kāshikā* of *Suchorita Mishra*, on verse 10 of the *Shlokavārtika*, and believed by my late revered tutor *Mahāmahopādhyāya Pandit Chitradhara Mishra* of Darbhanga, to be the earliest commentator on the *Sūtras ;*—(2) *Bhavadāsa*, mentioned by *Kumārila* in *Sholkavārtika* 1.63 ;—(3) *Hari*, referred to in the *Shāstradīpikā* of *Pārthasārathi* under 10.2.59-60.—These, however, are known only by their names ; the earliest commentary that has been available to us so far is that by *Shabara* or *Shabara-svāmin*, known to the world as '*Shabara-bhāṣya*'. This is the work on which the entire literature of *Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā* is based.

Shabara-svāmin is known among Pandits as a senior contemporary of the great '*Vikramāditya*', the founder of the '*Samvat*' era, and hence believed as having lived in 57 B.C. Indeed they quote a *Shloka* which speaks of *Shabara* as the father of *Vikramāditya*—

ब्राह्मण्यामभवद्वराहमिहिरो ज्योतिर्विदामग्रणीः
राजा भर्तृहरिश्च विक्रमनृपः क्षत्रात्मजायामभूत् ।
वैश्यायां हरिचन्द्रवैद्यतिलको जातश्च शङ्कुः कृतीः
शूद्रायाममरः षडेव शबरस्वामिद्विजस्यात्मजाः ॥

Here the persons spoken of as sons of *Shabara* are—(*1*) *Varāhamihira*, the great astronomer, from his *Brāhmaṇa*-wife, (2) King *Bhartṛhari* and (3) King *Vikrama*, from his *Kṣhattriya*-wife, (4) *Harichandra*, the great *Vaidya* and (5) *Shaṅku*, the learned, from his *Vaishya*-wife, and (6) *Amara*, from his *Shūdra*-wife. The date of the astronomer *Varāhmihira*, however, has been fixed by scholars to be somewhere in the fourth century A.D.—*Vidyāpati Thakkura*, in his *Puruṣaparīkṣā*, speaks of *Shabara* as the '*Guru*' of *Vikramāditya*.—The name '*Vikramāditya*' continues to be shrouded in mystery. The only conclusion, therefore, that we can come to is that *Shabara* lived before 400 A.D. This would fit in with his posteriority to '*Bhagavān Upavarṣa*'—whose date is believed to be pre-Christian,—and priority to *Prabhākara*, *Kumārila*, *Maṇḍana* and *Shaṅkara*.—Under Sū. 6.1.12, *Shabara* has quoted the well-known text भार्यां दासश्च पुत्रश्चं निर्धनाः सर्वं एव ते which occurs in *Manusmṛti ;* this would make *Shabara* posterior to the Great Law-giver.

Vidyāpati has spoken of *Shabara* as the '*Guru*' of *Vikramāditya ;* this would make him a resident of Ujjain. But from certain points gleaned from the *Bhāṣya*, he appears to belong to the *North—Kashmir*, or even *Takṣashilā*—[Vide *Intro. to English Translation of Shabara-Bhāṣya* by Gangānātha Jhā—*Gaekwad Series*, Baroda.]

It is this *Shabara-Bhāṣya* that has formed the basis and starting-point for all later *Mīmāṁsā* works ; well might *Shabara*, therefore, be regarded as the 'Father' of *Mīmāṁsā*-literature ; he it was who seems to have systematised and co-ordinated the *Sutras* into *Adhikaraṇas* ; we have to accept this as a settled fact, at least until we have discovered the earlier commentaries on the *Sūtra*, by *Upavarṣa* and others. Indeed *Shabara* had attained this position as early as the time of the Great *Shaṅkara*, who quotes his words as those of the '*Sāstratātparyavidah* (*Shārīraka-Bhāṣya* 1.1.4).

The earliest commentaries on the *Bhāṣya* so far found are those by *Prabhākara* (also spoken of as *Prabhākara-Mishra*, and called *Guru*), and by *Kumārila* (also spoken of as *Kumārila-Bhaṭṭa*, or simply *Bhaṭṭa*). These two writers became the founders of two *schools* of *Mīmāṁsā*,—to which a third was later on added in the person of *Murāri Mishra*. In *Mīmāṁsā*-literature, the view of *Prabhākara* is generally referred to as '*Guru-mata*', that of *Kumārila* as '*Bhāṭṭa-mata*', and that of *Murāri Mishra* as '*Mishra-mata*'.

There are references to a *Vārtikakāra* in the works of *Shālikanātha*. This *Vārtikakāra* does not appear to be *Kumārila ;* he is evidently an older writer whose '*Vārtika*' has been referred to by *Kumārila* himself in the *Tantravārtika* (Text, p. 606) ; where a '*Vṛtti*' also is mentioned.

There has been some difference of opinion regarding the relative chronological position of *Prabhākara* and *Kumārila*,—*Murāri Mishra* being generally admitted to have lived long after these two. The idea current among Pandits is that *Prabhākara*, along with *Murāri Mishra*, was Kumārila's pupil ; and a story is told to the following effect : From his early age, *Prabhākara* had showed signs of keen intelligence and independence of judgment, and in course of study there arose a sharp difference of opinion between the pupil and the teacher on some matter relating to the After-death Rites ; having failed to convince the pupil by arguments the Teacher had recourse to a stratagem ; once in the morning, it was given out that the Teacher had expired ; when the people assembled for the purpose of the Rites, there arose a question regarding the proper manner of this performance ; the matter was referred to *Prabhākara*, as the protagonist

of one of the two views that had been discussed; and he readily said—'Of course the view held by our teacher is the correct one; the other view had been put forward by me only for the purposes of discussion;' thereupon *Kumārila* got up and said—'So *Prabhākara* has been won over to my view!' whereupon *Prabhākara* retorted—'Yes, but not while you were alive'—Another story:—In course of study, the Teacher came by a sentence—'अत्रतुनोक्तं तत्रापिनोक्तम् इति द्विरुक्तम्; the apparent meaning of this was—'This has not been mentioned here, nor has it been mentioned there, so it has been mentioned *twice*'.; and this was an absurdity which puzzled the teacher and the pupils alike; after some cogitation, the teacher retired to rest; before he returned *Prabhākara* put a mark between अत्र and तु and another, upon त्रा which altered the whole structure of the sentence अत्र तुना' उक्तं' तत्र अपिना' उक्तम्'—इति द्विरुक्तम्, which thereby was found to mean—'Here this idea has been expressed by the particle तु and there the same idea has been expressed by the particle अपि, hence it has been expressed twice'; when the teacher returned, he saw the marks and found the difficulty easily solved; and having found out who had supplied the key to it, he was very highly pleased and bestowed upon *Prabhākara*, the title of '*Guru*'—Another explanation of this title of *Prabhākara's* is not complimentary, being attributed to the *complicated* nature of his views, in the following verse current in South India—

गाथा ताथागतानां गलति गमनिका कापिली क्वापि लीना
क्षीणा काणादवाणी द्रुहिणहरगिरः सौरभं नारभन्ते ।
क्षामा कौमारिलोक्तिर्जगति गुरुमतं गौरवाद् दूरवातं
का शङ्का शङ्करादेर्भजति यतिपतौ बद्धवेदीं त्रिवेदीम् ॥

This tradition relating to the relationship between *Kumārila* and *Prabhākara* is found mentioned in the सर्वसिद्धान्तरहस्य of *Shēṣa* commented upon by his son *Govinda* who was a pupil of the Great *Madhusūdana Sarasvatī*, where we read—

अस्यां सूत्रं जैमिनीयं—शाबरं भाष्यमस्य तु
मीमांसावार्तिकं भाट्टं भट्टाचार्यकृतं हि तत् ।
तच्छिष्योऽप्यल्पभेदेन शाबरस्य मतान्तरम्
प्रभाकरगुरुश्चक्रे तद्धि प्राभाकरम्मतम् ॥

Prabhākara is believed by Prof. Keith and other scholars to have lived between 600 and 650 A.D.

It is interesting to note that while the Buddhist writer *Shāntakakṣita*, who lived in the eighth century, criticises in his *Tattvasaṅgraha* and quotes

extensively from *Kumārila* (and also criticises *Uddyotakara,* the author of the *Nyāyavārtika*),—neither he nor his commentator makes any reference to *Prabhākara.*

Notwithstanding all this, however, the fact appears to be that *Prabhākara* was senior to *Kumārila* and the two were perhaps contemporaries, and that for the following reasons :—(a) *Internal evidence—Prabhākara's* commentary on *Shabara-Bhāṣya*—known as *Bṛhatī*—is a *comment* in the strict sense of the term ; he does not criticise the *Bhāṣya* on any point, he simply puts forward the *Bhāṣya-kāra's* view as understood by himself. In fact, he does not criticise other views either, except in very few places. *Kumārila,* on the other hand, very frequently criticises and rejects the interpretation of the *Bhāṣya-kāra* and puts forth his own views ; this he does in several places—in no less than seven places—in the first *adhyāya* itself ; *Pāda* 2, *Adhikaraṇa* (1) [*Tantravārtika,* Translation, page 32] ; *Pāda* 3, *Adhikaraṇa* (1) [*Tantravārtika,* Translation, p. 116] ; *Pāda* 3, *Adhikaraṇa* (4) [p. 178] ; *Pāda* 3, *Adhikaraṇa* (5) [p. 207]; *Pāda* 3, *Adhikaraṇa* (7) [p. 227] ; *Pāda* 3, *Adhikaraṇa* (10) [p. 347] ; and *Pāda* 4, *Adhikaraṇa* (1) [p. 373] ;—also in *Adhyāya* III, *Pāda* 7, *Adhikaraṇa* (19) [p. 1643]. Under *Adhyāya* III, *Pāda* 4, after *Sūtra* 9, *Kumārila* has six *Sūtras* embodying four *Adhikaraṇas ;* these do not figure in the *Bhāṣya,* nor in the *Bṛhatī ;* nor does *Ṛjuvimalā* take any notice of these *Sutras.* Under *Sū.* 3.7. 39, 40, the *Bhāṣyakāra's* interpretation has been criticised by *Kumārila ;* it has been adopted by *Prabhākara* (vide *Bṛhatī*), and *Ṛjuvimalā* has answered the objection raised against the *Bhāṣya* by *Kumārila.*

If *Prabhākara* had come after *Kumārila,* he would not have failed to defend the *Bhāṣya* against these strictures of *Kumārila.* As a matter of fact, however, he takes no notice of these strictures, or of the new interpretations put forward by *Kumārila.* On the other hand, *Kumārila* is found to be taking great pains to demolish certain views, a few of which we find put forward in the *Bṛhatī :* For instance—(a) under 1.2.31 (*Tantravārtika,* Trans., p. 54), *Kumārila* objects to the question of the *Adhikaraṇa* being put in the form 'Are *Mantras* meaningless ?'—and this is the form in which it has been put forward in the *Bṛhatī* (in accordance with the *Bhāṣya*) ;— (b) under 1.3.2, according to *Prabhākara* (MS. 31b) [see *note* in *Shabara*— Trans., pp. 90-91] the Vedic text in support of the *Smṛti* is to be *inferred ;* this is objected to by *Kumārila* (*Tantra.,* Trans., p. 112) ;—and so on in other places. The only point where we have found *Prabhākara* combating a view propounded by *Kumārila* is under *Sū.* 4.1.2 (*Bṛhatī* MS., p. 64b).

But in this connection also, it is noteworthy that the words in which the criticised view is expressed—which are apparently a quotation,—are very different from those employed by *Kumārila* (under 4.1.2); the words of *Kumārila* are—क्रत्वर्थं द्रव्यार्जने क्रतुविधानं स्यात्: while those found in *Prabhākara* are क्रत्वर्थत्वे' स्वत्वमेव' न' भवतीति' याग' एव' न' संवर्तते and this view is combated by *Prabhākara* in the words—प्रलपितमिदं केनापि अर्जन् स्वत्वं नापादयतीति प्रतिषिद्धम्, This difference in the words shows that the person referred to by *Prabhākara's* केनापि is someone different from *Kumārila*. It is interesting to note that these very words of *Prabhākara* have been quoted in the *Mitākṣarā* with approval (p. 181 Ed. Setlur).

In point of style also, *Prabhākara's* work shows distinct signs of being older than *Kumārila's* work. The style of *Bṛhatī* is similar to that of the *Bhāṣya*—possessing the same natural grace, simplicity and directness, while that of *Kumārila* becomes rather duffuse and rich very much like that of *Shaṅkarāchārya*. In *Bṛhatī* we met with more of those flashy retorts and turns of idiom which characterise the earlier works, like those of *Patañjali* and *Shabara*; *e.g.* अज्ञानकातर्यमायुष्यत: प्रदर्शितम् (p. 30b 1.2)—अहो अनवस्थितनयनीतिज्ञो भवान् (32b 1. 3)—मूर्धाभिषिक्तं प्रामाण्यम् (32b, line 6)—अग्रन्थज्ञो देवानाम्प्रिय: (35b, line 9).

Under Sū. 3. 4, after Sū. 9, the *Tantravārtika* has six *Sūtras*, which are not found in the *Bhāṣya*; nor in the *Bṛhatī*; and *Kumārila* has suggested several reasons for this omission in the *Bhāsya*:—(1) the author of the *Bhāṣya* forgot to comment on these *Sūtras*; or (2) his comments on these have been lost; or (3) they have been intentionally omitted as they were not of much importance; or (4) he did not accept them as genuine, on the ground that they interrupt the desirable connection between *Sūtra* 9 and *Sūtra* 16.

This last view has been controverted by *Kumārila*, at the end of Sū. 9 (*Tantravārtika*, Trs., p. 1275).

The studied omission of these *Sūtras* by *Prabhākara* has been expressly noted by later writers; *e.g.*, by *Vidyāraṇya* in his *Viva-raṇaprameyasañgraha* (p. 4).

The *Ṛjuvimalā* also does not make any reference to these *Sūtras*; it does not even seek to traverse the arguments that have been propounded by *Kumārila* in favour of their genuineness.

This is an indication of the fact that, though *Kumārila* knew of the omission of the *Sūtras* by 'some commentators', *Prabhākara* and his imme-

diate followers have taken no notice of what *Kumārila* has said regarding. them :—which points to the conclusion that *Prabhākara* lived before *Kumārila*.

This question however of the priority or otherwise of *Prabhākara* to *Kumārila* is still far from being definitely settled.

Some light appears to be thrown upon the question by a passage in the *Sankṣepashārīraka* (1. 271) which contains the expression प्रभाकरे' च' समये; this shows that the *Prābhākara* system was a well-recognised system at the time the outhor *Sarvajñatma* was a pupil of *Sureshvarāchārya*, the well-known disciple of *Shṅkarāchārya*. Under the circumstances—(a) if the traditional equation of *Surēshvara-Maṇḍaṇa* is correct (which is doubtful), —and if *Maṇḍaṇa* was the pupil of *Kumārila* (which is not unlikely),—*Prabhākara* should be very much older than *Maṇḍaṇa* and hence than *Kumārila* also. All this, however, is still problematical.

Later researches carried on at the Madras University are beginning to point to the conclusion that *Prabhākara, Kumārila* and *Maṇḍaṇa* are not far removed in point of time—that all of them lived during the sixth-seventh centuries A.D.

In this connection it is interesting to note that the Buddhist writer *Shāntarakṣita*, author of the *Tattvasaṅgraha*, who is believed to have lived only about a century later, has quoted extensively long series of *Kārikās* from *Kumārila's Shlokavārtika*, and criticises in detail the views embodied therein ; while he nowhere mentions *Prabhākara* either directly by name or by a reference to his distinctive views ; he mentions and refers to *Shabara* frequently. It may be that the *Tattvasaṅgraha* itself being entirely in the form of *Kārikā*, the author found it easier to quote from a work in the same form—as the *Shlokavārtika* is,—than from a prose work, like *Prabhākara's Bṛhatī*.

The only manuscript available of *Prabhākara's* work—the *Bṛhatī* commentary on *Shabara-bhāṣya*,—extends to the middle of *Adhyāya* VI only. The *Tarkapāda* section has been published at Benares, and also at Madras,—along with its extensive commentary, the *Ṛjuvimalā* by *Shālikanātha Mishra ;* who is believed to have been a direct pupil of *Prabhākara* himself ; but this is doubtful.

There is another commentary on the *Sūtras* called नयविवेक by *Bhavanātha Mishra*, believed to represent the *Prābhākara* School. A manuscript of this work is available at the *Sarasvatibhavana*, Benares, which is a transcript obtained from the Madras Oriental MSS. Library. One or two

later *Prābhākara* works have also been printed at Calcutta—such as प्रभाकरविजय. The most important of these is the प्रकरणपंचिका by शालिकनाथमिश्र, the author of ऋजुविमला (published at Benares).

Prabhākara's Bṛhatī appears to have been spoken of as the '*Nibandha*' or '*Nibandhana*',—vide *Shāstradīpikā*, 2.1.1, where a passage from the '*Nibandhana*' is quoted, and this is believed to be from the *Bṛhatī*. In the only manuscript of the *Bṛhatī*, however, which has been found, we find that the colophon at the end of *Pāda* 2 of *Adhyāya* 2, speaks of the work as प्रभाकरमिश्रकृतौ मीमांसाभाष्यविवरणे while that at the end of *Adhāya* 3, it speaks of it as इति बृहत्याम्

It is interesting to note that this manuscript (in the Library of the Bengal Asiatic Society) bears the words—सर्वविद्यानिधान-कवीन्द्राचार्यसरस्वतीनां 'प्राभाकरमीमांसायाम्' after the end of Adhyāya 3. So that the manuscript belongs to the collection of MSS. that belonged to *Kavindrāchārya* who lived at Benares in the seventeenth century and obtained from the Emperor Shahjahan the remission of a certain tax that used to be levied on pilgrims to Benares. A list of this collection came into our hands in 1918; and it was published in the Gaekwad Oriental Series. This *Kavīndrāchārya* is believed to have lived on the other side of the Barnā river opposite the site now occupied by the Queen's College and the *Sarasvatī-bhavana*.

Bṛhati quotes from *Bhāravi's Kirātārjunīya-Kāvya*: अविवेकः परमापदां पदम् (242).

Kumārila's system—called the *Bhāṭṭa* System—is represented by the works of *Kumārila* himself; the best known of which is his extensive commentary on the *Shabara-bhāṣya*, which commentary, as it has come down to us, consists of three parts—Part I, called the *Shlokavārtika* dealing with the *Tarkapāda* Section; Part II, called the *Tantravārtika* dealing with Adhyāya I, Pāda 2 to the end of Adhyāya III; and Part III, called the *Ṭupṭīkā*, dealing very briefly with the remaining nine *adhyāyas*.—The whole of these three parts has been published at Benares; and Parts I and II have been also translated into English, and the translation has been published by the Bengal Asiatic Society.—*Kumārila* is believed to have written a still more extensive commentary on the *Bhāṣya*, called the *Bṛhat-ṭīka*; and also the *Madhyamāṭīkā*; both these have been referred to by *Kṛṣṇadeva* in his *Tantra-chūdāmaḍni*,—where he remarks that *Tantravārtika*, otherwise called '*Tantraṭīkā*' is only a summary of the *Bṛhaṭṭīkā*. This *Bṛhat--ṭīka* has also been referred to by *Someshvara* in his *Nyāyasudhā*.

Kumārila quotes (in *Tantravārtika*, Text, p. 347) the grammatical dictum 'करोतिरर्थेष्विव सर्वधातून्' which is also found in the *Bhaṭṭikāvya*,—and also the well-known words सतां हि सन्देहपदेषु वस्तुषु प्रमाणमन्तःकरणप्रवृत्तयः which are found in *Kalidāsa's Shākuntala* ;—this latter in *Tantravārtika*, Text, p. 133. He also wrote a commentary on the *Mānava-Kalpa-Sūtra* ; a facsimile of the manuscript of this work (India Office Library No. 17) was published in 1867 by Th. Goldstucker.

Kumārila is believed, on good grounds, to have lived between 600 and 660 A.D. *Prabhākara*, according to Prof. Keith, who is convinced that he was senior to *Kumārila*, lived between 610 and 690 A.D.

The earliest expositor of the *Bhāṭṭa* System hitherto known is *Maṇdana Mishra* (615—695), who wrote a commentary on *Kumārila's Tantravārtika*, which is mentioned in *Shāstradīpikā* on 2.1.1 ; as also other important works——such as *Vidhivivēka* and *Bhāvanāvivēka* (both published at Benares), and a résumé of the entire *Sūtra-Bhāṣya*, named *Mīmāmsānukramaṇī* (printed with a modern commentary in the Chaukhambha Series, Benares.) He also wrote the Vedānta text-book (pre-*Shāṅkara*, apparently) *Brahmasiddhi*, on which *Vāchaspati Mishra* wrote the commentary known as ब्रह्मतत्त्वसमीक्षा. The *Vidhivivēka* of *Maṇḍana*, has been regarded as an important work, so much so that it has been honoured by an extensive commentary by the great *Vāchaspati Mishra* ; this commentary is called *Nyāya Kaṇikā*, which also has been printed along with the text at Banaras.—Later on came *Sucharita Mishra* who wrote the *Kāshikā*, a voluminous commentary on *Kumārila's Shlokavārtika* ; it is being published in the *Trivandrum Sanskrit Series*.—Somewhat later came *Pārthasārathi Mishra* ; he wrote—(1) the *Nyāyaratnākara*, a commentary on *Kumārila's Shlokavārtika*, (2) the *Shāstradīpikā*, an independent complete commentary on the Sūtras, (3) *Tantraratna*, a commentary on Kumārila's *Ṭuptīkā*, and (4) the *Nyāyaratnamālā*, an independent treatise, a *Prakaraṇa-grantha*, dealing with some selected topics. Long after him came *Someshvara Bhaṭṭa* who wrote the *Nyāyasudhā*, also called *Trikaṇḍimīmāmsāmaṇḍana*, better known as *Rāṇaka*, which is an extensive commentary on *Kumārila's Tantravārtika*. Earlier than all these appears to be *Paritoṣa Mishra*, whose work, the *Ajitā*, appears to be a commentary on the *Tantravārtika* ; the Colophon speaks of it as '*Nyāyanībandhaṭīkā*. A manuscript of this work is contained in the Oriental Manuscripts Library, Madras. Many other works, too numerous to be named here, have been written and still continue to be written, on the *Bhāṭṭa* system. In addition to the *Rāṇaka* and the *Ajitā*, we know of some other commentaries on the *Tantravārtika*—for instance, (1) *Tautātimatatilaka*

by *Bhaṭṭa-Bhavdeva,* alias *Bālabalabhī-bhujaṅga* (India Office Cat., p. 690), (2) *Nyāyaparāyaṇa* by *Gaṅgādhara Mishra* (Govt. Sans. Liby., Benares); (3) *Subodhnī,* by *Annambhaṭṭa,* son of Tirūmātārya of *Rāghava-Somayāji* family (Govt. Sans. Liby., Benares); (4) *Mitākṣarā* by *Gopāla Bhaṭṭa.*

Besides the above there is believed to have been another commentary on the *Tantravārtika* by *Bhaṭṭa Umbeka* (who has been identified by some people with *Maṇḍana* and also with the poet *Bhavabhuti*), as observed by Kṛṣṇadeva in the *Tantra-Chūḍāmaṇi. Shāstradīpikā* also refers (page 199, 2.1.1.) to Maṇḍana as a commentator on the *Tantravārtika.* The said *Umbeka* is known to have written a commentary on the *Shlokavārtika* also. The reference in the *Shāstradīpikā* (2.1.1. may however be only to an explanation of the *kārikā* (of the Tantravārtika धात्वर्थव्यतिरेकेण यद्यप्येषा न लक्ष्यते—तथापि सर्वसामान्यरूपेणान्याऽवगम्यते ।) provided in course of a discussion in either *Vidhivivēka* or *Bhāvanāvivēka.*

Of the third school—that of *Murāri Mishra,* called the *Mishra-mata,* much is not known except through references in other works. He appears to have struck out a fresh path in relation to certain important topics; which has led to the saying—

मुरारेस्तृतीयः पन्थाः; the प्रथम and द्वितीय apparently being प्रभाकर and कुमारिल ।

Dr. Umesha Mishra, in his paper entitled '*Murārēstṛtīyaḥpanthā,,* makes out that there have been five 'Murāri Mishras' in Sanskrit Literature; one of them is the well-known *Mīmāmsaka,* who lived some time between the eleventh and twelfth centuries of the Christian era; no complete work of his is available; Dr. Umesha has come by two fragments of his gloss on the *Mīmāmsā-Sūtras*—(1) the *Tripādī-nītinayana,* dealing with *Pādas* 2, 3 and 4 of *Adhyāya* I, and (2) the *Ekādashādyadhikaraṇa* dealing with the question of *Tantra-Ārāpa* dealt with under *Adhyāya* XI of the Sūtras. From these fragments, it is not easy to find out on what points *Murāri Mishra* struck out his 'third path' as distinguished from the *Prābhākara* and the *Bhāṭṭa.* But from references to him found in several important work, it is found that the following are a few of the three ploints. (1) *Murāri,* like Shankarāchārya, regards *Brahma* as the only one Absolute Reality; but for practical purposes, he admits of diverse *Objects, Qualities, Time-substrata* and *Space-substrata* ;—(2) in the maker of the variety of cognitions, the opinion expressed by Murāri is that Cognition is *svataḥpramāṇa,* its validity not being dependent upon anything extraneous to itself; and the very circumstances that bring about the Cognition also serve to establish its validity; (as pointed out in the Āloka of *Pakṣadhara*); his view on the

point differs from the other two views. According to him the validity of the Cognition is apprehended by the *Anuvyavasāya*, Representative Cognition, that follows in the wake of every Cognition ;—like the Cognition, its validity is apprehended by the Mind itself,—according to Murāri-Mishra' says *Vardhamāna* on *Kusmāñjali* (p. 219) ;—(3) in the matter of Error, *Bhrānti*, his view appears to be the same as that of *Kumārila* ;—(4) in regard to Causality, the Cause brings about the Effect by virtue of the *Shakti*, Potency, inherent in itself,—according to *Prabhākara* and the other *Mīmāmsakas* ; and according to the *Naiyāyika* the Cause must be something that is free from obstacles in the way of the apperance of the Effect. According to Murāri. however, neither *Potency* nor *Absence* of *Obstacles* can bring about the Effect ; the Effect at a certain point of time is brought about by something which is free from obstacles at that time ; and the *absence of obstacles* is only a qualifying condition or adjunct of the Cause, it is not the Cause itself ;—says *Varadhamāna* in his Gloss on *Nyāyalavatī* (pp. 62—64) ; (5) as regards the term '*Vaishradēva*', according to *Shabara*, *Prabhākara and Kumārila*, this is the name of a particular sacrifice (Mī. Sūtra 1. 4. 13-16) ; but according to Murāri it is only indicative of the Deity '*Vishvēdēva*'. This view is found attributed to 'Mishra' by *Vardhamāna* on *Tattvachintāmaṇi-Shabdaṇḍa*, (pp. 702—704).

In the following passage in his *Āloka* (Commentary on *Tattvachintāmaṇi* ; Fol. 15A-15B, Benares Sanskrit College Palm-Leaf MS.) *Pakṣadhara Mishra* has briefly brought out the distinction among the three schools of *Mimāmsā* in regard to the Validity of Cognitions—"The upshot of the whole is that *Validity* consists in bringing about efficient and effective activity ; and this condition is fulfilled under all the three views of the *Mīmāmsakas* according to all of whom the Validity of the Cognition is cognised by just those same circumstances by which the Cognition itself is apprehended ; that is (1) according to the *Guru-mata* (Prabhākara) it is *self-illumined*, that is self-apprehended ; (2) according to the view of Murāri, it is apprehended by the subsequent *anuvyavasāya* (Representative Cognition) ; and (3) under the *Bhāṭṭa* view, the Validity of the Cognition is apprehended through Inference (and Presumption) based upon the fact of the Cognition itself being apprehended.

(१) गुरुनये स्वप्रकाशादिना, (२) मुरारिनयेऽनुव्यवसायादिना, (३) भट्टनये ज्ञाततालिङ्गकानुमित्यादिना यावज्ज्ञानग्राहकसामग्रीग्राह्यत्वस्यसर्वसाधारणत्वात् ॥

In the literary history of *Mīmāmsā*, there is an important factor which demands careful study, but which has not been studied so far ; nor

have we met with any materials that are essential for that study. In his Introduction to the *Shlokavārtika* (verse 10), Kumārila has said--'Among people Mīmāmsā has been made almost heretical (unorthodox, materialistic); I have made this effort to bring it to the path of *Orthodoxy'* ; and on this *Nyāyaratnākara* remarks—Mīmāmsā, without being really unorthodox, has been made so by *Bhartṛimitra* and other writers, who have held out wrong doctrines, such as that no desirable results follow from the performance of the acts that are laid down as compulsory, nor any undesirable results from the acts that have been forbidden.

Hitherto however, we have not come across any of those works by *Bhartṛimitra* and others. From the remarks of the *Nyāyaratnākara* it would appear as if all these came before *Kumārila*.

The *Kāshikā* (on Shlokavārtika 1. 10) mentions *Bhavadāsa* in several places—pp. 13, 16, 21 (Trivandrum series).

CHAPTER II

PHILOSOPHICAL TOPICS: SOUL

Before plunging into the question of the *Means of Cognition*, which as we shall see later on, leads on directly to the special content of the *Pūrva-Mīmāmsā Shāstra*,—we shall deal briefly with some of the more important Philosophical Topics which, as remarked above, have been incidentally dealt with by writers on the *Shāstra.*

Ātman—Soul.

It becomes necessary for the *Mīmāmsaka* to posit the *Ātman*, Soul, as something distinct from the Body; because without some such entity ensouling the Body there would be no sense in the Vedic texts that speak of the performer of a certain act 'going to Heaven', or 'becoming liberated', and so forth.

We shall see what (1) *Shabara*, (2) *Prabhākara* and (3) *Kumārila* have said in regard to this *Soul.*

We have selected these three wirters as representing the three main schools of *Pūrva Mīmāmsā*—(1) The '*Bhāṣya*', (2) the '*Bhāṭṭa*' and (3) the '*Prābhākara*'. For the school generally known as the 'Third Path' 'तृतीयः पन्थाः' associated with the name of *Murāri Mishra,* and hence called '*Mishra-mata*', material is not yet available for a full account.

In addition to these, wheresoever we have been able to ascertain the '*Mishra-mata*' from fragments of *Murāri-Mishra's* work, we have inserted a few notes here and there.

(A) 'Ātman,' 'Soul,' according to Shabara.

The Vedic text has spoken of 'the sacrificer equipped with the sacrificial implements proceeding to heaven'; and the opponent has argued that here we find the Veda making an absurd statement; hence the Veda cannot be a valid source of knowledge. It is argued that what is 'equipped with sacrificial implements' is the physical body, and as the body is entirely burnt up by cremation, it cannot 'proceed to heaven'.—Our answer to this is that what is spoken of here as 'equipped with the implements' is not only the physical body, but also that entity which ensouls the body and to whom the body belongs...The presence of such an Ensouling Entity is inferred from the phenomena of breathing, winking of the eyes and the like,

which cannot belong to the body, as they are not found after death,—though the body is there all right. Secondly, such phenomena as the feelings of pleasure, pain and the like are cognised by the person himself only, while the qualities of colour and the rest which belong to the physical body are cognised and perceived by others also, who have no direct cognition of the feelings of the other person. This shows that there are certain qualities in the person which are directly cognisable by himself only.—From the fact of there being certain qualities of the person which differ radically from the qualities that belong to the physical body, we conclude that the entity spoken of as 'equipped with the sacrificial implements' and as 'going to heaven 'is other than the physical body.

This argument is met by the opponent by the statement that the mere presence of the feelings and cognitions of pleasure cannot justify the conclusion that there is a distinct Entity to whom these belong, in which these subsist; in fact these feelings and cognitions do not necessarily presuppose a *feeler* or *cogniser;* the Cognition itself may be regarded as all-in-all.

The answer to this is that the *Act* of *Cognising* presupposes an Agent who does that act; and an Agent must be an Entity distinct from the *Act* itself. And it is this Agent of the act of *Cognising*, *Desiring* and the like which we call 'Soul', *Ātman.*

Similarly with Remembrance; it is only when one sees a thing on one day that he has the *remembrance* of it on a later day; and the *recognition* appears only in an Entity that has continued to exist all the time; and this can only be the Soul.

This Soul, the *Cogniser*, the Agent of the acts of Cognising, Desiring, Feeling and the like can be directly cognised by each man for himself; it is in this sense that the Soul is regarded as '*Sva-samvedya*', 'self-cognised'; and no Soul can be directly cognised by another. And yet it can be expounded to another, in the manner described in the Upaniṣads—'Neti-Neti', 'This Soul is *not this, not that*'. Thus it is that the existence of the Soul is taughtby this pointing out that it is *not-desire, not-feeling* and so forth. And when one becomes cognisant of his own self-luminous Soul, he infers the presence of similar souls in other persons also.

This *Soul* is everlasting,—a Person or Personality apart from Pleasure etc. and the Cognitions. It is, in terms of the *Brāhmaṇa,* 'indestructible, not liable to disruption; but it comes into contact with perishable things, like Sense-organs, Merit, Demerit and so forth'—(Shatapatha Brā. 14.7.3. 15).—(*Shabara-Bhāṣya*—Tr. pp. 26—31).

(B) Prabhakara's Views of the 'Soul'.

(The references are to the Madras Edition of the *Bṛhatī*.)

According to *Prabhākara*,—the Soul is of the nature of the (A) *Doer* and *Experiencer* (p. 235—7) ; (B) it is something entirely different from the Body, the Sense-organs and *Buddhi*,(p. 231) ; (C) it becomes manifest in all Cognitions,—(D) it is eternal (p. 235) ; (E) omnipresent (p. 235) ; and (F) many, one in each body ; (G) it rests upon the notion of 'I', entirely free from any notion of 'this' or 'that' (p. 239) ; its existence is proved by the universally admitted and undenied and undeniable notion of 'I', which is *self-luminous* (p. 245) ; in the sense that it is realisable or cognisable by each man for himself.

The following systematic account of the *Prābhākara* view we gather from *Prakaraṇapañchikā* :—

That the *Cogniser* is something different from *Buddhi* (Mind) is proved by the fact, among others, that *Buddhi* is inert and absent during sleep, and yet there are Cognitions during sleep. (*Buddhi* is the same as *Manas*, Mind, says *Ṛjuvimalā* on *Bṛhatī*, p. 75.]

The Sense-organs cannot be regarded as the *Soul* ; because we often perceive a single object by more than one Sense-organ,—*e.g.*, *touching* the same object that is *seen* ; which shows that the factor that perceives—*i.e.*, the perceiver—which is common to the two perceptions,—is different from the two organs concerned. Then again, it is found that the blind man remembers the things he had seen in the past when he was not blind ; which proves that the *perceiver* is different from the organ concerned. Lastly, the Body can never be accepted as the *Cogniser* ; because it consists of the Earth and there is no cognition or consciousness in particles of Earth. The term 'Soul' too can be applied to that only which is endowed with intelligence, and the Body is not endowed with intelligence ; the sole criterion for this lies in our own consciousness ; as a matter of fact we actually have the consciousness of things past and future also ; hence it cannot belong to any objects that are perceptible by the senses.

If the Soul were the only source of all cognition, then as the Soul is everlasting, cognitions also would have to be regarded as everlasting ; which is absurd. Hence philosophers have held that while the Soul is the *basic* (according to some, the *material* or *constituent*) cause of Cognition, it needs the help of other auxiliary causes ; and as such an auxiliary, *Prabhākara* posits the *Contact of the Soul with the Mind* ; this contact being brought about by a certain action of the mind, due either to the effort of

the Soul or to the Unseen Force of the previous activities (*Karma*) of the Soul; these efforts and Unseen Forces also being the effects of previous Mind-Soul contacts; and so the infinite cycle goes on. This Mind-Soul contact is not the only cause of our cognitions; if that were so, then the perception of colour would be possible for the Blind also. Hence the operation of the Sense-organs also has to be admitted. Even so, it is the Mind-Soul Contact that is the cause common to all Cognitions.

Thus then, the Soul is the Agent, *enjoyer*, (*bhoktā*) of experience (p. 232); the Body is the *abode* or *receptacle* of experience; the organs are the *instruments* of experience; and the objects of experience are of two kinds—*internal*, in the shape of Pleasure, Pain and the like,—and *external*, in the shape of the Earth and other things;—the *Experiencer* consists of pure Consciousness. It is in these five that all truth is centred; there is nothing beyond these five; they comprise the Universe.

Though the Soul, the Agent, enters as a necessary factor into every act of Cognition, it is not itself amenable to any of the ordinary means by which things are cognised. The Soul is self-luminous; in this sense it is cognisable by each man for himself.

The existance of the Mind is proved by the manifestation of the qualities of the Soul itself. These qualities are—*Buddhi* (Intellection, Cognition), Pleasure, Pain, Desire, Aversion, Effort, Destiny and Faculty. The existence of *Buddhi* is self-manifest, in the form of *Cognition* and *Remembrances;* Pleasure, Pain, Desire, Aversion and Effort are apprehended by mental Perception. By 'Faculty' (*Saṃskāra*-Impression) is meant a certain power or capacity imparted to the Soul by its Cognitions; its existence is proved by the fact that unless we have some such force intervening between the *Cognition* of an object and its *Remembrance*, we cannot account for this latter. As for *Destiny*, it always takes the form of Merit and Demerit; whose real character can be known only from the scriptures, which alone are the safe guide as to what is *Right* and what is *Wrong*. As pointed out above, all our Cognitions are not due to Mind-Soul contact only; if it were so, then the Blind man would also cognise colour; the function of the Sense-organs comes in here; and as all perceptible things fall within five well-defined classes, we posit five Sense-organs. These five, along with the Mind, which may be regarded as the *Universal* or *Common* perceptive organ, form the six Sense-organs, of which the Body is the abode. These organs are—the Visual Organ (Eye) the Gestatory Organ (of taste), the Auditory Organ (Ear), the Tactile Organ (of touch), the Olfactory Organ (of smell). (Prā. Mī., pp. 76-77).

That the Mind is a *substance* is indicated by the fact of its having contracts with the Soul and with the Objects of Cognition. It cannot be regarded as made up of many component particles ; as that would involve many unnecessary assumptions. Then again as the Soul is omnipresent and without parts, if the Mind also were of the same character, then, either there would be no contact between the Soul and the Mind, or such contact would be everlasting. Hence the Mind is regarded as of *Atomic Dimension.* And as it exists, and yet has no cause, it must be *eternal.* It is extremely mobile, as is proved by the very swift contacts formed by it, at the time that we have one perception following another in quick succession, which must be due to the Mind coming into contact with one perceptive organ after another. Unless aided by the Mind, no organ can apprehend its object, as is found in the case of the absent-minded man who fails to see things before his eyes. The contact of the Mind with the conscious Soul is due to the endless series of Merit-Demerit,—the accumulated effects of the past acts of the individual Soul concerned.—(Prābhā. Mī., pp. 77-78).

The Cognition of the Soul itself proceeds from the same source as the Cognition of any other object. But here a distinction is drawn. Though the Soul is manifested in every act of *Cognition,* it is not the *object* of that Cognition ; it appears only as the *Nominative Agent,* namely, the *Cogniser,* the *bhoktā,* the *Experiencer ;* it is not the *object* of the act of *Cognition,* because the operation of that act does not fall upon it. The Soul thus is the substratum of the Cognition which is self-luminous, and into which the Soul enters as the *Cognitive Agent,* the 'I', the *Bhoktā, Expereincer,* which is inseparable from all Cognitions ; and hence like *Cognition,* the Soul also is self-luminous. Each man cognises his own Soul *for himself*—this is its स्वयंज्योतिष्ट्व 'self-luminousness'. This is made clear by *Kumārila* also in *Shlo. Vā. Atma.,* 145.—The Cognition of other Souls is obtained by means of Inference.

The Cognition of the Soul being thus obtainable only as a factor in the Cognition of things,—it is natural that during deep sleep, when there is no Cognition of things, there should be no idea of the Soul. During the *Turīya*—Fourth, highest,—state of consciousness, however, the Soul is cognised, but only as pure *Esse* or *Being,* the substratum of the comprehensive cognition of all things, but free from and beyond all perceptible things. This is how it continues to exist after Liberation—a mere *Esse.*

Not having been produced by a cause, the Soul must be *imperishable,* eternal ; appearing during wordly existence, in every act of *Cognition,* as the *Cogniser* and *Experiencer,*—and after Liberation, as pure *Esse, Being.*

The Soul again is omnipresent—all-pervading, like *Ākāsha ;* but its properties—Pleasure, Pain and the rest—cannot become manifest except in a body ; as such manifestation requires Mind-contact, and the Mind subsists in the Body. Even though omnipresent, the Soul cannot experience what is occurring in the Body of another personality, because experience is always due to the *Karma* of the particular Personality ; hence the experience of one personality cannot form the experience of another.

This Soul is distinct in each body ; hence there are many Souls ; as many Souls as there are conscious bodies. There are two reasons propounded in support of this view. (*a*) In the case of other personalities, we infer the presence of the Soul from certain activities manifested therein, which cannot be otherwise accountable, and we always feel that this Soul in the other personality is not-my-soul ; what we feel is that just as certain activities of my body are rendered possible only by the presence of the Soul, so also similar activities in the other body must indicate the presence of a Soul there. The activities of another personality are never recognised as one's own activities. (*b*) We always find a clear difference between Merit-Demerit and the resultant pleasure and pain of different personalities ; and all these are qualities of the Soul ; consequently, if there were only one Soul,—the same in all persons,—its qualities also would be the same in all the bodies ensouled by it ; and then the Merit-Demerit and Pleasure and Pain of one person would be the same as those of another.

Prabhākara has an interesting note towards the end of the section of *Bṛhatī* dealing with Soul (p. 256). It is true, he says, that the notions of 'I' and 'mine' imply a misconception,—an idea, as Soul, of what is really 'not-Soul' ;—but this assertion of this fact can come only from persons who have shaken off all impurity—मृदितकषाय, and not from those who are still addicted to *Action ;* that is why the Blessed Lord has declared (in (Bhagvad-Gītā)—'One should not divert the notions of the ignorant who are addicted to Action' ;—that is the reason why the *Bhāṣyakāra* (Shabara) has not dealt with this question ; as it was not his business to deal with people who have transcended Action.

(C) KUMÂRILA'S VIEWS OF THE 'SOUL'.

The Veda speaks of the 'Sacrificer' going to heaven after death ; the body perishes after death ; hence the Entity that is spoken of as 'proceeding to Heaven' must be something other than the perishable body. This entity is the Soul. If there is no such entity, then the Veda has made an absurd statement ; this strikes at the reliability of Veda ; and hence at

the very root of all 'orthodox' philosophy.—(*Shlokavārtika-Atmavāda*, 1—5.) This Soul is something distinct from the Body, the Sense-organs and *Buddhi;* it is eternal (7), imperishable (147);—it is the real *doer* of action, agent of acts, and the *experiencer* of their results and reactions (8);—it is also *all-pervading* (20); we regard it so, because we find it functioning everywhere; that is, the notion of 'I' which is all the notion that we have of the Soul, always indicates the notion of the Soul, *which is of the nature of pure Consciousness*, and is not qualified by any limitations of time and place. (*Tantravārtika*-Trans., p. 516). It is the Soul that passes through the experiences of Pleasure, Pain, etc. (*Shlo. Vā. Ātma.*, 26; *Tantravārtika*, p. 516); and yet it never renounces its own character of *consciousness;* it forms the constant factor in all those variable and varying experiences. (*Shlo. Vā. Ātma.*, 26 28); the Soul experiences the recations of all acts (290). If the Soul consisted of Consciousness, not in its eternal form, but in the form of fleeting cognitions, then it would not be possible to account for the activities of man, or even the phenomenon of *rebirth* (34). It is necessary,, therefore, to regard the Soul as being of the nature of *Consciousness*, eternal, omnipresent, capable of ensouling several bodies (73); it is itself *conscious*, as otherwise, it would not be the experiencer; it is *omnipresent*, as otherwise, it could not occupy one body after another, which it does even without any locomotion (*Nyāyaratnākara*). Though in the performance of the ordinary acts in the world, the Soul is the *doer*, Agent, only indirectly through the body, there are certain acts such as those *being* (existing), *knowing* and the like, of which it is the *doer* or *Agent*, directly by itself (*Shlo. Vā. Ātma.*, 76). The Soul is (*Aham-pratyaya-gamya*), *i.e.*, apprehensible by the notion of 'I' (107); that is, the notion of 'I' that we have in such ideas as 'I know' indicates the *Knower*, the *Cogniser;* who, therefore, forms either the *object* or the *substratum* of that notion (110); the cogniser is always cognisable by—*i.e.*, the object of—the notion of 'I' (126), which enters into all acts of Cognition. The idea that 'there is no Soul' is thus contrary to, and is set aside by, the universally recognised notion of 'I'. The positive arguments in support of the notion have been set forth in the *Shlo. Vā. Ātma.*, 136—139.

The question arising—"if words are incapable of bringing about the cognition of the Soul, by what means is it cognised ?"—the answer given by the *Bhāṣya* is that it is 'illumined'—made cognisable,—'by itself'; and what is meant by 'self-luminosity' is that *one Soul cannot be directly cognised by another Soul* (*Shlo. Vā. Ātma.*, 142-143),—it is cognised by another only through Inference, drawn from the perception of such activities in

the other personality as have been found, in one's own Soul, to be invariably concomitant with the *Soul.* It is clear, therefore, that for such person, his own Soul is Self-luminous, Self-cognised; but for other persons, it is cognised through Inference.—(*Shlo. Vār. Ātma.*, 145).

The *Tantravārtika* (Trs., pp. 518-522) deals at length with the question of the *omnipresence* of the Soul. (*a*) The Soul being itself immaterial, cannot move from place to place; when therefore a man moves from one place to another, his Soul would be left behind; and the body would become soul-less and hence in-animate. But if the Soul is omnipresent, wherever the body goes, it finds itself ensouled by the Soul; the connection of one Soul with one body at a time being determined by the past *Karma* of the Soul which is always equipped with a body that is capable of bringing about the experiences resulting from that past *Karma* of the Personality. This continuous connection of the Body with the Soul is exactly like the continuous connection of the Body with Space or Time, which latter also are omnipresent. (*b*) If the Soul were not omnipresent, it would be either *atomic* in size or of the size of the body. It cannot be the former; as, if it were so, the person could be conscious of only those sensations that would appear in that small part of the body which would be occupied by the atomic Soul; which is absurd. If, on the other hand, the Soul were regarded as being of the same size as the Body, this would involve many gratuitous assumptions; such as that the Soul has parts, those parts are immovable, there is a conglomeration of such parts, and even though with parts, the Soul is eternal (which is admitted by the protagonists of this view), that the Soul moves from one body to another after death, and that there is some internal connection between its departure from one body and entrance into another.

Even though omnipresent, one Soul cannot serve the purpose for all personalities, as that would mean that one and the same Soul undergoes the experiences of all persons. The Soul, therefore, must be regarded as *many* and existing simultaneously. Being immaterial, they would not come in each other's way. In fact it is on account of this immateriality and consequent *indivisibility* of Souls and their omnipresence,—and on account of all being of the same nature of pure Consciousness,—that the Upaniṣad-texts have spoken of all Souls as one. (*Tantra Vā.*, pp. 518—523). Though *Jñāna*, Cognition, involves some sort of विक्रिया *modification*, of the soul, this does not militate against the *enternality* of the Soul itself. (*Shlo. Vā. Pratyakṣa.*, 52-53.).

CHAPTER III

LIBERATION

A. Liberation of Soul—Mokṣa

We do not find anything in regard to the details of Liberation in the *Bhāṣya,* and it has been explained by *Prabhākara* that *Shabara* was dealing with the subject of Karma, Action; hence he confined himself to what benefits the man addicted to Action, not the man who has washed off his impurities and renounced all Desire and Action; hence he has not gone forward to deal with the subject of Renunciation and Liberation. This is in strict accordance with what has been taught in the *Bhagvad-Gītā* to the effect that—'One should not disturb the ideas of people addicted to Action'. (*Bṛhatī,* p. 256).

B. Liberation According to the Prābhākara

The view of *Prabhākara* himself we have no direct means of ascertaining, as, like *Shabara,* he does not deal with people who have transcended Karma or Action. His followers' views on the subject we learn from the *Prakaraṇapañchikā* (p. 156). According to these views, Liberation consists in the disappearance of all Merit and De-merit (resulting from Actions). It is on account of Merit and De-merit accruing to the Soul that it is born in the physical body; consequently when all Merit and De-merit have disappeared, there remains nothing that could lead the Soul to be born again in a body; and when the Soul ceases to have connection with bodies, and hence also with the Sense-organs, etc., all its metempsychic troubles are ended and it is free, *liberated.* As to how all this comes about, the following explanation has been provided :—(1) First of all, the man becomes disgusted with the troubles that he has had to undergo during his life on the earth; (2) finding the pleasures of the world also to be invariably accompanied by some sort of pain, he comes to lose all interest in, and longing for, pleasures also; (3) he thereupon turns his attention towards Liberation; (4) he ceases to perform such acts as are prohibited and which lead to trouble, as also those that are prescribed only as leading to some sort of happiness here or hereafter; (5) he attenuates all previously acquired Merit and De-merit by undergoing the experiences resulting from them; (6) he destroys the sole receptacle or abode of his experiences by the knowledge of the Soul, as aided by such qualities as Contentment, Self-control and so

forth, all of which are laid down in the scriptures as tending to put a stop to the further return of the Soul into this world; it is only when all this has come about that the Soul becomes free, *liberated.*

All this may appear to be inconsistent with *Prabhākara's* own declaration (in *Bṛhatī*, p. 235) to the effect that 'the Soul is purely the actor and experiencer'; which apparently means that there is no freedom for the Soul from *Action* and *Experience*, so that there can be no Liberation. But there is no real inconsistency; like *Shabara*, *Prabhākara* has confined himself to the *Man of Action—i.e.*, the Soul engaged in activity, and has taken no notice of one who has transcended Action.

Shaṅkara Mishra in his *Vādivinoda* (p. 40) has the following note:—According to *Prabhākara*, Liberation is the *Prāgabhāva*—absence before appearance—of Pain along with the *total obsence of Pain;* that is a state in which there is no Pain and no likelihood of (appearance) of Pain. This is the view of *Vallabhāchārya* also. According to *Bhaṭṭa*, Liberation consists in the appearance of everlasting Happiness. According to *Tridaṇḍin* it consists in the fusion of the *Jīvātman* into *Paramātman*. According to *Shankarāchārya*, it is the *direct realisation, Sākṣātkāra*, of the non-duality of Brahman. He goes on to remark that according to the *Līlāvatī*, as according to the *Mīmāmsaka*, there is no possiblity of all personalities ever attaining *Mokṣa*.

C. Liberation According to Kumārila

The *Bhāṭṭa*, view of Liberation is summed up in *Shlokavārtika* (*Sambandhākṣepa-parihāra*, 108—110) thus:—"For those who have understood the real nature of the Soul, all their past *Karma* having become exhausted through experience, and there being no further Karmic residum left to wipe off, there comes no further body; as it is only for the experiencing of the reactions of past *Karma* that the Soul is burdened with the Body; therefore the seeker for Liberation should not do any such act as has been forbidden or even what has been enjoined for certain purposes; (as both these would bring about Karmic reaction which would have to be expiated by experience); but he should continue to perform the compulsory acts, as the omission of these would involve sin, which have to be expiated by painful experience through a physical Body". The *Nyāyaratnākara* and the *Kāshikā* (*Shlo. Vā. Ātma.*, 106) go on to add—"Liberation must consist in the destruction of the present body and the non-production of the future body".

Knowledge is not the direct cause of Liberation, which is purely *negative* in character; all that Knowledge does is, as shown above, to lead to the stoppage of further *embodiment* of the Soul; it cannot lead to the expiation of past *karma,* which can be brought about only by experience. There is no means of knowledge, Pramāṇa, indicating Knowledge to be the cause of Liberation. The Veda also does not enjoin 'knowledge' as leading to Liberation. The injunction that 'the Soul should be known 'is not meant for the purposes of Liberation; in fact all that the knowledge of the Soul does is to bring about the activity of man towards acts conducive to results which accrue only to a lasting entity like the Soul,—such results, for instance, as Heaven and the like; apart from these latter, there is no result that follows from the Knowledge of the Soul. If Liberation is regarded as consisting in the experiencing of pleasure, then it is only a form of 'Heaven'; but Heaven being something transient, such Liberation cannot be lasting. An effect that is brought about by a cause must be evanescent. Hence we conclude that when all Karmic residua have become exhausted, and there is no further Body for the Soul,—such a Soul becomes *liberated* through the mere fact of there being no cause left which could bring about a Body for such a Soul. There can be no justification for Liberation being regarded as ever-lasting, permanent, except the fact that it is purely *negative* in character. (*Shlokavārtika-Sambandhākṣepaparihāra* 101—107).

The *Shāstradīpikā* (p. 145) is not sure regarding this being or not being Kumārila's 'own opinion', *Svamata.*

The *Nyāyaratnākara* (on 102 above) explains that there are two kinds of Soul-Knowledge :—(1) Knowledge of Soul as an entity distinct from the Body, etc.; and (2) that Knowledge which takes the form of *worship* and *meditation;* it is the former Knowledge that is meant by Kumārila when he says that it has not been enjoined as leading to Liberation. The other kind, in the form of Worship and Meditation, does lead to Liberation.

This view appears to have the direct support of *Kumārila* also, who says :—

'As for the *Knowledge of the Soul,* it is both *Kratvartha*—helpful to the *Sacrifice,* and *Puruṣārtha*—helpful to man; in as much as, unless one knows the Soul, he cannot undertake the performance of a sacrifice which is laid down as leading to results after death; and we find such Vedic texts as—'The Soul, free from evil, is to be sought after, etc. etc.,—which lay down the *Knowing of the Soul* as to be acquired through reflection, etc.,

and as leading to both kinds of results—Happiness and Liberation. Then again there is the text—"He obtains all desires and passes beyond all sorrows, " which speaks of all the eight mystic Perfections (of *Yoga*) accruing to the person knowing the Soul; and then lastly there is the text—"Passing his life thus, he reaches the regions of *Brahman* and from there never returns", which directly speaks of Liberation (as resulting from Soul-Knowledge)'.—(*Tantravārtika-Translation*, p. 321. under Sū. 1.3. *Adhikaraṇa*, 9.)

CHAPTER IV

BODY, SENSE-ORGANS AND MIND

(A) According to Prabhākara.

The Body, as we have seen above, is the abode of the Sense organs. There are three kinds of Body—(1) Womb-born, (2) Eggborn and (3) Sweat-born. The *Prābhākara* does not admit of the *Vegetable Body*, on the ground that we have no proof for the view that vegetable organisms are endowed with the six sense organs; nor does he admit of any bodies not made up of Earth. According to him two organs—the Mind and the Tacticle organ—are present in all bodies.

The following questions have been discussed in *Prakaraṇapañchikā* (p. 52 *et. seq.*) (a) How is the existence of the Senseorgans proved ? (*b*) What reasons are there for postulating the number as *six* only ?

The answer provided to these questions contains an analytic account of the whole process of Perception. Hence it will be found under "Perception" (below).

The Mind is a *Substance;* otherwise there could be no contact between Mind and Soul or of Mind with Objects of Cognition. The Mind is not all-pervading ; if it were, Mind-Soul contact would be perpetual ; Mind therefore must be *atomic,* and hence *eternal ;* it is extremely mobile. Without the aid of the Mind, no Cognition is possible. Mind-Soul contacts are the result of Merit and Demerit attaching to the Soul. (*Prakaraṇapañchikā,* p. 52, *et seq.*)

(B) According to Kumārila.

The Sense-organ is the *Instrument* of Cognition. (*Shlokavārtika, Perception* 121.) The organ of Perception cannot be *one* only (*Ibid.,* 159 *et seq.*)

There are only five Sense-organs, not endless (*Ibid.,* 169).

As regards Sense-organs, the *Nyāyaratnākara* has the following remarks on *Shlo. Vā. Perception* 51 :—

"The Sense-organs are all material and operative by contact. For instance, (*a*) The Visual Organ, which brings about the perception of colour, is of the Essence of Fire, like Light ; hence the phenomena of its rendering visible larger and larger things becomes easily explicable, on the analogy

of Lamp-light; the reasoning being—the Visual Organ is 'Firy' in its Essence, because it renders perceptible *colour*, which is the specific quality of 'Fire'. (*b*) Similarly, the Olfactory Organ renders odour perceptible, and hence is of the Essence of Earth because *odour* is the specific quality of Earth; this organ operates through contact; as what happens is that the fine particles of the pollen of flowers become wafted by air and reach the inner surface of the nostrils and there the odour subsisting in those particles becomes apprehended and perceived. (*c*) Similarly, the Gestatory Organ apprehends Taste and is of the Essence of Water; that this is so is indicated by the fact that Taste is felt when the tongue is wet, not dry; (*d*) when after bath a man emerges from water, he feels cold when his wet skin comes into contact with Air; so that it is the Air-Element in the body which renders touch perceptible, which shows that the Tacticle Organ is of the Essence of Air; (*e*) the Auditory Organ is of the Essence of *Dik*, Space".

We learn the following from *Shāstradīpikā* (*Sū.* 1.1.4. page 21) regarding Kumārila's view of *Mind*:—

The opponent has raised the question—"Sense-perception cannot be regarded as *Cognition* brought about by the contact of the Object and the Sense-organ,—because Pleasure, Pain, etc., are Sense-perception and yet, there is no sense-contact in this case". The answer is that there is *Sense-contact* in this case also, *viz.*, the contact of the *Mind*, which is a 'Sense-organ'. Evidence of the existence of the Mind is afforded by our own experiencing of Pleasure and Pain. The Cognition of Pleasure is of the Nature of *immediate*, *Direct*, Perception; and this leads to the inference of *Mind* as the instrument of that Direct-Perception; because the Visual and other organs are unable to account for such perception. Some people have regarded Mind as an independent substance by itself. But the Mind is never operative apart from the Body; hence it cannot be regarded as an independent substance apart from the Body. *Question*—"What is the definition of the *Sense-organ*, which is applicable to the Mind and also to the other well-known Sense-organs?" *Ansewr*—That is called *Sense-organ* whose contact with the Object brings about the direct clear perception of the object. This *Sense-organ* is of two kinds—*External* and *Internal*. The *External* is of *five* kinds—*Olfactory*, *Gestatory*, *Visual*, *Tactile* and *Auditory*; the *Internal* is *one* only, the Mind. The first four respectively have their mateiral source is Earth, Water, Fire and Air. As regards the Auditory Organ, the *Vaishēṣikas* regard it as of the Essence of *Ākāsha*. But we take our stand upon the Vedic text '*Dishaḥ shrotraṇi*', which speaks

of the Auditory Organ as '*Dik*', *Space;* and hence regard the Auditory Organ as that part of Space which is enclosed in the tympanum. Lastly, as regards the *Mind,* it may either be of the Essence of any one of the five, Earth and the rest, or of something apart from these. But this Mind, *by itself alone,* is operative only on the Soul and its qualities, not upon any thing wholly *External;* that is why it has been called an *Internal organ.* In regard to *external* things, Mind is operative only through one or the other of the five *External Organs.* In regard to Inferential Cognition also, the Mind operates through the knowledge of the Probans and the Inferential Indicative; and in regard to Remembrance, it operates thruogh Impressions left by previous Cognitions. But it operates independently by itself only in regard to the Soul and its qualities of Pleasure, Pain, Cognition and so forth (*Shāstradīpikā,* pp. 21-22).

CHAPTER V

GOD

(A) According to Shabara.

Shabara-Bhāṣya (Trs., p. 22), discussing the question of the relationship between the *Word* and its *meaning*, has the following remarks:—'There can be no *Creator* of this relation, because no Soul is cognised as such by any of the means of cognition. If there had been such a Creator, he could not have been forgotten; just as in the case of Himālaya mountains and such things, it would be impossible to forget the Creator if there had been one. In fact, persons making use of the Veda would certainly have some idea of the Creator of the relation between the words and their meanings...Even if the possibility of the said Creator being forgotten were there, we could not admit of the Creator unless there were proofs for it... Presumption (*Arthāpatti*) cannot lead us to cognise a Creator; if it were a fact that in the absence of a Creator of word-relations, the meaning of words could never be coprehended,—then alone could we be justified in deducing the Creator from Presumption. In reality, however, Words are taught as accomplished entities, having the inherent power of expressing their meaning. What actually happens is that, when older people are making use of words for their own purposes, the younger men who happen to hear these words are found to comprehend them; these older people also, when they were young, comprehended the meanings of words as used by the older people of the time; and so on the process of comprehension has gone on, without any beginning in time...So long as this explanation of the comprehension of word-meanings is available, it cannot be right to *presume* a Creator. From all this it follows that there has been no Creator of word-relations'.

Under Sutra 1.1.27 et seq. it has been established that there is no *Composer* of the Veda.

Sūtra 1.1.5 declares that "the relation between the Word and its Meaning is innate"—which also denies the said Creator.

(B) According to Prabhākara.

The 'Creator' of Word-relations has been denied, in the manner of *Shabara,* in *Bṛihatī* (pp. 174 et seq. also *Prakaraṇapañchikā,* p. 52).

Prakaraṇa-pañchikā (p. 133 et seq.) supplies the following explanation :—The *Mīmāṁsaka* lays great stress upon the denotativeness of Words being independent of personal agency, and inhering in the Words themselves, because, if it were not so, the validity of words and Verbal cognition would be based entirely upon the trustworthy character of the person pronouncing the words ;—and as the *Mīmāṁsaka* denies any *personal agency* in the composing of the Veda, it would mean that no validity can be attached to the Veda itself.—Nor can the *Mīmāṁsaka* accept the *Naiyāyika's* point of view, by which the denotativeness of words is created and fixed by Conventions among people who introduce and make use of words for the first time—*i.e.*, by God Himself in the first instance. This *Nyāya* view necessitates the postulating of a 'God', 'Creator,' as the originator of words and verbal usages and hence also of the Veda. This militates against the *Mīmāṁsaka's* doctrine of the *self-sufficiency* of the Veda, which must be independent of all personal agency. In fact, if the denotativeness of words depended entirely upon Conventions made by personal agencies, the Veda would be reduced to the position of a meaningless jumble of words ; however, according to the *Mīmāṁsaka* the pre-eminent function of the Veda lies in the enjoining of certain acts accomplishing an *Apūrva*—invisible subtle potency —leading up to certain results ; and as this *Apūrva* is something beyond the ken of any person, independently of the Veda, how could the denotativeness of those words of the Veda be fixed by any conventions made by any *person?* As no connection would be possible in regard to those words, all the Vedic texts containing those words would be meaningless. If a Creator-God were admitted, then as this God, being omniscient, would be possessed of the knowledge of all things, including the *Apūrva*, He would be in a position to lay down the necessary conventions. But for reasons stated above,—specially in view of the self-sufficiency of the Veda—the Mīmāṁsaka does not admit of such a God. Hence for the sake of the Veda—his all in all—he finds it necessary to stick to the view that all words and their denotations are beginningless and everlasting, idnependent of all conventions and Agencies.

The *Prābhākara* view regarding God is set forth in great detail in *Prakaraṇa-pañchikā*, p. 137 et seq. It is as follows :—

The *Prābhākara* denies a Creator for the universe ; even though he admits that the universe is made up of component parts, and as such it must have had a beginning and an end in time,—yet he finds no reason for believing that the universe, as a whole, has had a beginning at any one point of time, or that it would all come to an end at any one point of time ;

hence if the constituent factors of the Universe have a beginning, they must each individually have their beginnings, one after the other; and they should also cease one after the other; in fact, that is what is actually found to be the case in every-day experience. Thus then, even if it were true that certain factors of the Universe are brought into existence by an Ultra-mundane Supervisor—operating through *Dharma-Adharma*—this could not be true of the Universe *as a whole*. There are some things—for instance, the bodies of men and animals,—which are actually brought into existence by the operation of their parents, and not by any external supervising Agency. Nor is there any force in the *Naiyāyika's* argument that the *Dharma-Adharma* of man must have a supervisor, possessed of intelligence and faculties higher than those of ordinary men. Because the *Dharma-Adharma* of the Body,—which itself is the product of *Dharma-Adharma*—must always belong to the same intelligent being to whom the body itself belongs; any other being, howsoever intelligent, can never have any knowledge of the *Dharma-Adharma* of another being; hence the ultra-mundane God could have no knowledge of the *Dharma-Adharma* of the being that is born as *man* or animal, etc.; and without such knowledge, He could not exercise any intelligent and effective control over it. Then again, let us examine the character of the 'Supervision' that God is said to exercise over *Dharma-Adharma*.—(a) This 'Supervision' cannot be of the nature of *Contact or Conjunction;* because *Dharma* and *Adharma* are qualities and hence not capable of *conjunction*, which (according to the *Naiyāyika* himself) is possible for Substances only;—(b) nor can the 'Supervision' be of the nature of *Inherence;* as the *Dharma-Adharma* inhering in other Souls could not inhere in 'God' And as these two—Conjunction and Inhrence—are the only possible forms of relationship, no other kind of 'supervision' is possible . In the case of ordinary Agents,—*e.g.*, the carpenter—the 'Supervision' exercised consists in their *contact* with the tools and instruments, which again are brought into *contact* with the wood-pieces upon which the man works. This is not possible in the case of God. Nor is it possible for the operations of God to have any effect upon the *Dharma-Adharma* of Beings; because *Dharma-Adharma* are qualities, and hence they could not come into *contact* with any *operation* of things.—Nor can the action bringing about the creation of the Universe be held to lie in the Atoms which operate under the will of God. Because in all our experience we never come across any such supervision or guidance as would be implied in such a process; all 'Supervision' or 'guidance' in fact is found to be done

by Soul over that Body alone which it ensouls by virtue of the Soul's *Dharma-Adharma* ; and the Atoms can not be said to be such a 'body' of God ; hence He could not guide the activity of the Atom. Even if we grant such a 'body' for God, the activity of such a body could not be due to His mere wish ; it must be due to an *effort* put forth by Him. Nor could these *Wishes* and *Efforts* be everlasting ; as that would make the activity of the Atoms also everlasting ; which would lead to the absurdity of an unceasing Creative Process. The argument as generally put forward by the *Naiyāyika* in proof of the Creator-God is that—"The Body of man must have a Supervisor, because it is itself non-intelligent". To this his opponent offers the counter-argument—that God cannot be such a Supervisor, because He cannot have any motive in exercising this supervision. We cannot deny the truth of the proposition that there is intelligent supervision only in cases where some purpose of the supervisor is served by the supervision. Then again, the same argument that would prove the existence of the intelligent Supervisor would also prove that Supervisor to be an embodied or corporeal Being ; as the *Naiyāyika* bases his argument upon the analogy of the carpenter supervising and guiding the making of wooden articles,—and as this carpenter, is also a corporeal being,—the analogy, extended further, would prove the supervising God also to be a corporeal Being. But, at the same time, we know that no corporeal being can exercise any effective and intelligent control over such subtle things as *Atoms, Dharma* and *Adharma.* Even if He did exercise such control. He himself, as a Corporeal Being, would have to be the creation of another supervisor or creator, and so on and on *ad infinitum.* Thus then, the 'supervision' of the work of creation being impossible, it has to be regarded as a never-ending process of things coming into existence and passing out of it, under the influence of the *Dharma-Adharma* of the Souls ensouling those things ; and there is no reason for the assumption of an Ultra-Cosmic 'God-Creator'.—(*Prakaraṇapañchikā,* pp. 137 et. seq.)

(C) According to Kumārila

This is what we learn from the *Shlokavārtika* (Chapter on *Sambandhākṣepaparihāra,* 41 et. seq.).

The question of the Creator, God, is raised in connection with the eternality of Word and its meaning and the relation between the two. The view has been held that the entire verbal process rests upon the will of God who set up, at the time of Creation, the convention upon which the entire process is based.

Kumārila denies the beginning of any such Convention relating to the relation of Word and Meaning.

We do not admit of any 'beginning of Creation',—says *Kumārila*. The idea that "God created the world, as also *Dharma* and *Adharma* along with their means of accomplishment, also Words, their Meanings and the relations between them, and also the Veda" cannot be proved; it is as impossible to prove as the existence of the Omniscient Person (God) Himself. This is the reason why this view has not been accepted. If there was any point of time when all this world did not exist—*i.e.*, prior to its creation by God—then what would have been the condition of things at the time? Where and in what form would the Creator Himself exist at the time? Who too was the person who would know the Creator at the time and describe Him to the people later on? How too could there come about the initial impulse to the activity of the Creator? As God could have no body etc., at the time, how could He have a *desire* to create things? If He had a body then, that body could not have been ereated by Himself. Earth, Water etc. being non-existent at the time, of what would God's body consist? As the world is found to be full of pain and suffering, it cannot be right to attribute its creation to God; specially because at the beginning of Creation, the Merit or Demerit of men could not exist to which their sufferings could be due.—No Agent can create anything without some material to work upon and implements to work with.—Nor can Creation be attributed to God's compassion towards beings; for, at the outset, there would be no beings towards whom the compassion would be directed: secondly, if Creation were due to compassion, the world would be made entirely happy, specially as the Creator being all-powerful, nothing could hamper His compassionate activity. If any such extraneous agency did hamper God's activity, then He could not be omnipotent.—What too could have been His purpose in creating the world? No sane person undertakes any activity without some purpose. If His activity is purposeless, then how can He be an intelligent person? If the activity of God be attributed to His desire for '*Sport*', '*Līlā*'—then, He cannot be regarded as one who has all his desires fulfilled. If He had to carry out all the operations necessary to create and carry on the world, then He would be too busy to be happy over it, and regard it as 'Sport' (56).—If the desire to create was prompted by 'compassion', or 'Sport', then why should there be a consequent desire to dissolve the world? Even if such a Creator existed, He could not be known by any means of knowledge; even if He were perceptible in some divine form (as is claimed for certain men) no one could ever perceive Him

as actually creating the world. We of the present day can have no knowledge, either of the world at the time of Creation or of the Creator himself. The mere assertion by the Creator himself (as stated in the *Upanishads* regarding *Prajāpati's* declaration about His desire to 'multiply' and so forth) is not enough to bring conviction to us.—If the whole worldly process were dependent upon the whim of the Creator, there would be no reasonable basis for the doctrine of Karma (72).—The wish or whim of God also could not arise without some cause to arouse it; and the cause that would arouse God's desire might very well be regarded as bringing about the things of the world themselves (73).—If all that the Theist is keen about is the theory that there must be *some cause*, some agency, that controls the world-process, then we are all agreed that the necessary controlling agency is provided by the '*Karma*' of living beings; and on this point there need be no difference of opinion (75).—The argument that "the bodies of men must have been created by God, because they are bodies"—would aply with equal force to the *Body* of God Himself, which is as much a 'body' as our own (77).—If God's body be held to be inhabited and controlled by God Himself,—then the controller himself would be without a body. On the same analogy, if the Potter were regarded as the 'controller' of the Jar, then the Jar would not be something 'controlled' by the Potter (79).—The idea of a God *with a body* having been rejected, the controlling and supervising will have to be regarded as done by a bodiless God; and yet no *effort* is possible for a bodiless being: how can any supervision be exercised without effort ? Mere desire or wish cannot be enough. Even if such effort on the part of a bodiless being were possible, how could the unconscious *Atoms* become active by the mere wish of the intelligent Person ? It is only the conscious or intelligent servant who acts in accordance with the wish of the conscious or intelligent master (82).—Then, there is the other theistic view that before the beginning of Creation the Supreme Self alone exists, and this Supreme Self, by His own wish, evolves out of Himself the Earth, Water and other things of the world. But that Supreme Self being all-pure, how could he evolve out of Himself things that are not pure (82) ?—The impurities in the shape of suffering and pain have been regarded as the effect of *Dharma-Adharma;* and these would not be there in the case of the Supreme Self, who is self-sufficient and pure; so that He would not be the source of any evolution that can proceed only from Ignorance and Illusion (84).—If those 'impurities' are attributed to some other cause, then the theory of 'One Cause' becomes abandoned (85).—If the Ignorance or Illusion to which the impurities and imperfections are due are inherent in the Supreme Self, then it must

be irrevocable; as it would be entering into the very Essence of the One Cause (86).—So much for the Vedāntic conception of the cause of Creation.

As regards the Sāṅkhya view that Creation is due, not to the action of an intelligent Soul or Personality, but to the action and reaction of the *Guṇas*, it has to be explained how the first and initial activity of the *Guṇas* began. Before the Creation, there could not be any '*Karma*' of past Personalities, to which the activity could be due;—nor could there be any wrong notions;—nor Hatred and Love etc.; nor any mental operations of any kind (87-88).—It has been sought to be explained that the source of all trouble lies in the '*Karma*' that are still there in their latent state.—But, as a matter of fact, no effect is ever found to proceed from causes in the latent stage (89).—If *Karma* in the latent stage were to be cause of the world and all attendent troubles, then there could be no freedom from those, as, in its latent stage, the *Karma* would always be there (94).—It may be that the *Krama* themselves are the product of Ignorance; but even so, they could not be set aside by mere *knowledge:* as there is nothing to prove that it is so (98).—If, then the view is that "bondage is due to *Karma* and *Karma* is due to Ignorance,—and when one has attained the knowledge of difference between Soul and Matter,—then the Cause, in the shape of Ignorance, having ceased, the effect, in the shape of *Karma* ceases to appear, whence Bondage ceases and Liberation comes about,"—then' the difficulty is that the cessation of Ignorance might stop the appearance of more *Karma* and the consequent Bondage;—but it cannot stop the reaction and fruition of all past *Karma* (101).—There is no basis for the assumption that...there is Creation and Evolution of the World, consisting in the birth and destruction of all things" (113).

The fact of there being no Ominiscient Person is proved by the following arguments set forth in *Shlokavārtika* (under *Su.* 1 1. 2, verses 117 to 151):

As a matter of fact no one ever meets with anyone who knows everything, who is omniscient; nor can there be any reliable inference of there having been one in the past; nor is there again any verbal authority for believing in any Omniscient Person. How too could reliance be placed on the verbal assertion of another person? There can be no Eternal Secripture speaking of any omniscient person; in case any passage were found in the eternal scripture, it could only be an *Artharvāda:* for if it did really speak of a real person, it could not be eternal; and it has been proved beyond doubt that the Veda is eternal. So no other means of knowledge can apply to that self-sufficient athority that belongs to the Veda.—As for the argument set up by the Buddhist (who believes in the omniscience of Buddha)

that—"*Buddha* has declared 'I am omniscient', and this assertion must be true, because it has been made by Him, like his assertion regarding the heat of Light,"—this is invalidated by the counter-argument—"My assertion that Buddha and other persons were *not omniscient* must be true, because it has been made by me, just like the assertion that Fire is hot and bright". In fact this argument of mine is more reliable than yours, because the fact of the assertion being made by me is directly perceived, while the fact of Buddha having made the assertion regarding his own omniscience can, at best, be proved only by means of inferences.—Nor can the idea of there having been an omniscient Person be based upon an unbroken 'memory' (tradition)—because there is an equally strong tradition to the contrary, that Buddha was a hypocrite,—because the idea of omniscience itself is inherently impossible,—and because the idea has been accepted by very few men. That the very idea is absurd is clear from the fact that whether or not a certain person is omniscient—*i.e.*, possesses the right knowledge of all things—cannot be ascertained by men who do not themselves know, and hence can verify, His knowledge of all things; so that unless one is himself omniscient, he cannot recognise another person to be omniscient; hence there should be, not one, but many omniscient persons (135).—There is another theory—that "all Persons—*i.e.*, their Souls—are inherently omniscient; and the fact of all men, in actual life, not knowing all things is due to the Soul being fettered and disabled by the limitations of the body and the sense-organs" (141).—The objection against this theory is that this idea of the omniscience of all persons could be derived only from the words of some persons, and the reliability of these words would be dependent entirely upon the fact of those persons being omniscient. This is also against common experience, by which it is found that men are more untruthful than truthful.—The case of the Vedic tradition is different from the Buddhist tradition, in so far as the former is not based on the omniscience of any single person,—it is inherent in the Veda, the reliability of which is perfect and discernible by men of the present, as it has been in the past (151).—The untruthful character of men does not affect the reliability of the Veda, because it is not the work of a personal author.

God, as world-creator, is denied by *Kumārila;* but as to whether this denial applies also to the *Parama-Ātman*, the *Super-Soul*, has been felt to be doubtful. On the authority of a comparatively recent work, the *Sarvasiddhāntasaṅgraha*, it seems that *Kumārila* was a believer in a multiplicity of *Jīva-Souls* and in the identity of these with the *Super-Soul;* this Super-Soul is one and eternal and is present in all *Jīva-Souls*. This

is the teaching of the *Vedānta* also ; and the *Shlokavārtika* ends its treaties on 'Soul' with the declaration that sound knowledge of the Soul is to be obtained from the '*Vedānta*'. From this it would seem that Kumārila was a believer in the *Super-Soul,* Paramātman, in its *impersonal* aspect, though opposed to the idea of one *Personal-World-Creator*. But if he had really believed in the *Super-Soul,* it seems impossible that he should not have asserted that belief and should have left it to be inferred from his reference to the '*Vedānta*', which too does not necessarily indicate his belief in the *Super-Soul.*

It is true that the benedictory opening verse of the *Shlokavārtika* invokes 'God', in the shape of *Shiva.* But it is open to a different explanation also ; as pointed out by the *Nyāyaratnākara.* Nor does it necessarily imply belief in the *Super-Soul,* one, indivisible, permeating all Souls and all things.

CHAPTER VI

REALITY OF THE EXTERNAL WORLD

(A) According To Shabara

As regards the things of the world, the *Mīmāṁsaka* is a confirmed Realist. He believes in the reality of the External World, and every writer on the system, from the earliest times, has tried his best to refute the several forms of Idealism that have held ground in the field of Indian Philosophy.

Shabara-Bhāṣya (Trans., p. 12)—In attacking the validity of Sense-Cognition, the Idealist says,—"All Cognition is baseless,—*i.e.*, without a real subsratum in the external world,—as is clear from the case of Dream-Cognition. In the case of Dreams, we have found that Cognition has no real objective substratum.—Waking Cognition is also a Cognition;—hence Waking Cognition also can have no real objective substratum.—It is true that the Cognition that one has in the waking stage is perfectly definite and determinate. But the same may be said of Dream-Cognition also, which is quite definite and determinate till the time of waking.—It may be argued that the Dream-Cognition becomes sublated, rejected as false, as soon as the man wakes up.—But from the fact of both being of the nature of *Cognition*, it can be presumed that the Waking Cognition also will, in due course of time, become sublated and rejected".

Such a presumption, however, would be justifiable only if the falsity of Dream-Cognition were due to its being a *Cognition*. But, if the falsity of Dream-Cognition were due to the fact that it cognises, apprehends, things,—then inasmuch as Waking Cognition also apprehends things and is a *Cognition* in that sense, this also would be equally false. As a matter of fact, however, the falsity of Dream-Cognition is inferred from other reasons; for instance, that it becomes sublated, on waking, by a Cognition to the contrary. As a matter of fact, Dream appears only while one is sleepy—only half asleep, when the mind is not quite alert, just before and after deep sleep—during which no dreams appear,—while the man is drowsy and his mind is not really perceptive. It is this *sleepiness* that is the cause of the falsity of Dream-Cognition, and as there is no *sleepiness* when the man wakes up and the Mind is quite alert, there is no reason why the Cognition during this state should be false. It is possible that during the waking state also there may be some defect in the cognitive process and organs; but whenever there *is* such a defect, it becomes detected sooner or later and the Cognition is declared to be *false*.—(*Shabara-Bhāṣya*. Trs., p. 12).

"But"—says the opponent—"as a matter of fact, Cognition is an empty void, *i.e.*, devoid of any foundation in the external world; because we do not perceive any difference in form between the Cognition and its object; what is apprehended by the senses is only the Cognition; from which we conclude that there is no form or shape of any object apart from that Cognition itself".

Shabara's answer to this is as follows :—This would be so if the Cognition had the form of the Object; as a matter of fact, however, Cognition has no form; it is only the external object that has form, and is actually apprehended as existing in external space. Then again, the objective of the *Sense-Cognition* is the *Object*, not another *Cognition;* and thus for the simple reason that Cognition, having only a momentary existence, (especially according to the Buddhist Idealist), could never continue to exist till the appearance of the other Cognition of which it could form the objective. Further, it is only *after* the Object becomes cognised that the person comes to cognise the Cognition, which he does through a subsequent Inference; the existence of the Cognition being only *inferred* from the fact of the Object having been cognised. Thus there can be no simultaneity between the *Cognition of the Object* and the *Cognition of that Cognition.* It may be true that it is the Cognition of the object that *appears* first, but it is not the first to *become cognised;* it sometimes happens that even a *cognised object* is spoken of as *not-cognised;* when, for instance, one is speaking of the past, he says, 'I never knew this thing;' though in reality he really knew it. Further, the form of the Cognition is never apprehended except in terms of the Object; which could not be the case if they were cognised simultaneously. Hence the Cognition can never be regarded as the objective of Sense-perception.

Even if the Cognition and the Object were identical in form, it is the Cognition that should have to be denied separate existence, not the *Object,* which is actually perceived. In reality, however, the two are not identical in form; when we cognise a Cognition,—and this is always through Inference from the fact of the Object being *cognised,*—we infer it without a form, simply as 'Cognition', not as the cognition of a particular *object.*

As a matter of fact, whenever the perception of cloth appears, it does so only when the yarns composing the cloth are there, which establishes a permanent connection between the Cognition and the Object cognised, in the shape of the *cloth,* whose existence therefore cannot be denied. If there were no such connection between the Cognition and the Object cognised,

it might be possible to have the cognition of the *cloth*, when the *object* before the eye is the *jar*.

All this goes to prove that the Cognition has a real substratum in the external world.—(*Shabara-Bhāṣya*. Trs., pp. 12—15).

In the above account, *Shabara* has disposed of Idealism in both its forms—in the common form where the reality of the External Object alone is denied, while that of the *Idea* or *Cognition* is admitted,—as *momentary*, by the Buddhist, and as *permanent* by the *Vedāntin*,—and also in the extreme form of the Buddhist Nihilism, *Shūnyavāda*, according to which all is '*Shūnya*,' mere 'Void'.—This latter extreme view, however, has been confuted by implication only; the direct confutation has been directed entirely to the proving of the *reality of the external object*: the idea being that when the reality of the Object has been established, that of the Idea or Cognition cannot be denied.

According to the interpretation of the *Bṛhatī*, there is no reference to the extreme Nihilism, in the *Bhāṣya*, when it speaks of '*Shūnya*,' 'Void ;' all that it means is that the *Cognition* is 'VOID'—*i.e.*, devoid of all external background.—This same interpretation of the *Bhāṣya* has the support of *Kumārila* also, according to whom the question considered by the *Bhāṣya* with the words '*Shūnyastu*, etc'. is—Is it a fact that Cognition is able to function only when Objects like the Pillar have a real existence in the external world ?—or is it that Cognition rests in itself, and not in any object extraneous to itself ?

(B) Prabhākara's View of the Reality of the External World

The Idealist having put forward the view that "there is no real Object in the external world ; whenever we have the cognition of things,—like the wall, for instance,—it is baseless, being due entirely to the *Vāsanā*, Predisposition, present in the mind of the congniser",—the answer of *Prabhākara* is as follows :—(*Bṛhatī*, p. 69 *et. seq.*)—Whenever we have to find out the cause of a certain effect, we always assume a cause which accounts for the appearance of the effect,—and not one which would be destructive of the effect. In the case of Dreams and other Cognitions, the Cognition that appears clearly manifests external things ; this effect in the form of such a Cognition cannot be explained except on the basis of the *real existence* of the external things ; and when one thing is not possilbe without another, the latter is regarded as its *cause*. Hence the only right view is that it is the *external thing* which is the cause, the *basis*, of the said Cognition. In fact, no Cognition is ever apprehended as being without an external basis. For

these reasons, the Perception brought about by the senses cannot be due merely to the Predisposition present in the mind of the observer. Some dreams may certainly be accounted for on the basis of this Predisposition due to the thoughts and anxieties in the mind of the man when going to sleep, but it is not so in all cases. In any case it is not so in the case of our *Waking Cognition*, which is perfectly well-defined. In cases of *Wrong Cognition* of things, what happens is that there is no Cognition of the things at all, not that the thing cognised has no existence in the external world.

Says the Idealist,—"Cognition is the property of the Soul, or of the Mind, or of Consciousness itself.—What is meant is that *Saṁvit* (Objective Ideation, or Perception) is actually perceived; if it were not perceived then there could be no perception of things at all; and yet what is formless cannot be perceived. There is only one form, in the shape of what is perceived;—*e.g.*, a particular odour; this is the form therefore which must belong to the Percepeion; this *Saṁvit* (Perception) is not in the form of the Soul, or of the Mind; as these two exist even without the Cognition; hence Perception (*Saṁvit*) cannot be identified with the Soul or with the Mind. It is only right to identify it with Consciousness (*Jñāna*); so that what is perceived is only the *Saṁvit*, Objective Ideation, not any *external* object in the shape of Sound and the rest".

What is meant by the Idealist (says the *Ṛjuvimalā*, p. 78) is as follows:—"What is perceived is the *Saṁvit* (Objective Ideation); if there were two distinct factors in the Perception—in the shape of *Cognition* (*Jñāna*) and *Object*, then there would be three forms in the Perception—(1. of the Perception, *Saṁvit* itself, 2. of Consciousness and 3. of the Object). While what is actually manifested is only one form, the *Blue*, for instance If this Blue colour belonged to the Object or to Consciousness, then the Perception (*Saṁvit*, the Objective Ideation) itself would be formless, and hence imperceptible; and if the Perception is imperceptible, the Object and Consciousness also would be imperceptible. Hence, Cognition must be regarded as devoid of any corresponding real external object".

Probhākara's Siddhānta on this matter is as follows:—(*Bṛhatī-Ṛjuvimalā*, pp. 80 *et. seq.*)—The *Saṁvit* (Perception, Objective Ideation) and the Object—both are perceived; not so Consciousness (*Jñāna*);—though the form perceived is one only, yet the Perception (*Saṁvit*) is not the only entity involved, because *both*—Perception as well as the Object—are both equally manifested in every act of Perception. Though the *Saṁvit* (Perception) by itself is formless, yet it is perceptible, because the form in which it appears is only that of the resultant of the act of Perception;

and this Resultant does not stand in need of another form. The *Jñāna* has to be admitted as the direct cause of the said *Saṁvit*, which could not come about without cause.. The question arising as to what is *Jñāna* (Cognition)—the answer is that it is the cause leading to the effect in the form of the said *Objective-Ideation* or Perception. This effect, in the form of Objective-Ideation, must have a cause; the permanent Soul cannot be that cause; for were it so, then the Ideation also would have to be eternal; but the Cognition that is inferred is a fleeting one; and when this Cognition is inferred as the cause of Perception or Objective Ideation, it is so only in the form of Blue and such external things. Thus all Cognitions must be based upon real objects.

The next question is—"If the Blue *Object* is what is perceived, how about the Perception itself ? Is it perceived or not ? If it is not perceived, its existence should not be admitted".—The answer to this is as follows :— (*Bṛ.*, pp. 82 *et. seq.*) The Perception (or Objective Ideation) is certainly perceived, but it is perceived as *Perception*, not as a *perceptible object ; i.e.*, the Perception is perceived by itself not as the *object* of another Perception; even without being an *object*, it manifests itself; it is not necessary that everything that is perceived should be percieved as an *object*. When therefore the term 'perceptible' is applied to Perception, it is only in the sense of its being perceived directly, by itself, not in the sense of its forming the *object* of sensuous cognition. The said Perception cannot be regarded as *unperceived*, because it is on the basis of Perception itself being *perceptible* that things *perceived* are regarded as such. This Perception (*Saṁvit*) however leads on to Cognition (*Jñāna*), which is puely *inferred* as the cause of the said Perception or Objective Ideation. The inference is this :—This Objective Ideation (Perception) is an effect;—it must therefore have a cause; this cause is the *Jñāna* (Cognition). As a matter of fact, all men are cognisant of this two-fold form—one the *effect* in the form of the *Saṁvit*, Perception, the Objective Ideation, and the other the *causes*, in the form of the *Jñāna*, Cognition. Thus then apart from the Objective Ideation or Perception, thre is the Cognition and also the Object.—(*Bṛ.*, p. 83.)

Prabhākara (*Bṛ.*, p. 84) has also drawn a distinction between the terms '*Saṁvedya*' (Perceptible) and '*Pramēya*' (Cognisable). It is *Perception* where the form of the object is clearly manifested as a factor; while in *Pramiti* or *Cognition* there is no *Objective Ideation*, hence no other form; consequently Cognition cannot be regarded as *perceptible ;* also because Cognition is fleeting, momentary; hence at the time that the Cognition of that Cognition appears it will have ceased to exist; hence it could not be

perceived.—Hence it follows that—'Until the Object has been cognised, no one apprehends the Cognition; it is only after the Object has been cognised that the Cognition comes to be *inferred*' (*Shabara*).

From all this we conclude that the entire cognitive phenomenon is not based wholly upon *Vāsanās, Predispositions,* it is, based upon *real* objects in the external world.

(C) Reality of the External World According to Kumārila

The *Mīmāṁsaka* lays stress upon the reality of the external world, because, if Cognition had no real basis in the external world, all that has been declared in the Veda in regard to the worldly and supernatual results following from actions would be meaningless. (Shlo. Vā.—*Nirālambana-vāda,* 3).—The needs of the situation cannot be met by postulating the 'Illusory Reality' of things; because what is *real* cannot be *illusory,* and what is *illusory* cannot be *real* (6).—Whatever *is* is real, whatever *is not is unreal;* and there can be no two kinds of *reality—true* reality and *untrue* (illusory) reality (10).—The opposite view is represented by (1) the *Yogā-chāra*—Buddhist Idealist—who postulates the Cognition, Idea, *Vijñāna,* but without a real substratum in the external world; and (2) by the *Mādhya-mika*—Buddhist,—the *Nihilist*—who does not admit even the Idea. Both are agreed as to the *unreality* of the external world (14-15).

This is the reason why the *Mīmāṁsaka* makes it his business to demolish the arguments set forth by the Idealists and Nihilists and seeks to establish, by his own arguments, the reality of the external world. *Kumārila* has done this in great detail in the two chapters of his *Shlokavārtika* where he shows that the reasonings set forth by the other party are entirely fallacious, even on technical logical grounds.—The main positive argument that *Kumārila* has put forward in support of the Reality of things is this—"The idea that Cognitions have a real basis in the external world must be true,—because it is an idea that is never sublated,—just as the idea of Dreams being false is never sublated" (79).—He goes a step further, and declares (107-108) that even Dream-Cognition is not entirely devoid of an external basis; even there we have the cognition of external things; with this difference that the things cognised are cognised as things related to place and time other than the real ones.—Similarly in all cases of Wrong Cognition, there is always some sort of external basis.—Nor can we admit of the Idealist's explanation that all cognitions are the products of *Vāsanā,* Predisposition—and hence they need not presuppose an external

hasis. Because mere verbal jugglery—the using of the word '*Vāsanā*'—cannot explain away the real state of things.—(*Nirālambanavāda*, 107 *et. seq.*)

It is a universally recognised fact that what is apprehended by a cognition is something which is endowed with a definite colour, size and shape.—The question that has to be considered is—To what does all this colour, etc., belong ? To the Cognition itself ? or to something exterior to it ? (*Shūnyavāda*, 8-9).

The Idealist view is that the colour, etc,. that are apprehended belong to the Cognition or the Idea itself, so that there is no need for postualating an external object,—especially because all parties are agreed that the colour, etc., are manifested in the Cognition (19) ;—there is no proof of the fact that the Cognition has any connection with an external object (49).—That the form belongs to the Cognition is proved by the fact that it is apprehended when the Cognition is there, and not apprehended when the Cognition is not there (53).

Kumārila's answer to this is as follows :—According to the Idealist's view the Cognition itself would be both *what apprehends* and *what is apprehended ;* which is absurd (64). Cognition cannot be both *apprehender* and the *apprehended ;* both parties are agreed that it is the *apprehender ;* so that the *apprehended* must be something other than the Cognition (147-148). —In as much as a Cognition cannot apprehend itself, what is apprehended by it must be something exterior to itself ; and on account of the diversity of the causes of Cognition,—such causes consisting of the Sense-organs, etc.—it is only one object that is apprehended by one Cognition, not all objects by all Cognitions. Whatever object is presented to us in whatever form by the Cognition as *apprehended* by itself is naturally acceped by us to be of that form (225—227).

The *Shāstradīpikā* (p. 37) explains that the Perception of an object ends, *not* in a further cognition of that Perception, but in the *Āparokṣya* or *Pratyakṣatā* —*i.e.*, *Direct Apprehendedness*—of that object,—and that every act of Perception involves a certain relationship between the perceiver and the perceived,—the former being the *Agent* and the latter the *Object.* This Agent-Object relationship is not possible without some activity on the part of the Agent ; hence the presence of this Relationship leads to the Inference of its invariable concomitant,—*viz.*, the action of the Agent ; and it is this action, which in the case of knowledge, is known as *Cognition* ; and it has been shown to be *inferable* from the relationship between the *cognising* Soul and the *cognised* Object.

CHAPTER VII

THINGS OF THE WORLD

We have seen that the things of the World—the Objects of Cognition—are real. Now there arises the question—What are these things? Under what general heads are they classified by the *Mīmāṁsaka*? So far we have not met with any systematic account of these '*Padārthas*' or categories, in the *Bhāṣay*, or in the *Bṛhatī* or in the *Shlokavārtika* or in the *Tantravārtika*.

(A) Shabara.

The only indication that we find in the *Bhāṣya* is under Sū, 10.3.44, where 'kinds of things' are mentioned as *Dravya* (Substance), *Guṇa* (Quality), *Karma* (Action) and *Avayava* (Constituent Part).

(B) Prabhākara.

As regards the *Prābhākara* view, we gleam the following from *Prakaraṇapañchikā* :—

Prefacing the proof of 'Similarity' as a distinct category (on p. 110) it says that it cannot come under any of the well-known categories—Substance, Quality, Action, Community, Inherence and Ultimate Individuality; which are precisely the six categories of the *Vaisheṣika*. But in regard to the last, Ultimate Individuality, it adds that 'People learned in this Science do not accept any such category'. From this it is clear that *Prābhākara* admits the first five categories of the *Vaisheṣika*, and he posits 'Similarity' in place of the *Vaisheṣhikā's* '*Visheṣa*, (Ultimate Individuality).—The same work (on the same page, 110) provides the following account of this 'Similarity'.—It is something entirely different from *Substance* and the other categories, as is proved by the fact that it enters into our Consciousness exactly in the same manner as any other category; and our Consciousness is the sole criterion regarding the existence of things. This 'Similarity' cannot be regarded as a '*Substance*', because it is found in *Quality* and *Action* also, and no *Substance* is known to subsist in the latter, though we speak of *similar colours*, *similar actions*, and so forth.—Similarity cannot be classed under *Jāti*, Community; because it does not form the basis of any comprehensive conception (says *Bṛhatī*, MS p. 86).—Inherence is a kind of Relation, hence *Similarity* cannot be classed under that. As

regards the *Vaishēṣika* category of '*Vishēṣa*', Ultimate Individuality, it is only the quality of *Separateness*, which separates—differenciates—the ultimate substances in the shape of Atoms. Whatever it is, it is quite contrary to *Similarity*. For these reasons *Similarity* must be regarded as a distinct category ; it is apprehended as subsisting in perceptible things, through the apprehension of such qualities, actions and constituents as are common to the things concerned.

As regards, *Shakti*, Potency, Force, Power, as a distinct category—We learn from the *Prakaraṇapañchikā* (pp. 81-82) as follows :—Everything in the world is found to be possessed of some sort of *Shakti*, Potency, Power or Capacity ; it cannot be perceived, but it can be inferred ; for instance, Fire is always seen to bring about a certain Effect, in the shape of Burning ; but the same Fire, when under the influence of certain incantations, fails to bring about that effect ; there has been no change in the visible form of the Fire that can account for this phenomenon, the visible form of the Fire remaining exactly the same in both cases. This leads us to the conclusion that there is something in the Fire by virtue of which it can *Burn*, and in the absence whereof it cannot burn. From this we are led on to conclude that in all things there is something which enables them to produce their Effects, being deprived of which they are unable to do so. To this imperceptible something, we give the name *Shakti*, Potency Power, or Capacity.—In eternal things this Potency is eternal, but in transitory things it is brought into existence along with the things themselves. This *Shakti* cannot be the same as *Saṁshāra*, Embellishment ; as this latter is ephemeral in Eternal things also.

Karman, 'Action', also is one of the perceptible categories. When a thing moves, what we actually see is, not the moving of the thing, but only the various conjunctions and disjunctions that the thing passes through with certain points in space ; the expression 'the thing moves' also refers to these-same conjunctions and disjunctions ; and yet these conjunctions and disjunctions cannot be regarded as the 'Action' of *moving*, because the Action subsists entirely in the *active* thing, while the conjunctions and disjunctions subsist in outside points of space ; and as it is only these conjunctions and disjunctions that are seen, *Action* cannot be held to be *perceptible :* it can only be *inferred* (from the said conjunctions and disjunctions). (*Prakaraṇapañchikā,* pp. 78-79.) This is not admitted by the followers of *Kumārila* (see *Shāstradīpikā*, p. 50).

Samavāya, Inherence, says the *Prakaraṇapañchikā*, (pp. 26-27) cannot be regarded as everlasting ; because it is actually found to be ephemeral ;

for instance. the Inherence between the Community and the Individual comes into existence when that Individual is produced, and perishes as soon as that Individual perishes.

As regards *Substance*, we find four—Earth, Water, Air and Fire—mentioned in the *Prakaraṇapañchikā* (p. 24), where also we find the term '*Gaganādayaḥ*' ; so *Gagana*, Ākāsha, would be the fifth ; (6) *Ātman*, Soul, is admitted to be a *Substance* under the chapter called *Tattvāloka*, where also (7) *Manas*, Mind, is mentioned as a *Substance* whose contact with the Soul brings about Cognition, Pleasure and Pain etc. Again on p. 84, we find the *Eternal* Substances enumerated, wherein, apart from *Atoms*, *Ākāsha* and *Ātman* (Soul), we also find Time (8) and Space (9). As regards *Tamas*, Darkness, which some people regard as a *Substance* by itself, the *Prakaraṇapañchikā* (pp. 142-145) says it is only *absence of Light*. Of the *Substances*, Earth, Water, Air and Fire are perceptible by the visual as also by the Tactile Organ ; *Ākāsha* and the rest cannot be regarded as perceptible, because they cannot be seen or touched or heard. (*Prakaraṇapañchikā*, p. 24). *Ākāsha* cannot be seen by the eye, because it is devoid of colour ; if it had colour, it would also be tangible ; as Colour and Tangibility go together, the whiteness that appears in *Ākāsha* belongs to the patches of Fire hanging in the atmosphere ; and the Darkness noticed at night is not the quality of anything, it is only *absence of Light ;* if it were something positive, it would be visible during the day also. (*Prakaraṇapañchikā*, pp. 143-144.) In this connection it may be noted that as *Ākāsha* is imperceptible, it cannot form one of the constituents of the Body. Though *Ākāsha* cannot be perceived, it can be *inferred* as the Substratum of Sound ; Sound cannot belong to the source from which it proceeds, because the organ of Hearing can apprehend only what it can get at, reach, and it can never *get at* the source of Sound. (*Prakaraṇapañchikā*, p. 145).

The touch of Air is *neither hot nor cold ;* its apparent *coolness* is due to the water-particles hanging in the Air, and the *Heat* to the fire-particles floating in it. (*Ibid*'. pp. 77-78).

Among Qualities, Colour, Taste, Odour, Touch, Number, Dimension, Separateness, Conjunction, Disjunction, Priority, Posteriority, Pleasure, Pain, Desire, Aversion and Effort are perceptible.—Conjunction is of three kinds—(1) Due to both members, (2) Due to the action of either of them and (3) Due to another Conjunction. (*Pra. Pañ.*, pp. 26 and 151).

Composite Wholes or Aggregates are of four kinds—Earth, Water, Fire and Air ; the first three are of large dimensions, and having colour, are

perceptible by the senses, by the organ of *Touch* and by the organ of *Vision.* Air being devoid of colour, is perceptible by the organ of *Touch* alone.—The Atoms of these substances are, by their very nature, imperceptible; so also is the compound of *two atoms;* as the *large dimension,* which is a necessary condition in all perceptibility, is present only in such substances as have *many, i.e.,* not less than three constituent particles.—*Ākāsha, Time and Space,* even though of large *Dimensions,* are not perceptible, as they are devoid of Touch and Colour.

This is all we can glean from *Prābhākara* Sources, but a comparatively recent work, the *Sarvasiddhāntārahasya* supplies us with the following information.—According to the *Prābhākara,* there are the following categories—*Substance, Quality, Action, Community, Paratantratā* (which appears to be the same as *Subsistence* or Inherence), *Shakti* (Potency, Power, Capacity), *Similarity* and *Number.* Action is inferred from the disjunction of a thing from one point in Space and its conjunction with another. Inherence is not Eternal, because it subsists in perishable things also, and being a relation thereof, it could not be eternal. Nor can it be *one;* it is as many as there are things in the world. Potency, Power or Capacity is the common name given to that by virtue of which, *Substances, Qualities and Actions and Communities* come to be regarded as the 'Cause' of things; it is to be inferred from particular Effects; it is Eternal in Eternal things, and perishable in perishable things. Similarity, like Potency, cannot come under any other category, and hence has to be regarded as a distinct category. The '*Vishēṣa*', *Ultimate Individuality,* of the *Vaishēṣika* cannot be a category; because the differentiation among Eternal things—like *Ākāsha,* Atoms, etc.,—for the purpose whereof the *Vishēṣa* has been posited—can always be done on the basis of the ordinary qualities of the things concerned.

Apart from other things the mention in this work of 'Number' as a distinct *category* by itself appears to be clearly wrong; as the *Prakaraṇa-pañchikā* (on p. 54) speaks of *Number* as a 'Quality'.

In reference to *Darkness* as a *Substance,* and its perceptibility, there is an interesting verse current among Pandits :—

तमो द्रव्यं नैल्याद् घटवदिति माने समुदिते
यदीदं रूपि स्यात् किमिह न भवेत् स्पर्शनगुणः ।
इतीमं सत्तर्कं शिथिलयितुमतर्व्यवसिता
तमोवृन्दं धत्ते कचभरमिषेणेन्दुवदना ॥

"The Upholder of Darkness as an independent Substance argues—'Darkness is a Substance, because it is black, like the Jar,'—whereupon

the other party puts forward the confutation—'If it had colour, it should be amenable to Touch also'.—In order to weaken the force of this confutation, says the poet, the fair-faced girl bears the mass of black hair, in order to show that Darkness is both dark-coloured and tangible."

(C) Things of the World—According to Kumārila.

The *Sarvasiddhāntarahasya* has the following :—

All categories, according to the *Bhāṭṭa*, are classed under two heads—*Bhāva*, Positive, and *Abhāva*, Negative. The latter is of four kinds—Prior Negation, Utter Destruction, Absolute Negation and Mutual Negation.—Positive categories, there are four,—*viz.*, Substance, Quality, Action and Community. Of Substance, there are eleven—Earth, Water, Fire, Air, *Ākāsa*, Space, Time, Soul, Mind, Darkness and Sound. Some people mention *Gold* as the twelfth. Of Qualities, there are thirteen—*viz.*, Colour, Taste, Odour, Touch, Dimension, Separateness, Conjunction, Disjunction, Priority, Posteriority, Gravity, Fluidity and Viscidity.—Of Actions there are five—*viz.*, Throwing upwards and the rest.—Communities there are two—Higher and Lower. *Shakti* (Potency) and *Sādṛshya* (Similarity) are included under 'Substance.' Of Potency, there are two kinds—*Sahaja*, Inborn, and *Ādhyeya*, Extraneous, Imposed from without.

All that we can glean from the original *Bhāṭṭa* sources is as follows :—

'Similarity' cannot be a distinct category by itself; if it were so, we could not account for the varying degrees of *Similarity* between things and things. Nor is there any reason for regarding it as a category; in fact, it consists only in the presence in one thing of the character and conditions present in another thing.' (*Shāstradīpikā*, p. 52).

As regards *Karman*, Action, it is not something to be *inferred* (as held by *Prābhākara*), it is directly *perceived.*—It cannot be regarded as only *Inferred ;* because it could be inferred only as the non-constituent cause of the conjunctions and disjunctions of the *active* object with points in space; and as such, it would have to be cognised as subsisting in that thing as well as in Space. As a matter of fact, however, it is cognised in the thing only. Action must be regarded as perceived; we actually see the thing passing through certain conjunctions and disjunctions with points in Space; but the cognition that we have is that what brings about these conjunctions and disjunctions lies in the thing and not in Space; and that which forms the basis of this cognition is called the *Action* of the thing. (*Shāstradīpikā*, p. 50).

Samavāya, 'Inherence', is denied—(vide *Shlokavārtika* 1.1.4, *Pratyakṣa*, 146—150)—as a relation, between the Community and the Individual, for instance. Because so long as the Individual has not come into existence, there can be no real relation, as there is only one of the two relatives concerned ; and after the Individual has come into existence, before the relation has been established, it cannot be regarded as a permanent, inseparable, relationship. In fact the relationship cannot be anything distinct from the things themselves among whom it is supposed by the *Vaishēṣika* to subsist.

CHAPTER VIII

HEAVEN

The name 'Heaven' is applied to that happy state which is entirely free from all touch of pain, and which, as such, is desired by all men. ((*Prakaraṇapañchikā*, pp. 102-103.) This is a paraphrase of the well-known definition provided in the *Vishṇu-Purāṇa*—

यन्न दुःखेन सम्भिन्नं न च ग्रस्तमनन्तरम् ।
अभिलाषोपनीतं च तत् पदं स्वःपदास्पदम् ॥

Sukha, Happiness, Pleasure, is not mere *absence of pain*. In the *absence of pain* what we feel is only that *there is no pain ;* the feeling being purely negative ; so that what we are conscious of in the Soul by itself is as *without pain*, not as with some positive quality. On the other hand, when we feel *happy* or *pleased*, we are conscious of something *positive*,—a positive quality, as belonging to the Soul ; or more exactly, the Soul as endowed with a positive quality.—(*Prakaraṇapañchikā*, p. 149.)

CHAPTER IX

JĀTI

(A) Jāti, Sāmānya,—Class, Genus, Community, 'Universal'

Preliminary Note.

The *Nyāya-Sūtra* and its commentaries have drawn a distinction between the terms '*Jāti*' and '*Ākṛti*', the former is used in the usual sense of the 'Universal', but the latter is used in the sense of 'Configuration'; and according to them the denotation of the Word consists *collectively* in *Vyakti* (Individual), *Ākṛti* (Configuration or Figure) and *Jāti* (Universal). (*Nyāya-Sūtra*, 2.2.68.) In later Nyāya-literature, however, the distinction appears to have been dropped, and in discussions relating to the denotation of Words, we meet with the two words, '*Vyakti*' (Individual) and '*Jāti*' (Universal) only.

There has been no such distinction between '*Jāti*' and '*Ākṛti*' in Mīmāṁsā literature; in fact the two have been distinctly identified. For instance, *Shabara* says (under Sū. 1.3.33) द्रव्यगु-णकर्मणां सामान्यमात्रमाकृतिः; Kumārila also says (in *Shlokavārtika*, on *Vanavāda* 3) that *Ākṛti* is the same as '*Jāti*' or '*Sāmānya*'; and he distinctly denies the connotation attributed to the term '*Ākṛti*' by the *Naiyāyika*; he says (*Tantravārtika*, Trs. pp. 330-331) that the term, '*Ākṛti*' does not stand for *Configuration* or *Shape* or Figure.

(B) Shabara's View of the 'Universal'

On the question of the denotation of words, the Mīmāṁsaka's view is that the word denotes the Class, Community, *Jāti*, also called *Ākṛti*. (See below under *Verbal Cognition*.)

He also holds that the Word, its denotation and the relation between the two,—all this is eternal, having no beginning or end.

In order to shake this view, his opponent asks—"When you say that it is the *Universal*, Class or Community that is denoted by the Word,—is this *Universal*, an accomplished entity, or something that is to be brought about, produced?"

The answer is that, being actually perceived, it cannot be something yet to be accomplished, as what is perceived is only an accomplished entity.

This notion of *Jāti*, Universal, cannot be a mere illusion. No conception can be regarded as illusory and false unless we find a more reliable conception to the contrary, which negatives and sets aside the conception in question.

The opponent argues—"We find such conceptions as *Series*, *Group*, *Forest*—all conceived as single entities,—while in reality there are no such single entities apart from the many component individuals. That is, the *Series* is nothing apart from the individual factors, the *Group* is nothing apart from the component members, and the *Forest* is nothing apart from the trees composing it; the comperhensive conception of the *Community* or Universal as an entity, must, therefore, be a misconception and a mere illusion".

The answer to this is that the *Forest* is actually *percieved* as a single entity; and the validity of this fact of Sense-perception cannot be denied. If you deny this, you might as well deny the real existence of the trees themselves and reduce yourself to the position of the Buddhist Idealist......... Merely because the *Forest* is not perceived *apart from the trees*, it does not follow that it does not exist as an entity. (*Shabara-Bhāṣya* Trs., p. 21 *et seq.*)

In all cases—such, for instance, as the Vedic text to the effect that the 'Altar should be made like the *Shyēna*,' the term '*Shyēna*' (Kite) must be taken as denoting the *Universal* or Community.—In fact terms like 'Cow' are always understood in the sense of an *Individual belonging to a particular Community* and what is directly denoted by the term is the *Community* and this cognition of the *Community* leads to the cognition of the *Individual*. In this way, as the term denotes the Community, and through that, the Individual also. there would be no dissociation between the Individual and the acts prescribed by words denotative of Communities and Individuals. (Sū. 1.3.30—35, *Shabara-Bhāṣya*, Trs., pp. 118—124.)

(C) Jāti, 'Universal'—According to Prabhākara.

We have a full account of the *Prābhākara's* view of *Jāti*, Community, 'Universal' in the *Bṛhatī-Ṛjuvimalā*, pp. 163—173; and it has been clearly set forth in the *Prakaraṇapañchikā* (pp. 17—32).

There is a difference of opinion among philosophers regarding the exact character of '*Jāti*':—(1) according to some the notion of '*Jāti*' is purely imaginary, illusory; (2) according to others it is a real entity, but not apart from the individuals wherein it subsists, and as such is cognisable only along with these latter; (3) others again hold that it has a real existence

of its own, apart from the individuals comprising it, and its existence can be cognised through Inference; (4) lastly, according to some, it is different as well as non-different from the individuals comprising it, and is apprehended by Perception. According to *Prabhākara* the *Jāti* is something real, distinct from the Individuals which are its substrata, receptacle, and is perceptible by the senses. Says the *Kārikā*—

जातिराश्रयतो भिन्ना प्रत्यक्षज्ञानगोचरा

When we properly analyse the notion of *Jāti*, we find that the only basis that we have for accepting any such thing lies on our Conception of some sort of *Non-difference* among a number of things which are known to be different individually.

The Buddhist Idealist, consistently with the doctrine of *Universal, Perpetual Flux*, denies all aggregates, and hence the *Jāti* also, which is only an aggregate of Individuals.

The Idealist's conclusion is that,—"the *Jāti* has no real existence, nor are there any substances which could be the substratum of *Jāti*."

For a detailed discussion, from the Buddhist point of view, the reader is referred to *Shāntarakṣita's Tattvasaṅgraha* (Translated in the *Goekwaḍ's Oriental Series*, Vol. 80, pp. 402—445.

Prabhākara's answer to the Idealist position against *Jāti* is as follows :—

The proof of the existence of anything must ultimately rest in our own consciousness, and it cannot be denied that there are present, in our consciousness, distinct cognitions of the *gross* or aggregated forms of things and what is thus distinctly cognised should not have its existence denied. As regards the constitution of the gross or aggregated substance, it must exist as we actually perceive it; that it is made up of subtle constituent particles is implied by its very nature; in fact, without this, our conception of it would be impossible. Such being the indisputable fact, it becomes necessary to find an explanation for the fact of a number of subtle particles combining to make up a gross and aggregated object. The only explanation possible is that a number of particles, coming into conjuction among themselves, tend to bring into existence a single object, which being perceptible, (while the particles themselves may be imperceptible), is called *gross* or *aggregate*; a single conjunction subsisting over all the component particles, and that same Conjunction tending to combine all the said particles into one aggregated *whole*. Thus in bringing about one aggregated whole, the constitutent particles are the material or constituent cause, and their conjunction is the immaterial cause.

This *aggregate* subsists in all the component particles collectively, and not in each of the particles severally. It is not necessary for all the particles to be perceived before the *whole* is perceived, because the *whole* is something different from the parts ; and as in every case the 'cause' that we are justified in assuming is only that which is sufficient to account for a certain given effect,—for the perception of the *whole,* we must regard as its necessary cause, the perception of only those parts without which the perception of the *whole* would not be possible ; as a matter of fact, if only *a few* of the parts are perceived, it is enough to bring about the perception of the *whole.* Then, again, the fact of the *whole* being always found together with the parts is due to one being the cause of the other. That the whole is yet something different from the parts is shown by the fact that the two give rise to entirely different effects in our consciousness ; *e.g.*, the *whole* gives rise to the notion of something that is *one* and *extensive ;* while the parts produce the notion of things *many* in number and small.

The existence of the aggregated *whole* having been proved, the existence of the *Jāti* cannot be denied, merely on the ground that there can be no *whole* made of the parts.

This Community, 'Universal', *Jāti,* is eternal, and when a new Individual comes into existence, which belongs to that *Jāti,* what is born is not the *Jāti,* but the relation of the existing *Jāti,* to that particular individual. This relation, which is *Inherence,* is not *eternal* (according to the *Mīmāṁsaka*). Similarly when a certain individual ceases to exist, what ceases is only its relation to the 'Universal', which continues to exist in other individuals.

The Universal resides in its entirety in every Individual ; as is clear from the fact that we recognise the same Universal in every Individual. Nor is the Universal ever perceived apart from the Individuals. It is perceptible by the senses, as is shown by the fact that its cognition is brought about by its coming into contact with the organs of perception, though it is the Individual in which it subsists which is in direct contact with the sense-organs.

While admitting such *Jātis,* Universals, as 'Substance', 'Quality' and the like, the *Prābhākara* does not admit of the *summum genus* 'Sattā', 'Being', as including all that *exists ;* and this for the simple reason that we have to accept such a *Jāti* as 'Substance' because we actually perceive a number of individual things as having certain characters in common : and on the basis of this perception we postulate the *Jāti,* 'Substance'. We have

no such cognition of a number of individual things merely as *existing*, and in the absence of such a conception, we have no basis for the postulating of such a *Jāti* as 'Being'. The term '*Sattā*, 'Being', in fact denotes only the individual existence of the thing and it does not denote any *Jāti* like '*Sattā*'. All that it means is that the thing has an *individual existence* of its own (not necessarily, forming part of an Aggregated Whole).

Nor does *Prabhākara* admit of such *Jātis* as '*Brāhmaṇa*', '*Kṣattriya*' and the like; as such *Jātis* cannot be perceived by the senses. All that is meant by calling a man '*Brāhmaṇa*' is, *not* that he belongs to a certain *Jāti*, but only that he is descended from a particular line of ancestors. This also is the view of *Kumārila*—'ब्राह्मणत्वादि योनितः' (*Shlo. Vā. Vana-Vāda*, 29.) This purity of descent is to be accepted until there is sufficient evidence to the contrary. (Vide *Tantravārtika* under 1.2.2.)

(D) Kumārila's View of Jati, 'Universal'

As *Jaimini* in his *Sūtra* 1.3.33 has declared the '*Ākṛti*' to be what is denoted by the Word,—and the *Nyāya-Sūtra* and *Bhāṣya* have recognised *Ākṛti* as something different from what is commonly known as *Jāti*, 'Class', 'Community, 'Genus,' 'Universal',—*Kumārila*, at the very outset, points out that it is *Jāti* itself which has been called *Ākṛti*; so the *Jāti* is called *Ākṛti* in the sense that it is what serves to *define* the Individual. *Sāmānya* also is another name given to *Jāti*, on the ground that it provides the basis for the *common comprehensive notion* of all individuals included under the Universal. Thus '*Jāti*', '*Ākṛti*' and '*Sāmānya*' are all synonyms. (*Shlo. Vā. Ākṛti* 3-4). In regard to all things, there are two kinds of ideas—*inclusive* and *exclusive*. If it were not so, and if things were only *exclusive*, then they could never be conceived of as *inclusive*; and *vice versa*. Thus there is a permanent and inseparable relationship between the Individual and the Class or Universal; all individuals being included in the Universal; and the Universal pervading over, embracing, all individuals (9). The *Class* or Universal is something that is distinct from the Individuals, and yet it embraces the Individuals and subsists in each one of them. It is through this that we come to have a single comprehensive unitary conception of several individuals under one head,—of all individual cows as 'cow', for instance. It is to this something that people apply several names, such as '*Sāmānya*,' '*Jāti*', '*Ākṛti*' (17-18). The relationship between the Individuals and the Universal is natural, inherent in themselves—and notadventitious, brought about by any causes (31).—*Question*—"Why should the Universal 'Cow' reside only in the animals with the develop, etc. ?" *Answer*—Because

it is the same as—consists of—these animals. *Question*—"To what is the identity due ?" *Answer*—To the very nature of the things concerned ; *i.e.*, several individuals come into existence only as identical with a particular Class or Community (47-48).—The difference therefore that is perceived between the Class or Universal and the Individual is due to their very nature (50).—*Question*—"The Universal comprehends many Individuals, while the *Individual* does not extend beyond itself,—how can then the two be the same ?"—(53).—*Answer*—There is no incongruity in this ; as there would be an incongruity only if the Universal subsisted in the *many only*, and the Individuals subsisted in each of themselves, to the exclusion of all else ; as a matter of fact, however, Individuals also,—in the form of the *Universal*—subsist *in the many*, also, and the Universal *in the form of the Individual*, subsists exclusively in *one* only ; hence there is no incongruity in the notion of the two being *not-different* (54-55).—The Universal and the Individual being identical, what happens in actual experience is that when the Universal character is cognised as non-different from the Individual, the object becomes cognised as an *Individual*, the *Universal* lying latent in it, and helping its existence ; and through these, the Universal does not present itself to our consciousness ; and conversely, when the Individuals are cognised as non-different from the Universal, what is cognised is the Universal, and the Individuals remain latent ; lastly, when the object is cognised in its mixed character,—*as an individual belonging to a particular Universal* or Community —then all notions of difference and non-difference between the two (Individual and the Universal) disappear (59—62).—*Jāti*, Universal, is not the same as *Sārūpya, Similarity of Forms* among individual things (65).

The Dewlap, etc., which have been spoken of as the characteristics of the Universal 'Cow', are only its indicatives, and serve to distinguish that particular Universal from other Universals (*Vanavāda 2 et. seq.*). The notion of 'Universal' or 'Community' is universally admitted—by all parties (14-15).—When *Ākṛti* is spoken of as '*Jāti*', it is not the *Configuration* or *Shape* that is meant. Because no such 'configuration' is possible in the case of 'Fire', 'Air' and such *shapeless* things (16).—In fact the '*Jāti*' is quite distinct from the configurative shape (19). This Universal is eternal (23) ; it is perceptible by the senses (24). There are various indications whereby one Universal is distinguished from another ; these indicatives consisting of specialities of time, place and other things. For instance, Gold is distinguished from Copper and other metals by its colour ; Clarified Butter is distinguished from Oil by its taste and also by smell ; the *Brāhmaṇa* and other castes are distinguished by parentage (26—29). No exception

can be taken to the subsistence of the Universal in each individual comprised within it, as it is a perceptible fact, and yet it is *one* only (30). The all-pervading character, and the absence of constituent parts are to be accepted, as in the case of Sound (31). The questions also as to whether the Universal subsists in its entirety, or only in part, in each Individual, does not arise when the Universal is something indivisible, impartible, whole (33). So we have to accept the fact as we perceive it—that the Universal subsists in the Individuals. And as there is nothing incongruous in this notion, it cannot be sublated or rejected (42). Hence the conclusion put in the form of an Inferential Argument is—"The idea of *Cow* in regard to several cows must be due to a single entity in the shape of the *Universal* 'cow'.—Because they are all cognised in the same form as *Cow*, like any single cow" (44). The notion of 'cow' in regard to several cows is analogous to the notion of 'forest' in regard to several trees (72), but it is not exactly alike (96).

Though the Universal is one, it is regarded as *many* when viewed in relation to the Individuals, and though the Individuals are *many*, they are regarded as *one*, when viewed in relation to the Universal (85-86).

Ākṛti is cognisable by Sense-perception, and what is meant by *Ākṛti* is commonality, community,—not the configuration or *shape* of things. If it meant the latter, it could not belong to such immaterial and incorporeal things as the Soul, Space, Time, Mind, Action, Quality,—all which have no *shape* at all. Then, again, the *Ākṛti* to which Substances, Qualities and Actions belong are overlapping, these classes varying in their extension, *e.g.*, 'Thing' is the largest class we can think of to which Substance belongs; and under 'Substance' come Earth, Water, etc,............This would not be possible if *Shape* were meant. Then, again, the material *shape* of things is destructible and varies with each individual. The idea of *Ākṛti* standing for *shape* or *configuration* has been held by the followers of *Gautama* (Nyāya). It is with a view to remove this misconception that *Shabara* has made it clear that *Ākṛtī* stands for the *Universal*, the *Class* and the *Community* or *Commonality* (*Tantravārtika* Trs., pp. 330-331).

This 'Universal' is not totally different from the *Individuals*. And when something is said in regard to something being done to a thing what is meant is the *Universal as subsisting in a particular Individual*. Though the Class or *Universal* is affected by the Individual and *vice versa*, yet that does not make the Universal transitory, it is only the Individual aspect of it that is so. Particular Individuals vanish ; but other Individuals remain ; hence the Universal never vanishes. And yet there is some difference

between the two, as we speak of the Individual as belonging to, comprised in, the Universal (*Trantravārtika* Trs., pp. 345—347).

Though the Universal is not perceived as anything totally different from the Individuals, yet, at the time that we perceive certain individual cows, we are cognisant of a certain character that is common to all the cows perceived and it is this *commonality* that constitutes their *Jāti* or 'Universal'; and the character that is peculiar to such individual constitutes its *Individuality, Vyakti.*—This is where lies the difference between the *Universal* and the *Individual*.........The *Universal,* however, is not anything totally different from the *Individual*.........This *Universal* may be taken as standing for the *Summum Genus, Being,* which is a Universal that is common to all Substances, Qualities and Actions; —or it may stand for each of the three *Universals* (named in the *Bhāṣya*)—Substance, Quality and Action; or it may stand for all *Universals* in the world—from the *Summum Genus* of *Being* down to the smallest Universal conceivable. In contradistinction to this Universal, the Individual is that which has a specific peculiarity; it does not consist of the peculiarities themselves; as the *Bhāṣya* has distinctly spoken of the Individual as the receptacle of, and hence different from, these peculiarities (*Tantravā.* Trs'. pp. 357—359).

As regards Atoms, the *Mīmāṁsaka* is not keen on postulating them. *Kumārila* has distinctly declared that—'the *Mīmāṁsakas* do not necessarily admit of Atoms'—(*Shlokavārtika-Anumāna,* 183—185). On this the *Nyāyaratnākara* remarks as follows:—We can admit of the Atom only if we find it necessary for explaining and justifying the aggregated objects that we see; so that if the postulating of the Atom tends to do away with the Gros or Aggregated objects that we perceive, then, we shall unhesitatingly reject it. The fact of the matter is that we accept each thing as we actually perceive it in our experience,—in the form of the Universal or the Individual, the gross or the subtle, the large or the small. This position is thus explained by the *Nyāyaratnākara* :—

सिद्धे स्थूले तदनुपपत्त्या परमाणवो ऽपि कल्प्यन्ते । स्थूलस्यहि परिमितत्व मसत्सु परमाणुषु नोपपद्यते । अनन्तावयवत्वेहि मूर्त्तैरवयवैरन्योन्यावकाशमप्रयच्छद्भिः अनन्ततद्देश-व्याप्तेरेकेनैव सर्षपेण सर्वं जगत पूर्येत । अतोऽन्ततोऽपिगत्वा केचिन्निरवयवा एवाङ्गीमर्तव्याः इति स्थूलसिद्धौ तदनुपपत्या सिध्यन्त्येव परमाणवः ॥ तस्माद् यदेव किञ्चिदवयवि द्रव्यं गोत्वादि सामान्यं वा साक्षात् प्रतीत्या गम्यते तत्सर्वं परमार्थत एव तथाभूतं प्रत्यक्षं चेत्यभ्यु-पगन्तव्यम् ॥ (न्या० र०)

CHAPTER X

PRAMĀṆA

(A) Pramāṇa (1) Valid Cognition and (2) the Means of Valid Cognition.

We have cleared the ground by setting forth the *Mīmāṁsaka*' view relating to things, the proper understanding of which is incidental to the study of the main subject of *Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā*, which has been declared to be the Knowledge of Duty, *Dharma* (*Jaimini-Sūtra* 1.1.1.).

The understanding of the true nature of *Dharma* or Duty thus being the avowed aim of the *Mīmāṁsaka*, he takes care to examine in detail the exact nature of the Means of Cognition or Knowledge, as a necessary preliminary to determining the right means of securing the knowedge of the true nature of Duty.

The first point to be considered is the nature of Cognition itself.

(B) Prabhākara's View Regarding Cognition and Its Validity.

Cognition is divided into two broad classes, of *Valid* and *Invalid* Cognition—Under *Valid Cognition* are included all those cognitions that bear directly upon their object; and under *Invalid Cognition*, those that bear upon their object only indirectly. At the outset this classification corresponds to the two broad divisions of (1) *Anubhūti*, Apprehension, and (2) *Smṛti*, Remembrance. *Prabhākara* thus regards all Remembrances as invalid (agreeing in this with the *Naiyāyika*) and all Apprehension as valid (differing in this from the *Naiyāyika*).

The *Prābhākara* has provided a full account of his views regarding the whole cognitive process—(vide *Prakaraṇa-Pañchikā*, p. 42 *et. seq.*).

The starting point of the enquiry is—What is *Pramāṇa?* In philosophical literature, this term 'Pramāṇa' has been used somewhat promiscuously: sometimes in the sense of the *Means* of Cognition, the etymology of the word being explained as, '*pramīyatē jñāyate anēna*',—while sometimes it is used in the sense of Valid Cognition itself—with the etymology '*pramīyatē yat*'. In the present context, the term is used in the latter sense of Valid Cognition.

What then is this Valid Cognition? The answer is, Valid Cognition is Apprehension and it is something different from Remembrance; which

latter cannot be valid, inasmuch as it stands in need of a previous cognition. This Siddhānta has been summed up thus—

प्रमाणमनुभूतिः सा स्मृतरन्या-न सा स्मृतिः ।
न प्रमाणं स्मृतिः पूर्वप्रतिपत्तिव्यपेक्षणात् ॥ (*Pra.-Pañchikā*, p. 42)

This exclusion of Remembrance and its definition does not exclude Recognition entirely ; as this latter does not consist entirely of Remembrance, there being an element of direct Cognition in it ; and to that extent it is valid. Recognition appears in the form 'This is the same as that', where the factor represented by 'this' is directly perceived and hence to that extent it bears upon its object directly : while Remembrance bears upon its object wholly indirectly, through the agency of impressions left by previous cognitions.

Even though Valid Cognition has been defined as Apprehension, any wrong cognition cannot be regarded as valid,—not indeed because there is anything invalid in it *per se*,—it would not be a *cognition* if it were so,—but because the judgment or idea resulting from that cognition,—*e.g.*, the cognition of 'Silver' in the Shell, 'this is silver',—represents not one but two cognitions—one pertaining to 'silver' and the other to 'this' ; and of these two, the idea of *silver* is pure Remembrance, as there is no silver before the eye which could be reached by the sense-organ ; and as such not being Apprehension, it cannot be valid ; the other factor in the judgment —the factor of 'this'—is of the nature of pure Apprehension and as such must be regarded as valid. Thus we find that the wrongness of the judgment 'this is silver' lies in the idea of *silver* which is Remembrance,—and this also is regarded as wrong simply because it is not found, later on, to agree with the real state of things, when the Agent proceeds to act up to the judgment and picks up the thing perceived. Even those who regard the entire judgment 'this is silver' as wrong, base this wrongness upon the fact that it is subsequently sublated, set aside, denied,—and not because there is anything inherently wrong in the nature of the Cognition itself. But in reality, even those people cannot deny the validity of the cognition in so far as the element of 'This' is concerned ; as this is not found to be sublated, as it is present in the subsequent sublating judgment also which appears in the form—'*this* is not silver, *this* is shell'. Other instances of wrong cognition are similarly explained. (See below.)

Prabhākara says (*Bṛhatī*, p. 24)—'It is strange indeed how a Congtonii can apprehend an object and yet be invalid'. This idea has the support of *Kumārila* also, who has described 'the validity of the cognition' as consisting in its being an apprehension'—(*Shlo. Vā.* Sū. 2.53).

According to *Prabhākara* it is not a necessary condition of 'Validity' of Cognition that its object should be one that is not already known.

The above definition of *Pramāṇa,* 'Valid Cognition', presupposes the self-validity of Cognition, which must be inherently valid by itself. Valid Cognition can be defined as *Apprehension* only if each and every Apprehension were inherently right and valid. This 'self-validity' of Cognition forms the very key-stone of *Mīmāṁsā.* The reasons why the *Mīmāṁsaka* lays stress upon this doctrine lies in the fact that if this were not so, then Cognitions derived from the Vēda would not be valid or reliable, as the reliability of all Verbal Cognition is dependent upon the veracity of the person using the word and the *Mīmāṁsaka* does not admit of an author or speaker for the *Vēdas,* henee the *Vēda* could not be *reliable.* This would strike at the very foundation of the structure of *Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā.* Then again, if all cognitions were not inherently valid, whence could we have confidence in our own cognitions ? Even when the Cognition may be one which is found subsequently to be not in consonance with reality, the Cognition *as Cognition* remains valid. If it were always necessary for the Cognition to be in consonance with the Object, then it would have to be regarded as having the form of that Object, and this is an absurdity. Because, if the Cognition had the form of the Object it would mean that the two are identical; and in that case, how could one be the *apprehender* and the other the *apprehended ?* Nor is it difficult to distinguish one Cognition from another, when they are formless. Because what is meant by '*Saṁvēdana*' (Cognition or knowledge) that a man has is that there is the manifestation of a special factor of the man's *Dharma* or Merit which focusses his active cooperation in connection with a certain object, and even though this 'Manifestation' is self illumined, that does not render its differentiation impossible, as a Cognition is regarded as appertaining to that particular object with regard to which it favours the activity of the cogniser; and as each Cognition tends to active cooperation in connection with a distinct Object, this would afford all the basis that is necessary for its differentiation from other Cognitions. This formlessness too does not imply the absence of all characteristic features. In regard to every entity, it has to be admitted that it possesses that form in which it is actually manifested; no other criterion is possible; and as all Cognitions are manifested simply as 'Cognition' Cognition can be the only character, or even *form,* that can belong to it. The *form* that is cognised belongs always to the Object.

We have found that Cognition is self-valid, and also self-illumined;

which disposes of the view that "Cognition is perceived through the operation of the Mind, in the same way as Pleasure and Pain are."

This Idealist view has been answered as follows. (In *Bṛhatī Ṛjuvimalā* and *Prakaraṇa-Pañchikā*, p. 63)—Cognition can never be *perceptible;* this has been declared by the Bhāṣya (Text, p. 9)

अर्थविषया हि प्रत्यक्षबुद्धिः, न बुद्धिविषया

—that is, 'what forms the objective of Sense-perception is the *Object*, not the *Cognition*'—This does not mean, however, that the Cognition is never known as *apprehended;* it is certainly *apprehended*, but only as *Cognition*, not as *something cognised*—संवित्तयैवहि संवित् संवेद्या न संवेद्यतया—says Prabhākara. If it were cognisable as something *cognised*, then for every Cognition, it would be necessary to postulate an endless series of Cognitions. What is meant by this distinction is that the Cognition, even though *cognised*, cannot itself form the object (*phala*) of another act of Cognition—तस्यां कर्मभावो न युक्तः । If it were the *object* of another Cognition, it would not be *self-luminous*, and yet we cannot regard the Cognition as entirely *unknown* or *unapprehended;* because it is only when the Cognition is *apprehended* that the Cognition of things becomes possible. The right conclusion thus is that the Cognition is self-apprehended, and its presence is known by means of Inference. What we apprehend by means of this Inference is not the object, but only the *presence* of the object: नाप्यनुमानाद् रूपग्रहणं सन्मात्रग्राहि-अमनुमानं भवति—says the *Bṛhatī*. So in the case in question, all the information provided by Inference is that the Cognition *is* there, the Inference being thus formally stated—'The Cognition exists, because we have the apprehension of its Object'. In this way Cognition falls within the purview of Inference, which is one of the Means of Cognition; and it is in this sense that Cognition is held to be *Pramēya, Cognisable;* but this does not make it *Samvēdya—i.e., Cognisable as an Object.*—Prabhākara draws a subtle distinction between (*Pramēya*) (Cognisable) and '*Samvēdya*' (*object* of Cognition)—*Samvēdana* is that Cognition where the form of the object is apprehended, and this can occur only in the case of objects apprehended through the senses—In the case of the '*Pramēya*', on the other hand, it is not necessary for any *form* or *figure* to be present in consciousness. Thus Cognition cannot be *Samvēdya*, and hence also not *perceptible;* but as having its *presence*, or *existence*, apprehended by means of Inference,—which is one of the *Pramāṇas*,—it has to be regarded as *Pramēya*.

"If every Apprehension is valid, then how about Doubtful and Wrong Cognitions? These certainly are not valid, and yet they are Cognitions".

In answer to the above it is pointed out that the Object of a Cognition is that same thing which is presented to consciousness by it. Thus in the stock-example of Wrong Cognition—"This is *silver*"—in reference to a piece of *shell*—what is presented to consciousness is Silver, which thus is the object of cognition,—and not the Shell, which does not enter into the consciousness at all. For this reason, the Judgment in question is not found to fulfil the conditions of the *Wrong Cognition*, which has been defined as 'the Cognition of a thing as something which is not that thing'. Because in the Cognition in question, we find that it is not the Shell that is cognised as *Silver ;* what happens is that the Shell is not cognised, it does not enter into consciousness at all; but what does enter the consciousness is the Silver. Though the object present before the eye is the Shell, yet, inasmuch as the perceiver fails to notice the distinctive features peculiar to the Shell, and notices only those features that are common to the Shell and the Silver, he fails to apprehend the difference between these two things ; this brings to his mind, presents to his consciousness, the Silver. This cognition of Silver thus is due to the non-perception of the difference between Silver and the object before the eye, that is of the distinctive features of any one of the two. The idea of Silver also comes to the mind by the force of memory, which has been aroused by the perception of the properties common to the two things ; thus the Silver is *remembered ;* but it is not remembered as (*that*)—something perceived in the past,—which would have sufficed to differenciate the '*that* silver' of the past from '*this* silver' before the eyes ;—this non-perception of the '*that*'—factor is due to a certain weakness of the Mind. Thus the apprehension of the Silver represented in the Judgment 'this is Silver' has to be regarded as an act of Memory, a mere Remembrance. The Silver, which has entered into consciousness, not being present before the eyes, could not be regarded as *perceived ;* nor are there any factors available that could bring about the inferential or other kinds of valid Cognition of the Silver in the case. Though the Judgment in question is thus found to partake of the dual character of Remembrance and Direct Apprehension,—and as such differs from the ordinary Valid Cognition of Silver, which is wholly 'Direct Apprehension',—yet in actual experience, it is not known to be so different ; and this for the simple reason that, just as in the case of real Silver, the thing perceived is not cognised as different from Silver,—so also in the case in question. Thus in actual experience, there is found to be no difference between the right and the wrong Cognition of Silver ; specially as both equally give rise to the same kind of activity on the part of the *cogniser*, in both cases he stoops to pick up the thing.

In the other instance of Wrong Cognition—'the Conch-shell is yellow'—what happens is this: The *yellowness* that is perceived is quite real, present in the bile that has affected the eyes,—the whitness of the conch-shell fails to be perceived on account of the same bile which has beset the eyes ;.....thus what is perceived is the conch-shell *without any colour*,—and the *yellowness* that is perceived is perceived *without the object* to which it belongs, as the bile in the eye cannot be seen; thus a colourless object (conch-shell) and an objectless colour (yellowness) being perceived at the same time,—both these cognitions being quite valid so far—what more natural than that the two perceptions should coalesce, and present to consciousness the *yellow conch-shell?* Even when picked up, the conch is found to be yellow; so that in this cognition of the *yellow conch* we do not find anything that would make it *wrong:* in fact the man comes to regard the Cognition as *wrong* only when he comes to know of the disease (Bile) in the eye.

In the same manner in the perception of *two Moons*, the rays of light issue from the two eyes......not simultaneously, but at slightly different points of time; hence it is only natural that the two images of the Moon are produced and imprinted on the retina, and as such presented to the man's consciousness. Thus in this case also, there are two distinct perceptions of the same Moon; but the interval of time between the appearance of the two images on the retina being very subtle, the two coalesce, and give rise to the single cognition of 'two moons'.

In Dream-Cognition also, even though things are only *remembered*—and not directly perceived,—yet they appear in consciousness as actually apprehended at the time: and what occurs is that the factor of *having been apprehended* at some previous time is lost sight of, under the effects of sleep; and it is this factor only that differenciates what is *remembered* from what is *apprehended.* Then as regard the agencies that energise or excite the impressions that bring about the Remembrance,—this is supplied by some Unseen Force which guides the percipient or dreaming souls in their earthly sojourn. If the time during which the man sleeps is one at which he is destined to experience pleasure, the Unseen Agency of his *Karma* energises the impressions that bring to his mind pleasant memories,—and consequently pleasant Dreams; similarly with painful Dreams. This accounts for the fact that Dreams are sometimes pleasant, sometimes painful. This feeling of pleasure or pain,—so far as the actual *feeling* is concerned,—is as real as any that is experienced during waking consciousness.

Thus it is found that whenever there is actual Apprehension or Cognition, there is nothing *wrong* in it; and that the *wrongness* comes in only when an element of *Remembrance* creeps into the Cognition, through some cause or the other. Thus none of the instances of so-called 'Wrong Cognition' militate against the self-validity of Cognitions.

As regards Doubtful Cognitions,—"Is this a pillar or a man?"—what is actually perceived, and enters the consciousness, is only some object endowed with the quality of *tallness;* and this is quite valid so far:—this persception of *tallness* then reminds the man of a number of *tall* things—the pillar, the man, the tree and so forth. Then it is that there comes the doubt as to whether it is this or that particular *tall thing.* Thus in all doubtful cognitions there are two remembrances imolved—and not only one act of Apprehension. Hence this also leaves the self-validity of cognitions untouched.

(B) The Bhāṭṭa View Regarding Cognition and Its Validity.

The question that arises next is in regard to the validity of Cognitions. Is this Validity inherent in the Cognition itself or something extraneous to itself?—There are four alternative views that have been held on this question.

These have been thus set forth in the *Shlokāvārtika* (Sū. 2, 33 *et seq.*):—in regard to all Cognitions we have to consider this—(*a*) Are *Validity* and *Invalidity* both inherent in the Cognition? or (*b*) are both these extraneous? or (*c*) is *Invalidity* inherent and *Validity* is extraneous? or (*d*) is *Validity* inherent and *Invalidity* extraneous? *Validity* is held to be extraneous when it is held to be due to, and brought about by, the defectless efficiency of the agency that brought about the Cognition: and similarly *Invalidity* is held to be extraneous when it is held to be due to defects in the agency that brought about the Cognition.

(*a*) The view that both Validity and Invalidity are inherent in Cognition cannot be accepted, because the two are naturally contradictory and as such cannot belong to the same Cognition. (*b*) Nor can both Validity and Invalidity be wholly extraneous; as, if they went so, the Cognition by itself would be neither valid nor invalid; it would bear no character at all. Whenever a Cognition appears, until the cogniser has had time to find out if it has been due to true and efficient causes or to false and defective causes, —the Cognition would be regarded as neither valid nor invalid; if it is neither, then it is as good as non-existent. (*c*) The third view is that by its nature,

Cognition by itself must be regarded as invalid, its Validity alone being due to extraneous circumstances; the argument in support of this view is that Invalidity, being negative in character, cannot be due to, and brought about by, any extraneous causes,—while Validity, being positive, can be brought about by efficient causes. On the other hand, if Cognitions were inherently valid and their Invalidity were due to extraneous causes,—then even Dream-Cognition would have to be regarded as valid. Under our view, there can be no Validity in Dream-Cognitions, because there are not efficient causes present which could bring about the Validity. Hence the conclusion is that the Validity of Cognitions is due to the efficiency of the causes, while by themselves, Cognitions are inherently invalid.—The point of this third view is that the Validity of valid congitions also should depend upon the efficiency and consequent reliability of the person who spoke the word—and as, in the case of the Vēda, there is no author or speaker according to the *Mīmāṁsaka*, there could be no reliability and hence the Veda could not be a reliable source of knowledge regarding Duty, *Dharma.*

(*d*) It is on this account that the *Mīmāṁsaka* has insisted upon the *fourth* view, that all Cognitions are inherently valid, and it is only *Invalidity* that is imposed upon them from without, when it is found that its source has been defective. It is agreed that if *Validity* were wholly non-existent in the Cognition, it could not be produced therein by anything else. Under the view that the *Validity* of the Cognition is due to the efficiency of its source—to what could the *Validity* of the Cognition of this efficiency be due ? It could only be due to another Cognition of the efficiency of the source of this second Cognition; and so on and on, there would be an infinite regress. On the other hand, if *Validity* belongs to the Cognition by itself, them there would be no need of any other Cognitions; specially as any idea of its *Invalidity* could not appear, for the simple reason that there would be no Cognition of any defect in the source of the initial Cognition. The conclusion therefore is that the Cognition is valid *qua* Cognition, and this *Validity* can be set aside only when one comes to perceive a defect in its source (*Shlo. Vā.* Sū. 2, 53 *et. seq.*).

The *Shāstradīpikā* (pp. 37-38) makes the following remarks:—(1) The perception of an object leads, not to a futher cognition of that perception, but to the *Āparokṣya*, the *prakaṭatā*, *i.e.*, *direct apprehensibility*—of that object, and (2) every act of Perception involves a certain relationship between the Perceiver and the Perceived,—the former being the *active agent* and the latter the *objective* of that act of Perception; this *agent-object*

relationship is not possible without some activity on the part of the agent; hence the presence of this relationship leads to the inference of its invariable concomitant, the action of the agent; and it is this action which, in the case of knowledge, is known as 'Cognising'; the mentally perceived relationship between the cognising *Soul* and the cognised *Object* leads to the inference of the act of *knowing* or *cognising.*

This Cognition is a *Vikriyā,* modification, of the Soul,—and this is not inconsistent with the *Eternity* of the Soul,—says Kumārila (*Shlo. Vā.* Perception, 52-53).

As regards Wrong Cognitions, the *Bhāṭṭa* view is as follows:—In so far as the judgment 'this is silver' involves a Cognition *per se,* it is quite valid; it is quite valid for the cogniser at the time that he has the Cognition; that it is sublated or rejected by subsequent experience is another matter; the subsequent experience must be regarded as destroying the Validity that belonged to the Cognition as *cognised*—तस्मात् स्वतःप्रामाण्यं प्राप्तम् अर्थान्यथात्वकारणदोषज्ञानाभ्यामपोह्यते इत्यवश्यमङ्गीकरणीयम् । (*Shāstradīpikā,* p. 15, line 15.) And again—यत्न प्रयत्नेनान्विष्यमाणोऽपि कारदोषो बाधकज्ञानं वा नोपलभ्यते तत् प्रमाणम्—इतरच्चाप्रमाणम् । (*Shāstradīpikā,* p. 31, line 5.)

As regards Dream-Cognition, says the *Shāshtradīpikā* (p. 39, line 10)—

'In Dreams also, what is cognised is the external object as perceived elsewhere and presented to consciousness during sleep by an Unseen Agency; the Cognition is quite valid so far as the object is concerned, *the wrongness* or Invalidity comes in only when it is regarded as something actually *apprehended at the time,* and not as only *remembered.* And the cause of this lies in such discrepancies as are due to sleep. Thus the Invalidity pertains only to the accessory details, not to the Cognition as *Cognition.*

According to Kumārila, it is a necessary condition in the Validity of a Cognition that its object should be one that is *not already known.*

Kumārila appears to have been much misunderstood in regard to his views on the Self-Validity of Cognition. Nearly all later writers have declared that he is not an upholder of the inherent Self-Validity of Cognition. Without entering into a lengthy discussion on this point, we shall only quote the words of *Kumārila* himself:—

On p. 54 of the *Shlokavārtika* (Chodanā-Sūtra, 33) the question to be discussed is thus propounded.

सर्वविज्ञानविषयमिदं तावत् परीक्ष्यताम् ।
प्रमाणत्वाप्रमाणत्वे स्वतः किं परतोऽथवा ॥

"In regard to all Cognitions, this has to be considered,—Are Validity and Invalidity inherent in them or extraneous?"

The conclusion is in no unmistakable terms as under on p. 59.

स्वतः सर्वप्रमाणानां प्रामाण्यमवधार्यताम् ।

'It should be understood that the Validity of all Means (or Forms) of Cognition is inherent in them".

And on p. 61

तस्माद् बोधात्मकत्वेन प्राप्ता बुद्धेः प्रमाणता ।।
अर्थान्यथात्वहेतूत्थदोषज्ञानादपोद्यते ।।

"Thus it follows that every Cognition, *as Cognition*, must be valid, this *validity* may be set aside if subsequently it is found that it has had its source in some defect in the Cognitive Process as evidenced by the object cognised being in reality otherwise then as apprehended by the Cognition in question".

In this discussion people have confounded the issues by mixing up the question of what is *Pramāṇa*, the *Means of Cognition*, and what its *Phala*, 'Resultant'; though on this point Kumārila is not at all particular—He says (*Shlo. Vā.* Pratyakṣa, 51)

प्रमाणफलभावश्च यथेष्टं परिकल्प्यताम् ।

"As regards what is the *Means* and what the *Resultant* it might be assumed just as one chooses".

But even on this point of प्रमाणफलभाव he sets forth his view clearly as follows—

विशेषणे तु बोद्धव्ये यदालोचनमात्रकम्
प्रसूते निश्चयं पश्चात् तस्य प्रामाण्यकल्पना ।।
निश्चयस्तु फलं तत्र......................
हानादिबुद्धिफलता प्रमाणं चेद् विशेष्यधीः ।। (*Ibid.*, p. 71—73.)

"When we come to examine the details, we find that the mere vague indeterminate Cognition which brings about the definite Cognition is the Means, and the Definite Cognition is the Resultant. In case this latter is regarded as the Means, then the notion of the acceptability or rejectability of the cognised thing is to be regarded as its Resultant".

There has been a confusion in people's minds regarding this point between (*a*) *Svataḥpramāṇa* "Self-valid" and (*b*) '*Svaprakāsha*', "Self-illumined". In regard to (*a*) all Mīmaṁsakas are agreed; it is only in regard to (*b*) that there is some difference of opinion as shown later on.

(*c*) MURĀRI MISHRA'S VIEW.

According to Murāri Mishra, Cognition is *perceived*, *pratyakṣa*—says the *Nyāyakustubha ;* and the *validity* of the Cognition is also made known by those same circumstances and implements that bring about the Cognition itself; it is not due to anything extraneous to the Cognition. He is as much the upholder of "*Svataḥ-prāmāṇya*" as Kumārila. According to Murāri, the validity of the Cognition is apprehended by the Representative Cognition that follows in the wake of every Cognition; *e.g.*, the idea "I see the jar" which follows after the seeing of the Jar.—Says *Vardhamāna* in his gloss on the *Kusumānjali.*—According to Murāri Mishra, like the Cognition itself, the Validity of the Cognition also is apprehended through the Mind.

These three views of the three Mīmāṁsakas—Prabhākara, Kumārila, and Murāri Mishra—are found summed up by Paksadhara Mishra in his *Āloka*, with the remark that—"There is this factor common in the views of all the three *Mīmāṁsakas*—that the validity of Cognition is apprehended through precisely those conditions that bring about the Cognition itself; (*a*) under *Gurumata*, it is apprehended through its self-luminous character, (*b*) under *Bhāṭṭamata*, through Inference based on its being *apprehended*, and (*c*) under *Murārimata*, through the Representative Cognition". (Palm leaf Ms., Banares Sanskrit College, 15a-15b).

Herein may lie the clue to the saying—मुरारेस्तृतीयः पन्थाः ।

CHAPTER XI

DIFFERENT KINDS OF VALID COGNITION: PERCEPTION

Valid Cognition has been classed by the *Mīmāṁsaka* under six (by Prabhākara, only five) heads, *viz.* :—

(1) Perceptional,
(2) Inferential,
(3) Scriptural (Vedic),
(4) Analogical,
(5) Presumptive, and
(6) Negational.

(A) Shabara's Views.

That Cognition by men which appears when there is contact of the sense-organs is "Sense-perception,"—says the Sūtra (1.1.4).

The following explanations are provided by Shabara (Translation, page 8 *et seq.*).—What is meant is, that Perception is Cognition which a man has when his Sense-organs are in contact with the Object cognised ;—it is the cognition of an Object which is actually present at the time. Hence it cannot be the Means of Knowing Dharma.—The only factor meant to be stressed is the fact of its being such as is possible only when there is cantact between the Sense-organ and the Object.

(P. 10)—What is real Perception is never wrong, and what is wrong is not Perception. What is real Perception has been shown in the Sūtra (1.1.4), the meaning of which is that —"That Cognition is real Perception which appears when there is contact of the Sense-organs with the object perceived" ; that is to say, when the Sense-organ are in contact with the Object actually perceived, the resultant Cognition of the man is real Perception,—and it is not real Perception when the Object perceived is different from that with which the Sense-organ is in contact. (Therefore, in a case where the Shell is cognised as Silver, what is cognised is the Silver, while what is in contact with the sense-organ is the Shell ; hence this is not a case of real Perception at all.)

(P. 11)—When it is found that, at the time of Perception there is no contact of the Sense-organ concerned with any Object other than the one

perceived, it follows that the perception has appeared on the actual contact of the Object actually perceived; and when the contrary is the case, the Perception is taken as following upon contact with something other than the object perceived. In cases where a Perception is subsequently followed by a sublative Cognition to the contrary,—such as "in reality it is not as I have perceived it, this Perception has been wrong,"—it is understood that the Perception in question had appeared on the contact of the Sense-organ with something other than the Object perceived; while in cases where no such sublative Cognition appears it is understood that the Perception had appeared on actual contact with the object perceived.

Q. "How can this distinction be made before the sublating Cognition appears? At the time that a certain Perception comes, there is nothing to differentiate a right Cognition from a wrong one, until the subsequent appearance or otherwise of the sublative Cognition".

A. A Cognition is wrong,—(*a*) when the Mind is affected by some sort of derangement,—or (*b*) when the Sense-organ concerned is beset by disabilities,—or (*c*) when the object itself suffers from such disabilities as being too small for perception and so forth. In cases where none of these three,—Mind, Sense-organ and Object,—suffers from these defects, the Cognition is right. What brings about a right Cognition is the contact of the Sense-organ, the Mind and the Object; when there is no such contact, the Cognition is wrong. Hence what leads to wrong Cognition is a defect in one or the other of the three factors concerned—Mind, Sense-organ and Object. That this is so is learnt from the fact that on the disappearance of the defects, there appears that Cognition which is recognised by all persons as right. Whether or not any of the three factors is defective is ascertained when, even on careful scrunity, a defect not being detected, it is concluded that there is no defect,—simply because there is nothing to show that there is a defect. From all this it follows that only that Cognition is wrong the means whereof are defective, or with regard to which there is a sublative Cognition that 'it is wrong'; and no other Cognition can be regarded as wrong.

(Pp. 12—15)—Perception is not devoid of real basis in the external world,—nor is it a *void;* it has a real substratum in the external world ....Thus the conclusion is that Perception is never false or wrong.

(B) Prabhākara's Views on Perception.

(*Prakaraṇa-Pañchika*—p. 52 et seq.)—Perception is direct apprehension —"*Sākṣāt pratītiḥ*;" it envisages the Apprehended Object, the Apprehended

Person, and the Apprehension itself. In each act of Perception therefore the idea of each of these factors enters as its constituent factor. [This distinctive view of Perception has been called the "*Tripuṭī-pratyakṣa-vāda*", *i.e.*, the Doctrine of Tripartite Perception.] Direct Perception envisaging the apprehended Object proceeds directly from Sense-contact. The number of Sense-organs is six,—1. Olfactory, for the perceiving of odour; 2. Visual, for the perceiving of colour and form; 3. Gestatory, for the perceiving of taste; 4. Tactile, for the perceiving of touch; 5. Auditory, for the perceiving of sound; and 6. the Internal Organ or Mind, for the perceiving of such purely mental states as those of pleasure, pain and the like.

As a matter of ordinary experience, it is found that our Cognitions of things are not ever-lasting; they appear at only certain times. Thus, being ephemeral, they must have some Cause. Every Effect has two kinds of Causes,—the *Material* or *Constituent* Cause, to which it owes its material composition, and the *Immaterial* cause, which, in most cases, takes the form of certain qualities, conditions or circumstances which, in proximity with, and through, the Material Cause, help in the bringing about of the effect. For instance, the *Material* Cause of the Jar is the clay-particles that compose it, and the conjunction of those particles is its *Immaterial Cause.* The *Immaterial* Cause of an effect may subsist either in its *Material* Cause, or in the *Material* Cause of that Material Cause. In the case of Perceptions, we have the Percipient Soul as the *Constituent* Cause, and when we seek for its *Immaterial* Cause, we find that there cannot be anything subsisting in the Cause of the Soul, as the Soul, being eternal, can have no Cause; hence the *Immaterial* Cause sought after must be something subsisting in the Soul itself; further, as it is only a quality that can subsist in a Substance, it follow that the *Immaterial* Cause of Perception must be a quality;—then again, we know that Perception which is a particular kind of Cognition, is a "specific" quality of the Soul, and also that for such a quality belonging to an eternal Substance, the *Immaterial* Cause must be in the form of contact with some other substance; for example, the colour produced in the Earth-atom has, for its *Immaterial* Cause, the contact with Fire; from this it follows that Cognition must have for its *Immaterial* Cause, its contact with some other substance; and inasmuch as we have nothing to show that the other substance is something subsisting in yet another substance, we conclude that the Substance whose contact would be the *Immaterial* cause of Cognition must be one that has an existence independent of other Substances. Of such independent substances, there are two kinds—(1) Those that are all-pervading in character,—as Time, Space, etc., and (2) Atoms. It is a

well-known fact that no contact (which, by its very nature, must be ephemeral) with an all-pervading substance can be brought about by any Cause, as an all-pervading substance is in permanent contact with all things; hence it cannot be said to come or be brought into contact with anything. Nor can their eternal contact be the Cause of anything; as being eternal, it could bring about only eternal effects, which is a contradiction in terms.—From all this it follows that the Contact which is the *Immaterial* Cause of Perception must be one that subsists in something *atomic;* the contact of atomic substances is brought about by the action—movement—of the Atoms themselves; Atoms can move up to one or more substances, thereby creating so many contacts for themselves, one after the other.—This Atomic Substance again must reside in the body ensouled by the perceiving Soul; as none other could contain the substratum of the *Immaterial* cause of the Perception of which that Soul is the Material or Constituent cause. The action of the Atomic Substance in the body,—tending to bring about the contact—is due to its coming into contact with the Soul which (in every act of Cognition) puts forth an effort towards the act of cognising. The only Atomic Substance that fulfils these conditions is the *Manas*, the Internal Organ. This *Manas* alone by itself, brings about such effects as Cognitions, Pleasure, Pain, Desire, Aversion, Effort and so forth; it also brings about Remembrance when aided by Impressions left by past Cognitions.

Thus we arrive at the conclusion that the *Manas* or Mind, by itself, is found to be devoid of any such qualities as Colour, Odour and the rest, and, as such, it cannot lead the Soul to experience or cognise these qualities; hence for this, it stands in need of such other organs as may be characterised by these qualities; for the perception of Colour, for instance, the Mind will need the aid of an organ of which Colour is the distinctive quality; for the perception of Odour, the help of an Odorous Organ; and so on, with the perceptions of Touch, Sound, and Taste. Now we know that the organ of which Colour is the distinctive quality must be one constituted by *Tejas* or Light; as Colour is a feature of Light; and this proves the existence of the *Luminous Organ*, the Organ of Vision, as leading to the perception of Colour. Similarly the Organ with Odour as its distinctive quality must be one composed of *Earth;* as it is to Earth alone that Odour belongs; and this proves the existence of the *Earthly Organ*, the Olfactory Organ, which leads to the perception of Odour. The organ with Taste as its distinctive quality must be composed of Water, as it is to Water that Taste belongs; this proves the existence of the *Aqueous Organ*, the Gestatory Organ, which

leads to the perception of Taste. The Organ with Sound as its distinguishing feature must be composed of *Ākāsha*, as it is to Ākāsha that Sound belongs; this proves the existence of the *Ākāshic Organ*, the *Auditory Organ;* which leads to the perception of Sound. Lastly, the Organ having Touch for its distinguishing quality must be composed by Air, as it is to Air that Touch belongs; and this proves the existence of the *Airy Organ*, the Tactile Organ, which leads to the perception of Touch.

Contact of the Mind is regarded as a necessary factor in the Perceptions by means of all the Sense-Organs; because of the fact that, even when the object to be perceived is in close contact with the Sense-Organs concerned, it fails to be perceived, if at the same time the said Organ also is not in contact with the Mind; that is, if the man is Absent-Minded. Thus in the case of all perceptions there are four contacts necessary :—

(1) Contact of the object with the Sense-Organ; (2) that of the distinctive qualities of the object with the Sense-Organ; (3) that of the Sense-Organ with the Mind; (4) that of the Mind with the Soul.

In the perception of Pleasure and Pain and such other purely mental or subjective states, only two contacts are required,—that of the Pleasure with the Mind and that of the Mind with the Soul.

(B) As regards the *Object* Apprehended by Perception, it has been classed under three heads :—

(1) Substances, (2) Universal (Class or Community) and (3) Qualities.

To the first category belong such substances as are tangible and of sufficiently large dimensions (substances other than these being *imperceptible*) partaking of the nature of Earth, Water, Air and Fire. To the third category of *Qualities*, belong such qualities as Colour, Taste, Odour, Touch, Number, Dimensions, Separateness, Conjunction, Disjunction, Priority, Posteriority, Pleasure, Pain, Desire, Aversion and Effort,—all which are *perceptible*. How the second category of 'Universal' or 'Class' is perceptible has been already explained above.

(B) As regards the third factor in Perception,—*viz.*, the *Apprehenison* itself—it has been divided into two classes :—

(1) *Savikalpaka*, Determinate, Conceptual, (2) *Nirvikalpaka*, Non-Determinate, 'Non-Conceptual'.

In regard to the *Nirvikalpaka*, 'Non-Conceptual', Perception, the view of Prabhākara is the golden mean between two exterme views. He

does not accept the *Bauddha* view that what forms the object of Perception is the mere '*Svalakṣaṇa*', the 'Specific Individuality', of the thing apprehended by it ; and his reason for rejecting this view is that, as a matter of fact, the Non-Conceptual Perception does apprehend the class-character, the Universal also of the thing: Nor does he accept the *Bhāṭṭa* view that 'in Non-Conceptual Perception, neither the Class character nor the Specific Individuality is presented to Consciousness, all that is presented is the Object by itself, pure and simple, wherein these two subsist' (*Shlo.-Vā.-Su.* 4, 113). Nor does Prabhākara accept the view that it is only the Class-Character that is apprehended, because he finds that after all, the Object is apprehended as an *individual* and not merely as belonging to a *class*. Having rejected these views, Prabhākara accepts the view that what is apprehended in the first or non-conceptual, state of Perception is both the Class-Character (the *Universal*) and the Specific Individuality ; but with this difference that, inasmuch as no other object has as yet entered into the Apprehension, the thing is not apprehended as actually being an *individual belonging to a definite class ;* because a thing can be cognised *as an Individual* only in comparison to, or in relation with, other things,—and cognised as an 'Individual' only *in comparison with other things ;* and so it follows that so long as no other thing has presented itself to consciousness, even though what is apprehended is actually *an Individual belonging to a Class*, this mixed character of the thing cannot be fully comprehended until some other things have entered into consciousness, until which time the Perception remains *non-determiate, non-conceptual.* (See *Bṛhatī*, pp. 50 *et seq.*).

As regards the other, the *Savikalpaka* or *Conceptual*, Determinate, Perception,—it follows in the wake of the *Non-Conceptual* Perception, and apprehends the same object as actually being an Individual possessed of some well-defined specific features peculiar to itself and also certain class-characteristics in common with other things, and thus belonging to that 'Universal', 'Class' or 'Community'. (See *Bṛihatī*, p. 50.) The object in contact with the organ of Perception is one, only *one Individual thing*, and *no other things ;* and hence it may be questioned how the Perception can apprehend it as *an Individual possessed of the said class-characteristics*, etc.,—which presupposes the apprehension of things other than the one in contact with the Sense-organ concerned. But the fact of the matter is that what really apprehends the object is neither the Perception, nor the Sense-organ, but the *Soul* which, by its very nature, apprehends all that can be apprehended ; hence what happens is that, just after the Soul has had the *Non-Conceptual* Perception of the thing, there come to the Mind those other things also—those from

which it differs and also those with whom it has certain characteristics in common; and this accounts for the aforesaid *mixed* character of *Conceptual Perception.*

This *Conceptual Perception*, even though apprehending the same thing as that apprehended by the preceding *Non-Conceptual* Perception, is yet a *valid* Cognition; inasmuch as it also apprehends certain such factors as had not figured in the *Non-Conceptual* Perception. Though there is a certain element of Remembrance in this *Conceptual Perception*, that appertains to the *other things* in relation to the Object perceived,—not to this Object itself, hence so far as the Object is concerned, that Element of Remembrance does not vitiate the validity of the Perception.

The second factor entering into Perception is the '*Apprehender*'. In all Cognitions—be they either *Direct Apprehension* or *Remembrance*,—the *Apprehender* always figures as an essential factor; so long as the apprehending Soul does not become manifest, there is no Apprehension at all; because all Cognitions are in the form 'I know'. It must be admitted therefore that whenever anything is cognised, it is cognised along with the *Cogniser;* and the Cognition of the Cognising Soul is always of the nature of *Direct Apprehension.* Even when the Cognition of the object is Inferential or Verbal, the cognition of the Cognising Soul is, in every act of Cognition, purely *Direct* or *Perceptional*, obtained through the agency and contact of the Mind.

The factor of 'Apprehension' also is always self-cognised by Direct Apprehension (see above),—even the Inferential or the Vebal Cognition is apprehended by itself directly.

Though all these three factors—Apprehension. Apprehended and Apprehender—figure in every act of Preception, yet there is this difference that, so far as the Apprehender—Soul—and the Apprehended Object—are concerned, these are something different from the Apprehension itself, while the Apprehension is not different from itself. The reason for this lies in the very nature of things. The Apprehension being of the nature of Light, Illumination or Manifestation, does not stand in need of any other thing to manifest it or make it apprehended; it is therefore *Self-apprehended;* the Apprehender—Soul—and the Apprehended Object,—on the other hand, are not of the nature of Light or Illumination; hence for the manifestation of these they require something different from themselves, which is of the nature of Light. That the Apprehender—Soul—and the Apprehended—Object—are not of the nature of *Light* is proved in the following manner:—

We know, as a matter of fact, that in the waking state, both the Apprehender and the Object figure in the Apprehension; but neither of these really figures in the Apprehension during deep sleep; and yet it cannot be denied that they are there all the time. The fact of their being there, and yet not appearing in Consciousness, proves that they are not of the nature of Light. The case of the Apprehension on the other hand is totally different; whenever and wherever it exists, it is self-manifest and self-apprehended; it is thus neither like the Apprehender nor like the Apprehended Object, both of which are never apprehended except through the Apprehension.

As regards the question of *Pramāṇa* and *Phala*, *Prabhākara* holds that if the term '*Pramāṇa*' be taken to mean *that which is cognised,—i.e.,* the Cognition itself,—then it is this Cognition itself that is the *Pramāṇa, Valid Cognition;* and in this case the *Phala*—the Resultant, Effect,—would consist in either the *acceptance* or the *rejection* by the Cognising Agent, of the object Cognised, or his indifference towards it;—these three being the attitudes taken by the Cogniser towards the things that he cognises. If, on the other hand, the term '*Pramāṇa*' is taken as 'that *by which* something is cognised,'—*i.e.*, the *Means* of Cognition;—then the name '*Pramāṇa*' would apply to the *Mind-Soul Contact* (which is the element common to all cognition); and in this case, the Cognition itself would be the '*Phala*', the Resultant.—So also in the case of the name '*Pramāṇa*' being applied either to the cognising Sense-Organ or to the Contact with the Mind,—the Cognition itself would be the *Phala*, as it is towards this result that all the said agencies are operative.

(C) Bhāṭṭa View of Perception.

There are six Sense-Organs (as according to Prabhākara) (*Shāstradīpikā*, p. 21). The contact of these and the process of 'perception' have been described under 'Sense-Organs' above.

As a matter of common experience, when an Object is first perceived—be it a Substance or Quality or a 'Universal'—it is perceived in its own pure form, free from all distinctive features; our own experience is the sole criterion and authority for the view that whenever the Object comes within the range of our Sense-Organs, and our Mind is not 'absent', we perceive the Object *by itself;*—the Cognition that appears of it is a mere *Ālochana* or *Simple Perception*, called '*nirvikalpaka*', *Non-conceptual*—appertaining to the Object *itself* pure and simple, resembling the cognition by a new-born infant. (*Shlo. Vā. Pratyakṣa* 112.)—This has been called

Nirvikalalpaka-pratyakṣa, Non-conceptual Perception. This is followed by a fuller perception of the thing as having certain distinctive features—such as *belonging to a certain Community or 'Universal'*, bearing a certain *name* and so forth. The former is somewhat indistinct and the latter quite distinct; the latter is called *'Savikalpaka-Pratyakṣa'*, *Conceptual Perception.* Some people have held that this latter is the only Perception and there is no *Non-conceptual* Perception. But this is contrary to all experience. What is apprehended by the *Non-conceptual* Perception is *a vague undefined sort of 'something'* which might embrace any number of things; while what is apprehended by the *Conceptual Perception* is a *definite thing* with its own individual characteristics.—(*Shāstradīpikā,* pp. 22—24.) (See *Shlo. Vā. Pratyakṣa,* pp. 112, 120 *et seq.*) Both are 'Perception' because Sense-born (*Nyā. Ratnā,* p. 175).

On the question of what is *'Pramāṇa'* and what its *Phala, Kumārila* is not very particular. (*Shlo. Vā. Pratyakṣa,* p. 59.) He apparently accepts the view of *Prabhākara,* which appears to be the commonsense view. (See *Shlo. Vā. Pratyakṣa,* p. 70 *et. seq.*)

Pleasure etc. are amenable to *Sense-Perception,* through the instrumentality of the *Mind,* which is a 'Sense-Organ'. (*Ibid.,* p. 83.)

As regards *'Yogic'* (Mystic) Perception, some people have held that these apprehend even past and future things,—also those that are too subtle or are hidden from view and too remote and so forth. They argue that in view of this fact, Perception cannot be regarded as restricted to things *present* only. The answer to this is that the Perception of the Mystic also cannot differ from the Perception of the ordinary man; and so long as it is *Perception,* it must appertain to things *present* only; and what does not pertain to *present* things cannot be regarded as Perception. Such Cognitions may be regarded as 'Intuitional', due to *Pratibhā,* Intuition; but such *intuitional* Cognition cannot be always free from doubt. (*Ibid.,* pp. 26—37.)

CHAPTER XII

ANUMĀNA: INFERENCE

(A) Shabara's View.

[*Shabara-Bhāṣya*—Trs., p. 15]—When the Perception of one factor of a well-recognised relationship (of Invariable Concomitance) leads to the cognition of the other factor of that relationship,—which latter is not in contact with the person's Sense-Organs,—this secod Cognition is what is called '*Anumāna*', 'Inference', (Inferential Cognition). Inference and the other forms of Cognition also presuppose, and are based bupon, Sense-perception. (Trs., p. 8.)

What is meant is that the cognition of the permanent relationship between two things helps in the Inferential Cognition by providing to the Agent the idea of the other factor of the relationship when one factor is cognised; when the observer perceives a certain thing, and recalls to his mind the permanent relationship that that thing has been known to bear to another thing,—this *recalled* idea of the relationship presents to his mind the apprehension of the other factor of that relationship, and to this apprehension is given the name 'Inferential Cognition'.—(*Prakraṇa-pañchikā*, p. 74.)

[*Shabara-Bhāṣya*, p. 15]—This Inferential Cognition is of two kinds: (1) That based upon the *Directly-perceived* relationship, and (2) that based upon a *generalised* relationship; as an instance of the former, we have the Inferential Cognition of Fire following from the Cognition of Smoke (which is based upon the invariable concomitance of Smoke and Fire, which has been directly perceived in the Kitchen);—and as an example of the *second* kind of Inferential Cognition, we have the case where, finding that the Sun changes its position, we infer that 'the Sun is moving,'—on the ground of our experience that, in the case of the person Devadatta, we have found that it is only after he moves that he changes his position; which experience has led us to the *generalised* Premiss that 'whenever an object changes its position, it moves;' and it is on this *generalised* premiss that the Inference of the Sun's movement is based.

(B) Prābhakara View of Inference

[*Ṛjuvimalā*, p. 49]—The *relationship* upon which Inference is based must be one that is *Unfailing*, ever true and permanent; *e.g.*, that which

subsists between Cause and Effect, between Whole and Part, between Substance and Quality, between Qualities subsisting in the same Substance, and so forth: for instance, the relationship between Fire (Cause) and Smoke (Effect).

[*Ṛjuvimalā*, p. 95]—*Question*—"What is that Means of Knowledge by which we obtain the right knowledge of the permanent and unfailing character of the said *relationship?* It cannot be known through Perception, which is operative only in regard to the things *in the present* and in contact with the Sense-Organs. Nor could it be known through Inference or Presumption, as both of these also would, in their turn, depend upon like relationships, which would thus involve an infinite regress.—Nor lastly could it be known through Perception obtained through the instrumentality of the Mind alone (irrespectively of Sense-Contact); because if the Mind alone by itself were to bring about such Cognitions, then men would become omniscient; and there would be no limitation upon the reach and functioning of the Mind".

This difficulty has been met in the following manner:—The relationship is cognised through that same Means of Cognition by which the members of the relationship are cognised; *e.g.*, between Fire and Smoke, all relationships are cognised by means of Perception through the Senses; the relationships being apprehended as qualifications belonging to the two things (Fire and Smoke), which latter are *perceived* by themselves. The particular time and place also are perceived as qualifying adjuncts of those same things. Thus it is that Fire and Smoke become *perceived* as qualified by a qualifying Relationship and by certain specifications of Time and Place. The next stage in the process is the recognition of the fact that while, in some cases, Fire is found to be concomitant with Smoke, there are instances where it is not so; *e.g.*, in the case of the Red-hot Iron; this gives rise to the conviction that the Relationship (of concomitance) of *Fire* with *Smoke* is not *constant*, but qualified by variations of Time and Place;—as for *Smoke*, on the other hand, it is never found apart from *Fire;* and this gives rise to the conviction that Smoke is *always, invariably*, concomitant with Fire; that is, the said Relationship of *Smoke* and *Fire* is contant. After this conviction has dawned upon the mind, all that is needed for the forthcoming Inferential Cognition (of Fire) is the apprehension of the mere existence of Smoke; for which apprehension alone there is need for the operation of a Means of Cognition; and when once this existence has been apprehended, the idea of the connection and presence of Fire

follows naturally from the pre-conceived notion of the said relationship between Fire and Smoke. Thus then all that is needed for the apprehension of the Inferential Cognition is supplied by *Sense-Perception* itself. This view may be open to the objection that, under the above explanation, the Cognition of *Smoke* would include within itself the Cognition of *Fire* also, and thus there would be nothing left unknown which would be cognised by the resultant Inferential Cognition; and this last would therefore cease to be *Valid Cognition, Pramāṇa.* This objection would have had some force against the *Prābhākara,* only if *Pramāṇa,* Valid Cognition, had been defined as that which affords the cognition of something *not already cognised.* As a matter of fact however *Prabhākara* does not make this a necessary condition in the *Validity* of a Cognition; he defines it simply as *Apprehension,* and certainly the Cognition of Fire following upon the Cognition of *Smoke* is 'Apprehension'. Then again, in all cases of Inferential Cognition, the previous knowledge of the relationship between the 'Subject' and the 'Probans' is absolutely necessary; and hence Inferential Cognition must always pertain to things *already known.* The reason why Inferential Cognition does not appear in regard to each and every thing known to us lies in the fact that there can be no Cognition of any sort unless the Agent wishes it (*i.e.,* has his mind turned towards it); and in a case where all that we wish to know regarding a certain thing is already known by other and simpler means of knowledge, there is no occasion for us to recall to our minds the various relationships borne by the thing concerned; and hence the idea of the relationship not being before the Mind, no Inferential Cognition ensues.—(*Vide Prakaraṇapañchikā,* p. 76.)

The very definition of *Inferential Cognition* serves to indicate all the more important defects in the Inferential process,—which defects have been called *'Hetvābhāsa'*, *Defective* or *Fallacious Reason.* For instance, (*a*) the condition that 'the relationship between the two factors must be one that has been previously known' precludes the *Asādhāraṇa* or *Too Specific Reason* (*Probans*). As a matter of fact, the character that belongs specifically to the 'Subject' cannot form the basis of any valid Inference; because such a character could not have been perceived anywhere else, and thus this character along with the Subject could never be known as *related* to any third object, and yet it is the relationship to this *third* object that forms the essence of an Inferential conclusion. For example, the Earch is related to Odorousness by such a peculiar relationship that that relationship cannot indicate the Earth as being related to anything other than the said *Odorousness.*—(*b*) The condition that 'there must be a clear relationship

between the two factors' precludes the '*Bādhita*' *Anulled Probans; e.g.*, when the eternality of Word. Sound is sought to be established on the basis of its *being an Effect*, it is found that no positive relationship is possible between the character of 'Eternality' and that of *being an Effect*,—the two being naturally contradictory; for this reason the said Inference cannot be valid.—(*c*) The condition that 'the relationship should be infallible, permanent' precludes the *Sādhāraṇa*, *Too Wide Probans; e.g.*, when the 'Eternality' of Word-Sound is sought to be proved on the basis of its *being cognisable*, it is found that the relationship between 'Eternality' and 'Cognisability' is not permanent, inasmuch as there are many things that are *cognisable* without being *eternal;* and hence the said relationship cannot lead to a valid Inference of *Eternality*.—(*d*) The condition that 'one factor of the relationship (which is to be the Probans) must be *perceived* or well known in order to bring about the Inferential Cognition' precludes the '*Asiddha*', *Impossible or Unknown Probans; e.g.*, when the fact of things like Merit and Demerit being *perceptible* to *Buddha* is sought to be proved on the ground of *His Omniscience*,—it is found that, inasmuch as this 'Omniscience has never been perceived or well known at all' it cannot lead to a valid Inference.

Apart from these *Fallacies*, the *Prābhākara* does not accept any other. For instance, he does not admit of the *Neutralised Probans* ('*Satparatipraksa*'). His reason for this is that it is impossible for two contradictory characters to be predicated of the same 'Subject', as is presupposed by the Fallacy of 'Neutralisation'; as under the circumstances, the two Inferences cannot be equally *valid*, as is implied by this fallacy; such contradictory Inferences would be possible only when the real character of the 'Subject' would be unknown. (See *Prakaraṇapañchikā*, p. 77.)

The Object of *Inferential Cognition* is of two kinds:—(1) *Dṛṣṭasvalakṣaṇa*, that of which the specific individuality or feature is *perceived*, and (2) the *Adṛṣṭasvalakṣaṇa*, that of which the said feature is *not perceived*. To the former category belong all such things as Fire and the like; and to the second category, such super-sensuous things as the 'Capacity' of things, —the specific feature of which cannot be perceived, and yet it is possbible for us to cognise its permanent and infallible relationship to get at its *Inferential Cognition*. For instance, we cannot perceive the *burning capacity* of Fire, and yet we can *infer* its existence from noting its Effect produced upon things. (See *Prakaraṇapañchikā*, p. 78.)

As to what is the '*Pramāṇa*' and what the *Resultant*, in the case of Inference, the conclusion is the same as in the case of *Perception*. That is

to say, if we regard '*Pramāṇa*' as synonymous with 'Valid' Cognition (*Pramiti*),—and hence '*Anumāna* as synonymous with 'Inferential Cognition', —then what is '*Anumāna*', Inference, is the *Cognition of the Subject, Fire*, proceeding from the Mind-Soul contact, as influenced by the perception of the Inferential Indicative (Smoke); and the 'Resultant' in this case would consist of the acceptance or rejection of the *cognised* object by the *cognising* Agent.—If, on the other hand, '*Pramāṇa*' is regarded as the *Means* by which valid cognition is obtained,—and '*Anumāna*' as that *by means of which* the valid Inferential Cognition is obtained,—then, in that case, the *Anumāna-Pramāṇa* would be the Mind-Soul contact; and the relation between the several factors would form the 'Cognitive Proces; and the *Resultant* in this case would be the *Inferential Cognition* itself. If, lastly, the Means (of the Cognition) be taken as that which is the *most effective* (*Sādhakatama*) in the bringing about of the Result, then the *Perception of the Inferential Indicative or Probans* (*e.g.*, Smoke) would have to be regarded as the *Anumāna-Pramāṇa* (Means of Inferential Cognition); as it is this that is most directly and immediately effective in bringing about the *Inferential* Cognition (of Fire). (See *Prakaraṇapañchikā*, p. 82.)

There are two kinds of Inference—(1) '*Svārtha*', *for one's own benefit*, and (2) '*Parārtha*', *for the benefit of others*. In the former, the conclusion is deduced from the premiss or premises recalled to the mind; in this case all the processes need not be stated; one often deduces a conclusion from a single premiss. In the second, the conclusion is deduced from premises which are generally fully stated.

As regards this *Statement of the Inference*, it consists of *three* Propositions, technically called '*Avayavas*', *Factors*, of the Inferential Statement. These are—(1) Statement of the Proposition, (2) the Statement of the Major Premiss—involving the Statement of the Corroborative Instance, and (3) the Statement of the Minor Premiss—involving the Statement of the Probans or Inferential Indicative.—(1) The *Statement of the Proposition* serves to point out what is intended to be proved by the Inference; *e.g.*, 'Word-Sound is eternal'; it is only when this has been stated that we can intelligently proceed with the Inference.—(2) The Major Premiss states the Corroborative Instance and shows that there is an unfailing relationship between what is sought to be proved (the Probandum) (*Eternality*) and that by *means of* which it is sought to be proved (the Probans); and this relationship must be indicated as existing in cases that are well known to both parties; for instance, when it is intended to prove the presence of *Fire* by means of the presence of *Smoke*, the Major Premiss is stated thus:—

'Wherever there is *Smoke* there is *Fire, as in the Kitchen'*. Instances that do not apply to the case in question are regarded as *wrong*—दृष्टान्ताभास.—Lastly, inasmuch as Inferential Cognition follows upon the Perception of one of the two factors between which the permanent relationship subsists,—the perception of one factor becomes a necessary element in all Inferences; and it is as stating this, the presence of the one factor, that the Minor Premiss becomes essential. For instance, when seeking to prove the presence of *Fire* on the Hill by means of the presence of *Smoke*, it is necessary to make the statement that 'there is *Smoke* on the Hill'; without which the conclusion—that 'there is *Fire* on the Hill'—could not be rightly deduced. (*Prakaraṇapañchikā*, p. 82)

There is some difference of opinion regarding the precise order in which the Inferential Argument should state the two premises. According to *Prābhākara*, there need to be no hard and fast rule regarding this order; because the conclusion—'There is fire on the Hill'—follows all the same, whether we state the reasoning in the form—'(*a*) Wherever there is Smoke there is Fire, as in the Kitchen;—and (*b*) there is Smoke on the Hill,'—or in the form—'(*a*) There is Smoke on the Hill, and (*b*) wherever there is Smoke there is Fire, as in the Kitchen'. (See *Prakaraṇapañchikā*, p. 85).

Some writers have held that the purposes of the Corroborative Instance can be also served by the *Negative Instance*, or an *Instance per contra;* for in corroboration of the reasoning 'There is Fire because there is Smoke', we may put forward the Instance 'Whenever there is no Fire, there is no Smoke, as in the Tank'.—This view is not accepted by the *Prābhākara:* because, he argues, the Probans can prove the conclusion only by force of its relationship to that which is sought to be proved; and this relationship can be asserted only by means of a *positive* instance, not by a negative one; even though in some cases, the *Negative Instance* may serve to point out the necessary relationship, yet it can do so only indirectly, the process thereby becoming more involved than in the case where the instance is stated in the positive form. Hence in all cases, it is the positive instance that should be put forward. (See *Prakaraṇapañchikā*, p. 85).

The defects pertaining to the 'Subject', *Pakṣa,* of the inferential Reasoning are of two kinds.—(*a*) being contary to well-known facts of experience, and (*b*) having a qualification that is absolutely unknown.—The defects pertaining to the *Probans* have already been indicated above under 'Fallacies'. Those pertaining to the Instance are of four kinds,—(1) being not applicable to what is sought to be proved, *i.e.*, the Probandum; (2) being not applicable to the *Probans;* (3) being not applicable either to the *Probans*

or to the *Probandum ;* and (4) failing to establish the desired relationship. The defects pertaining to the Statement of the *Proposition* are (1) Indefiniteness and Obscurity of Expression and (2) Non-Affirmation. (*Prakaraṇapañchikā,* p. 87.)

(C) Bhāṭṭa View of Inference.

Shabara (Trs., p. 8) has declared that Inference (along with the other forms of Cognition) presupposes, and is based upon, Perception.—This has been objected to in *Shlo. Vā. Pratyakṣa,* 87—94; and explained in 95-96 *et. seq.* The objection emanates from the Buddhist, who holds the view that 'Perception is always *Non-Conceptual*' and as such, it cannot form the basis of Inference or any other form of Cognition, as all these latter relate to the relationship of things, while no relationship can figure in Perception which is always *Non-Conceptual.*

Kumārila's answer to this is that all that the *Bhāṣya* means is that the Inferential and other cognitive processes can proceed only after one or the other factors that figure therein have been previously *perceived.*

To the stock objection that the Major Premiss already implies the Conclusion ;—hence (in the words of J. S. Mill)—"Every syllogism involves the fallacy of *Petitio Principii*",—the answer given by the *Bhāṭṭa* is bolder than that given by *Prabhākara,* who, as we have seen, had to give up the idea that 'every valid cognition must apprehend something not already known'. The *Bhāṭṭa* accepts the permanent relationship between the Probandum (Fire) and Probans (Smoke), and yet holds to the view that *Inferential Cognition,* like every valid cognition, apprehends something that is *not already known.* He argues that, even through it is true that the Probans—*Smoke*—is seen, and also that the said perception of *Smoke* carries with it the vague general idea of the *Fire* as a permanent concomitant of the *Smoke,*—yet the final Object apprehended by the resultant Inferential Cognition is, not one that is *already known* by other means of Cognition ; because the said *perception of Smoke,* though implying the vague notion of *Fire* as its relative, does not imply the notion of the presence of the Fire *in the mountain ;* and it is this *qualified* Fire that forms the object of the Inferential Cognition. Thus Inferential Cognition also has to be regarded as apprehending something *not already known* by other means. The vague notion of Fire in *general* is already there ; but the Cognition of the *Fire as related to a particular time and place,*—the mountain for instance,—is not implied in the perception of Smoke. The smoke is seen,—the idea of *Fire* in general is also there, implied in the perception of *Smoke,*—the perception of the *mountain* is also there ; but there is no idea yet of the *Fire as present*

in the Mountain, and it is this that forms the objective of the Inferential Cognition. (*Shāstradīpikā*, pp. 41—44).

When a man has got the Inferential Cognition through his knowledge of the permanent relationship between the Probans and the probandum,—he may wish to convey the same to another person; but for doing so, and for convincing him of the validity of his conclusion, he will have to state the Inferential reasoning in full; this Statement is called the '*Sādhana*', 'proof' of the conclusion. The Statement of the proof consists, according to the *Bhāṭṭa*, of three Statements:—(1) Statement of the Conclusion ('Word-Sound is transitory'), (2) Statement of the Probans or the Reason ('Because it is an Effect'), (3) Statement of the Major Premiss along with Corroborative Instance ('All Effects are transient, e.g., the Jar'). The order of these Statements is immaterial; the reasoning may be stated as—(1) 'The Effects are transient—*e.g.*, the Jar', (2) 'The Word-Sound is an Effect', and (3) 'Therefore Word-Sound is transient'.—(*Shāstradīpikā*, p. 44.)

The following are the defects in the Inferential Process:—

(1) Defects of the Statement of the Conclusion—(*a*) Contrary to perceptible facts, (*b*) Unknown qualification and so forth (See *Shlo. Vā.*, *Anumana*).

(2) Defects of the Probans—(*a*) Unknown, not admitted, Inadmissable, (*b*) Fallible, Inconclusive, (*c*) Contradictory, (*a*) The Unknown or the Inadmissible is of five kinds:—(1) Inadmissible by itself, (2) Inadmissible in Qualification, (3) Inadmissible Negation, (4) Inadmissible Substratum, (5) Inadmissible Concomitance. (*b*) The Inconclusive is of two kinds—(1) Fallible, Untrue, and (2) Neutralised. In the case of the Neutralised Probans, the two contradictory reasons are not equally valid; what is meant is that the parties are unable to notice any difference in their comparative validity.—The *Too-Wide* Probans also is defective; so also is the *Too-Narrow* Probans.—(*c*) The Contradictory Probans is what is concomitant with the contrary of the Probandum.

The Corroborative Instance is of two kinds:—Instance of Similarity and Instance of Dissimilarity. An example of the former we have in the *Kitchen*—which provides an instance of the concomitance of Smoke with Fire; an example of the Instance of Dissimilarity we have in the *Tank*, which provides an instance of the concomitance of *No-Fire* and *No-Smoke*. But it is seldom necessary to state the second kind of Instance. (*Shāstra-dīpikā*, p. 45.)

What is meant by the Bhāṣya declaring that there are two kinds of Inference is only that there are Inferences pertaining to *Particulars* as well as to *Universals*. (*Shāstradīpikā*, p. 50.)

CHAPTER XIII

'VERBAL COGNITION' : 'SCRIPTURAL INJUNCTION'

(A) Shabara-Bhāṣya.

'Shāstra', 'Scriptural Injunction', is that means of cognising super-sensuous things (*i.e., Dharma* and *Adharma*) which proceeds from *Verbal Cognition.*—(*Bhāṣya* Trs., p. 15.)

The *Bhāṣya* does not think it necessary to provide a definition of 'Word' or 'Verbal Cognition' in general; it defines only the particular form of Word, *Injunction*, which is what bears upon the subject-matter of Mīmāṁsā, *viz., Dharma-Adharma.* Hence the term *'Shabda'* here stands for the Vedic or Scriptural Word, and *'Artha'* for *Dharma-Adharma*, which forms the subject-matter of 'Scripture'—says *Kumārila.* (*Shlo. Vārtika, Shabda*, 8—13.)

According to *Prabhākara* (*Bṛhatī*, p. 104) also, the term *'Shāstra'* (in the Definition) stands for *Injuction;* and the term *'Shabdavijñāna'* stands for the Cognition of *something to be done*, derived through *Word.* Hence *'Shāstra'*, Injunction, is the means of cognising *what should be done, through Words.* (Sū. 1.1.5., *Bhāṣya*—Trs., p. 9.)

In course of discussion, the general question relating to *Verbal Cognition* in general and its validity and reliability, also comes in for full treatment. (*Shabara-Bhāṣya* Trs., pp. 16—25) as below.

The validity and reliability of the cognition derived from Scriptural Injunction is assailed on the ground of the Veda (Scripture) being full of absurd and incoherent assertions: which fact vitiates its validity as a guide to the right knowledge of *Dharma.* (*Shabara-Bhāṣya*, pp. 16-17.)

The answer to this is provided in Sū. 5.—*The relation of the Word with its denotation is inborn ; 'Injunction' is the means of knowing Dharma,—and it is infallible in regard to all that is imperceptible ; it is a valid means of knowledge, as it is independent.* That is, (*a*) the relation between the Word and its Denotation is inseparable ; (*b*) it becomes the means of knowing *Dharma*, which is not cognisable by any other Means of Cognition ;—(*c*) it is *Word* in the form of *Injunction* that provides this knowledge ;—(*d*) this means of knowing *Dharma* is infallible ; (*e*) hence it is a valid means of knowledge ; as it is independent. That is, when a cognition has been

brought about by the said Word, there is no need for any other corroborating Cognition or Person. (*Bhāṣya,* Trs. pp. 8-9.)

What is meant by the relation between the Word and its Denotation being 'inborn' is that it does not owe its origin to any person, it is primordial, original, self-sufficient, not dependent upon any other Means of Cognition. (*Bhāṣya,* Trs., p. 17.)

If the connection between the Word and its Denotation were dependent upon other Means of Cognition, then all those Words and Expressions which speak of super-sensuous things might be regarded as of doubtful validity ; when however the said connection is inborn, inherent, self-sufficient, then there is nothing to shake the inherent validity of what is learnt from the words of the Veda. (*Bṛihatī-Ṛijuvimalā.*)

Thus then the knowledge provided by the Scriptural Injunction must be right and reliable. In the case of Words emanating from human sources, there may be doubts regarding their validity or truth ; as in this case it would all be dependent for its validity upon things extraneous to themselves,—such as the validity of those sources from which the speaker may have derived his knowledge of what he is speaking of and so forth. On the other hand, in the case of the Word not emanating from a human source,—why should there be any doubt regarding its truth ? Certainly, we do not require any corroboration of what we learn from the said Word ; when the Word speaks of something, what is meant is that it makes that thing *known, i.e.,* it becomes the means of that thing becoming *known ;* so that as soon as the *Means,* in the shape of the Word, is there, what is expressed by it becomes known *by itself,* without any extraneous help. Under the circumstances, how could one call it "*false*" ? As a matter of fact, the notion derived from an Injunction is not of a doubtful character ; nor does there appear any notion to the contrary at any other time or place, or under any other circumstances. (*Shabara*—Trs., pp. 17-18.)

This leads on to the general question of Words and their Denotation. It is argued that all that has been said above may be true ; but there can be no relationship between the Word and what is denoted by it ; none of the several kinds of Relationship—Conjunction, Inherence, Cause-Effect, Container-contained—is possible between the Word and what it denotes.

The answer to the above is that the Relationship between the Word and what it denotes is that of the *Denoter-Denoted, i.e.,* of the *Name and the Named.*—This is objected to on the ground that no such Relationship is cognised when one hears a Word uttered for the first time.—The answer

to this is that in all such things our experience is the only guide. It is only when we find a Word actually expressing a certain thing that we regard it as the *Denoter* of that thing ; this is not found possible in the case of a Word heard for the first time ; in fact, the denotation of a Word is understood only when it has been heard used as many times as makes it definitely recognised that 'this Word denotes this thing'.—Says the opponent—"If the Word does not express any meaning when it is heard for the first time, then the relation between the Word and its Denotation cannot be inborn, it must be something created, artificial". (*Bhāṣya*, Trs., p. 18.) The answer to this is that the said relation cannot be artificial ; it cannot be regarded as created by any person—not even by God. No such creator of Word-relationship can be vouched for by any Means of Cognition.

The *Bhāṣya* (Trs., p. 19) takes up the three questions—(1) What is a *Word ?* (2) What is its *Denotation ?* and (3) What is the relation between the *Word* and its *Denotation ?*

I. What is a *Word ?* The Word is a verbal unit composed of a number of letters. For instance, in the case of the word '*Gauḥ*' (as denoting the *Cow*), the *Word* is the unit composed of the component letters *g*, *au* and *ḥ*. Such is the declaration of the revered *Upavarṣa.* Among people the term 'Word' is applied to what is apprehended by the Ear ; and in the case of the Word '*gauḥ*' what is apprehended by the Ear is the unit composed of the said letters (p. 19).

The *Bhāṣya* brings forward, in this connection, the view of the Grammarian regarding the nature of the 'Word'. The Grammarian holds what has been called the '*Doctrine of the Sphoṭa*'. He argues as follows (against the view propounded by *Upavarṣa*) :—"If it is as declared by *Upavarṣa,* then there can be no cognition of the meaning of a word. Because, as a matter of fact, the cognition of what the Word denotes does not appear on the hearing of the component letters, directly ; and apart from the *component* letters, there is no single entity in the shape of the *composite whole* (under the above theory), from which the cognition of the Denotation could follow. For instance, at the moment that we hear the letter '*ga*', we do not hear the letter '*au*', and so forth. From all this it follows that the word '*gauḥ*' as a *composite unit,* must be something different from the component letters ; and it is from this *composite unit* that the cognition of the Denotation follows [and to this *composite unit* we give the name *Sphoṭa*]".

Shabara's answer to this is as follows :—What happens is that each component letter, as it is uttered, leaves an impression behind, and what

brings about the cognition of the Denotation of the Word is the *last component letter along with the Impressions of each of the preceeding component letters.* In actual experience, the composite Word-unit is never found to be anything entirely different from the component letters ; hence there can be no 'Word' apart from the component letters.—This is a much simpler hypothesis than that of the Grammarian who has to postulate a *'Sphoṭa'* as entirely distinct from the component letters ; while our doctrine requires no such postulate. (*Shabara*, Trs., pp. 19-20.)

II. What is it that is *donoted* by the *Word ?* What is denoted by the Word—'Cow', for instance,—is the *'Universal'* (Class or *Community*) 'Cow'—marked by certain characteristic features—the *dewlap*, for instance. This Universal is an accomplished entity and is actually perceived as such. (*Shabara*, Trs., pp. 21-22.)

That it is the 'Universal' that is denoted by the Word has been declared by *Jaimini* himself under 1.3.33 ; and *Shabara's* comments on this Sūtra are found under *Adhikaraṇa* 10 B of *Adhyāya* I, *Pāda* 3—*Sūtras* 30 to 35. (Trs., pp. 118—124).

Under this *Adhikaraṇa*, the question is pointedly raised—Is it the 'Universal' or the 'Individual' that is denoted by the Word ? That factor which is *common* to several particular things is the *Class* or *Universal ;* while that which possesses certain specific *uncommon* characteristics is the *Individual.* The question as to which of these two is denoted by the Word—'Cow' for instance—arises from the fact that whenever the Word 'cow' is pronounced in common parlance, it brings about the idea of the *Universal*—the *class-character*—common to all cows,—and yet in all actions resulting from the use of the Word, it is the *individual* cow that comes in.

The Individual-Theory has been thus set forth (in *Sū.* 30 and *Bhāṣya*) : "(A) If Words denoted Universals or Classes, no *Injunctions of Action would be possible ; i.e.*, if Words denoted 'Universals', there could be no injunction of actions like *killing*, *washing*, *chopping* and so forth, as none of these actions could be done to any 'Universal'. As regards the notion of *Class* or *Universal* that appears on the utterance of the Word, the right view is that the 'Universal' figures only as the distinguishing feature of the *Individual* denoted by the Word,—the idea being that of 'that particular animal which has the *class-character* Cow' ; just as when the word 'Lancer' is uttered, though the resultant idea is that the *man with the Lance*, yet the *Lance* is not what is denoted by the Word, it comes only as the characterising feature of the man.—(B) Another argument favouring the Individual-Theory is that,

if the Word denoted '*Universals*', then *there would be no words expressive of qualities as subsisting in substances.* (Sū. 31); that is, if Words denoted the 'Universal', there would be no Word expressive of *qualities*, such as we have in the expression '*Six cows* are to be given as the Sacrificial Fee'.—(C) The third argument (*Sū.* 32) is that we meet with such Vedic texts as—'If the animal consecrated has run away, one should secure another animal of the same colour and of the same age'; if words denoted the 'Universal' then there could be no securing of '*another* animal': as the other animal also would belong to the same 'Universal' as the one that has run away. From all this it follows that what is denoted by the Word is the *Individual*".

The *Siddhānta* view is that *it is the Class, the Universal, that is denoted, as it is that which serves the purpuse of Actions.* (*Sū.* 33). For instance we have the Injunction 'One should erect the Altar like the '*Shyēna*'; such an injunction would have sense only if the word '*Shyēna*' denoted the 'Universal' If it denoted an *individual* Shyēna-bird, then, inasmuch as it would be impossible for the performer to make or produce any such individual bird,—the Injunction would be laying down something impossible and hence meaningless and futile. The word therefore must stand for the *Class*, the *Universal*, the factor common to all individuals, and as such representable and producible in the shape of the *figure* of the Bird.........If the Word denoted any *one* Individual, then it could not be used for any other Individual.........and if the Word 'Cow' could be used for other Individual cows also, then why could it not be used for other Individual *animals*—Horses, Asses, etc. ?.........If again, a Word were to denote that Individual alone to which it has been actually applied in usage, then the Word 'cow' could not be used in reference to the newborn calf. Nor, in this case, would it be possible to have any such comprehensive idea the *Cow* as is met with in such expressions as—'this is a cow, that is a cow'. As a matter of fact, too, no Word is ever found to be applied to any *one* Individual only, and not to another. It may be held that—"the word *Cow* is applied to and denotes all those Individuals wherein the common classcharacter—'Cowness'—subsists". If that were so, then what would be cognised as denoted by the Word would be a *qualified* Individual, *i.e.*, the Individual *qualified by the Universal 'Cow'*;—in that case the qualifying factor—the *Universal* 'Cow'—should be one that has been already cognised before.—It may be held that "the Word may be taken as denoting the *Universal* as the *qualifying factor* and the *Individual* as the *qualified factor*; and in any particular case, which of these two is the *primary* and which the *secondary* will be determined by the intention of the Speaker."—This however cannot

be so ; such determination of the *Primary* or the *Secondary* character would be possible or necessary only if both, *Universal* as well as *Individual*, were denoted by the Word ; as a matter of fact, however, by positive and negative concommitance we know that what is invariably expressed by the Word is the *Universal*, not the *Individual*, the idea of which latter only follows upon the wake of the notion of the *Universal*.—Nor can the Word be taken as denoting the *Universal as qualified by the Individual ;* as, if that were so, then the Word denoting the *Universal as qualified by any one Individual*, could not be applied to any other Individual. From all this it follows that it is the *Universal* that is denoted by the Word, and it is this Cognition of the *Universal or Class* that brings about the notion of the Individual subsequently.

[*Sū.* 34, *Bhā.*, Trs., P., 123]. It has been argued by the Individualist that (1) "no action would be possible, if the Word denoted the *Universal*" (*Sū.* 30)—and (2) that "there would be no Word expressive of Qualities subsisting in Substances" (*Sū.* 31),—and (3) "that there could be no Injunction of *another*, such as we have in the text *another animal should be brought in*'. (*Sū.* 32).

The answer to all this is that—*As Words denote Universals or classes, and through these, also Individuals, there would be no dissociation from Action, etc.* (*Sū.* 35). That is, (*a*) inasmuch as the Word denotes the Universal, the Action enjoined would pertain to that Individual which is related to that Universal. For instance, in the case of the Injunction 'Sprinkle water on the *Vrīhi-Corn*',—what is enjoined is the *sprinkling of water* over paddy—over that Substance which is helpful in the sacrificial performance ; as the *sprinkling* could not be enjoined as to be done over the 'Universal' because no *sprinkling* over a 'Universal' is possible ; so what happens in this case is that the word '*Vrīhi*-Corn', which really denotes the 'Universal', is used for the purpose of qaulifying and indicating the receptacle of the action of *sprinkling water ;* so that the 'Universal', when cognised as denoted by the Word, would qualify that receptacle of the action. Thus there would be no incongruity at all. (*b*) Similarly as regards Words expressive of *qualities*—in the case of the text speaking of '*Six* Cows', what is intended to be declared is the *number* of that substance which is to be given as the Fee, and the word 'cows', as denoting the 'Universal', serves to qualify and indicate that Substance. (*c*) As regards the Injunction regarding '*another* animal', what is meant to be spoken of as 'another' is the substitute for what has been lost ; and hence the word 'animal', which denotes the 'Universal', serves to qualify and indicate the real substitute.

Thus it is established that all Words like 'Cow' 'Horse' and so forth denote Classes or *Universals.* (*Shabara,* Trs., p. 124.)

III. The third question is—What is the relation between the *Word* and its *Denotation ?*

The relation between the *Word* and its *Denotation* is that—on the *Word* being cognised, what is *denoted* by it becomes cognised. That is, the relation is that of the *Name* and the *Named.* (*Shabara,* Trs., p. 22.)

All these three—(1) the *Word,* (2) its *Denotation, i.e.,* the Universal, and (3) the relation between these,—are eternal. That the *'Universal'* (or *Class*) is eternal has been shown *above* (Section on *Jāti*).

The relation between the Word and its Denotation is also eternal. It cannot be regarded as brought about by any Person (in the shape of God) ; as there is no proof of the existence of such a Person.—Words are always taught as accomplished entities having the inherent power of denoting things. If it were impossible for us to comprehend the meaning of words without persuming a Creator of this relationship, then alone could there be justification for presuming such a Creator. As a matter of fact, however, we find that when older people are making use of words for their own purposes, the younger men who happen to hear those words actually come to understand them ; those older people too, when they were young, understood the words in he same way, when uttered by *their* Elders ; those later again understood them as used by still older people ; and so on the process has gone on without beginning in time.—The other explanation provided by the other party is in the shape of the doctrine that the meaning is comprehended because the relation between that Meaning and the Word was created, laid down, by some Person. As between these two explanations, so long as the explantion based upon *common usage* is available, it cannot be right to presume a Creator of the relation. (*Shabara,* Trs., p. 24.)

This relationship is *infallible* also, it is always found to be true. There is no point of time when the *Word-relation* was not there. (P. 24). Then again, in regard to such super-sensuous things as the Deity and the like, the creating of a Name would be not only useless, but also impossible. When a thing is known in its general form, and its particular forms are not known,—then alone is the *Name* propounded in connection with these particular forms ; and in the case of such words as 'Deity' and the like, no general or particular forms can be perceived. For this reason also there can be no *creation* of the relation in question by any Person. (*Shabara,* Trs., pp. 24-25.)

It has been shown that what is denoted by the *Word* is the 'Universal', and this is eternal ;—also that the *relationship* between the Word and what is denoted by it is eternal. As a necessary corollary to these, it follows that the *Word* itself is eternal. This has been dealt with in detail under *Sūtras* I. i. 6 to 23. (*Shabara,* Trs., pp. 32—41.)

The opposite view has been set forth under *Sū.* 6—11 ; it is as follows :— "It has been asserted that the relation between the Word and its Denotation is eternal. But this is not possible ; because the Word itself is not eternal. As a matter of fact, Word is often found to be destroyed, so that when it comes to be produced (uttered) again, its relation to its Denotation cannot but be artificial, ephemeral, newly made. Then again, no one ever comprehends the meaning of a Word heard for the first time. —The Word itself must be something ephemeral, (*a*) *because it is always found to follow after an Effort ;* finding that there is an invariable concommitance between the appearance of the Word and Human Effort,—the Word appearing only when there is Human Effort,—we infer that the Word is *produced* by the Effort ; nor is there anything to show that the Word existed before that Effort. (*Sū.* 6)—(*b*) Another reason why the Word should be regarded as ephemeral is that *it does not persist.* (*Sū.* 7) ; that is, when the Word is uttered, it is not found to persist even for one moment ; it is not perceived at all ; from which we conclude that it must have been destroyed.—(*c*) Another reason :—Because the term '*Karoti*', 'makes', 'produces', is heard in connection with words. (*Sū.* 8). In common parlance people make use of such expressions as '*Kuru shabdam*' (make the word sound),which shows that the Word is something *made,* produced.—(*d*) Another reason :— We hear the same Word uttered in several places at the same time ; this would not be possible if the Word were one and eternal. Unless there is something very special about, it, there can be no plurality in what is eternal ; it is only in the case of *non-eternal* products, which are many, that, on their being produced in several places, they become connected with the sveral points in space. (*Sū.* 9)—(*e*) Another reason for regarding Word as non-eternal :—Because there are original forms and their modifications (*Sū.* 10). In the case of such expressions as '*dadhyatra,* the original form was '*dadhi-atra*', and the '*i*' of '*dadhi*' because *modified* into '*y*' ; such is the teaching of the Grammarians ; and as a rule whatever is liable to Modification *is not eternal.* (*Sū.* 10).—(*f*) Another reason :—There is an Augmentation of the Word-Sound due to the multiplicity of its producers (speakers) (*Sū.* 11). As a matter of fact, we find that when a Word is pronounced by several persons, the Word-Sound produced is very loud. If the Word were only

manifested, and not *produced*, then the Word-Sound heard would always be the same, whether pronounced by one or by many persons. From this we conclude that some portion of the Word is *produced* by each of the speakers, and it is on account of the consequent augmentation of the sound that it is perceived as louder. (*Sū.* 11.)"

Shabara's answer to the above is as follows :—As regards the reason (*a*) that "Word is found to appear after human Effort", —if we can establish, by sound reasoning, that Word is eternal, then the fact put forward admits of the explaination that what is brought about by the Effort is only the *manifestation* of the already-existing Word. (*Sū.* 12.) When the Word ceases to be heard, what happens is that there is no perception of the Word which is still there,—on account of the *non-reaching* (non-contact) of the perceptive agency ; and it is not due to the *Destruction* of the Word. If we can establish the fact of Word being eternal, the phenomena brought forward can be explained on the ground that of the causes that bring about the perception of the Word-Sound, there are some which are not operative when we do not hear it. The said perception of the Word-Sound is brought about by certain Conjunctions and Disjunctions which serve to *manifest, not produce*, the Word-Sound. What happens is that the Air-particles disturbed by the Sound-provoking stroke strike against the surrounding stagnant Air-particles, and produce certain Conjunctions and Disjunctions (in the shape of *waves*) on all sides, which go on spreading as long and as far as the momentum lasts ; these Conjunctions and Disjunctions—Air-Waves—are not perceived because Air is imperceptible, invisible ; and as for the Word-Sound, it is heard only so long and so far as the waves do not cease, and after these have ceased, it is not heard. It is for this same reason that Sound is heard at a greater distance when the Wind is favourable. (*Sū.* 13.)—(*b*) As regards the next argument—based upon the use of the word '*Karoti*' '*makes*' in relation to the Word-Sound urged in *Sū.* 8),—the answer to this is that when Word has been definitely proved to be eternal, the expression '*Karoti*' is to be explained as meaning 'making use of'. (*Sū.* 14).—(*c*) As regards the next argument (urged in (*Sū.* 9)—that the Word is heard simultaneously in several places ;—the answer is that what is urged is not right. The Sun, though *one*, is actually seen at the same time in several places. When the form of the Word is one only, if there are several places where the Word is heard, the diversity lies in the *places*, not in the *Word*. (*d*) As regards the '*Modification*' urged in *Sū.* 10, the case of the expression '*dadhyatra*' is not one of *Modification* of the original letter '*i*' ; in fact the resultant '*y*' is a letter totally different from the original

'*i*'. That there is no *Modification* in this case is proved by the fact that people going to use the letter '*y*' do not take up the letter '*i*',—in the way in which one going to make curds takes up milk, of which the curd is a Modification. Merely because we perceive some sort of a similarity between the two letters '*i*' and '*y*' we cannot regard one as the *Modification* of the other.—(*f*) As regards the 'Augmentation' (urged in *Sū.* 11),—what has been urged is not quite accurate; as a matter of fact the Word-Sound has no parts,—no such parts are perceived; and being without parts, it cannot undergo *Augmentation.* What happens in the case urged is that when the Word is uttered by one man, its sound is *soft,* but when it is pronounced by many men, those letters which had sounded *soft* come to be heard as *loud,* on account of having been taken up by several Conjunctions and Disjunctions due to the utterances. Hence the 'Augmentation' spoken of is of the *Noise,* not of the *Word.* (*Sū.* 17). From all this we are led to the final conclusion that *Word is eternal,* as its *utterance is for the purpose of another* (*Sū,* 18),—*i.e.* for the purpose of making the meaning known to another person. If the Word ceased to exist as soon as uttered, then no one could speak of anything to another person. On the other hand, if the Word does not cease, but continues to exist, then it is only right and natural that when the Word is uttered and heard repeatedly, its meaning becomes comprehended by other persons; specially as it would not be possible to establish the necessary relationship between each succeeding Word and its Denotation. (See above). If then, the Cognition of the meaning of the succeeding Word were based merely upon its similarity to a previous Denotative Word, then there would always be a chance of its being mistaken and hence liable to sublation. Further, each time that the word 'cow' is heard, if it were only a different Word, only similar to the original Denotative Word, then this would mean that whenever the Word is uttered it produces two things—(1) the use of the new Word and (2) the connection of this new Word with the Denotation; this cannot be right. (*Sū.* 18). As a matter of fact, whenever the word 'cow' is pronounced, the idea that it produces is that of *all cows* simultaneously; this shows that the Word must denote the entire *Class* or *Universal* 'Cow'; and it is not possible to create the relation of the Word to a 'Universal', because in creating a relation, the creator would have to lay down the relation by pointing to the Universal, and without actually using the word 'Cow',—which he could not use until he had created its relation to the Denotation—in what manner could one indicate the distinct 'Universal' denoted by the Word? Specially as the *Body* of the Cow, which alone could be *pointed out,* is the substratum of several 'Universals' —such

as Earth, Substance, etc. If however, the word Cow is *eternal*, it is the same Word that is uttered several times, and has been previously heard several times, as applied to other individual cows; thus by a process of positive and negative concommitance, the Word comes to be recognised as denoting the particular *Universal*. For this reason also, the Word must be eternal. (*Sū.* 19).—Then again, when people speak of a *number* in connection with a Word, what they mean is that the Word is *pronounced so many times;* they never mean that the Word itself is *so many in number;* and the use of such expressions shows that people recognise the *same* Word; their process of reasoning is as follows;—"We recognise the Word to be the *same*, our Cognition and our Cognitive organs—are not defective,—other people also recognise the Word to be the *same;* nor can this idea be called a *Delusion;* it could be so recognised only if the *difference* among the words were actually preceived; as a matter of fact however, the idea that there are *so many different* words is not vouched for by any Means of Right Cognition;—we do not however accept mere *Recognisability* of the Word as proof of its *eternality;* all that we mean by citing the fact of *Recognition* is to show that the theory of the *non-eternality* of the Word is contrary to a fact of Perception, in the form of *Recognition;* and we do not mean that *eternality* is *inferred* from, proved by *Recognition*. It may be that the *non-eternality* also of the Word is supported by an Inference only, while Eternality will have the support of Inference in addition to Perception in the form of Recognition. It may be argued that the word 'cow' that was pronounced yesterday has ceased to exist, so that what is heard today must be a different word. But the Word that was pronounced yesterday has *not* ceased to exist; for the simple reason that we perceived (hear) it again; when people see an object, and after ceasing to see it for a while, see it again, they recognise it to be the *same*, and they never think that the previous object had ceased to exist and a new one had come into existence. A thing can be regarded as having *ceased to exist*,—as being non-existent—only when it is not cognisable by any Means of Cognition. In the case in question however the Word is actually cognised, perceived, through Recognition, as the *same*. For the *non-existence* of the Word on the other hand, there is no proof at all. Hence the idea of the *Continuous Existence* of the Word cannot be *wrong*, it must be *right*. From this it also follows that even in the case of a Word not pronounced and heard, if people do not actually perceive it, they cannot assume that it is *non-existent;* just as, when a man, going out of the house does not perceive all his family-members, he does not assume that they have ceased to exist, are *non-existent*. The

Eternality of Word have ceased to exist, are *non-existent.* The Eternality of Word is not affected by the doctrine of *Universal Flux;* because, in regard to other things, that view has the support of the fact that the things are actually found to be *perishing*, while in the case of the Word, no such *perishing* is perceived, and it is never found to have perished or ceased to exist. From all this it follows that Word is Eternal. (*Sū.* 20.) Even in the case of things whose actual production has not been perceived, some are regarded as *non-eternal*, perishable, when it is found that there are potent causes leading to their destruction. For instance, even though one may not have seen the Cloth being *produced* by the process of weaving, yet seeing that it has been brought about by the conglomeration of the yarns, he concludes that it must *perish*, become non-existent, when that *conglomeration* comes to an end, or when the yearns themselves are destroyed.—In the case of the Word, there is no such cause or circumstance that could be regarded as bringing about its destruction and non-existence. (*Sū.* 21.) The view "that the Word is a product of the *Air*, and hence perishable" is not tenable; if the Word were the product of Air, then it could only be *Air in a particular shape:* as a matter of fact, however, we do not recognise a single particle of Air in the composition of the Word, in the manner in which we recognise the parts of Yarn in the composition of the Cloth. Then again, if the Word were an air-product, it would be perceptible through the organ of *Touch;* as a matter of fact, however, the Word is not *Touched;* hence it cannot be a product of Air. It must be Eternal. (*Sū.* 22)—There are Vedic texts also which speak of the Word as *Eternal.*—From all this we conclude that the Word is eternal. (*Sū.* 23.)

THE SENTENCE AND ITS MEANING

Shābara-Bhāṣya (Trs., pp. 42—47)

It has been established that Words, their Meanings and the Relation between Words and their Meanings, are all Eternal. But so far nothing has been said regarding *Sentences.* And as the Vedic Injunction, which is the sole means of knowing *Dharma*, is always in the form of a *Sentence*,—until the same facts have been established in regard to *Sentences*, the validity of the Injunction as a means of knowing *Dharma* remains doubtful. Hence it is that all writers on *Mīmāṁsā* have devoted their attention to the *Sentence* and its *Meaning.*

Sūtra 24 sets forth the arguments in support of the view that Eternality cannot belong to the *Sentence* or its Meaning, or to the Relation between the two. The Sentence is a group of words; each Word has its own

Denotation; and even though each individual Word and its Denotation is eternal, the Sentence or its Meaning cannot be eternal.

The *Mīmāṁsaka's* own view is set forth under *Sū.* 25:—*In the Sentence, there is only a mention of words with definite Denotations along with a Word denoting Action, and the meaning of the Sentence is based upon that.*—On this the *Bhāṣya* proceeds (Trs., p. 44):—In the *Sentence,* we have a few words that are tied down to their respective Denotations, along with a word denoting Action. Hence the Sentence cannot have any separate meaning, entirely apart from the meanings of words composing it. In fact, there is no valid means of knowledge whereby we could have a Cognition of the independent meaning of the *Sentence.* Even the last letter of the Sentence, along with the Impressions left by the preceding letters, has no power, independently of the meaning of the words, to express any meaning totally different from what is expressed by the words. In the case of the Sentence, what happens is that each of the words composing it ceases from activity after having expressed its own meaning,—and the meanings of words thus comprehended bring about the comprehension of the meaning of the Sentence as a whole. What is brought about by the meaning of a word is the notion of a qualified thing—the *white object, the black object* and so forth; and as what is expressed by the Sentence is only a *qualified thing,*—*viz.*, the meanings of words as *qualified* by one another,—it follows that the comprehension of the meaning of the Sentence is derived from the meanings of the Words; and no separate *power of expression* need be postulated for the Sentence as a whole. Then again, whether a certain thing is different or not-different from another is always ascertained through positive and negative concomitance; and in the case in question it is found that sometimes, by reason of some mental derangement,—as loss of memory—the meanings of the Words uttered are not comprehended; at such a time the meaning of the Sentence composed of those Words would never be comprehended,—only if the meaning of the Sentence were not different from that of the Words; and as matter of fact, the meaning of the Sentence is never comprehended in such cases. It follows, therefore, that the meaning of the Sentence is not entirely different from that of the Words.—From all this it follows that the meaning of the Sentence is comprehended only on the comprehension of the meanings of the component Words; and it has no connection with, and does not follow from, a distinct *unit* in the shape of the *Group of Words* (*Sentence,* conceived as something distinct from Words). It is true that the direct Denotation of each word,—which consists of the *Universal*—becomes somewhat restricted in its scope when the Word appears

in a Sentence ; it is for that reason that we regard the Meaning of the Sentence as consisting in a *qualified* Denotation of the component Words ; but only when we find that the meaning of the Word as used by itself serves no useful purpose. Our idea is that if it can serve no useful purpose in its isolated form, it may serve some purpose by being taken as a *qualified* idea expressed by the Sentence. Further, the Accusative and other Endings appearing at the end of Words clearly indicate the rule that the Denotation of the Words qualifies and restricts the signification of those Endings ; so that the general rule —that the Accusative Ending signifies the *objective* character of things.—*e.g.*, the idea of the *cow* as denoted by the term '*Gām*' with the Accusative Ending,—becomes set aside by the special rule that the Accusative Ending at the end of the particular word '*go*' (Cow) denotes, not *objectivity in general*, but the objectivity *of the Cow ;* that is, the *objective character* as restricted, and qualified by, the *Cow.*

Then there is the argument that Sentences, as *Groups of Words*, are composed by human beings, and hence cannot be Eternal, like the *Word.* This may be true in regard to Sentences composed by human beings ; it cannot be true regarding Sentences *in the Veda ;* and it is the latter that the *Mīmāṁsaka* cares for ; indeed according to him, it is only the *Vedic Sentence*—which is entirely free from defects—that can be valid by itself and hence a reliable means or source of knowledge—specially that relating to Super-sensuous things. *In regard to the ordinary things of the world, it is possible for Sentences to be composed in actual usage* (*Sū.* 26)—by men, after they have actually perceived the things spoken of in those Sentences. The conclusion thus is that the comprehension of the Meaning of the Sentence is obtained from that of the Meanings of the component Words. (*Shabara-Bhā.*, *Trs.*, pp. 42—47.)

From what has been said under *Sū.* 25 :—to the effect that the Sentence contains only *the mention of Words with definite Denotations along with a Word denoting action,*—and from what the *Bhāṣya* says on that Sūtra,—it is clear that these old authorities lend tacit support to the *Prābhākara* view of *Verbal Expression*, the implication of which is that it is only the *Injunction of an action* that is rally *expressive* and hence *valid.* (See below, under *Prabhākara.*)

The same support is also lent by *Sū.* 1.1.32 and the *Bhāṣya* thereon (*Trs.*, p. 50)—where we read—*On account of passages being related to Actions* etc. (*Sū.* 32) ; on which the *Bhāṣya*—'The Sentences occuring in the Veda are laid down as mutually related, and *they always collectively bear upon an Action.*' (*Trs.*, p. 50.).

Veda Not the Work of a Personal Being

(*Shabara, Sū. 27* to *32, Trs.*, pp. 48—50)

The *Mīmāṁsaka's* main thesis is that *Dharma* can be known only from the Vedic Injunction; and in order to establish the infallibility and utter reliability of the Vedic Injunction, he has had to prove that—(1) Words are Eternal, (2) the Denotations of Words are Eternal, (3) the Relationship between Words and their Denotations is Eternal, (4) the meaning of the Sentence is comprehended only on the comprehension of the meanings of the component Words, and the Sentence has no meaning apart by itself. As regards the Eternality of the *Sentence*, however, that Eternality cannot belong to the Sentence composed by human beings, and as such it cannot be Eternal; and for the same reason it cannot have an inherent validity, as it is open to the suspicion of having been vitiated at its source by the defects of the man pronouncing the Sentence. But this does not perturb the *Mīmāṁsaka ;* as the only *Sentence* upon whose *eternality* and *validity* he is keen is the *Vedic Injunction*, which alone is the valid source of our knowledge of *Dharma.* And as all human or personal associations are open to the suspicion of being vitiated at its source, it becomes necessary for the *Mīmāṁsaka* to show that the Vedic Sentence is not the work of any person,—that the Veda is not the work of any author,—that it is Eternal, self-sufficient.

The opposite position has been thus set forth in *Sū.* 1.1.27-28 :—"The Veda is the work of a personal author; it belongs to recent times; this is shown by the following facts ;—(1) Sections of the Veda are named after human beings such as '*Kāṭhaka*' '*Kālāpaka*' and the like; *Kaṭha* and *Kalāpa* are well-known names of certain sages; such naming of the Vedic sections, therefore, could not be possible except on the basis of the assumption that these persons are the authors of the sections named after them; (2) in the Veda we find the mention of such ephemeral things and names of men, etc.—as '*Babara, the son of Pravahaṇa*' and so forth". (*Shabara-Bhāṣya, Trs.*, pp. 48—49).

The *Mīmāṁsaka's* answer to the above is as follows :—We have already explained above (under *Sū.* 5,—*Bhā., Trs.*, p. 17) that there is an unbroken tradition of the Vedic text among Vedic Scholars of which no beginnings can be traced. This proves that the Vedic text, the Vedic Injunction, is Eternal. The names '*Kāṭhaka*' and the like are due to the fact of the particular person having been a specially efficient teacher of that section of the Veda. As for the words that appear to be proper names and

met with in the Veda, these are not the names of any persons at all; they are common words, not names, and it is only a chance coincidence that they resemble some proper names of modern times.

As for certain sentences in the Veda that appear to be incoherent and meaningless, which might discredit the reliability of the Veda, it is not right to take any Vedic text out of its context, and treat it as an isolated assertion. The sentences have to be taken as correlated to, and collectively bearing upon, some *action* which is enjoined as to be done. Thus interpreted, no sentence in the Veda can be found to be meaningless or incoherent. (*Bhā.*, *Tr.*, pp. 49-50.)

CHAPTER XIV

(B) SCRIPTURAL OR VERBAL COGNITION ACCORDING TO PRABHĀKARA

[*Prakaraṇa-Pañchikā*, p. 87 et saq.] The *'Shāstra'*—*Scriptural* or *Verbal* Cognition—has been defined as the cognition of something not before the Eyes, brought about by the knowledge of words. Verbal Cognition therefore is that Cognition of things imperceptible—*i.e.*, not cognised by other Means of Cognition—which proceeds from Mind-Soul contact aided by the knowledge of 'Sounds'; the 'Sounds' meant here being those in the form of letters; as these alone are audible by the ear; all sounds heard are in the shape of letters, there being no such thing as mere *Dhvani*, Indistinct Sound. The 'Sound' therefore that is spoken of in this connection is only a composite of Letter-Sounds related to something (which forms its Denotation); such indistinct Sounds as those of the *crowing of birds* is not really what is *heard*.—(*Bṛhati*, p. 155); in every case the Sound that is heard is in the form of Letter-Sounds; in the case of Words there are as many units of Perception, *i.e.*, Audition, as there are letters composing them; and the idea that we have of having heard *one Word* is due to the close proximity and quickness in which the several Letter-Sounds are heard. This idea of the 'Word' however has to be regarded as a *Unit*, as it is only thus that it could have a single Denotation.

The comprehension of this Denotation of Words is not got at through the Sense-organs; because the Sense-organ brings about the perception of only the Letter-Sounds. In the *Letters* themselves, however, there is a certain potency which brings about the apprehension of the Denotation of the Word composed of those Letters. It is for this reason that *Letters* have been held to be *the Means of Verbal Cognition*. 'The *Word* is nothing more than the *Letters*—*ga* and the rest,—and it is this that is spoken of as *Shabda*, Word, and there is nothing apart from the Letters',—says the *Bṛhatī* (p. 63).—But the *Word* alone, as composed of the Letter-Sounds, is not sufficient to bring about the comprehension of the meaning; *it is only the Sentence* composed of such words that brings about the Cognition; and what is *eternal* too is only the relation of the *Sentence* with its meaning. (*Ṛjuvimalā*, p. 135.)

As a matter of fact, the Perception of each letter (of the Word) vanishes as soon as it appears; and so also the perception of each Word composing

a Sentence. Hence it has been held that every such Perception leaves behind an Impression which leads on to the Perception of the next letter in the Word; and so on,—the Impression left by these Letter-perceptions combines with that left by the last Letter of the Word, and thus brings about the idea of the Word *as a whole,* which brings about the idea of the *meaning* [though according to *Prabhākara,* all this happens for the first time in the experience of any one person, only when the Word thus cognised is found used in a Sentence—*see below*].—Each Word has thus to be regarded as having the potency of bringing about the comprehension of the meaning. In a case where, even on the due hearing of the Letters of the Word, no meaning is comprehended, it has to be admitted that some necessary auxiliaries to that comprehension are wanting. Thus the conclusion is that, in the ultimate analysis, it is the *Letter-Sound* that is the root-cause of Verbal Cognition; and what is true of the *Letters* as composing the *Word* is true also of the *Words* as composing the *Sentence.* This theory of 'Impressions' left by Letters has been justified on the ground that no other hypothesis can explain the well-known facts of experience. (See *Bṛhatī,* pp. 160-161).

The next question is—What is meant by the '*Artha*'—'Meaning', 'Denotation'—of the Word?

The *Artha,* Meaning, of the Word is what is expressed or denoted by it; and what is denoted by the Word is something to which it bears a *relation* which is independent of,—and not created and established by—any personal agency.

This *Relation* is that of the *Denoter-Denoted, i.e.,* the *Denotative Relation.* Even though we do not comprehend the Meaning of a Word when we hear it for the first time, yet it cannot be denied that the Denotative Potency of the Word is something that belongs to it by its very nature, it is inherent in it. In our experience, when we are listening to the conversation betwen two elderly persons, and fail to comprehend the meaning of the Words used by them, there arises in our minds an uncertainty as to whether or not the Words are expressive of any meaning at all; we proceed to reason in our minds that if the Words were entirely inexpressive, they could not convey any sense to the person to whom they are addressed;—from his behaviour, however, it is clear that he does derive the idea of something out of the words; and yet, if the Words are really expressive how is it that they do not convey any meaning to ourselves? The only explanation for this apparent anomaly must lie in the fact that in the person to whom the Words are addressed, there is something, some peculiar Power, which is

wanting in ourselve ; this power must be in the shape of the knowledge of what is *denoted* by the Word ; it is such Power alone whose presence in the man is indicated by his behaviour. We can have no idea of the man having the knowledge of any '*Saṅkēta*', or Convention, bearing upon the expressiveness of the Word,—*i.e.*, some such conventional law as that 'this Word *denotes* this meaning,' upon which law some philosophers have based the denotativeness of Words. Until we are ourselves cognisant of the meaning of the Word, we cannot form the idea of any such law bearing upon it, and the knowledge of the said law presupposes the knowledge of the meaning. From this it follows that the only power present in the person comprehending the meaning of a word consists in his knowledge of the fact that the Word is *expressive* of such a meaning. This proves that the *expressiveness* of the Word is something that belongs to it by its very nature, and is not created or produced by any person or thing. As this *inherent expressive potency* of the Word is sufficient to explain all phenomena of Verbal Expression and Cognition and Usage, there can be no justification for attributing the expressiveness to a Convention. In the case of some Words—such as Proper Names—such a Convention has to be admitted—which applies certain names to certain persons. But in the case of common names—such as 'cow', 'jar', 'man' and so forth—there is no justification for postulating any Convention. Consequently the relation of all such Words to their meanings must be held to be Eternal.

Exactly the same is true of the *Sentence* also ; the relation of which to its meaning is *Eternal ;* 'the *relation between the Sentence and the Meaning of the Sentence is inborn, Eternal*'—says *Prabhākara* (*Bṛhatī*, p. 135), on which the *Ṛjuvimalā* remarks—'The *inborn character* of the Relation is in reference to the Sentence itself ; because the mere Word, simply by itself, expresses no meaning, it expresses a meaning and is comprehended only when occuring in a *Sentence ;* and what is *expressive by its very nature* is the *Sentence,* and not any single Word by itself.

The *Mīmāṁsaka* lays stress upon this *denotativeness*—*i.e.*, the relation between the Verbal Expression and the Idea Expressed—being *inborn, Eternal,* because if it were not so, the validity of the Scriptural texts would be based upon the whim of the agencies creating and setting up the said Relation, or of the person uttering those texts. And thus, as he denies all personal agency in the composition of the Veda, there would *ipso facto* be no validity in the Vedic texts themselves. Nor can the *Mīmāṁsaka* accept the Logician's point of view, by which the denotativeness of words is created

and fixed by 'Convention' among people who introduce, and make use of, the Words for the first time,—according to the Logician, created by God Himself. This view necessitates the postulating of a 'God' as the Creator of *all* Words and their denotations, and hence of the Veda itself; and this militates against the *Mīmāṁsā*-doctrine of the Eternality and Self-Sufficiency of the Veda, which must be independent of all personal influence of any kind. In fact, if the denotativeness of Words depended solely upon 'Convention', the Veda would be reduced to the position of a meaningless jumble of words; because, according to the *Mīmāṁsaka*, the pre-eminent function of the Veda lies in the enjoining of certain acts as bringing about an *Apūrva*—an imperceptible, Subtle Force—leading to a definite result; and as this *Force* is something of which no Person could have any direct knowledge, except through the Veda—how could the denotativeness of those words of the Veda be fixed by any Convention? And as no Convention could be found applicable to these words, these would, according to the Logician's view, have to be regarded as absolutely meaningless. If a Creator, God, were admitted, then as this God, being omniscient, would be possessed of the direct knowledge of the said *Apūrva*, He would be in a position to lay down the Conventions with regard to the denotativeness of Words,—including the Word denoting the *Apūrva*. But to the Mīmāṁsaka the idea of an omnicient Person, like God, or any one else, is wholly inacceptable; hence for the sake of the Veda, his all-in-all, he finds it necessary to stick to the view that *all* Words and their *Denotations* are eternal, everlasting, independent of all conventions and agencies and influences.—(Vide *Prakaraṇa-pañchikā*, p. 133 et. saq.)

We have seen that the denotation of words—*i.e.*, the relation between Words and their Denotation—is Eternal, without beginning or end. Now as regards the Eternality of the Words themselves, it has been pointed out that we comprehend the meaning of Words by observing their use among experienced people on various occasions. If then, at each time the older man speaks of a thing, he were to create a new name for it for the occasion,—which name could disappear as soon as uttered,—necessary corollaries of the view that the Word is evanescent,—then what basis would the younger man have for observing the frequent use of the Word and thereby ascertaining its meaning? As each time that the thing is spoken of, he would be face to face with a newly created Word, never heard before; and under the circumstances, the meaning of the Word would remain ever uncomprehended and incomprehensible; and until the Word affords some Cognition, it cannot be regarded as Valid Means of Cognition (*pramāṇa*).

Consequently, unless the Logician is prepared to deny this character to the Word, he must accept it as Eternal. Then there arises the question—"If the Word is Eternal, why is it not *always* present in our Consciousness ?" The answer to this is that, though the Words is ever present, yet, in order that it may become cognised, it stands in need of certain auxiliary aids that serve to manifest it and render it cognisable, or present it to our consciousness. This manifestive agency consists in the Effort put forth by the man who utters the Word. The Logician regards this Effort as the *Cause* producing the Word ; but in reality, it is only a force or agency that serves to *manifest* to our Consciousness the Word that is already in existence, but imperceptible. And as these Efforts may be many, there need be no incongruity in the same Word being uttered, and heard, by several persons ; whenever the manifestive agency is present and active the Word will become manifested and heard. Hence if there are several men putting forth the Effort for uttering a Word, it is only natural that there should be several manifestations of the Word. That it is the same Word that is cognised in each of these cases is proved by our direct Cognition of all of these as one and the same. And this is another reason for regarding the Word as *Eternal.* The Effort put forth by the speaker is not in itself sufficient to account for the Cognition of the Word ; and in that case we could not account for the non-cognition of the Word by the deaf. In fact, the Effort tends to manifest the Word only through certain effects that it produces in the auditory organ of the person standing by. The several steps in the physiological process of speech have been thus explained :—(1) The speaker puts forth an Effort, (2) this Effort brings the Speaker's Soul into contact with the Air enclosed within his lungs, (3) in obedience to the impulse imparted by the Effort, the Air in the lungs is expelled outwards, (4) in its upward progress, it comes into contact with the vocal chords, (5) these contacts modify the character of the said Air, (6) on issuing from the mouth, the Air passes onwards and reaches the auditory organs of the persons standing near enough to be reached by the Air-waves,—the extent of the reach of this Air depends upon the greater or less degree of the initial Effort of the Speaker ; (7) on reaching the said Auditory Organs, the Airwaves produce in those organs a certain change that is conducive to its power of making the Sound audible. Thus it is this faculty of the Auditory Organ that is the direct Agent manifesting the Word to the Consciousness of the Persons to whom the Auditory Organs belong. As the Air-current is endowed with a certain momentum, by virtue of which it keeps moving onwards—when it has passed out of the Auditory Organ, the Sound also passes out and the audition ceases, the

person hears the Sound no longer. The next question that arises is—"What is the change in the Auditory Organ which renders it capable of manifesting Sound ?" What happens is that the Air-waves issuing out of the Speaker's mouth, strikes the first layer of Air enclosed within the hearer's Tympanum and produces in the latter a peculiar modification whereby it is rendered capable of manifesting Sound and making it audible. To this end, the *Mīmāṁsaka* postulates the presence, in the ear-cavity, of the fixed layer of Air, for the purpose of affording a screen of resistance to the Sound-waves ; against which screen these waves strike-and thereby effect the change in the Auditory Organ. It is a well-recognised fact that Air cannot produce any effects unless it meets with a certain degree of resistance. Even though the Auditory Organ consists of *Ākāsha*, and *Ākāsha* is one only, yet the Ear-Drum is distinct in each person—each being limited in its power and scope by virtue of the Merit-Demerit of the person to whom it belongs. Then again, the change produced in the Sound-waves is not in the *Ākāsha* of the Ear, but in the Air enclosed within the Ear-Drum ; and as this latter differs in each person, all men need not hear the Sound that may be heard by one of them. That all this diversity is due to *Air-waves* is also indicated by the fact that when Sound-waves travel with the wind, the Sound is heard at a greater distance than when they travel against the Wind.

Lastly, each time that we hear a Word (or Sentence) uttered, we at once recognise it as being the *same*, and not as different in each case. Even though it may be uttered in varying degrees of loudness, yet all the difference that we are cognisant of is that in the tone or pitch of the Sound,—not in the *Word* itself, which latter is always recognised to be the *same.*

For these reasons the conclusion is that the Word (and Sentence) has no cause bringing it into existence,—and thus it has the same *Eternality* that belongs to *Ākāsha* and such other things.

The above leads us on to the question of the exact denotation of Words : Does the Word (name of things, noun) denote the *Universal* (Class) or the Particular (Individual) or both ? The ground for doubt on this point (as expounded by *Shabara*, above) is that while the *Cognition* brought about by the Word pertains to the *Class*, the *Action* that follows the Word (*i.e.*, the Injunction) pertains to the *Individual.* This same view has been expressed by *Prabhākara* (*Bṛhatī.* MS., p. 36, b)—who holds the *Anvitābhidhāna* theory of Verbal Expression, according to which the Denotation of a Word is cognisable only through its connection with a particular *action* ; hence, as each Sentence would appertain to some *action*, which by its very

nature, must appertain to an *Individual,* his theory would appear to lend support to the Individualistic theory of Denotation.

The practical purpose of the present enquiry lies in the fact that, if all Words denoted Individuals, there could be no differentiation of rules into *General* and *Special—i.e.,* the General Law and its exceptions—and thus it would not be possible for the former to be set aside by the latter; and this would give rise to much confusion in the actual interpretation of the Vedic texts bearing upon the rules regarding actions. But *Prabhākara* in his characteristic manner, has turned this question also on to the main subject of the First Discourse—*i.e.,* the reliability of the Veda relating to *Dharma.* The *Pūrvapakṣa* view therefore, according to him would be that—"it being doubtful whether Words denote Universals or Particulars, the exact meaning of the Vedic texts must remain doubtful, and this vitiates the validity and authority of the Vedic texts."

The answer to the above, *i.e., Prabhākara's Siddānta* on this question—is that in reality, there is nothing doubtful regarding the denotation of Words; *it is the Universal that is denoted by the Word, because it serves the purpose of actions.* (Su. 33). The reason for this as given by *Prabhākara* (and also by *Shabara,*—see above) is that, if the Word denoted the Individual or Particular, we could not explain such Injunctions as 'The altar is to be built like a kite'; as it would be impossible for altars to be made in every case like a particular kite. The word 'kite', therefore, must denote the Class, the 'Universal'; and that alone can form the denotation of the Word which is found to be related to a Sentence (Injunction),—and here, as we find the Individual or Particular kite incapable of being so related,—the Word must be taken as denoting the 'Universal' or *Class.* The *Bṛhatī* (MS., p. 37 b) puts forth the objection that—"though all this may be true in the case of the particular Injunction cited (with the word 'kite'),—in the case of other Sentences, it is equally evident that the Word cannot tbe taken as denoting the 'Universal'; hence the matter of the exact denotation of Words remains as doubtful as ever, and that fact vitiates the authority of the Vedic Sentence". In answer to this, it is pointed out that, as a matter of fact, we find that the injunctive function of an Injunctive Sentence cannot be accomplished until its words afford some idea of "commonality"; consequently all *actions* must be reiated to that *Commonality* or *Community,* or '*Universal'—or Class-Character,*—and not to the Particular or Individual; the idea of the Particular or Individual, where necessary, is obtained indirectly, through that *class-character* with which it is inseparably connected.

MEANING OF THE SENTENCE ACCORDING TO PRABHĀKARA.

It has been seen that according to *Prabhākara*, people learn the meaning of Words only by watching the usage and activity of older people. When a set of words is addressed by one person to another,—whereupon the latter person acts in a certain manner, it is clear to the observer that the meaning of the words pronounced must have been in the form of an Injunction to do what the other person has done. In the case of Words where such an interpretation is not possible, the comprehension of the meaning must depend upon something indirectly connected with the Injunction. This is the reason why *Prabhākara* has asserted in connection with the definition of *Verbal Cognition* that the object cognised must be one that has not been already cognised by another means of Cognition ; and this can be so always in the case of the Injunctive Sentence. All words with the Imperative or similar terminations express the Injunction *directly*, while other words denote things related to that Injunction ; such things, for instance, as the name of the Act enjoined, the person enjoined and so on. This leads to the view that the whole direct denotation of the Veda must lie in the enjoining of *something to be done*. This goes directly against the view of the Vedāntin that the direct denotation of the more important texts lies, *not* in the laying down of *something to be done*, but in the pointing out of certain well-accomplished entities like *Brahman*, the Super-Soul. As against this Vedanta view, it has been pointed out (*Bṛhatī.*, p. 47) that, though such may be the case with a few words, yet the comprehension of the denotation of those words also could be obtained only by observing the usage of older persons, and this usage must always lie in the form of an *Injunction* addressed by one person to another for *the doing of a certain act ;* thus ultimately the denotation of all Words must lie, directly or indirectly, *with something to be done.* The Vedānta-texts also speak of the Super-Soul as something which one is *enjoined to know and meditate upon*, in order to escape from the cycle of Births and Deaths.

Thus then, if the meaning of the Words can be known only when they occur in Injunctive Sentences, it follows that every Word must denote things only as related to the other factors of the Injunction, and no word can be comprehended as having any denotation when taken apart from such Sentence. Says *Prabhākara* (*Bṛhatī*, p. 135)—'What is eternal is the Relation which the Sentence bears to what it expresses,'—on which the *Ṛjuvimalā* remarks—The *Word*, alone by itself, never expresses any meaning ; it is only the *Sentence* that does it ; as is clear from the fact that we learn the meaning of Verbal expressions only from the usare of older people,—and

this usage is only in the form of Sentences ; and every single Word is understood only in so far as it is related to the other words in the Sentence ; hence it becomes established that what is expressive of the meaning is the *Sentence* only, not any *Word* alone by itself.—(*Ṛjuvimalā*, p. 135.)

Herein we have what has been called the *Anvitābhidhāna* Theory of Verbal Expression. This forms a distinctive feature of the *Prābhākara* School of Thought,—and it has the tacit support of the *Sūtra* (1.1.25) and also of *Shabara* (Trs., p. 44, and 132 of Bib. Ind. Text).

Says the *Bṛhatī* (p. 188)— वाक्यार्थेन व्यवहारः; that is, all usage is through the Sentence and its meaning. How is this to be reconciled with the assertion in the *Bhāṣya* that 'the Word *'cow'* denotes the Class or Universal distinguished by the dewlap' ?—how too can this be regarded as 'eternal', when it is based upon the usage of experienced people ? In order to meet this difficulty which involves an inconsistency between the Premiss and the Conclusion,—the *Bhāṣya* has provided an explanation later on, under Sū. 1.1.25.

On this the *Ṛjuvimalā* remarks—The 'Conclusion' stands for the declaration of the Eternality of the Relationship, and the 'Premiss' stands for the 'beginninglessness of the usage'. The inconsistency between these two has been explained away in the *Bhāṣya*, where it has been pointed out that words express the meaning of the *Sentence* only through the comprehension of the meaning of the words themselves. (See *Bhāṣya* under 1.1.25).

The *Ṛjuvimalā* (pp. 190-191) has summed up this controversy in the following words :—

There are some people whose mind is led away by the declamatory descriptions of the Creation and Dissolution of the World ; to this class belong *Kaṇāda*, *Gautama* and their followers. These people declare that God is the one Cause, Creator, of the whole Universe. They argue thus—"We see that every composite object comes into existence through the *coming together* —Conjunction—of their component parts ;—all worldly things, the Body and the various Regions, are composite in their nature ;—the conjunction of component particle is found to go on till the *Diad*—the Two-Atom Compound ; which Diad also is *composite*, being composed of two atoms. The conjunction between the two Atoms is brought about by the action—vibration—of the two Atoms ; and this Vibration in the Atoms is due to the conjunction of Souls influenced by the Unseen Force (of Destiny) ;—this Unseen Force is non-intelligent, unconscious, by its nature ;—and as a matter of fact no non-intelligent entity is found to act except under the guidance of an intelligent operator. This operator of the Unseen Force could

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not be those same Souls that are themselves under the influence of that same Force ;—because they are not cognisant of this Force—which is made up of their own Merit-Demerit, of which however they themselves are not conscious—and the operator of the Force must be one who knows it ;—hence all this leads us to postulate an Intelligent Being apart from the said Souls ; and this Controller and Operator of these Unseen Forces is one possessed of very superior Intelligence. Thus the entire Universe comes to be regarded as having had a beginning and having been brought to the present stage through a long series of products beginning with the Atomic Diad, brought about by conjunctions due to vibrations in the Atoms due to the said Unseen Force, under the Control of the Great Operator of Superior Intelligence. Thus having had a beginning, the World must come to an end. How then can there be a *beginningless usage of Experienced People* upon which all Verbal Usage could be based ?"

The *Mīmāṁsaka's* answer to the above is as follows : [*Ṛjuvimalā*, p. 191] :—All this argumentation may be very soul-satisfying. But what has got to be explained is—how is it that the entire World of Composite Things becomes dissolved all at once simultaneously. At the present time we find that while one thing is coming into existence, another is disappearing ; when such is the fact of common experience, who can deny the beginningless tradition of usage among experienced people ? Then again, if the ordinary Intelligent Beings—the ordinary Souls—are unable to control Destiny, by reason of their being non-cognisant of their own Destiny,—then how can an entirely distinct Soul (the Super-Soul, God) be the Controller ? The absence of the knowledge of the Destiny of Souls would be there in His case also, Specially because the idea is that all Cognition (knowlede of things—) proceeds from Mind-Soul contact through Sense-object—contacts,—all these contacts being due to Destiny ; and all these *contacts* could not be there, for the cognising (and controlling) of Destiny (even by God)........Nor is it right to regard Gods' Cognition as eternal ; because the fact universally recognised is that every Cognition is *produced and destroyed ;* so that God's Cognition also must be the same.—Further, what is the meaning of the 'control' exercised by God ? The only 'control' that is inferable is one of the same kind as that exercised by the Carpenter over the Implements ; but no such 'control' is possible in the case of God. As for 'Destiny' itself, its action can be no other than its *coming into existence ;* and this is brought about by such acts as *sacrificing* and the like. The God-Idea therefore is too flimsy to receive serious attention. That is why the *Bhāṣya* and the *Bṛhatī* have taken no notice of it. (*Ṛjuvimalā*, pp. 190-191.)

Veda is not the Work of a Personal Author According to Prabhākara.

According to *Prabhākara*, we can derive a truly valid *Verbal Cognition* only from Words and Sentences contained in the Veda. This, he says, is clear from the very name given to the Means of Cognition, '*Shāstra*' which means *Scripture*, or more precisely, *Scriptural Injunction.* As a necessary corrolary to this, it is held that, apart from the Words found in the Scriptures, no Words can provide any Cognition of things not already known through other means of knowledge ; all words used in common parlance are mostly only such as denote things that can be cognised through Perception and Inference also ; while things not cognised through these can be reightly cognised only when described by words of unquestionable authority and trustworthy character. From this it follows that Cognitions provided by Words other than these,—and all non-Vedic Words and Sentences belong to this other category—can have no inherent validity by themselves.

This theory becomes divested of much of its apparent absurdity when we realise the fact that, the Scriptural Word alone is free from all defects in its source (as it has no *source* at all), and hence inherently valid ; and hence no other Words can be regarded as affording *invariably* valid Cognitions ; specially when it is found that in common parlance, most of the Cognitions obtained through Words of ordinary men turn out to be invalid and unreliable. Hence at best, Cognitions derived from Non-Scriptural Words can be regarded to be of the same kind as Remembrance ; and hence of doubtful validity. And as Cognitions of doubtful validity cannot be accepted as 'Cognition' *proper*, which, by its very nature, must be always valid, the conclusion is irresistible that *Non-Scriptural* words cannot provide any *Cognition*, in the proper sense of the term ; they are mere *translators* or *reflectors* or *describers* of what is in the mind of the person uttering the words ; and the validity of these *reflectors* can be ascertained only by other means of knowledge. It is in reference to such *Non-Scriptural* words that we have the saying—पदमप्यधिकाभावात्स्म रकान्न विशिष्यते, that is, 'the Word is nothing more than what provides Remembrance ? (*Shlo. Vā. Shabda* 107).

This cannot be true of the words of the Veda. Because in the case of *non-vedic* Words, its invalidity or doubtful validity is based upon the the generally untrustworthy character of speakers, —which is due to many such causes as wrong information, wrong understanding, incapacity to use the right words, and so on. In the case of the Words of the Veda, on the other hand, as they do not emanate from a *Speaker* or *author*, there can be

none of these causes to which the falsity of the assrtion may be due. In the case of the words of ordinary men, even when we find them providing a reasonably connected sense, there is always a lurking suspicion that there may be some defect in the source from which the speaker has derived the information that he is seeking to convey by means of the words in question ; and for this reason we can never be absolutely sure of the validity of the Cognition provided by such words, which, for this reason cannot be regarded as the '*Means of Right Cognition*', *Pramāṇa*. Even in cases where ordinary words do afford valid Cognitions, it is not the *Words* that bring about the Cognitions *directly ;* what occurs is that on hearing the Words, we find that they convey a certain information, and then we proceed to reason that,—'the speaker is a trustworthy person as not one of the grounds of untrustworthiness—such as greed and the like,—is found in him, hence what he says must be true ; hence the information conveyed by his word must be true'. Thus in these cases, the *Words* are not the *Direct Cause* of the valid *Cognition,* they only indirectly indicate the presence of the Cognition in the Speaker's mind, in so far as the hearer is concerned, the Words are not the *Means of Valid Cognition, Pramāna ;*—at any rate, not independently of the Inference that is involved in the process of the Cognition in the Speaker's mind. All such cases involve a clear *inferential* process ; such as for instance, as—'This speaker has a particular Cognition in his mind, because he has pronounced these words (and he is a reliable person)'.

This view of *Verbal Cognition* and *Shabda-Pramāṇa* has been set forth in the *Prakaraṇapañchikā* (pp. 15 et saq) ; where we read—It is only the *Veda* that can be called *Shabda-Pramāna ;* and that also only when containing an Injunction ; words of common parlance cannot be so, because the Cognition produced by them is purely *inferential.* When, for instance, we hear a man saying something, our mind goes through the following reasoning—'This man speaks of such and such a thing—this he must be speaking of after having known what he speaks of,—hence what he says must be true'. The speech of the man is an effect of his knowledge, and hence from the Effect (Speech) we *infer* its Cause (the man's knowledge). Thus all ordinary *Verbal Cognition* is *inferential,* while that provided by the *Veda* alone is purely *Verbal.* It is true that all Words are endowed with an inborn denotative potency, but in the case of the ordinary speakers of the world, this inborn potency of the Word becomes obscured by the suspicions regarding the capacity and trustworthy character of the person concerned. On the other hand, in the case of the Veda, there being no speaker concerned,

there can be no grounds for such suspicion, and the inherent Potency remains unobscured.

It is interesting to note in this connection that *Kaṇāda* (in the *Vaishēṣika-Sūtra* 1.1.3 ; 2.3.32 ; 9.2.3. ; and 10.2.9—regarding the Veda as the work of a Person (God),—has declared that *Verbal Cognition,* is nothing apart from *Inferential Cognition,* as all words emanating from *persons*provide only *Inferential Cognitions,* and there is no such thing as purely *Verbal Cognition ;* hence *'Shabda'* need not be regarded as a distinct *Pramāṇa,* Means of Cognition. From this it is clear that *Shabda* as a distinct Means of Cognition can be acknowledged only by those who regard the Veda as *Eternal,* and not the work of an author. (See below)

Just as in the case of the other *Pramānas,* so here also, if we regard the term 'Shāstra' as an Accusative Abstract Noun—*Shiṣyatē yat tat*—equivalent to *'Shiṣṭi',*—then it is synonymous with Verbal (or Scriptural) Cognition ; but if it is taken as an Instrumental Abstract Noun—*Shiṣyatē anēna*—then it is synonymous with the *Word* providing *Verbal Cognition.*

This 'Word'—which, according to *Prabhākara,* is the same as *Scriptural Text*—is of two kinds :—(1) Those actually found in the Veda and (2) those, the presence of which in the Veda is inferred. To the latter class belong all those texts that are inferred as supplying the basic authority for the Injunctions of actions contained in the *Smṛtis,*—whose sole claim to authority rests upon the fact that they contain no Injunctions save those vouched for by Vedic texts.

It may be observed here, as remarked by the *Prakaraṇapañchikā* (p. 101), that the *'Shāstra',* or *Vedic Injunction* often stands in need of some factors being supplied from without ; *e.g.,* the text that speaks of a certain action merely as accomplishing a certain desirable result, stands in need of some such Injunctive words as that 'this act should be done' ; and these words have to be supplied. Similarly, certain texts stand in need of certain well-ascertained facts of experience ; *e.g.,* for ascertaining the true significance of the injunction *'Udbhidā yajēta',* 'one should perform the *Udbhid',* it is necessary to call in the help of ordinary experience ; the word *'Udbhid'* in ordinary language means a *tree* ; so the text might well be taken to mean that 'one should perform the tree' ; but there our experience steps in and tells us that such a performance would be an impossibility and it is only an account of this impossibility that we are led to take the word *'Udbhid'* in the text as the *name* of a particular sacrifice, which is the correct interpretation. (*Vide Mīmā. Sū.* 1.4.2.)

Then, as regards the question as to how to determine the facts of certain words forming a single *Sentence* or text,—the principle adopted is that just as a number of letters denoting a certain *conceptual unit* is regarded as *one Word,* so when a number of words express a single complete *conceptual Idea,* they are regarded as *one Sentence.* (*Mīmā. Sū.* 2.1.16—see below—the Principle of Syntactical Convention.)

We have seen that the Veda is not the work of a Person or Author. This is proved by the fact that all words and things denoted by them are Eternal (see above), and there is no other means (save the Veda) available for the Knowledge of *Dharma,*—including as it does the notion of such supersensuous thing as *Apūrva* and the like; and the Veda itself, as only a collection of words speaking of such things, must be Eternal, and as such independent of all authorship.

The *Bṛhatī* (p. 403) asks—'What is the meaning of the opponent's assertion that the Veda is an *Effect,* a product? It has been proved that Words are eternal and so also is the relation of Words with their Denotations; what else then is there in the Veda which could be a product? The answer is that what is meant by the opponent regarding the Veda as an *Effect or product* is that it is dependent upon other Means of Cognition; and he argues that the fact of the Veda being so is shown by the presence there of such words as '*Babara, the son of Pravahaṇa*' and so forth. The Mīmāṁsaka's answer is that all such instances adduced by the other party are capable of being explained away and they do not prove the said *dependence* of the Veda. The rest of it can be learnt from the *Bhāṣya* (see above).

CHAPTER XV

(C) VERBAL COGNITION

According to Kumārila

Kumārila and his followers do not restrict *'Shabda-Pramāṇa'* to *Vedic Injunctions* only; as is done by *Prabhākara.* The former divide the *'Shabda-Pramāṇa'* into two classes—(1) *Pauruṣeya, Personal,* and *Apauruṣeya* Impersonal. Under the *Personal* Word are included all words uttered by trustworthy personal beings, and under the *Impersonal* Word come the words of the Veda. Both of them are *valid;* and the reason given for this view is that the only ground of the *invalidity* of a Word lies in the fact of its emanating from an untrustworthy Source, and this ground is as absent in the case of the words of trustworthy persons as in that of the words of the Veda.

The reason why the author of the *Bhāṣya* has defined *Shabda* under the name of *'Shāstra'*, 'Scriptural Word', is not that he confines valid Verbal Cognition to the *Scriptural Word* only, but that it is this latter alone that bears upon the subject-matter of study—*i.e., Dharma,*—and it is the *Vedic Word* alone that bears upon *Dharma.* (*Shlo. Vā., Shabda* 1.10.)

The *Vaisheṣikas* and the *Bauddhas* have both included *Verbal Cognition* under *Inference.* But this is denied by Kumārila on the ground that under formal definitions, the two cognitions—Verbal and Inferential—might appear to be the same; but that cannot justify the identification of the two; as the conditions of Inferential Cognition might be fulfilled in the case of Personal Word, they cannot be fulfilled by the Cognition derived from the *Vedic Word.* (*Shlo. Vā., Shabda* 51.)

For the same reason the *Word,* as a means of Valid Cognition, cannot be defined as 'the teaching of a trustworthy person'; as there is no possibility of any such 'person' in the case of the Vedic Word. Hence we conclude that the Cognition that is brought about by *Words* is *Verbal Cognition,* and (like all Cognitions) it is self-sufficient in its validity (*Ibid.*, 53); and it is on this point of *Self-validity* alone that Verbal Cognition may be regarded as similar to Inferential Cognition (*Ibid.*, 54). *Kumārila* (*Ibid.* 54 et. seq.) has entered into a long explanation of the points of difference between the *Inferential Probans* and the *Word* as the means, respectively, of *Inferential* and *Verbal Cognitions;* and the conclusion arrived at is that *Verbal Cognition*

does not fulfil the three conditions that are essential in all Inference, and hence it is as distinct from *Inference* as *Sense-perception* itself (*Ibid.* 98).

Kumārila appears to be slightly halting on this point, and he seems to concede that the knowledge derived from *Individual* Words might be included under 'Inference'; and goes on to point out that the Cognition provided by the *Sentence* can never come under *Inference* (*Ibid.* 108—110).

What is Word?

The *Word* is not anything apart from the component letters, and just as several subsidiary acts in an Elaborate Sacrific combine to bring about the final result,—so the several *letters* composing a *Word* combine to bring about the Cognition of its Denotation (*Shāstra-dīpikā*, pp. 70-71). The order of sequence too belongs, not to the *Letters*, but to the *Letter-Sounds*, and through these latter, it is imposed upon the Letters that are manifested by those Sounds. Hence it is *Letters* alone that can be expressive of meanings. (*Ibid.*, p. 73.)

What is it that is Denoted by the Word?

The ground of doubt on this point as put forward in the *Bhāṣya* (See above) is that—'While the Cognition pertains to the Universal, the Action enjoined pertains to the *Individual*'. This same view has been accepted by *Prabhākara*, who holds that the Denotation of a Word is cognised only through its connection with a *Particular Act*, and each Sentence would naturally pertain to some *Individual Act*. The theory would appear to lend support to the Individualistic Theory of Denotation.

Kumarila naturally does not admit of this ground of doubt; and his dissatisfaction is based upon the fact that the Cognition is often found to pertain to the Individual also, not *always* to the Universal, as asserted by *Shabara*. *Kumārila* bases his doubt regarding the true denotation of words upon the fact that both Usage and Cognition are found severally to apply to the Universal *and* the *Individual*, while works on Grammar lend support to the view that it is the *Individual* that is denoted. The practical purpose of the present enquiry lies in the fact that if all words denoted *only* Individuals, then there could be no differentiation of Rules into *General* and *Special* (the General Law and its Exception), and thus it would not be possible for the former to be set aside by the latter, and this would give rise to much confusion.

According to Murāri Mishra also, what is denoted by the Word is the *Ākṛti*; as it is only with this that the relationship of the Word can be appre-

hended. What is comprehended through the Word is the *Individual as qualified by the Ākṛti ;* because the *qualified* cannot be conceived of without an idea of a *qualifying factor ;* the expressive potency of the Word however rests in the *Ākṛti* ; but mere *Ākṛti* or *Jāti* is never apprehended by itself alone ; it is always apprehended along with the Individual. (*MS*., p. 60.)

He goes on to say—Mere *Jāti* by itself is incapable of being manifested, it is always dependent on something else, hence it becomes manifested only when this *something else* is manifested (p. 62).

Kumārila also accepts the view that it is the *Universal* that is denoted. But he is not satisfied with the presentation of the case by *Shabara,* and sets it forth in his own words, as follows :—(*Tantravārtika* on 1.1.33, *Translation,* pp. 363—365).

It is the Universal that is denoted by the Word. Why ? (1) Because it is the Universal that is cognised before the Individual ; (2) because a Word is not found to give rise to a mixed conception ; and (3) because when the order 'bring a cow' is given, the person ordered brings any cow that he likes.

To explain these arguments—(1) When the Word 'cow is uttered,' before we have an idea of any *individuals,* it is the Universal that we have an idea of : and when the form of this Universal has been duly comprehended, then alone are the *Individuals* cognised. Thus, in as much as for the Cognition of the Universal there is no other means save the Word, while the Cognition of the *Individuals* is actually brought about by the Cognition of the Universal, we conclude that the Word denotes the *Universal.*

(2) If the Individuals were denoted by the Word, then, in as much as the *individual* cows are found to have various characters—such as the *variegated colour, absence of horns,* etc.—the idea brought about by the Word would be a mixed one (partaking of all these characters), while as a matter of fact, we find the word giving rise to a single uniform conception (of the common *Universal* 'cow'), and thus too we conclude that it is the *Universal* that is denoted by the Word.

(3) When a person is ordered to 'bring a cow', if no *particular* cow happens to be specially indicated, either by the character of the work in hand, or by the other concurrent circumstances, the person ordered is found to bring in any common cow and not any particularly specified cow, or all the cows in the world. If, however, the *individual* cow were denoted by the word, then the mention of the word 'cow' would have indicated all the *individual* cows in the world, which would have to be brought in by the

person ordered, or he could bring in only that one particular cow which would be denoted by the word. But, as a matter of fact, we find that he brings in any common cow, with the only restriction that it should possess the common character of the 'cow'. And hence too we conclude that the '*Universal*' is denoted by the Word.

If, however, the *individual* be held to be denoted by the Word, there could only be the three following alternatives :—(1) That *all* Individuals should be denoted independently by themselves ; (2) or that the *aggregate of all Individuals* as qualified by a particular individual should be denoted ; (3) or that *one* particular Individual be denoted.

(1) Now, it is not possible for all Individuals to be denoted ; (a) because that would necessitate the assumption of manifold denotative potencies in the Word ; (b) because the *Individuals* being transient, the relationship between the Word and its Denotation would be transient ; (c) because the conception of all the *Individuals* being absolutely impossible, the full relationship of the Word with the Denotation would never be comprehended, and as such there could be no using of the word or any business carried on (such as the following of one another's directions etc.) ; (d) as referring to many *Individuals* the word 'cow' would be always used in the plural, like the word 'eight' ; and as such it would never be possible to apply to it either the dual or the singular number ; (e) as the white colour cannot subsist in all the individual cows denoted by the word 'cow', there could be no co-extensiveness (of the qualification and the qualified) in the expression 'white cow' ; and (f) because in the case of the Vedic Injunction 'One should sacrifice with the animals', as it would be impossible to perform a sacrifice *with all individual animals*, such Injunctions, and hence the entire Veda, would lose authority.

(2) Similarly too, it is not possible to admit the Aggregate of *Individuals* to be denoted by the Word ; (a) because in this case also all the Individuals will have to be taken as denoted, as forming the Aggregate, and hence this theory would be open to all the aforesaid six objections ; (b) because such a theory would necessitate the assumption of an *Aggregate* apart from the *Individuals ;* (c) and as no usage is found to appertain to any such Aggregate, the Denotation of the Word would be absolutely useless as the sole use of the Denotation lies in the accomplishment of Usage ; (d) the units forming the Aggregate being all perishable, their Aggregate would also be perishable, and hence the relationship of the Word with its Denotation would become transient ; (e) the Aggregate being one only, there could be no plural or dual number in Nouns ; (f) nor could there be any co-extensiveness between the

qualification and the *qualified,* in expressions like 'white cow'; because the Aggregate of all cows cannot be said to be *white ;* (g) the Aggregate being shapeless, no sacrifice could be performed with it and that would shake the authority of all Vedic Injunctions.

(3) If a *single* individual be held to be denoted by the Word, then too—(a) there would be non-eternality of the relationship of the Word and its Denotation; (b) as it could not be ascertained which one particlar individual is denoted, no business would be possible; (c) there could be no idea of Community or common character; (d) Nouns could never have the Plural or the Dual Number; (e) no use of the word 'cow' could be possible, prior to the birth, and after the death, of the *particular cow* denoted; (f) the word 'cow' giving rise to an idea of the 'cow' in general, there can be no particular reason for asserting that it is only *this* particular cow, and not that, which is denoted by the word.

Relationship Between Word and Its Denotation—According to Kumārila.

The main thesis of the *Mīmāṁsaka* is that what the Veda says must be true, never false, because it is not dependent upon a speaker or personal author,—being as independent and eternal as the Word and its Denotation; and the Cognition or knowledge derived from the Veda must be true,—because it is eternal, because it is provided by the Sentence.

It has been shown above that the Word, as composed by Letters, is eternal; so also what is *denoted* by the Word,—*viz.*, the *Class* or *Universal* ; and the logical corollary to all this must be that the Relation between the Word and its Denotation also must be eternal. (*Shlo. Vā., Sambandhākṣēpa,* 1—4).

The existence of this Relation is proved by positive and negative concomitance; and this is learnt by experience. This relation of Denotations is deduced from the fact that until the relation has been grasped the Word does not provide the idea of the denoted '*Universal*', and when the Relation is grasped, the '*Universal*' becomes cognised. And all this indicates the Denotative Potency of the Word.

The other party argues—"We admit that there is this Relation between the Word and its Denotation. But you must admit that this Relation is dependent upon the experience of men, something evanescent, not Eternal". (*Ibid.,* 45).

The answer to this is given by *Kumārila* (in *Shlo. Vā., Sambhandhākṣēpaparihāra,* 13 *et. seq.*) as follows :—If the Denotativeness of words is

something created by some sort of Convention among men, then there are only three ways in which this Convention could function,—(1) A Convention would be set up for the benefit of each man—each one being told that 'Such is the meaning of this Word', or (2) this Convention would be set up each time the Word is pronounced; or (3) the Convention would be set up by God Himself for all time, at the time of creating the Word.—(1) Under the first alternative,—that the Convention is set up for the benefit of each person,—would the Relationship fixed by such Convention be one and the same for all men, or would it be different with each individual? If it is one and the same for all, then it cannot be artificial; and the idea of its being diverse and different would be contrary to all experience.—(2) The Second view,—that "a Convention is set up each time that the Word is pronounced"—is impossible, because a single utterance and the Convention based thereupon can never fix *for all time* the Convention between the Word and its Denotation; nor could it account for the usage of the same for all time.—(3) As regards the third alternative—that "the Convention was set up by God at the beginning of the World,"—in the first place there is no such thing as 'beginning of the World' (*Ibid.*, 42); and secondly there is no 'God or Creator of the World' (see above) who could set up the Convention (*Ibid.*, 44).

Even granting that there has been Creation,—the Veda and its component Words and their Denotations must have been in existence even before that (*Ibid.*, 116); and the said Relation between those Words and their meanings could have had no beginning in time (*Ibid.*, 123 and 137).

In fact in connection with all *Verbal Expression*, what happens is that when the inexperienced boy hears the use of certain words for the first time by people more experienced,—he perceives the Word-Sound, the experienced person and the material objects handled by them as the result of their conversation,—and the fact, that the person addressed has understood the meaning of the Words used by the other man, he *infers* from the resultant activity of the person addressed;—and then he presumes the fact of the Words used having the *potency*, the power, the capacity, to express what has been comprehended by the person addressed, as without such potency, the phenomenon noticed could not be accounted for. Thus the presence of the Relationship between the Word and its Denotation is got at and comprehended through three means of Cognition, Perception, Inference and Presumption. (*Ibid.*, 141).

ETERNALITY OF THE WORD.

The Mīmāṁsaka holds the Word to be Eternal; it is there always; we do not perceive (hear) it always, because its being perceived is dependent upon its being manifested by the manifestation of the Word-Sound brought about by certain manifesting agencies, and as the functioning of these manifesting Word-Sounds varies with varying distance and other circumstances, this accounts for the variations of time and place in the perception of the Word-Sound, and hence of the *Word.* There is no good reason therefore for regarding the Word as *non-eternal.*

On the other hand, in support of its *Eternality,* we have the Presumption based upon the fact that the meaning of the Word cannot be comprehended except on the hypothesis of its *eternality.* If at each utterance of it, the Word were a distinct unit, just produced, than its meaning could never be comprehended; because this comprehension depends upon the comprehension of the relation of concomitance between the Word and its meaning; and no such concomitance could be perceived if at each utterance, the Word were a different unit, just produced, and not the same. Mere similarity of the Word-Sound could not account for the said notion of the concomitance. As all the Word-units would be of equal importance, which unit would it be whose similarity to the others could be the determining factor ? In fact, in order to explain the phenomenon of the comprehension of the meaning of a Word, the Word must be regarded as one and the same in all cases. Nor can this requisite *unity* be obtained by the postulating of such comprehensive 'Classes' as the 'Letter—*ga*', for instance; because all such comprehensive notions presuppose *diversity,* not *unity,* of what is included under those notions.

Nor can the fact of the Word being actually *recognised* as the same in all cases be explained on the basis of mere *Similarity.* Hence, on the ground of this *Recognition,* Word should be regarded as *Eternal.* The Recognition is a form of 'Perception',—being *brought about by the Sense-organ* as aided by the Impression left by a previous impression; what it perceives and apprehends is the *present* object as qualified by the identity of the same object as *remembered.* For these reasons the Word must be regarded as *Eternal.* And the reason for this lies in the fact that the Word heard today is actually *recognised* as the *same* that was heard yesterday; and that when there is utterance, it only serves to *manifest* the existing Word, it does not *create* or *produce* it. Hence *Word* cannot be a product or Effect. Not being an Effect, it cannot be perishable. And, continuing to exist in its own form, and not being perishable, it must be *Eternal.*—(*Shāstradīpikā,* p. 112—125).

Sentence and Its Meaning.

Words are Eternal; what is denoted by them is Eternal, the relation between these two is Eternal. But the question remains—How does the *Sentence* express its meaning? This is the most important question; because the only right knowledge of *Dharma* that we can obtain is from the Vedic text, and this text is always in the form of a *Sentence.*

The view of the opposite party is that there can be no reasonable basis for the expression of its meaning by the Sentence,—or that it must be based entirely upon Convention; and as, according to the *Mīmāṁsaka*, there can be no maker of Convention in regard to Vedic Sentences, the Veda must be regarded as *unreliable*; or, in the last resort, the Veda should be regarded as the work of a trustworthy author, and its validity must be dependent upon the reliability of that author. That this is the most reasonable view is shown by the fact that in all our experience *Sentences* always emanate from human beings. It might be that in matters relating to *Dharma*, no Person can be regarded as an infalliable source of knowledge. But in that case the only reasonable conclusion is that no reliability can belong to the Sentences found in the Veda, and the Veda, therefore, cannot be regarded as an infallible guide.—(*Shāstradīpikā*, pp. 126—127).

The *Mīmāṁsaka's* answer to the above is that the basis of the meaning of the *Sentence* lies in the meanings of the *Words* composing that *Sentence*; each of these words denotes its own meanings,—and these Word-meanings indicate the meaning of the *Sentence.* For example, in the Sentence 'Bring the cow', the Word 'bring' directly denotes the *act of bringing* in general; and it indirectly indicates the particular act of *bringing* pertaining to the time. The word 'cow' also directly denotes Universal 'Cow'; and it indirectly indicates the *individual* Cow as the *objective* related to the act of *bringing.* Thus in every Sentence, each of the component words directly denotes its own meaning in the general form and indirectly indicates it as *related to* the meaning of the other words. (This is what is called the *Abhihitānvaya-vāda,*—the Theory of the Verbal Expression of Connection between what is denoted).

Thus the meaning of the *Sentence* is based upon the meanings of its component *words*; it is not baseless; nor is it based upon Convention. Hence the Vedic Injunction cannot be an unreliable source of knowledge regarding *Dharma.*

Then there remains the alternative view that the Veda may be the work of a trustworthy Person. In support of this view there is the following

argument—"The *Vedas* must be the work of a Person, because it consists of Sentences, like all such works, *e.g.* the *Mahābhārata*". This same conclusion is supported by the presence of such designations as '*Kāṭhaka*' and the rest, which are applied to the Veda. The *Author* of a work is that person who of his own free choice brings together words in the form of Sentences".

The *Mīmāṁsaka's* answer to the above is as follows :—If there were an Author, the Composer, of the Veda, he should certainly have been remembered through the long line of tradition; as we find in the case of *Buddha* who is known as the author and propagator of the Buddhist Scriptures. There could be no chance of such an Author being forgotten : because the religious performances of all men would be based upon the authority of his name; spceially as the Effectiveness of those performances could not be known from any other source. As a matter of fact, however, we find that people have no idea of any such Author of the *Veda*. Hence the non-rememberance of one who should have been remembered if he had existed leads to the conclusion that such an Author should be regarded to be as *non-existent*,—just like the Horns of the Hare. Even those persons who believe in the idea of the Veda being the work of an Author are not able to point definitely to any such person as being such an Author; they have very vague ideas about the matter; for instance, some of them regard the Veda to be the work of 'God'; others attribute it to '*Hiraṇyagarbha*'; others again to '*Prajāpati*'. All these divergent notions could not be correct if people had a definite idea of the Person who composed the *Veda*; as they have in regard to the *Mahābhārata* or the *Smṛtis* of *Manu* and others. As regards the personal names—'*Kāṭhaka*' and the like—being applied to the Vedas,—there is the simple explanation that these names are based upon the fact of such Vedas or portions of the Veda having had such persons as their most efficient Expounders. From all this we conclude that the *Vedas* are *not* the work of a Personal Author; and being thus free from any defects due to such authorship, the *Vedas* must be regarded as the only source of knowledge (relating to *Dharma*). which is infallible in its Self-Sufficient Validity. (*Shāstradīpikā*, pp. 131-132).

CHAPTER XVI

UPAMĀNA—ANALOGICAL COGNITION ACCORDING TO SHABARA

Upamāna, Analogy,—which consists in *Similitude*—also brings about the Cognition of things not in contact with the Sense-organs. For instance, the sight of the *Gavaya,* which is an animal resembling the Cow, brings about the Remembrance of the *Cow,* (as something *similar* to the animal before the eyes). (*Shabara, Trs.,* p. 15.)

According to the *Ṛjuvimalā* what is meant by the *Bhāṣya* is that the sight of the *Gavaya* brings about the Analogical Cognition, that "the animal seen is called *Gavaya*", to the man *who had known the Cow.*

This view of *Upamāna* has been contested in the *Shloka-Vārtika.*

The difference in the two interpretations turns upon the exact signification of the term *'gosmaraṇasya'* According to the *Bhāṭṭa* view, the term is to be construed as *'gosmaraṇasya buddhimutpādayati',*—*i.e.,* it (the Similitude) produces the idea (*buddhi*) of the *Remembrance* (*smaraṇa*) of the *Cow* (*goḥ*) *;* while according to the *Prabhākara* (*Bṛ.,* p. 107), the term *'gosmaraṇasya'* is to be construed as *'anubhūtagoḥ puruṣasya',* 'to the man who had known the Cow'. (See below).

ANALOGICAL COGNITION ACCORDING TO PRABHAKĀRA

Upamāna—Similitude—also brings about the Cognition of the unseen thing ;—for instance, when a man already knowing the *Cow* sees the *Gavaya*—the perception of the *Gavaya* brings about the Cognition of the unseen (cow), through *Similitude, Upamāna ; i.e.,* the Smilitude brings about the Cognition of another thing (Cow), which is not before the eyes, but which bears similarity to the *Gavaya* before the Eyes. (*Bṛ.,* p. 107).

On this, the *Ṛjuvimalā* (p. 107)—The direct meaning of the *Bhāṣya,* by which the Similitude would be the cause of the *Remembrance of the Cow,* cannot be right. as in the case in question, the *Cognition, 'buddhi',* that is brought about is, *not* of 'the Remembrance of the Cow' (*go-smaraṇasya*), but of *Similarity* (of the known Cow)...' *'Sādṛshyajñānagrāhyaṁ-sādṛshyam'* —'It is *Similarity* that forms the object apprehendeed by the Idea of Similarity (Upamāna)'—(*Ṛjuvimalā,* p. 109). That is, 'When one perceives the *Similarity,* and this *perception of Similarity* brings about the Cognition of Similarity in regard to the (unseen) correlative,—this is what is called *Upamāna,* Analogical Cognition'. (*Br.* VI, p. 109)

Against this, it has been argued that—"There would appear to be no *objective* of such Analogical Cognition; the man has previously *seen* the Cow,—he *perceives* the Similarity to that Cow in the *Gavaya* before his eyes. Now what is left which could form the objective of the Analogical Cognition in question?"

The answer to this is that, in the case of Inference we have found, even in the case of something already known through one Means of Cognition, that if it comes to be cognised by another Means of Cognition, it is regarded as the *Objective* of the latter Cognition. This is all the more reasonable in the present case where the Similarity of *the Gavaya in the Cow* is something that has not yet been cognised at all; and it is this Similarity of *the Gavaya* in the Cow (*'this Gavaya is similar to the known Cow'*) which forms the objective of—is made known by—the Similarity *of the Cow* in the Gavaya.—(*Bṛhatī* and *Ṛjuvimalā*, p. 109).

This Analogical Cognition cannot be regarded as *Perception*, as it is the Cognition pertaining to something not in contact with the senses; the cow, for instance, is not before the eyes.—Nor is it mere *Remembrance;* because at the time that the Cow was *seen* in the past, the *Gavaya* had not been seen, and hence at that time the *Similitude* could not have been *seen* and noticed, and what has not been seen cannot be *remembered*. Nor lastly can it be regarded as Inference (says the *Bṛhatī*, p. 108); because what brings about an Inferential Cognition is a Relationship (or concomitance) that has been perceived several times;—and another essential factor in Inference is that the Indicative Reason must be one entirely free from any such relationship with the contrary of the Probandum; so that Analogical Cognition presents none of the factors that are essential in Inferential Cognition.

Analogical Cognition According to Kumārila.

According to *Kumārila* what happens in the case of Analogical Cognition is this—The observer already knows a certain object,—for instance, the animal Cow,—then on going to the woods, he sees another animal, which, he perceives, resembles, is *similar to*, an animal already known to him,—thereupon there is recalled to his mind the formerly perceived Cow which he cognises now as *Similar* to the animal before his eyes; so that what forms the objective of Analogical Cognition *is the remembered Cow as qualified by similarity to the seen animal*,—or the *Similarity as qualified by the previously known animal*.—Though it is true that the *Similarity is perceived* while the *Cow is remembered*, yet the two together—*i.e.*, the *Cow*—cum *Similarity to the seen animal*—are not cognised, either by Perception or by Remembrance;

and hence, for the Cognition of the *two together* we need a distinct *Means of Cognition ;* and *Upamāna, Analogy,* is such a distinct Means of Cognition. Just as in the case of Inference, the *Hill* is *perceived* and the *Fire* is only remembered (as Concomitant with Smoke), for the Cognition of the *two together*—the *Fire and the Hill*—there is need of a distinct Means of Cognition, in the shape of Inference. In cases where the idea of *Similarity* is misconceived, wrong,—the Resultant Analogical Cognition is *wrong,*—based upon *false Analogy.* This *Analogical Cognition* cannot be regarded as the same as *Inference ;* because the factors necessary for Inference are not present in the case of Analogical Cognition. (*Shlokavārtika, Upamāna,* 37—43).

The resultant idea is in the form—'The Cow I had seen on the previous occasion is similar to this animal that I see now', says the *Shāstradīpikā* (p. 52).

CHAPTER XVII

ARTHĀPATTI—PRESUMPTION

According to Shabara.

Presumption consists in the presuming of something not seen, on the ground that a fact already seen or heard of cannot be explained without that presumption. For instance, it is found that *Devadatta*, who is alive, is not in the house, and this *Non-Existence in the House* leads to the *Presumption* that he is somewhere outside the house; as without this, the aforesaid fact of his being *alive* and not in the House could not be explained. (*Bhāṣya, Trs.*, p. 16.)

Presumption—According to Prabhākara.

What 'cannot be explained'—without the Presumption—is 'Non-Existence *outside*' along with 'Non-Existence *in the house*' (which latter is directly perceived). Hence, the perception of Non-Existence *in the House* 'becomes the source of *Inexplicability* of the man's *Existence* (*i.e.*, being alive) without the recognition of the connection of that *Existence* with *outside*. This '*inexplicability*' consists in contrariness (inconsistency) to other Means of Right Cognition. The process is as follows:—(*a*) First of all there is Perception of the fact that the Man *is not in the House*;—(b) so long as the connection of the Man's *Existence* with *outside* is not duly known,—the fact of his being *in existence* (alive), though well-known, becomes uncertain, open to doubt.—"The Man not being in the House, is he alive at all?" —and (c) the *Existence*, thus rendered doubtful, is finally cognised as connected with *outside*. Thus what is *inexplicable* is the Man's Existence (being alive); and this becomes explained by his existence *outside*, which thus forms the objective of the Presumptive Cognition.—(*Ṛjuvimalā*, pp. 112-113).

Though the *Bhāṣya* has mentioned only two forms of Cognitions—Seen or *Heard of*—yet what is meant is whatever may be a fact duly ascertained through any of the Means of Right Cognition. So that the expession 'Seen or Heard' is an idiomatic one which is used in the sense of 'Well-known'; such is the well-established usage.

This appears to be in anticipation of *Kumārila's* view, by which 'Seen' stands for what is well-ascertained through all the six Means of Cognition (Perception, Inference, Analogical Cognition, Verbal Cognition, Presumption

and Negation), and he finds a special purpose in the separate mention of the 'Heard' fact.—(*Shlo. Vā.*, *Presumption*, 1-2) where we read :—

प्रमाणग्राहिणीत्वेन यस्मात् पूर्वविलक्षणा

[श्रुतोद्भवा अर्थापत्तिः]

according to which the *Presumption* based upon Verbal Cognition is in the form of Words, i.e., the words 'He eats at night'. This is contested in detail by the *Ṛjuvimalā*, pp. 115—117,—according to which what is *presumed* is the *fact* of the *man eating at night*, not the *Verbal Cognition* that 'he eats at night'.

Kumārila's View of Presumption.

The above explanation of the process of Presumption is not accepted by the *Bhāṭṭa*, He demurs specially to what has been said regarding the Element of *Doubt*. He argues that in the example cited, if the man's *Existence* (being alive) were at all *doubtfull*, it could not afford a sound basis for the requisite Presumption; it is only when the Man's *Existence* is known *with certainty* that it can warrant the presumption of his *being out*. Further, the *doubt* regarding the man's existence could be set aside only by the *certain* Cognition of his Existence (in general)—not necessarily by the certain Cognition of his Existence *outside* (*Shāstradīpikā*, pp. 53-54). According to the *Bhāṭṭa*, the basis of Presumption lies, not in *Doubt*, but in mental *irreconcilability* or inconsistency between two well-ascertained facts; which inconsistency is removed by the Cognition of a *third* fact; and it is this last Cognition that constitutes *Presumption*. (*Ibid.*, p. 55—There is no *inconsistency* between well-ascertained facts in the case of Inference, and it is in this, according to the *Bhāṭṭa*, that lies the difference between Inference and *Presumption*.

The *Shlokavārtika* (Chapter on *Presumption*) supplies the following definition of Presumption :—(1) 'When a fact ascertained by any of the six Means of Cognition is found to be inexplicable except on the basis of a fact not so ascertained,—the assumption of this latter fact is what constitutes *Presumption*'.

(1) An example of Presumption based upon a *perceived* fact we have in the *presuming* of the *Burning Capacity* in Fire, which is based on the perceived fact that it *burns*. (2) An example of Presumption based upon an *inferred* fact, we have in the presuming of the *Moving Capacity* in the Sun, which is based upon the *inferred* fact that the Sun moves from place to place. (3) An example of Presumption based upon *analogically cognised* fact we have in the presuming of the *Cognisability* of the Cow by the Cog-

nition born of the Similarity between the Cow and the *Gavaya*. (4) An example of Presumption based upon Presumption is found in the Cognition of the denotative potency of the Word through Presumption based upon the well-known fact that it denotes certain things,—and on the basis of the said *presumed* Denotative Potency,—which cannot be otherwise explained,—we *presume* the *Eternality* of the Word. (5) An example of Presumption based upon Negation or Non-Apprehension we have in the case where the *non-apprehension of Devadatta* leads to the Presumption of his being *outside*. (*Shlo. Vā., Presumption* 3—8). This last cannot be included under Inference (*Ibid.*, 9—50). (6) An example of Presumption on the basis of a *Verbally Cognised* (Heard of) Fact, we have in the following case :—When one hears the assertion 'So and so is fat and yet 'he eats not during the day',—he is led to the Presumption that 'the man eats at night' (*Ibid.*, 51).

In regard to the exact form of this last kind of Presumption, there is a difference of opinion : Some people hold that the Presumption is of the *fact* of the man eating at night, while according to others, the Presumption is of the *Verbal Assertion* that 'he eats at night'. (*Ibid.*—52). All are agreed in regarding this sixth form of *Presumption* as not entirely different from *Āgama, Verbal Cognition*. (*Ibid.* 52). And the reason for this view lies in the fact that all cognitions derived from the Vedic text belong to this category ; and all these would be 'Non-Vedic', 'Non-Scriptural', if this Presumption were entirely different from Verbal Cognition. (53.) Though the Presumption in question has the character of Verbal Cognition,—being expressed by means of the Words 'He eats at night',—yet what we have to consider is the sanction behind this Verbal Assertion. This sanction cannot be held to be provided by Perception, because the presumed assertion is not actually *heard* ; nor by Inference ; as no connection of the two has been observed ; (pp. 53—60). Nor can the requisite sanction be derived from another Verbal Expression, (72) :—nor from Analogical Cognition (74). Thus the only sanction—proof, means of Cognition—for Cognition derived from the heard words 'He eats not during the day'—lies in Presumption only (76).

Such is the conclusion of the philosophers who hold that what is *Presumed* in this case is the *Verbal Assertion* ('He eats at night'), not the *fact* of his eating at night. That is, the *assertion* that 'He eats at night' is presumed from the inconsistency and inexplicability involved in the assertion that 'Being fat, he eats not during the day' (Nyāyaratnākara on 76).

This is followed in the *Shlo. Vā.* by a long discussion from the point of view—that what is *presumed* is the *fact of eating at night*, not the *assertion* 'He eats at night'. And Kumārila comes to this conclusion that as a matter of fact, all Conceptual (Determinate) Cognition is accompanied and preceded by *Verbal Cognition*, and that in the case in question, as soon as the Verbal Expression 'he eats at night' appears, the inconsistency involved in the previous assertion ('Being fat, he eats not during the day') disappears; and there is no further inconsistency left which could serve as the basis of the *presumption* of the *fact* as apart from the words expressing it. (*Shlo. Vā., Presumption*, 78.)

CHAPTER XVIII

ABHĀVA—NON-APPREHENSION

(According to Shabara)

'*Abhāva*', 'Non-apprehension', stands for the non-existence—absence—of all the five Means of Cognition described above; and this brings about the Cognition in the form—'It does not exist'—in regard to things not in contact with the senses. That is, (explains *Kumārila*, in *Shlo. Vā. Abhāva* 1) in a case where Sense-perception and the other Means of Cognition are not found to be effectively operative towards bringing about the notion of the *Existence* of a certain thing, we have the notion of the *non-existence* of that thing; and the means by which this notion of non-existence is got at is called *Abhāva*, 'Non-apprehension'.—(*Shabara-Bhāṣya, Trs.*, p. 16).

NON-APPREHENSION

According to Prabhākara.

Having quoted the words of the *Bhāṣya*, the *Bṛhatī* puts the question—"Is this the definition of a Means of Cognition?"—The answer from the *Mīmāṁsaka* (other than *Prabhākara*) is—Yes; and what is cognised through it is that a certain thing *does not exist* (as declared in the *Bhāṣya*). This answer is rejected by the '*Āchāryo*,' (says the *Ṛjuvimalā*, p. 119) in the following words:—What is said to be cognised is not actually cognised. The Definition too is given in the words—'*Pramāṇābhāva*', 'the absence of Means of Cognition';—and this definition clearly implies that what is proposed to be defined is not a Means of Cognition.—It is true that the idea current among *Mīmāṁsakas* is that this, '*Abhāva*', is the sixth Means of Cognition. But there is no reasonable basis for this idea. There is nothing that can form the *objective* of this Means of Cognition; nor can it have the Character of a real Means of Cognition.—And yet, with all this, it has been introduced here in the present context; the reason for which lies in the fact that, treating of the subject of the Means of Cognition, and having dealt with the five Means of Cognition, we add that what is not cognised by any of these five Menas is what is cognised through this Sixth Means, called '*Abhāva*', But this does not make this *Abhāva* a regular *Means of Cognition*, because a Means of Cognition can be regarded as really so only when it brings about its Effect, in the shape of the definite Cognition

of its objective; and this definite Cognition is always in the form of 'this', which implies *exclusion of all other things*. Hence, when no such Effect appears—as the Effect of the Means of Cognition—people have the idea 'this does not exist'. This being sufficient to account for the idea of the 'Non-Existence' of things,—and it being wrong to regard as *Means of Cognition* what does *not* bring about a definite Cognition,—any defining of such a source of knowledge as a 'Means of Cognition' must be regarded as childish prattle. As regards the idea being current among *Mīmāsakas*, it has to be rejected as an idea without sufficient basis. Thus we conclude that what the *Bhāṣya* says is only by way of Supplement to the definition of the other Means of Cognition, and it is not meant to be the definition of a distinct Means of Cognition in the shape of *Abhāva*.

Thus the view held by *Prabhākara* and his followers may be summed up as follows:—Cognitions of things are of two kinds—in one kind we cognise the thing as *along with some other thing*, and in another kind, we cognise the thing *by itself* alone; and this latter Cognition is apprehended in terms of things that are not there, and which, if present, would have been cognised. What we really have, in the latter case, is only the non-apprehension of something that would have been apprehended if it had been there; hence, the *Negative* Cognition can be nothing more than the Cognition of the one thing in terms of those other things which are not apprehended, and which, if present, would have been apprehended. Thus in the case of the conception 'The Jar is not here', all that is meant is that—Even though the Jar would have been perceived if it had been here, what we perceive is the *bare place*'; and this is an ordinary *positive* Cognition, pure *Perception* in this case. In this way it can be shown that there is nothing that could be cognised through *Abhāva*', *Non-Apprenhension*, which therefore cannot be regarded as a *Means of Cognition*.—(*Bṛhatī—Ṛjuvimalā*, p. 118 et seq.)

ABHĀVA—NON-APPREHENSION

According to Kumārila.

When the first five Means of Cognition do not function towards bringing about the Cognition of the Existence of a certain object,—then there comes to function that (Sixth) Means of Cognition which is known as '*Abhāva*' 'Non-Apprehension', 'Negation'.—(*Shlo. Vā.*, *Abhāva*, 1). It is through this Means of Cognition that the *non-existence* of things becomes cognised.—(*Ibid.*, *2.*)

Abhāva is of four kinds: (1) the *previous* Non-Existence; e.g., the Non-Existence of the Curd and other milk-products in the (fresh) milk, (2) Non-Existence by *Destruction*; e.g., the Non-Existence of the milk in milk-products, (3) *Mutual* Non-Existence; *e.g.*, the negation of the Cow in the Horse and *vice versa* and (4) *Absolute* Non-Existence: e.g., the Non-Existence of horns on the head of the ass, which is found to be devoid of any hard and enlarged protuberances on the head.—Under the circumstances, if *Abhāva* were not a Means of Cognition, then, there might be cognition—(1) of *Curd* in *Milk*, (2) of *Milk* in *Curd*, (3) of *Cloth* in the *Jar*, (4) of *Horns* in the *Ass*, of *Intelligence* in *Earth* and other material Substances,—of *bodily shape* in the *Soul*, of *Odour* in *Water*,—of *Taste* in *Fire*,—of *Colour*, *Taste* and *Odour* in *Air*—of *Tangibility* in *Ākāsha*.—All this Diversity could not be a mere non-entity, mere Negation. Hence, they must be regarded as real Entities, '*Vastu*'. Another reason why all this *Abhāva* should be regarded as *Entity* lies in the fact that it is capable of being apprehended by *inclusive* as well as *exclusive* Cognitions, which means that it is an *object of Cognition*, *Pramēya*, (*Ibid.*, 2-9). The notion that a certain thing '*does not exist*' is not possible without some sort of a comprehensive notion of 'thing' (16).

The 'Non-functioning of the Means of Cognition' stands for the non-appearance of Sense-perception and the other Means of Cognition (11)—For instance, the said notion, that a certain thing '*does not exist*', cannot be brought about by Sense-organs, because the Sense-organ can have contact only with a *positive* factor. What happens in the cases of Cognition that 'the Jar *does not exist*'—is that the observer *perceives* the *positive* entity in the shape of the *Place*, and then *remembers* the counter-entity which would have been seen (the Jar for instance, if it were there),—and there follows the Cognition of its being *non-existent*; and this latter is a purely *mental* Cognition, which comes independently of the functioning of the Sense-organs. What brings about the Cognition of *Non-Existence* is not the mere *non-perception* of the Object, but that non-perception of the object *which should have been perceived*, had it existed. (27). Nor can the Cognition of *Non-Existence* be brought about by Inference; because there is no perception of the Inferential Indicative and the other factors necessary for Inference (29). Thus the *Non-Existence* (Negation, *Abhāva*) being *what is cognised*, *the Means by which this Non-Existence is cognised*—its *Pramāṇa*,—also consists in *Abhāva*, Negation; and this negative Means of Cognition is not operative towards *positives* Entities,—in the same manner as the *positive* Means of Cognition (Perception and the rest) are not oprative towards

Negative Entities. Nor is there any Royal Command that the Means of Cognition *must be positive* (45—47).

The purpose of postulating this as a distinct Means of Cognition lies in the fact that the mixing up of things can be avoided only by the Cognition of the fact of *one thing not being another*, and this Cognition can be obtained only through the instrumentality of *Abhāva;* so in matters relating to Sacrificial Performances, that the details laid down in connection with one set of Sacrifices *are not* the same as those laid down in connection with another set, can be *known* only through *Abhāva,* Negation; so also the fact that a certain detail does not belong to a particular sacrifice can be known only by the *Absence or Negation* of the Vedic Injunction to that effect.

Other Means of Cognition

Shabara does not mention any other Means of Cognition apart from the above Six—Perception, Inference, Word, Analogy, Presumption and Negation (Non-Apprehension).

Prabhākara also does not mention any other.

Kumārila notices a few others; but adds that these are not independent Means of Cognition. He mentions (1) '*Sambhava*'. *Probability,*—whereby, it has been held, we cognise the presence of a *Hundred in a Thousand;* he explains, however, that it is included under 'Inference', being based upon the inseparable relationship (Invariable Concomitance) between 100 and 1000. (2) Similarly, '*Aitihya*', Rumour or Tradition, which has been regarded as a distinct Means of Cognition by some people,—is in most cases, not true; and when it is *true*, it comes under '*Word*', Trustworthy Assertion.—(*Shlo. Vā., Abhāva,* 57-58.)

Some people have postulated '*Pratibhā,*' Intuition, as a distinct Means of Cognition; but *Intuitional Cognition*—such as that appearing in the form of the premonition of certain events,—does not always turn out to be true. Hence, no reliance can be placed on the assertion of the *Vaishēsikas* that Sages and Mystics have the *Intuitional Cognition of Dharma-Adharma.* (*Shāstradīpikā,* p. 65.)

CHAPTER XIX

MIMĀMSĀ TOPICS PROPER

(A) INTRODUCTORY—SHĀSTRĀRAMBHA.

We have so far confiened our attention to the preliminary study of those topics of *philosophical interest* that bear upon the consideration of *Mīmāṁsā-topics* proper. Now we turn our attention to the study of these *Mīmāmsā-topics* themselves. The former study has shown us who is the Moral Agent for whose benefit all this study is carried on,—in what way this study will benefit him, and what is the ultimate Goal to which the proper performance of his duty will lead him,—what are the Sources and Means of Knowledge,—which of these can help the Agent to obtain the Knowledge of what his duty is and in what way it is to be performed. We have seen that the conclusion is that the Veda is the only Source and Means of Knowledge which can provide one with the right knowledge of Duty, in both its positive and negative aspects—that is, *What should be done* and *what should not be done.*

The proper study and the understanding of the *Veda,* therefore, becomes necessary for every intelligent and responsible person. Unless he has an intelligent conception of what his duty is, he cannot regulate his action rightly.

This study of the Veda, according to the *Mīmāṁsaka,* is reserved for the three 'Higher Castes' only; other people therefore have to depend upon the *Brāhmaṇa* for the exposition of what their Duty is; *teaching* being the function reserved for the Brāhmaṇa alone, among the 'Higher Castes'.

Now, this study of the Veda itself is a *Dharma,* a *duty;* and as such it must have been enjoined as such in the *Veda itself.* Hence, the *Mīmāṁsaka* makes it his business to explain that this proper study of the Veda—for the special purpose of securing the Knowledge of *what should be done* and *what should not be done,*—is actually enjoined in the *Veda.* This therefore forms the first *Topic of Study,* technically '*Adhikaraṇa*', of the *Mīmāṁsa-Shāstra.*

The method adopted by the *Mīmāṁsā-Shāstra* as embodied in Jaimini's *Sutra* in the study of each topic is to deal with it in five parts—(1) the explanation of the occasion that gives rise to the necessity of investigation of the topic concerned, (2) the subject-matter of the topic, represented in most cases, by a Vedic text, (3) the grounds of doubt or uncertainty

which necessitate the investigation, (4) the *Prima Facie* View called the '*Pūrvapakṣa*', on the question and (5) the Finally Established View, cal'ed '*Siddhānta*'.

In regard to this first Topic, the occasion has been presented by the first *Sūtra* of *Jaimini*, which declares—'Next therefore comes the enquiry into *Dharma*'; and the question arises—What does the term 'Next' exactly mean? It connotes *Sequence*, we know; but *Sequence* to what? The *Sequence* meant is that to the reading of the Veda, and this with reference to that particular kind of *inquiry* into *Dharma* which is not possible without the reading of the Veda. But the reason for this lies in the fact that in the course of the Inquiry, there will be various kinds of discussion over Vedic texts, and until we have studied the Vedic texts themselves there can be no discussion over them. It is not meant that there can be no *Inguiry into Dharma* before the Reading of the Veda, or that the Inquiry is to follow *immediately* after the Reading of the Veda. In fact, on the completion of the Reading of the Veda, there are two courses open to the Student; he may 'return' home from the Teacher's House immediately after the 'Final Bath' (Graduation), or he may continue to remain there even after the 'Bath' (Graduation) as a 'Postgraduate Student' and carry on investigations and researches into the Subject-matter of the Veda—relating specially to *Dharma*. And the advice conveyed by the opening *Sūtra* is that 'One should continue to remain at the Teacher's Residence and carry on investigations into *Dharma*'. The questions to be investigated are —(1) What is *Dharma?* (2) By what is *Dharma* indicated or made known to us? (3) What are the right Means of accomplishing *Dharma?* (4) What are the wrong Means of accomplishing *Dhrama?* (5) What is the need or purpose of *Dharma?*—Of these, questions (*a*) and (*b*) have been dealt with under *Sū*. 2 and the remaining questions have been dealt with in the rest of the *Sūtras*.—(*Shabara-Bhāṣya, Trs.*, pp. 1—3).

We proceed now to put all these ideas into the technical form of the '*Adhikaraṇa*' described above.

(1) The occasion is presented by the *completion* by the Student of the Reading of the Vedic Texts.

(2) The *Viṣaya*, or Subject-matter, of the Topic is provided by the Vedic text—'*Svāddyāyaḥ adhyetavyaḥ*'. ('The Veda should be studied', according to *Kumārila*),—or '*Aṣṭavarṣam brāhmaṇam upanayīta tam adhyāpayīta*' ('One should initiate the eight-year-old Brāhmaṇa and teach him', according to *Prabhākara*). [For a full statement and discussion of this difference of opinion, between *Kumārila* and *Prabhākara*, see below.]

(3) The doubt or question that arises in regard to the said text is—Does it enjoin the reading of the *Verbal Text only*, of the Veda ? Or does the Injunction include the Investigation of the Meaning of those Vedic Texts also ?

(4) The *Prima Facie* View (*Pūrvapakṣa*) is that the Injunction does *not* include the Investigation of the Meaning of the Vedic texts; whence it follows that there is no justification for the propounding of the *Mīmāṁsā-Shāstra*, which deals entirely with that Investigation.

(5) The *Finally Established View, Siddhānta*, is that Investigation is included in the Injunction of 'Vedic Study'; and hence the Investigation of the meaning of the Vedic texts is as much enjoined as the Reading of the Vedic Texts themselves.

We shall digress a little to discuss at some length the difference of opinion between *Prabhākara* and *Kumārila* in regard to the particular text that enjoins and prompts the said *Investigation,—i.e.*, the *Viṣaya-vākya*, the basic text, on which the whole *Adhikaraṇa* rests.

Shabara does not quote any particular text, he only speaks in a general way of '*Vedādhyayana*', 'Vedic Study', under Sū. 1; but from what he says under Sū. 6.1.35 (p. 625, Bib, Ind. text), his words seem to favour the *Prābhākara* view.—With reference to the question of the *Shūdra's* title to the performance of Vedic Sacrifices, he says—"What is laid down in the text referring to *Upanayana* is the acquiring of the title of '*Āchārya*', by the Investigator; that this is so, follows from the *Ātmanēpada* ending in the Injunctive word '*Upanayīta*', which clearly shows that the root '*nī*' here denotes the acquiring of the title of '*Āchārya*'; and from this it follows that what prompts the act of Initiation (*Upanayana*) is the desire to acquire the title of '*Āchārya*;' from this it is clear that it is only the *Brāhmaṇa*, the *Kṣattriya* and the *Vaishya* who are connected with the learning of the Veda (as Upanayana is prescribed for these three castes only). (*Shabara Bhā., Trs.*, p. 1000.)

The Prābhākara View.

The *Prābhākara* takes for his basic text the injunction—'*Aṣṭavarṣam brāhmaṇam upanayīta tamadhyāpayīta*' ('One should initiate the eight-year-old Brāhmaṇa and should teach him'); where the two injunctive words '*Upanayīta*' and '*Adhyāpayīta*' have the *Ātmanēpada-ending*, which indicates that the fruit of the action enjoined accrues to the Nominative Agent; so that the result that follows from the acts of *initiating* and *teaching*

should accure to the man who does the Initiating and Teaching. The only result that can accrue to him is the acquiring of the title of '*Āchārya*' (Teacher). This is made clear from the words of *Manu* (2. 140).

उपनीय तु यः शिष्यं वेदमध्यापयेद् द्विजः ।
सकल्पं सरहस्यं च तमाचार्यं प्रचक्षते ॥

'The *Brāhamaṅa* who, having initiated the Disciple, teaches him the Veda along with the Ritualistic Details and the Esoteric Explanations,—him they call the *Āchārya*'. (See above, from *Shabara* on 6.1.35. Trs., p. 1000.) Thus the motive desire leading to the *Study* and *Investigation* is on the part of the *Teacher*—not on the part of the Disciple. The Teacher *teaches*, for the purpose of obtaining for himself the title and honours of the *Āchārya*, Teacher; and as there can be no *teaching* and no *teacher* without some one to be taught, he has to *take to himself* (Upa-ni) a Disciple; but the latter cannot be a true *Disciple* or Student unless he is made to 'Study;' this act of *Studying* by the Disciple becomes implied by the above two texts; and as Study cannot be carried on without the help of a *Teacher*, the one implies the other. The Injunction of *Vedic Study* is thus implied in the Injunction of *taking a pupil* (*Upanayana*)—for the purpose of obtaining the title and honours of the Teacher'—so that it becomes necessary to find out a motive for this *Study* on the part of the *Pupil*; for whom the purpose of the Teacher cannot supply the requisite motive. This motive, for the Pupil, lies in the comprehending of what is taught in the Vedic texts studied; and as this comprehension cannot be secured without due reflection and pondering of the Vedic texts,—the Investigation embodied in the *Mīmāṁsā-Shāstra* becomes justified. (*Prakarana-pañchika*, pp. 5-12, See also *Bṛhatī*, p. 7.)

The above explanation of the initial motive for Vedic Study carried on by the Teacher and his pupil provides a perceptible motive,—in the shape of the Title and Honours—and thus avoids the necessity of having to assume an imperceptible transcendental result following (to the Student) from the said Vedic Study,—says *Bṛhatī* (p. 13).

One other reason that lies behind the *Prābhākara* view is that it is only thus, that, like the work of *Teaching*, the work of *Investigation* also becomes restricted to the *Brāhmaṇa* only; as it is the *Brāhmaṇa* alone who can *teach* and hence can aspire to the title and honours of the *Āchārya*.

The Bhātta View.

This *Prābhākara* view has been contested in *Parāsharamādhava*, pp. 36—39, where it is pointed out that *Teaching and Officiating at Sacrifies* have been prescribed for the *Brāhmaṇa*, only as a *means of livelihood*, and

hence are purely voluntary; while *Study* and *Sacrifice* are compulsory duties; the Injunctions of these latter therefore occupy a much higher position than, and must be distinct from, the Injunction of what is to be done for the acquiring of the title and honours of the '*Āchārya*'.

In view of this and other reasons, the *Bhāṭṭa* takes as his basic text the words '*Svādhyāyo' dhyētavyaḥ*'—('The Veda should be studied'). Though later writers like *Mādhavāchārya* object to this text on the ground that it occurs in the Injunction of the five *Mahāyajñas* necessary for he Householder, and hence cannot be taken as the basis for the Initial Study (by the Religious Student on his *Upanayana*—Initiation). They therefore propose a basic Vedic text inferred from the *Smṛti Injunction of Vedic Study.* (*Shāstradīpikā*, p. 4.)

The *Bhaṭṭa* position is thus set forth in the *Shāstradīpikā* (pp. 2—8):

The basic text is '*Svādhyāyo 'dhyētavyaḥ*' (The Veda should be studied'). The question is—Does this text lay down the *Study* of the Veda as a Duty, the performance of which brings about a transcendental result, in the shape of Heaven or some such thing? Or does it lay down the *Study* for the purpose of *reading* and *understanding* the Veda? In the former case, the Injunction would have been fulfilled by the getting up of the mere Verbal Text of the Veda, and there would be no need for proceeding with it any further, and investigating the meaning of the texts; while under the latter case, as the said Investigation would be necessary for the understanding of the meaning of the Vedic texts,—such Investigation also would be included under the Injunction, which would thus be an Injunction of the said Investigation also.

The *Prima Facie* View is that—"The necessity for understanding the meaning would be felt and recognised even without the Injunction of if; hence, the Investigation into the Meaning need not be sought to be included under the Injunction of *Vedic Study;* as the said *Investigation* would be serving a perceptible purpose it would not need to be *enjoined.* The conclusion, therefore, is that the Injunction of *Vedic Study* enjoins the learning of the verbal *text* only, as leading to a transcendental result; and the Injunction having been carried out by such study alone, the Student should leave the Teacher's Residence forthwith, and he need not prolong his pupilage for the purpose of carrying on the Investigation into the meaning of the Vedic texts."

The *Final Conclusion* is as follows:—The purpose served by the Injunction of *Vedic Study* is to restrict such Study to the three higher castes alone.

That is, if this Injunction of 'Reading the Veda' were not there the texts dealing with the '*Agnihotra*' and other acts would come to pertain to any one who had the requisite knowledge of the texts,—irrespectively of his caste; when, however, the Injunction of 'Vedic Study' is there, the title to the performance of the said acts becomes restricted to the three higher castes; because it is only the three castes for whom Initiation has been enjoined in such texts as—'The *Brāhmaṇa* is to be initiated during the Spring, the *Kṣattriya* during the Summer and the *Vaishya* during the Autumn'; as persons thus initiated are not told what they should do after being thus initiated, there comes the Injunction of 'Vedic Study', which however does not specify the person who is to do it;—now these two sets of texts, taken together, supply us with the idea that—'the boys of the three higher castes who have been *initiated* should study and get up the verbal text of the Veda and then carrying on its study, should proceed with the work of Research and Investigation and thereby obtain the idea of what is taught in the Veda.' Thus it is that the Initiation becomes a part and parcel of 'Vedic Study,' by preparing the Person who is to carry on the fruitful Study of the Veda. Thus Vedic Study serves the perceptible purpose of comprehending the meaning of the Veda, and this comprehension leads on to the useful purpose of the due performance of the acts prescribed in the Veda; hence, the entire process becomes fruitful.—From all this it follows that after *Vedic Study*, one should proceed with the Investigation into the meaning of the Vedic texts.

(B) What Is Dharma ?

It has been established that it is necessary to study the Verbal text of the Veda and to carry on researches and investigations for the purpose of learning what is taught in the Veda.

The question might arise—"The *Sūtra* started with the statement of its purpose as *Investigation of Dharma;* while the *Bhāṣya* and all other commentators have gone into the question as to whether the Student is to retire after the getting up of the Verbal text of the Veda, or he is to continue to reside with the Teacher and proceed with the work on Investigation as to the meaning of the Veda. What is the connection between the '*The Investigation into Dharma*' and the 'Study and investigation of Veda and its meaning'?"

The *first* point to be considered is—What is the *Dharma* which has to be investigated; and the *second* point—What is the Means whereby the Right Knowledge of *Dharma* can be obtained?

(1) The above is the 'Occasion' for the question arising;—(2) the Subject-matter is the Definition of *Dharma* and the Means of Knowing it; (3) The *doubt* is—Is it possible to define *Dharma* and to Know what it is?

(4) The *Prima Facie* View is that "*Dharma*, being something beyond the ken of men, cannot be defined and for the same reason there can be no valid *means of knowing it.*"

(5) The Final Established View is—Even though *Dharma* is something beyond the ken of men, yet it is possible to define it and also to find a means of knowing it. This right definition has been provided by *Jaimini* in *Sūtra* (2) as—'That which is indicated by the vedic Injunction as conducive to welfare',—*i.e.*, it is what is enjoined in the Veda and is conducive to desirable results. '*Dharma*' thus, in this context, does not stand for the *merit* that is obtained by the doing of good deed; by right conduct (which is the ordinary connotation of the term); it is used in the much wider sense of *what should be done, i.e., Duty*. This same definition of *Dharma* also supplies the answer to the *second* question, regarding the Means of Knowing *Dharma*, on which point the conclusion is that the *Vedic Injunction* is the only Means of knowing *Dharma*; that is, a right knowledge of *Dharma* can be obtained only from the Veda. This also implies that the Veda is a valid means of the knowledge of *Dharma*. Thus there are three conclusions involved—(1) *Dharma* is what is enjoined in the Veda as conducive to welfare, (2) the Veda is the *only* source of the knowledge of *Dharma*, and (3) the Veda is a *reliable* source of knowledge.

This is Kumārila's presentation of the Topic. According to *Prabhākara*, it is as follows:—

(1) It has been established that the Investigation into *Dharma* should come after the Study of the whole Veda; now, when the said Investigation proceeds, the question presents itself—How much of the 'meaning of the vede' is to be investigated?—(2) The Subject-matter of this Topic is the 'meaning of the Veda' as providing the right knowledge of *Dharma*.—(3) The doubt on this question is—Is the meaning of the *entire Veda—all* Vedic texts, including Injunctions enjoining *actions*, as well as the descriptions of things, *Mantras* and Descriptive Passages, to be investigated as the Means of knowing *Dharma?* Or only the *Injunctive* texts, laying down *something to be done?*—(4) The *Prima facie* view is that the meaning of the *entire* body of Vedic texts should be investigated.—(5) The Finally Established View is that themeaning of only those Vedic texts has to be investigated which are *injunctive;* because it is only the Sentence laying down

something to be done that is really directly *expressive*; and as such it is only such a Sentence that can be the Means of a valid Verbal Cognition. This is what has led the *Praābhākara* to deviate from the ordinary presentation of the *Adhikaraṇa.* This is in accordance with the *Anvitābhidhāna Theory* of Verbal Expression, of which *Prabhākara* is the propounder (see above),—according to which we can construe a Sentence and find out its meaning only when it contains some sort of an Injunction of *Something to be Done.*

It may be noted that the actual words used in the *Sūtra* lend support to Prabhākara's view. It speaks of '*Chodanā*' as the Means of knowing *Dharma*; and '*Chodanā*' is *Injunction.* The *Bhāṣya* also has clearly declared that the word, '*Chodanā*' stands for the Sentence *that enjoins an act* क्रियायाः प्रवर्तकं वचनम् and *Prabhākara* (*Bṛhatī*, p. 20) at once fastens upon this declaration of the *Bhāṣya* and remarks that 'this clearly asserts that the validity of the Veda as the Means of right knowledge pertains to *something to be done.*' Says the *Ṛjuvimalā*—'What is made known by the *Chodanā* is only an *act, something to be done,*—or things connected with that act; but not any *accomplished thing?* (P. 20.)*Kumārila* (*Shlo. Vā.*, 2, 7) asserts that 'the term *Chodanā* has been used in the sense of all *Worlds in general*; and on this the *Nyāyaratnākara* adds—'The *Chodanā* is the means of knowing *Dharma*; as a matter of fact *all Words* are the means of valid verbal Cognition, and the *Chodanā* is a *Word*; hence, it can certainly provide the right knowledge of even supersensuous things like *Dharma.*'

(C) Reliability of the Veda.

(1) That the Veda alone is the source of knowledge of *Dharma* has been established; (2) what is to be considered now is the necessity or otherwise of the examination of the trustworthy character of the *Veda*—(3) The doubt or question that has to be solved is—should the reliability of the Veda be examined or not?—(4) The *Prima Facie* View is that there is no need for any such examination of the character of the Means of Cognition; all that is necessary to know is that it is a Means of Cognition that does bring about the knowledge of *Dharma*; and this has been already learnt under the preceding Topic.—(5) The *Finally Established View* is that the said examination is essential; specially for the *Mimāmsā-Shāstra*, which makes it its business to enquire into all matters relating to *Dharma*; and the trustworthy character of the Veda as the declared Means of Knowledge,—and how far and why reliance is to be placed upon it—has to be fully examined before full reliance can be reposed upon it.

According to *Prabhākara* the *question* dealt with under Sū. 3 (embodying *Topic* 3) is whether it would not be the right order of procedure, —after having established the fact of the Veda being the means of knowing *Dharma*—to ascertain what is contained in the Veda, (which has been done under Discource II et seq.)—rather than proceed with an enquiry as to the validity and reliability of the Veda. The former of these alternatives is the *Prima Facie* View. The *Final Conclusion* is that, when it comes to *Action*, then certainly what is declared in the Veda *as to be done* becomes of prime importance; but when we are carrying on an enquiry into the nature of *Dharma* and the *Means of knowing it*, our first business is to ascertain how far our source of knowledge is valid and can be relied upon; as it is only when this has been done that we can be sure as to what it is that is actually mentioned in the Veda and *should be done*. Another reason for taking up this point first lies in the fact that the validity of a Means of knowledge is inherent in itself, and as such independent of everything else; whereas, whether a certain *act* is, or is not, enjoined by a certain text, depends upon the trustworthy character of that text itself. (*Ṛjuvimalā*).

(D) Sense-perception, Inference, etc., Discussed.

(1) Before dealing with the *Veda* as the reliable Means of knowing *Dharma*, it is found necessary to dispose of the other wellrecognised Means of Knowledge,—such as Sense-perception. Inference, Analogy, Verbal Cognition, Presumption and Non-apprehension—which might be regarded, in some quarters, as affording all the Means that is necessary for the knowledge of *Dharma*.—(2) The Subject-matter of this Topic then is the reliability of Sense-perception and the rest as reliable means of knowing *Dharma*.—(3) The doubt or question is—Is the knowledge of *Dharma* brought about by the Vedic Injunction *only*? Or also by Sense-perception and the other well-known Means of Cognition?—(4) The *Prima facie View* is that Sense-perception and the rest are as good Means of Knowledge as the Vedic Injunction; hence, Sense-perception and the rest also can bring about the requisite knowledge of *Dharma*.—(5) The *Finally Established View* is as follows:—As a matter of fact, Sense-perception is operative only in regard to such things as are *present* and in contact with the Sense-organs; *Dharma* however is not anything existing at present, nor is it possible for it to be in contact with any Sense-organ; hence, though *Dharma* is an *object of Cognition*, it is incapable of being cognised through Sense-perception. And when it is entirely beyond the reach of Sense-perception, the other Means of Cognition—Inference, Analogy and Presumption,—cannot be applicable to it; as these

latter are more or less based upon Sense-perception.—"As for Inference, Analogy and Presumption—these also presuppose and are based upon Sense-perception, hence, these also cannot be the Means of knowing Dharma,"—says *Shabara* (Trs., p. 8). All those other Means of Knowledge are based upon facts and factors cognised through Sense-perception. Hence, the conclusion is that *Dharma* cannot be known through *Sense-perception, Inference, Analogy* or *Presumption.*

(E) Vedic Injunction the Only Reliable Means of Knowing Dharma.

(1) It having been decided what is *not* the Means of knowing *Dharma*, it becomes necessary to consider what *is* such Means.—(2) Of the five well-known Means of Cognition—Perception, Inference, Analogy, Presumption and Scriptural Word,—the first four have been rejected; as regards the *fifth,* it has been shown that the knowledge of *Dharma* can be derived from *Word* only in the form of the Vedic Injunction.—The reliability of the Vedic Injunction thus is what we are to consider now.—(3) The question is—Is the Vedic Injunction reliable as a Means of knowing *Dharma* ?—(4) The *Prima Facie* view is that *Word* cannot be a reliable Means of knowing *Dharma* because the reliability and expressiveness of the Word is dependent upon the knowledge of its expressive potency, which is obtainable only from Convention, and this Convention can be learnt only from popular usage;—while Dharma is beyond the range of ordinary popular conception; —hence, it is impossible to conceive of any Convention bearing upon *Dharma* :—hence, *Word* cannot be the Means of knowing what *Dharma* is :—and what is true regarding *Word* in general is truer still in regard to the Veda and the Vedic Injunction.—(5) The Finally Established Conclusion is that the Expressiveness of the Word is not dependent upon Convention, as the relationship between the Word and what it denotes is inborn, eternal, without beginning or end; hence, in expressing its meaning the *Word* is self-sufficient; it is *infallible* also,—in the form of the Vedic Injunction, in which case there is no possibility of any source of mistake. (*See above, Section on Verbal or Scriptural Cognition*).

(F) The Vedic Injunction always Reliable.

(1) It has been proved that the Veda is the only Means of knowing *Dharma* ; it becomes necessary to show that the validity and the reliability of the Veda is free from all defects and deficiencies; and to this end, it has been shown that the relation between the Word and its meaning is *eternal,*

not artificial or created by Conventions. For this purpose it is essential that the eternality of the *Word* also should be considered. (2) The Word, as the Means of Knowing *Dharma*, is thus the subject-matter of this Topic.—(3) The question is—Is the *Word*, in the form of *Injunction*, eternal or non-eternal ?—(4) The *Prima Facie* View is that Word-Sounds are found to be evanescent, hence, *Word* must be evanescent, non-eternal.—(5) The Finally Established View is that Letters as well as Words are Eternal, as is vouched for by Recognition, which is never found to be sublated ; what is regarded as the *production* of the Word, is only its *manifestation*. This View is insisted upon because unless this is accepted there can be no confidence in the Word. (See above—Section on *Verbal Cognition*.)

(G) The 'Sentence' is as Reliable as the 'Word'.

(1) It has been established that the Word and its Relation to its Meaning are both eternal; the Vedic *Injunction* however—which has been declared to be the means of knowing *Dharma*,—is not a *Word*, it is a *Sentence*, an aggregate of several words ; hence, it has to be considered if the *Sentence* is expressive in the same way as the *Word*,—and if the relation of the Injunctive *Sentence* with its meaning is also *eternal*. (2) The reliability of the Injunctive Sentence thus is the subject-matter of Inquiry.—(3) The question is—Is the *Vedic Injunction*—which is a *Sentence*—a reliable means of knowledge or not ?—(4) The *Prima Facie* View is that the Injunctive Sentence cannot be reliable ; because it is not independent in its expressiveness—being dependent upon the connection among its component factors.—(5) The Finally Established View is that the *Sentence* expresses nothing more than what is expressed by the component *Words ;* hence, the Expressiveness of the Sentence is as independent and self-sufficient as that of the *Words ;* so that there is no room for any doubt regarding the reliability of the Vedic *Sentence*—a right means of knowing *Dharma*. (See Section on *Verbal Cognition*.)

(H) Veda, not the Work of a Personal Author.

(1) It has been established that the Veda is a reliable Means of knowing *Dharma ;* but if the Veda is the work of a personal author,—like other literary documents—then it is as liable to error, on account of the imperfections of that author, as the words of common people ; so that no reliance could be placed upon the words of the Veda ; it becomes necessary to prove, therefore, that the Veda is *not* the work of any author, it is eternal and self-sufficient, and hence, there is no possibility of any unreliability in it due to the defects of the Author.—(2) The reliability of the Veda is the subject-

matter here also,—(3) The question is—Is, or, is not, the Veda the work of an Author ?—The *Prima Facie* View is that portions of the Veda are named after certain persons,—such names are found for instance, '*Kāṭhaka*', '*Kālāpaka*, and so forth ; from which it is clear that, like these sections, the entire Veda is the work of certain persons.—(5) The Finally Established Conclusion is as follows :—The names cited indicate, not authorship but mere *expounding ;* so that the persons indicated are those who have been specially expert expounders of those sections of the Veda . As a matter of fact, we do not know of any *author* of the Veda ; there is no tradition on the point ; if there had been any author, he would have been surely known. Hence, the Veda cannot be regarded as the work of an author ; and being free from such authorship, it must be free from unreliability due to such authorship ;—hence, it beomes established that the Vedic *Injunction* is a reliable means of knowing *Dharma.*

Thus the whole of Discourse I is taken up in the establishing of the two main propositions propounded in Sū. 2—*viz.*, that (1) the Veda is the only Means of Knowing *Dharma,* and (2) that the Veda is entirely reliable and authoritative.

CHAPTER XX

EXTENT AND CONTENT OF THE 'VEDA'

Mantra and Brāhmaṇa.

We have seen that the Veda is the only reliable Source of knowledge regarding *Dharma.* The work known as the 'Veda' is an unequal work,—it is 'a collection of *Mantras and Brāhmaṇas*'.

The question to be considered now is—Are all these many *Vedic texts*—'Mantras' as well as 'Brāhmaṇas'—to be regarded as a reliable source of knowledge regarding *Dharma?* Or are we to pick and choose among them?—(*Shabara-Bhā., Trs.*, p. 24.)

(A) Mantras.

Before taking up the main question however we have to see what '*Mantras*' and '*Brāhmaṇas*' are.

Of 'Mantras' no formal definition has been attempted by the earlier writers. Later writers, however, have defined it as the '*Karaṇa,*' Instrument, of offering'; but this definition is too wide; as the Substances offered, the Implements used and such other sacrificial accessories are all as much '*instruments* of offering' as the *Mantras.* It is for this reason that the more logical writers on *Mīmāṁsā* have contented themselves with explanining *Mantra* as a name applied to 'those Vedic texts that are expressive of mere *Assertion* (as distinguished from *Injunction*)' (*Mī. Su.*, 2.1.32); that is,—those texts which express mere *assertion,*—which only *assert,* and do not *enjoin* any act; nor do they serve the purpose of *commending* acts;—it is only to such texts that learned men apply the name of '*Mantra*'.—This definition, however, is only illustrative; as there are certain well-recognised *Mantras* which do not make an *assertion; e.g.*, '*Vasantāya kapiñjalānālabheta*' (*Vāja. Saṁ.*, 24.20), which has been accepted as a *Mantra.* Even so, some sort of a general definition has been propounded here, in order to avoid having to point to every individual *Mantra-text.* (*Shabara, Trs.*, 202).

This is what has led *Kumārila* to remark that—'This definition has been provided here for the sake of its terseness, specially because it is in this sense that the name is used among teachers and students and other experienced people, and also because it is applicable to almost all *Mantras*'.—(*Tantravārtika, Trs.*, p. 570).

This has been still further simplified by the *Shāstradīpikā* (p. 207)—'What is meant is that that is a *Mantra* to which the name is applied by the learned'.

Prabhākara has offered the following explanation (*Bṛhatī*, MS., p. 50B)—In the Veda some Sentences are *Mantras* and some *Brāhmaṇas*; those to which the learned apply the name '*Mantra*' are *Mantras*; while all the rest of the Veda are *Brāhmaṇas*, to which they apply the name '*Vidhi*' also;—the *Arthavādas* (Declamatory Sentences) and *Nāmadheyas* (Names) are also included under the '*Brāhmaṇas*'; though this name '*Brāhmaṇa*' is applied strictly to the *Vidhi* or *Injunctive* texts only, the Declamatory texts and the Names are also included under that name by reason of their always subserving, in some way or the other, the Injunction along with which they are construed.

(B) Classification of Mantras.

Mantras have been classified under three heads :—(1) *Ṛk*, (2) *Sāman* and (3) *Yajuṣ*. On these three names the *Bṛhatī* (MS., p. 50B) remarks as follows :—'The words *Ṛk*, *Sāman* and *Yajuṣ* are found to be used in connection with the Vedas; hence, it becomes necessary to ascertain what part of the *Veda* is *Ṛk*, what part *Yajuṣ* and what part *Sāman* on this point our conclusion is that the name *Ṛk* is applied to those texts that are divided into '*feet*', *i.e.*, into certain well-defined parts, each part containing a definite number of syllables—and are called on that account by such prosodial names as *Gāyatrī*, *Triṣṭubh*, etc.

The clear line of distinction between the *Mantra* and the *Brāhmaṇa* is that the *Mantra* is that Vedic text which merely makes an assertion (*Sū.*, 2.1.32), while all the rest of the Veda comes under the name '*Brāhmaṇa*' —says *Sū.*, 1.2.33. The Veda consisting of '*Mantras* and *Brāhmaṇas*', and *Mantras* being those texts that are merely *assertive*, it follows that all the rest of the Veda falls under the head '*Brāhmaṇa*'; hence, no definition of the '*Brāhmaṇa*' has been provided. (*Shabara*, *Trs.*, p. 204).

(C) Mantras are not Injunctive.

That *Mantras* are not *injunctive* has been declared under *Sū.*, 2.1.31. The Established Conclusion set forth under the Sūtra is that 'the Mantra can be expressive of mere *assertion*, as it functions only *during* the performance of an act'; that is, it is only while the Sacrifice is being performed that the *Mantra* functions; if it enjoined the act, its functioning would come before the commencement of the performance. (*Shabara-Bhā.*, *Trs.*, pp. 200-201).

Kumārila has demurred to this conclusion. According to him these *Sūtras,* 2.1.31 and 30 do not bear upon *Mantras* at all, all that they mean to point out is that the functioning of the verb lies not only in Enjoining, but in *asserting* also. His argument is that it is not true to say that the verb, when it occurs in a *Brāhmaṇa*-text, serves to *enjoin* an act, while the same verb when occurring in the *Mantra*-text, ceases to be *injunctive.* Nor is there any reason to regard the *Mantra* is subsidiary to the *Brāhmaṇa,* and not *vice-versa.* That is, there is no special reason whereby it could be ascertained that it is the *Mantra* which has its injunctive potency suppressed by reason of the act in question having been already enjoined in the *Brāhmaṇa-text,*—and not *vice-versa.* Both the *Mantra* and the *Brāhmaṇa* therefore should be regarded as equally *injunctive;* and the *Non-injunctiveness* of *Mantras* cannot be regarded as well-established. Nor is there any incongruity in the *Mantra* serving both the purposes—of *enjoining* acts and of recalling things enjoined elsewhere...(*Tantravārtika, Trs.,* pp. 566-567).

Kumārila (*Tantravārtika, Trs.,* pp. 568-569) has drawn the following distinction between the *Mantra* and the *Brāhmaṇa* :—In the case of the *Brāhmaṇa*-text, if its injunctiveness is found to be suppressed by some such reason as the requisite *Enjoining* having been already done elsewhere, and such other grounds, then the verb is taken as pointing out something else which affords the occasion for another action; and in this case the mere verbal form of the text is not regarded as capable of being used at the performance. In the case of the *Mantra,* on the other hand, as soon as we learn its form, we at once realise that even the merely verbal form serves the useful purpose of recalling things; and hence we come to the conclusion that it is the actual words of the *Mantra* that are to be used at the performance, specially because at performances it is necessary that there should be such *recalling* of certain things. This *recalling* can be done only by such *Mantra-texts* as perform no other function. Consequently, when in a certain context, it is found that there are certain *Mantra-texts* mentioned which do not serve this purpose,—and which are taken along with an Injunctive-text with the vague notion that some useful purpose might be served by them—we conclude that these *Mantras* are to be used as serving the purpose of merely *asserting* things.

Prabhākara's view is more in keeping with the *Bhāṣya* :—From the very nature of the *Mantras* it is clear that they cannot be injunctive; because as a rule, they are devoid of the Injunctive Word; also all *Mantras* are found to be construable,—either by direct syntactical connection or by indirect implication—with other texts which are clearly *injunctive,*

Nor are Mantras found to contain any *Commendation or Condemnation;* hence, they cannot be regarded as *Arthavāda,* Declamatory. With all this, however, *Mantras* cannot be regarded as entirely meaningless or baseless; forming an integral part of the Veda, they must serve some useful purpose; they must have some meaning, expressing something that is needful in the acts prescribed by the Injunctive texts.

This question of *Mantras* being *expressive,* and not entirely meaningless has been dealt with by *Jaimini* under *Sū.,* 1.2.31—53. (*Shabara*—Trs., pp. 74—86). It has been shown that they are not *injunctive* and they are not *Commendatory* or *Condemnatory.* It has been shown that they serve the only purpose of *asserting* things and *recalling* them to the Mind.—But before this can be admitted, it has to be seen if the *Mantra-texts* are meant to be expressive, to convey a meaning at all. Because they could do the *asserting* or the *recalling* only if they expressed any meaning at all. It is necessary to discuss this because, if the *Mantra-texts* of the Veda are not meant to be expressive, they cannot convey any information regarding *Dharma,* and this would vitiate the authority of the Veda.—The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that the *Mantra-texts* are meant only to be repeated in their verbal form, they are not intended to convey any meaning; and this for the following reasons:—(a) Because there are separate injunctive texts laying down the use of the *Mantras;* this would not be necessary if the *Mantra* itself expressed any meaning, as in that case the use of the *Mantra* would be indicated by that meaning itself:—(b) because the exact order of the words of the *Mantra* is insisted upon; this would not be necessary if any significance were attached to the meaning of the texts,—as any change in the order of the words would not affect the meaning;—(c) because they speak of things that do not exist;—(d) because the meaning is not always intelligible;—for these reasons *Mantras* cannot be regarded as conveying any meaning.—The Final Conclusion is that being Sentences, like any ordinary Sentence, the *Mantra-texts* should be regarded to be as expressive as any other sentence. In cases where the meaning is not intelligible, it is not that there is no meaning; it is there always, only people are ignorant of it. There are certain *Brāhmaṇa-texts* also which already point to the expressive character of *Mantras. Shabara-Bhā., Trs.,* pp. 74—86.)

Being expressive,—and serving the purpose of *asserting* and *recalling* things in connection with the acts enjoined by the Injunctive texts, *Mantras* are clearly helpful in providing the knowledge of *Dharma.* Only those *Mantra-texts* which are not found to serve such purposes are to be used at the performances in their purely verbal form; and even so they serve a distinctly useful purpose in relation to what is *Dharma.*

According to *Murāri Mishra*, the question relating to *Mantras* is—Do they help the Act by their *utterance* only, or through expressing something useful in relation to the Act to be done; and the *Siddhānta*, he says, is as stated in the '*Nibandhana*'; he does not specify which work he means by this title; but it is clear that he means the *Bṛhatī*; as his statement of the *Pūrvapakṣa* is in greater accord with that than with the *Tantravārtika*.—He says—

सकलदेशनाप्रामाण्याक्षेपेणैव पूर्वपक्षः।

In this connection, *Murāri* criticises the view of *Chandra*, an old writer on *Purvamīmāṁsā*.

Mantras have been classed under three heads—(1) *Ṛk*, (2) *Yajus*, (3) *Sāman*. These have been defined under *Sūtras* 2,1.35 *et. seq.* All these three are found mentioned in the *Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa* 1.2.1.26.

The *Ṛk* has been defined (2.1.35) as *that where there is division into 'feet', on the basis of meaning.* That is, that Mantra is called *Ṛk* where there is division into 'feet'; *e.g.*, (1) '*Kētuṁ kṛṇvannaketavē*—(2) *pesho maryā apeshase*—(3) *samuṣadbhirajāyathāḥ*'. (*Ṛ.V.* 1.6.3). That the division into 'feet' should be *on the basis of the meaning* is not meant to be emphasised. For if it were, then the name *Ṛk.* would not be aplicable to those texts where the division into 'feet' is on the basis of *metre*, not of *meaning*. The exact definition of the '*Ṛk*' therefore is only that it is *that Mantra where there is division into 'feet'*. (*Shabara, Trs.*, p. 207.)

The name '*Sāman*' is applied to the *music*—says *Sū.*, 2.1.36. The particular music to which a *Mantra* is set is called '*Sāman*'; it is only when a *Mantra* is set to music and so sung that it is called '*Sāman*'. In this matter the teaching of the learned is our sole authority. So when the term '*Sāman*' is applied to *Mantras* set to music, the name stands for the *music* to which the *Mantra* (*Ṛk*) has been set; and the name is applied to the Mantra itself only indirectly through its connection with that music. (*Shabara, Trs.*, p. 208.)

Under Sū. 7.2.1.—21; (*Shabara, Trs.*, pp. 1252, etc.) also we are told that the various *Sāman-names*—'*Rathantara*' etc.—should be taken as denoting *music*. That this is so is shown by the fact that the name '*Rathantara-Sāman*' is applied also to cases where there is no basic *verse* at all (Sū. 14); *e.g.*, we have the text—'He *sings* the *Prajāpati-hṛdaya* without a verse'. In fact, these particular names are applied on the basis of the difference in the modulations (Sū. 16)—The Final Conclusion thus is that the term '*Sāman*' (and its varieties, 'Rathantara' (etc.) stand for the *music* (not for the words or texts).—(*Shabara, Trs.*, p. 1265.)

The same conclusion is more clearly reiterated under Sū. 9.2.1. et seq. where the Bhāṣya (p. 1493) says—'From all this it follows that the name *Sāman* applies to *Music only*, not to the *Mantra-text set to music*'. Under Sū. 3 (p. 1496) we are told that the *Sāman* is only an Embellishment of the words that are sung, because the *singing* (which is *Sāman*) cannot be a primary act, as it subserves the purpose of the words (Sū. 6) ; *i.e.*, the *Sāman* (music) is clearly perceived to be something helpful to the words.

Sāmans have been divided into several kinds—*Raṭhantara, Bṛhat, Vairūpa, Vairāja, Shakvara, Raivata* and so forth. They have been described in *Mīmāṁsābālaprakāsha.* This division appears to be based upon the different methods of *singing ;* e.g., the *Bṛhat-Sāman* is to be sung with force and *very loudly,* while the *Rathantara* is sung *not loudly, nor with force* (*Mī. Sū.*, 9.2.46).

It would follow from this that the *Sāman* should not be treated as a kind of *Mantra* or *Ṛk.*

On this point *Kumārila* remarks as follows (*Tantravārtika, Trs.*, p. 579).—The *Sāman, being sung* and being a *qualification,* and the *Mantra-text* being the *qualified,* the word '*Sāman*' denotes the *Sung Mantra* or *Mantra set to music* in the same way as the word 'Cow' denotes the *Class* 'Cow' qualified by the Individual ; in this same sense the qualifying factor—the *music*—is said to be denoted by the word '*Sāman*'.

If the *Sāman* is only the *music,* and is only an Embellishment, —that is, brought about by the Singer,—to that extent it cannot be *eternal,* and hence cannot be regarded as *Veda proper*, which is independent of all sources, human or divine. For instance, the syllable '*hā*' '*hau*' and the like which are introduced by the Singer into the *Mantra* through the exigencies of music, are always variable, being dependent upon the Singer, who may or may not introduce a certain syllable or set of syllables. Says *Shabara* on Sū., 9.2.29 (*Trs.* ,p. 1521)—*Singing* is an act ; it gives expression to particular sound-notes produced by the volitional effort of man,—for the purposes of securing the required Music ; it becomes necessary to have recourse to (*a*) Modifications of the Syllables contained in the *Mantra-text,* (*b*) to Disjunction, (*c*) to Withdrawal, (*d*) to Repetition, (*e*) to Pause, (*f*) to Breaks and so forth. What therefore is due to the effort of man cannot be *eternal.*

In the case of all *Mantras,* whenever they are recited in *praise* of something, they must be set to music and sung in the *Sāman*-form ; as the Praise is always more pleasing when it is sung than when it is merely recited. This has been declared under Sū. 9.2.31 (*Shabara*).

The name '*Yajuṣ*' is applied to the rest of the Mantras—says Sū. 2,1.37 ; on this the Bhāṣya says :—It is not necessary to propound a definition of *Yajuṣ.*, the third kind of *Mantra,* because by the process of elimination, the nature of the *Yajuṣ* would be understood from the definitions of *Ṛk, and Sāman ; i.e.,* that *Mantra* which is not set to Music and wherein there is no division into feet, is *Yajuṣ ; i.e.,* the whole of it is one continuous sentence.—(*Shabara, Trs.,* p. 209.)

There is another name met with in this connection—'*Nigada*'. It has been given to *Mantras* that are in the form of *address* or *praise.* They may be considered to belong to a separate class, because they have been mentioned separately in the text—'The *Ṛk* is to be recited loudly, the *Sāman* is sung loudly, the *Yojuṣ* is recited softly ; and the *Nigada* is recited loudly'. In other ways it is similar to *Yajuṣ,*—but the injunction that it is to be sung *loudly* differentiates it from the *Yajuṣ* which is sung *softly.*—The conclusion on this question is that the *Nigada* is to be classed as '*Yajuṣ*' because it has the same mixed and continuous form as the *Yajuṣ ;* and like the *Yajuṣ,* the *Nigada* also is 'different from *Ṛk* and Sāman'. As regards the different method of reciting it, that is due to the fact of its being addressed to other persons ; which serves a distinctly useful purpose. If the *Nigada* were uttered softly, like the *Yajuṣ,* it could not be heard by other persons and hence it could not convey any idea to them. It is for this reason that it has to be recited in a differest manner. Thus, then *Nigadas* may be defined as those *Yajuṣ-Mantras* that are pronounced loudly. The different name also is for the purpose of indicating this peculiarity. The name '*Nigada*' cannot apply to *Ṛk-Mantras,* as there is a text which clearly mentions the two (*Ṛk and Nigada*) separately—'*Ayājyā vai nigadāḥ, ṛchaiva yajanti*'. The very name '*Nigada.*' indicates that it is prose (*Gadya*), while the *Ṛk* is *metrical.*—(*Shabara—Trs.,* pp. 210 212).

The word '*Pṛṣtha*' is sometimes used to signify the *Ṛgveda.* Under Sū. 7.3.36 (*Shabara, Trs.,* p. 1298), it is asserted that the term stands for the *Substance, i.e.,* for the *word of the Ṛk-verses.* Again on page 1299—'The term '*Pṛsṭha*' stands for the *Mantras*' ;—and again, 'The term '*Pṛtha*' stands for the *Mantra-text*'.

The *Bhāṣya* (on Sū. 2.1.32 ; *Trs.,* pp. 202-203) has noted a few details regarding the characteristic features of the different kinds of *Mantra,*—(*a*) Those ending in '*asi*'—'*Mĕdho'si*' ;—(*b*) Ending in '*tvā*' '*Īṣĕ tvā*' (*Vija. Sam.* 1. 1) ;—(*c*) *Well-wishing ;*—'*Āyurdā asi,* etc'. (*T. S.,* 1.6.6.1) ; (*d*) Eulogistic—'*Agnirmurdhā,* etc'. (*T. S.,* 4.4.4.1) ; (*e*) Expressive of Number,—'*Eko*

mama, etc'. (*Sh. Br.*, 1.5.5.12); (*f*) Incoherent talk,—'*Akṣi te indra*, etc.'; (*g*) Bewailing—'*Ambē ambikē ambālikē*, etc'. (*Vāja. S.* 23. 18); (*h*) Directory, —'*Agnīdagnīn vihara*' (*T. S.*, 6.3.2);—(*i*) Searching,—'*Ko'si katano'si*, etc'. (*V. S.*, 7.29);—(*j*) Questioning,—'*Pṛchchhāmi tvā*, etc'. (*V. S.*, 23, 61);—(*k*) Descriptive,—'*Iyaṁ vediḥ, etc*'. (*V. S.*, 23. 62);—(*l*) Elliptical Extension,—'*Achchhidrēṇa pavitrēṇa, etc*'. (*V. S.*, 4.4);—(*m*) Performance, —'*Traisvaryam, etc.*'; (*n*) Capability,—*i.e.*, power of expression. All this, indicated by the *Vṛttikāra* is only illustrative, not exhaustive. There are, for instance, several *Mantras* which have the word '*asi*' in the middle and not at the end; *e.g.*, '*Iḍyashchāsi vandyashcha vājin*' (*V. S.*, 29. 3); also some having '*tvā*' in the middle; *e.g.*, '*Tat tvāyāmi*'. Then again amongst *Brāhmaṇa*-texts also, we find—(*a*) Well-wishing texts; '*So' kāmayata prajāḥ sṛjēya.*'—(*b*) Eulogistic texts also are found among the *Brāhmaṇa-texts*,—'*Vāyurvai kṣēpiṣṭhā*' *dēvata* (*T. S.*, 2.1.1.1); also Incoherent texts '*Na chaitad vidmo brāhmaṇā vā*, etc'. (*Mait. S.*, 1.4.11); also Rewailing—'*Ye māna-dhukṣanta*, etc.'; Directory, —*e.g.*, '*Amutaḥ somamāhara*'. 'Searching—'*Iha vā sa iha vā*, etc.';—Questioning—'*Veda karaṇavatīm*, etc'. Answer—'*Vidmo vā*, etc';—Elliptical Extension—'*Hṛdayasyāgrē*' *vadyati atha jihvāyāḥ*, etc'.;—Performance,—'*Traisvaryam, etc*'.; Capacity,—'*Sruvēṇāvadyati, etc*'.;—Thus the description supplied by the *Vṛittikāra* is neither inclusive of all *Mantras*, nor exclusive of all *Non-Mantras*.

The above classification of *Mantras* into *Ṛk*, *Yajuṣ* and *Sāman* is the main one. There is also another classification based upon the diversity in the character of the significance, of accentuation and so forth. This classification is applicable to the *Ṛk* and *Yajus Mantras*. Of the *Ṛk* there are 273 kinds and of the latter 50. These have been described and exemplified by *Shaṅkara Bhaṭṭa* in his *Mīmānsā-bāla-prakāsha*, pp. 58—70.

Mantras have also been classified according to their metre. This classification pertains to the *Ṛk Mantras* only. The following are the principal metres:—

(1) *Gāyatrī*—24 Syllables—9 Subdivisions.
(2) *Ushnik*—28 Syllables—7 Subdivisions.
(3) *Anuṣṭubh*—32 Syllables—7 Subdivisions.
(4) *Bṛhatī*—36 Syllables—9 Subdivisions.
(5) *Paṅkti*—40 Syllables—8 Subdivisions.
(6) *Triṣṭubh*—44 Syllables—10 Subdivisions.
(7) *Jagatī*—48 Syllables—3 Subdivisions.
(8) *Atijagatī*—52 Syllables.

(9) *Shakvarī*—56 Syllables.
(10) *Atishakvarī*—60 Syllables.
(11) *Aṣṭi*—64 Syllables.
(12) *Atyaṣṭi*—68 Syllables.
(13) *Dhṛti*—72 Syllables.
(14) *Atidhṛti*—76 Syllables.

Of these the *Gāyatrī*, *Triṣṭubh* and *Jagatī* are mentioned in *Shatapatha-Brāhmaṇa*, 1.2.2.6 ; 3.4.22 ; 3.4.4.8 ; and 4.1.1.8 ; and others are mentioned in 8.2.2.6.

For further details about Metra, see *Mīmāṁsabālaprakāsha*, pp. 56—70.

From the very definitions of the *Ṛk* and *Yajuṣ* it would follow that there can be no metre in the *Yajuṣ Mantras*. But *Pingala* in his *Chhandaḥ-Sūtra* has declared that there are metres in these also. That this is a later innovation is indicated by the fact that true 'Vedic authority' is not accepted by many old writers (*Karka* among others) to belong to those *Yajuṣ Mantras* that are distinguished and characterised by metres ;—and that even those who accept the authority of those *Mantras* (*e.g.*, *Devayājñika*) assert that there is no metre in many *Yajuṣ Mantras* on account of the syllables in them not being fixed. Herein may be found an orthodox authority for the view propounded by some people that the metrical portions of the *Yajurveda* are comparatively modern.

Among *Mantras* there arises one difficulty which has been anticipated and provided for by *Jaimini* (2.1.46—48). In regard to *Mantras* that appear in the metrical form—*i.e.*, Ṛk—or those set to music—*i.e.*, *Sāman*,— there is not much difficulty in ascertaining how far a certain *Mantra-text* extends, as the termination of the text is made clear by the metre or by the music. But in the case of the *Mantra-texts*—in Prose *i.e.*, *Yajuṣ and Nigada*, it is sometimes difficult to ascertain how far a certain *Mantra* extends. It is in view of this difficulty that certain Principles or Laws of Interpretation have been laid down. These are—(1) *Ekavākyādhikaraṇa*—What constitutes 'One *Sentence*'—*The Principle of Syntactical Unit* (2.1.46)—(2) *Vākyabhedādhikaraṇa*—'What constitutes different Sentences ?'—*The Principle of Syntactical Split* (2.1.47) ; and (3) the *Anuṣaṅgādhikarañā*—' 'How an incomplete Sentence may be completed'—*The Principle of Elliptical Extension.* (2.1.48). We shall deal with these in some detail, as they play an important part in the whole science of *Mīmāṁsā* and serve a directly useful purpose in all textual interpretation.

(1) Principle of Syntactical Unit—'Ekavākyādhikaraṇa'

This principle has been thus enunciated in Sū, 2.1.46—*So long as a single purpose is served by a number of words, which, on being separated, are found to be wanting and incapable of effecting the said purpose, they form one 'Syntactical Unit—one complete Yajuṣ-Mantra'.*

This form in which it is stated in the *Sūtra* naturally appertains to Mantras in the form of *Yajuṣ*. Hence, the following explanation in the *Bhāṣya* :—'One *Yajuṣ-Mantra* extends to that extent up to which the words serve the purpose of indicating things helpful to the act of sacrifice; to that extent it is one *Syntactical Unit*. This is what is meant by the words of the *Sūtra*—'So long as a purpose is served by a number of words'. Therefore it comes to this that a group of words serving a single purpose, forms *one Sentence*,—but only if any one of these words, on being disjoined from the rest makes it *wanting* or defective. We have an example of this in the case of the *Yajuṣ Mantra*—'*Devasya tvā savituḥ, prasave, etc.*', (*T. S.*, 1.1.4.2). The assertion in the *Sūtra* is to be explained and justified as menaing the *fulfilling of a single purpose*. For instance, the said *Mantra* serves the single purpose of indicating the act of *Nirvāpa* (offering), and hence, the words are taken as *one sentence*. (Shabara, Trs., pp. 213-214).—

Thus according to the *Bhāṣya*, the Principle is meant to be applicable to *Vedic* words only, in the form of *Yajuṣ-Mantra*. It must be so if the term *Arthaikatvāt* in the *Sūtra* is taken—as it is by the *Bhāṣya*—in the sense of *serving a single purpose ;* this purpose being something in connection with the *sacrificial performance*. That this is so is made still clearer by what is said in connection with the next Principle of *Vākyabhēda*, '*Syntactical Split*'. *Prabhākara*, in keeping with the *Bhāṣya*, explains '*Arthaikatvāt*' as serving the purpose of indicating or reminding *of what is to be done ;* he distinctly says that—'the term '*Artha*' stands for *Proyojana*, *purpose*, as the *Purpose* is the most important factor and the words of the 'Sentence' must be related to that important factor'. (*Bṛhatī* MS., p. 51.)

Even before *Kumārila's* time, however, it was felt that this Principle was capable of a much more extended application, and in the *Tantravārtika* (*Trs.*, p. 583) we find an objector urging the argument that the conditions stated in the *Sūtra* are more easily recognised when applied to ordinary Sentences, than in those of the Vedic Mantras. *Kumārila's* work contains such statements as—'It must be concluded that those words on hearing which we are clearly cognisant of a *single idea* must be regarded as *one Sentence*, and it is only this definition that is found compatible with the

character of every single sentence—either *ordinary*, or of the *Mantra* and *Brāhmaṇa*' (*Tantra-vā.*, *Trs.*, p. 586). And yet so far as the opinion of the *Bhāṣya* is concerned, we find *Kumārila* declaring—'The *Bhāṣya* explains, the words of the *Sūtra* as *that collection of words which is employed as one whole, at a sacrifice, is one Yajuṣ*'. (*Tantra-vā.*, *Trs.*, p. 587)—and again (p. 589)—'The reply given by the *Bhāṣya* is based mainly upon the fact that the word '*Artha*' is taken in the sense of *Purpose* (and not in that of Idea or Meaning).

Thus we find *Kumārila* accepting the explanation of the *Bhāṣya* which restricts the Principle in question to *Vedic texts* of the *Yajuṣ class* only,—and yet he is inclined to attach to it a wider signification. And we find among his followers, *Pārthārathi Mishra* favouring the restricted application according to the *Bhāṣya* by taking *Artha* in the sense of *Purpose,* while *Someshvara Bhaṭṭa* takes the word in the sense of *Idea* and thus admits the wider scope of the Principle.

The *Bṛhatī* (M.S., p. 52A) says—'The comprehension of the *Mantra* is dependent upon its prescribed *use.* The meaning and purpose of the *Mantra* therefore can be learnt from something apart from itself, and its extent can be ascertained from the metre. The present *Sūtra* lays down the *extent* of the Mantra. The term '*Artha*' in the *Sūtra* stands for *Meaning* as well as *Purpose ;* both being inter-related ; but of the two, *purpose* is the predominant factor ; that is why it has been emphasised by the author of the *Bhāṣya.*

(2) *Vākyabhēda—Principle of Syntactical Split—Distinct Sentences.* Says the *Sūtra* (2.1.47)—*When the sentences are equally independent of one another they should be treated as distinct sentences.*

On this the *Bhāṣya* (*Trs.*, pp. 216-217)—In connection with such *Mantra-texts* as '*Āyuryajñēna kalpatām*' *prāṇo yajṇēna kalpatām*' (T. S., 1.7.2.1.), there arises the question—Are the two sentences to be taken as *One* '*Sentence*'—*a* single '*Syntactical Unit*',—or as two distinct Sentences ? The established conclusion is that such set of words which stands independently by itself and does not stand in syntactical need of another set of words, should be treated as a distinct sentence ; so that the two sets of words—(1) '*Ayuryajñēna kalpatām,* and '*Prāṇo yajñēna kalpatām*'—should be treated as two distinct sentences.

What is meant by this is that when a number of words are found to be such that when taken by themselves severally, each, independently of others, is equally capable of *expressing one complete idea* (or *of serving one purpose*),—each should be regarded as a *distinct Sentence.*

This Principle applies, not only to cases where the actual words of the *Mantra-texts* are found to be so construable, but also to those cases where, even though the actual words of the text are not so separately construable by themselves, yet such construction is rendered possible and permissible by virtue of certain words of the related *Brāhmaṇa-text* bearing upon the use of the *Mantra-text* in question. For example, we have the *Mantra-text* '*Iṣē tvā ūrje tvā*, etc'. (Vājas, S. I. .); where the various parts of the text as they stand are not found to be construable independently as so many *different Sentences;* but in the *Brāhmaṇa-text* (*Shatapatha*—1.1.66; 1.7.1.2; 4.3.1.1.7) bearing upon this *Mantra* we read—'*Iṣē tvā iti shākhāṁchhinatti*'—'With the words *Iṣē tvā,* one cuts the branch' and so on, with the other parts of the *Mantra-text*;—on the authority of these injunctions contained in the *Brāhmaṇa-texts*, it becomes necessary to add to the words of the *Mantra-texts*, the words '*Shākhāṁ chhinadmi* ('I am cutting the branch'); and with these additional words this supplied, each of the several parts of the *Mantra-text* becomes a complete Sentence, expressing a complete Idea—'O Palāsha-wood, I am cutting thee for the obtaining of agreeable food'. This lends support to the view that the term '*Artha*' in the preceding *Sūtra* defining '*One Sentence*' stands for *Purpose;* each of the completed sentences serving a distinct purpose and hence regarded as a *distinct Sentence.* In this connection, however, it may be noted that a single *Yajuṣ-text* cannot be broken up into many *distinct sentences* in this manner without sufficient authority; such authority as has been shown above, in the form of the *Brāhmaṇa-text* related to the *Yajuṣ-text.* This form of '*Distinct Sentences*' is thus permissible only in very rare cases; in fact, not until it is shown that no other construction is possible,—either in view of the peculiar structure of the text itself, or in virtue of some direct injunction necessitating such split; and the reason for this lies in the fact that in a case where the nature of the sentence is such that it admits of being taken as *one Sentence,*—if we have recourse to splitting up the sentence into several *distinct Sentences* we incur the responsibility of abandoning the natural Syntactical Construction without any authority; and further, when the Sentence, taken as a single *Mantra,* would lead to a single resultant transcendental result, we—by forcing the split—make it necessary to assume a number of such results proceeding from each of the *distinct Mantras* into which the original sentence may be split up. And in cases where we have no direct injunction necessitating and justifying the said splitting,—and where the *splitting* necessitates the addition of new words, —these words, being supplied by ourselves, without the authority of a

Vedic Injunction, cannot be regarded as 'Vedic', and hence, the *Mantra* containing these *non-Vedic* words would no longer remain *'Mantra'* in the strict sense of the term.

To the foregoing Principle, we have a corrolary to the effect that—*Where different parts of a Mantra-text are found, by their implication, to be meant for serving distinct purposes, each such part should be regarded as a distinct Sentence.* For instance, in the *Mantra-text 'Syonantē sadanaṁ kr̥ṇomi......tasmin sīda'* (*Taitti. Br.* 3.7.5.2., and *Mānava-Shrauta-Sūtra* 1.2.6,19)—we find that the first part, by what it expresses, is intended to be employed in the act of *'preparing the Seat'* for the Cake,—while the last part, in the same manner, is intended to be employed in the act of actually *depositing* the Cake on that *prepared Seat ;* on this account the *Mantra-text* is taken as containing two *distinct Sentences.* This has been called 'the Principle of Distinct-Sentences due to diversity in use'. (*Br̥hatī* MS. p. 79b).

III. Principle of Elliptical Extension—Anuṣaṅga.

This has been thus set forth in Sū. 2.1.48—*Elliptical Extension should complete the Sentence ; as it is equally applicable to all.* That is, in certain *Yajuṣ-text,* it is found that there are several sentences that stand in need of a certain Word or Phrase or Clause, while the whole of the original text contains only one such Word or Phrase or Clause ; in such cases it would appear,—and it has been held as the *Prima Facie view*—that the Word or Phrase or Clause is to be construed and used along with only that one of the several sentences which happens to be nearest to it, and the *Lacunae* in the other sentences are to be filled up by means of words of common parlance introduced by ourselves. It is the possibility of such construction that this Principle precludes. By this Principle, the Word, Phrase or Clause in question is to be used along with every one of the Sentences,—provided that every one of these is of the same type and form ; and the reason for this is that the intervention of a similar sentence does not become an obstacle to Syntactical Connection. As an example, we have the text—(A) *'Yāte agnē' yaḥshayā tanūrvarṣiṣṭhā gahvarēṣṭhā ugram vacho apāvadhīttvēṣaṁ vacho apāvadhit svāhā'*—(B) *'Yā tē agnē rājāshayā*—(C) *'Yā tē agne harāshaya'*—Hence, by the principle just stated the Clause *'tanūḥ... svāhā'* has to be construed with each of the three sentences (A), (B) and (C) and its connection does not cease with (A) ; in this way the text in question is taken as three distinct sentences.

In this text, the common clause to be connected with each of the three sentences forms the principle clause in each sentence ; but the principle is

equally applicable to cases where each of the sentences is complete in itself; but there are certain words that form a subordinate factor and which need a principle sentence with a verb with which it could be connected,—and the text contains more than one such sentence. For instance, in the text—'(A) *Chitpatistvā punātu*—(B) *Vākpatistvā punātu*—(C) *Dēvastvā savitā punātu achchidreṇa pavitrēṇa vasoḥ sūryasya rashmibhiḥ*' (T. S., 1.2.1.2), the subordinate clause—'*achchidrēṇa......rashmibhiḥ*'—has to be taken with each of the three sentences—(A), (B) and (C)—ending with the verb '*punātu*'. (*Bṛ.* MS., pp. 51b-52; *Tantravārtika Trs.*, 599 *et. seq.*).

Under Sū. 2.1.49 we have an exception to the above. Says the *Sūtra*—'There should be no *Elliptical Extension* where there is intervention of unconnected words'.—This, says the *Tantravārtika* (Trs., p. 607), supplies a counter-instance to the functioning of mere Proximity in the matter of Elliptical Extension. For instance, there is the text—'(A) *Saṁ tē vāyurvātēna gachchhatām*—(B) *Saṁ yajatrairaṅgāni*—(C) *Sam yajña-patirāshiṣā*' (M.S. 1.2.15); here the singular verb '*gachchhatām*' as occurring in sentence (A), cannot be construed with sentence (C), because the connection between these two has been interrupted by the sentence (B), which cannot be construed with the verb '*Gachchhatām*, of the preceding sentence, as the plural noun '*aṅgāni*' (in B) would need the verb in the plural form—which would be '*Gachchhantām*,; thus then, the connection between (A) and (C) is cut off by the intervening noun in the Plural Number; and until there is connection between (A) and (B) there can be no connection between (A) and (C). For this want of connection thus there is a special reason in the shape of the said intervention; and so long as this special reason is there, it is not possible for the complementary word '*gachchhatām*' to betake itself to the third sentence (C). For these reasons, the intervening sentence (B)—which needs a verb in the Plural Number—as also the third sentence (C) whose connection with the verb in the first sentence (A) is interrupted by the intervening sentence (B)—have to be completed by the adding of words of common parlance.—(*Shabara—Trs.*, p. 221).

On all this, *Kumārila* has the following remarks—In cases where there is *Elliptical Extension*, the Sentence thus completed forms a regular *Mantra or Yajuṣ*; and hence any mistakes in the uttering of this would involve an Expiatory Rite; whereas if the Sentence is completed,—not by *Elliptical Extension*, but by the addition of words of common parlance,—it does not become a regular *Mantra* and hence any mistakes in pronunciation are not serious and do not involve an Expiatory Rite. (*Tantra. Vā.*, Trs., p. 608).

(B) BRĀHMAṆA-TEXT

The *Mantra and Brāhmaṇa* constitute the *Veda ;* of these, the *Mantra* has been defined and described ; hence it follows that *all the rest of the Veda is Brāhmaṇa* (says Sū., 2.1.33). That is, those Vedic texts which are not found to possess the distinctive features of the *Mantra* are to be accepted as '*Brāhmaṇa*'., (Shabara—Trs., p. 204.)

Kumārila remarks (*Tantravārtika,* Trs., p. 572)—There would have been no use in having this *Sūtra,* if it were known to all men that the Veda consists of only *Brāhmaṇa and Mantra.* As a matter of fact, however, there are many people who are ignorant of this fact ; and since such people may entertain the notion that they may be a *third* class of Vedic texts, it is necessary to state clearly that in the *Veda,* all that is *not Mantra* is *Brāhmaṇa.*

No clear-cut definition of the *Brāhmaṇa-text* has been provided, and all we have been told under Sū., 1.2.33 is that 'those parts of the Veda which do not possess the character indicated as distinguishing *Mantras* are *Brāhmaṇa*'—(*Shabara,* Trs., 204). *Shabara* continues—For the benefit of students, however, the *Vṛttikāra* has supplied the following details regarding the characteristic features of the *Brāhmaṇa :*—(1) *Abounding in the particle 'iti' ;* (2) *Containing the phrase 'So they say' ;* (3) *Anecdotal ;* (4) *Ratiocinative ;* (5) *Explanatory ;* (6) *Deprecatory ;* (7) *Commendatory ;* (8) *Doubtful ;* (9) *Injunctive ;* (10) *Descriptive of something done by another ;* (11) *Historical ;* (12) *Transpository.* In connection with this, there is the following declaration :—

'There are ten kinds of *Brāhmaṇa-text*—Ratiocinative, Explanatory, Deprecatory, Commendatory, Doubtful, Directly Injunctive, Descriptive of what is done by others, Historical, Transpositional and Analogical'. (*Shabara,* Trs., p. 204).

Shabara, however, proceeds to point out that as in the case of the *Mantra,* all this is purely illustrative, not exhaustive ; as some of these characteristics are found in *Mantras* also. For instance, we have the *Mantra* abounding in *'iti'* in *Ṛgveda* 10.119.1)—*'Iti vā iti vā manaḥ., etc'.* ; —one containing the phrase 'So they say', we have in *R.V.,* 7.41.2—*'Bhagam bhaksītyāha'* ;—the *anecdotal Mantra* we have in *R. V.,* 1.116.3—*'Tugro ha bhujyum, etc'.* ;—the *Ratiocinative* Mantra in *R. V.,* 1.2.4—*'Indavo vāmushanti hi, etc'.* ;—the *Explanatory* Mantra in *T. S.,* 5.6.1.3—*'Tasmādāponusṭhāna, etc'.* ;—the *Deprecatory* Mantra *in R. V.,* 8.6.23—*'Moghamannam vindatē, etc'* ;—the *Commendatory* Mantra in T.S., 4.4.4.—*'Agnirmurdhā,*

etc'. ;—*the Doubtful* Mantra in R. V., 10.129.5—'*Adhaḥ svidāsīdupari svidāsīt, etc.*' ;—the *Directly Injunctive* Mantra in *R. V.*, 10.117.15—'*Pṛṇiyādinnādhāmānaya, etc*' ;—Mantra *Descriptive of something done by others*—in *R. V.*, 8.21.18—'*Sahasramayutā dadat, etc.*' ; the *Historical* Mantra in R. V., 10. 19.16—'*Yajñēna yajñamayajanta dēvāḥ, etc.*'

We have seen that those Vedic texts that are not *Mantras* have all been classed as '*Brāhmaṇa-texts*' ; and this has been regarded as synonymous with *Injunctive texts ;* the idea being that all these are either Injunctions of acts or assert something in regard to those Injunctions. (See below.)

These *Brāhmaṇa* or *Injunctive* texts have been classed under five heads—(1) The *Karmotpattivākya,* the text injunctive of an action—*e.g.*, 'One should perform the *Agnihotra*' ;—(2) the *Guṇavākya,* the text laying down the necessary accessory details connected with the enjoined act ; *e.g.*, 'One should offer the libation of Curds' ;—(3) the *Phalavākya,* the text mentioning the result following from the performance of the prescribed act ; *e.g.*, 'Desiring Heaven, one should perform the *Agnihotra*' ;—(4) The *Phalāya-guṇa-vākya,* the text which lays down a particular accessary detail as conducive to a specified result ; *e.g.*,—'Desiring efficient Sense-organs, one should offer the libation of Curds' ;—(5) the *Saguṇa-karmotpatti vākya,* the text injunctive of an act along with its accessary detail ; *e.g.*, 'One should perform the sacrifice *with Soma*'.

Another classification of the *Brāhmaṇa-texts* or Injunctions is under the following three heads :—(1) The *Apūrva-vidhi, Originative Injunction,* which lays down an act which could not be done unless so enjoined, *e.g.*, 'One should sprinkle consecrated water on the grains' ;—(2) the *Niyama-vidhi* or *Restrictive Injunction,* which lays down the doing of a certain act for a certain result, in preference to other acts leading to the same result ; *e.g.*, 'The corn should be threshed,' this threshing being the one method selected out of a number of the methods of removing the chaff from the grains ;—(3) the *Parisaṅkhyā-vidhi,* the *Preclusive* or *Specificatory Injunction,* which precludes some from among a number of possible alternatives ; *e.g.*, the preclusion of the *Mantra* '*Imāmagṛbhnan, etc.*' from being used in the holding of the reins of other animals, except those of the *Horse.*—In the *Niyama-vidhi,* Restrictive Injunction (2), that alternative which a specially enjoined is already known as to be done, but only *as one of the possible courses of action open to us,* and the Injunction serves to restrict the choice to the one course enjoined ;—in the *Apūrvavidhi,* Originative Injunction, on the other hand, what is enjoined is entirely unknown as something to be done. This is what is meant by the saying—'*Vidhiratyanta-maprāptē*

niyamaḥ pākṣikē, sati'. In the *Parisankhya-vidhi, Preclusive Injunction,* all that is enjoined is already known as *to be done,* along with other acts, but not necessarily as possible alternatives; they may be known as all simultaneously possible, there is nothing that is unknown, all are known; and out of all these a few are chosen and specifically *enjoined,* as *to be done,* the others being *precluded.*

There are several divisions and cross divisions of *Injunctions* set forth in the *Mīmāṁsā-bālaprakāsha* (pp. 12—41).

The *Injuctive process* has been discussed in course of the treatment of *Apūrva* (in Discourse II, Pada i, opening *Adhikaraṇa*).

We have seen that the sole means of knowing *Dharma* our Duty, *what we should do,* consists in the Injunctive Vedic texts. The Injunctive text is, however, always a *Sentence* composed of several words;—the question arises as to which particular word in the Sentence it is that denotes the act to be done, and in what way this *denoting* is done. This question has been raised for the purpose of determining the difference between acts enjoined by different texts. In this connection the whole process of Injunction has been dealt with in great detail.

We shall take a typical injunctive-text, '*Svargakāmo yajēta*' ('Desiring Heaven, one should perform sacrifice'); there are two etrms, '*Svargakāmaḥ*' ('Desiring Heaven') and '*Yajēta*' ('Should perform sacrifice'); the former mentions the result that is desired by the Agent, and the latter lays down the act bringing about that result. This second term '*Yajēta*' is composed of two parts—(1) the verbal root '*Yaj*' (which denotes *sacrifice*) and the Injunctive Conjugational Ending '*liṅ*', connoting *Injunction.* Hence the word that directly denotes *what should be done* is this *Injunctive term* '*Yajēta*' ('should perform sacrifice').

In the connotation of this word '*Yajēta*' also, there are two factors—(1) *The act of Sacrificing* and (2) the accomplishment or *bringing about,* of that act. 'All verbs signify the *bringing about* of a certain act' says the *Tantra-Vā.* (*Trs.*, p. 474.) Of these two—the *Act* and the *Bringing About,*—the Act is signified by he verbal root ('*Yaj*'), and its *bringing about* is signified by the injunctive affix ('*Liṅ*'); this *bringing about* is what has been given the technical name of '*Bhāvanā*'. Thus it is this *Bhāvanā* or Bringing into *being*—or *Bringing about*—that is signified by the Injunctive *Liṅ.* '*Bhāvanā*' is signified by the Verbal affix'—says the *Tantravārtika* (*Trs.*, p. 486).

This *Bhāvanā* or *Bringing About,* Accomplishment, which constitutes the Effort or Activity of the Agent—is of two kinds—(*a*) *Ārthī* (Actual, External, Material) and (*b*) *Shābdī* (Verbal). Both of these contain three factors—(1) *What* is to be *brought about* or *accomplished,* (2) *by what* instrumentality it is to be brought about, and (3) *the manner* in which it is to be brought about.

In the case of the *Ārthī* or *Actual Bhāvanā,*—(1) What is to be *brought about* is the Final Result—*Heaven,* in the case of *Sacrifices;* (2) the instrumentality *by which* the result is to be *brought about* consists of the *Act* (of Sacrifice); and (3) the *manner* or process of the *bringing about* lies in the entire procedure of the actual performance of the Act of *Sacrifice.*

In the case of the *Shābdī Bhāvanā,* on the other hand, (1) what is *brought about* or *accomplished* is the Prompting of the Agent to activity, (2) this *prompting* is brought about by the *instrumentality* of the Injunctive, and (3) the process or manner of the *prompting* lies in the idea of the Excellence of the activity, derived from the Commendatory and other texts.

This *Bhāvanā,* which consists in the *Effort* or *Activity* of the Agent towards the fulfilment of the desired result, is expressed by the offix in the verb; this much of the connotation is common to the denotation of all verbal roots; for instance, in the *verb 'pachati'* ('cooks'), the idea expressed is 'he *does* the *cooking'*; of these two factors of this *act of cooking*—*'does'* and (2) *'cooking',*—the *cooking* as denoted by the verbal root is an *accomplished entity;* while the factor of 'does' is of the nature of something *to be accomplished,*—as is indicated by the affix. Thus then, what is expressed by the phrase 'does the cooking' is that 'one is *doing* the act that is conducive to the final result in the shape of the *coming into existence* of the *Cooked Rice';* and this *doing* of the act is what has been called *'Bhāvanā',* *Bringing into Existence, Accomplishing.*

Similarly, in the case of the Vedic text *'Svargakāmo yajēta'* ('Desiring Heaven, one should sacrifice'), what the injunctive affix denotes is that 'one should *bring into existence* the final result in the shape of Heaven'; and this is what is meant by *Bhāvanā'.* This *Bhāvanā*—in its *Ārthī, actual* or *material* form,—is made up of the three factors as explained above—(1) what is brought into existence,—(2) by what it is brought into existence,—and (3) in what manner it is brought into existence.

This *Ārthī* or *Actual Bhāvanā* itself, consisting in the Effort or Activity of the Agent, is something that is brought about by the *Shābdī* or *Verbal Bhāvanā.* In this (1) what is to be *brought into existence* is the prompting

of the Agent to the Effort or Activity,—(2) the means by which it is brought about is the Injunctive and (3) the *process* by which it is brought about consists of the commendation expressed by the *Arthavāda-texts*—as already explained above.

[For further details *re Bhāvanā,* the reader should refer to *Tantra-Vā.*, Trs., pp. 475 *et. seq.* A logical and philosophical discussion on the exact nature and signification of the Injunction is contained in the *Vidhi-vivēka-Nyayakaṇikā* and in the *Bhāvanāvivēka.*]

(C) ARTHAVĀDA—DECLAMATORY TEXTS

In the *Brāhamaṇa*-section of the Veda there are many texts that do not contain any Injunction; they are purely descriptive or declamatory. We have seen that it is the *Injunctive* text of the Veda that supplies us with the Knowledge of *Dharma,* of *what should be done.* The question that arises now is—what bearing have these other Declamatory texts upon the knowledge of Dharma ? Have they any bearing upon it at all ?

The *Prima Facie View* is that not being *Injunctive,* they can have no bearing upon the knowledge of *Dharma ;* because these texts merely speak of things as they exist, not of what has to be brought about. Thus even though these texts form part of the *Veda,* they do not serve any useful purpose regarding the knowledge of *Dharma.*

The *Finally Established View* is as follows :—It is true that the texts in question do not lay down *anything to be done ;* but in almost every case it is found that the text is related, in some way, to another text which is directly *injunctive,* laying down something *to be done.* Under the circumstances, if the two texts are correlated and construed together, it is found that the Declamatory text serves the purpose of eulogising and commending what is laid down in the Injunctive text; and in this way it serves the useful purpose of tempting and prompting the active agent to the performance of the act laid down in the Injunctive text. For instance, there is the Injunctive text—'One should sacrifice the White Goat to *Vāyu*',— and related to this is the Declamatory text—'Vāyu is the eftest Deity; and this latter text, by eulogising *Vāyu,* serves to commend the act of *sacrificing* to that Deity—which act has been enjoined in the Injunctive text. Thus serving the purpose of bringing about the activity leading to the *enjoined* performance, the declamatory text helps in the performance of *Dharma.* (Sū. 1.2.1—18).

Nor does this correlation of the two texts vitiate the self-sufficient authority of the Injunctive Text; because so far as the providing of the

knowledge of the particular *Dharma*—the act of *sacrificing*—is concerned, the Injunctive text stands self-sufficient; it is only the prompting of the Agent that is done by the other text.

The first classification of these *Arthavāda* or Declamatory Texts is into—(1) Descriptive by direct intention,—*e.g.*, 'Fire is the antidote for cold',—(2) Descriptive by indirect implication, *e.g.*, 'During the day, the Smoke alone of the Fire is perceived; not its light',—(3) Descriptive of an Accomplished Fact or Past Event, *e.g.*, 'Prajāpati cut out his own omentum'.

There is another classification by which there are 38 kinds of Declamatory Texts. These have been described and exemplified in the *Mīmāṁsābālaprakāsha* (pp. 448—58). The following are a few of the more important kinds that have been enumerated by *Shabara* (Under Sū. 2.1.33, *Trs.*, p. 204), as having been described by the *Vṛttikāra*:—(1) *Abounding in the Particle 'iti'*, (2) *Containing the phrase 'So they say'*, (3) *Anecdotal*, (4) *Stating a Reason*, *e.g.*, 'One should make the offering with the winnowing basket, because *by that is Food prepared*',—(5) Explanatory—*e.g.*, Therein lies the *curdishness* of the curd',—(6) *Commendatory*—'Vāyu is the eftest Deity',—(7) *Condemnatory*,—*e.g.*, 'His Fires are impure',—(8) *Expressing Doubt*,—'The Libation should be poured in the Gānhapatya, or the libation should not be poured';—(9) *Injunctive*, *e.g.*, 'The Post made of *Udumbara* should be of the size of the *Sacrificer*',—(10) Describing what is done by others—*e.g.*, 'He cooks *māṣa-grains* only on my account', (11) *Historical*, *e.g.*, 'The ancient people came in with flaming firebrands'; (12) *Transpositional*, *e.g.*, 'One should perform as many sacrifices as the Horses he *receives*,' (where 'receives' is meant to be transposed by 'gives').

The difference between (10) *Parakṛiti* (What is done by others) and (11) '*Purākalpa*' (Historical) has been pointed out by the author of the *Vārtika* as that the former is descriptive of what has been done in the past by a single person, while the latter describes what has been done in the past by two or more persons.—(*Mīmāṁsābālaprakāsha*, p. 51).

In regard to *Prabhākara's view* regarding the *Arthavāda-text*, there seems to be some confusion in the minds of students, created by what *Gadādhara Bhaṭṭāchārya* has said in his *Shaktivāda*, to the effect that according to *Prabhākara*, the *Arthavāda-texts* cannot be regarded as a *trustworthy* means of knowledge because they are *inexpressive;* as in accordance with the *Anvitābhidhāna* theory of Verbal Expression only that sentence is really *expressive* which lays down something *to be done;* and hence under this theory, it is only the *Injunctive* Sentence that can be really *expressive*

and hence capable of providing knowledge of *Dharma*, Though this may be true regarding the *Arthavāda* text taken by itself, it cannot be accepted as the view of *Prabhākara* regarding *Arthavāda*-text, as forming part of the Veda ; because on referring to the *Bṛhatī*, we find that the above view is only the *Prima Facie View* on the question of the reliability and authority of *Arthavāda-texts ;* and this *Prima Facie View* is demolished in the *Finally Established View*, under which the *Arthavāda-text* also is decided to be as Vedic and *authoritative* as the Injunctive text. The *Prima Facie View* on this question as put forward by the *Bhāṭṭa* is simply that these texts are *untrustworthy*, while as put forward by the *Prabhākara* it is that they are *inexpressive* (and hence untrustworthy) ; and this is the form that has been adopted by the opponent in view of *Prabhākara's Views* regarding Verbal Expression referred to above. The *Finally Established Conclusion* adopted by *Prabhākara*, however, is that the *Arthavāda-text* is as much 'Veda' as the *Injunctive text*, as like the latter the former also expresses the *performability* of certain acts, through the commendation that it directly expresses. (*Bṛhatī*—MS., p. 30.) Though it may be true that, strictly according to *Prabhākara's* view, the *Arthavāda-text* cannot be *expressive*, yet this can be urged only against such *Arthavāda-texts* as are absolutely incapable of being construed and co-ordinated with an *Injunctive text*. Most of the *Arthavāda-texts*, however, are actually found capable of being so construed and co-ordinated. And thus helping, through commendation, the initial *prompting* done by the *Injunctive text*, it serves a useful purpose in pointing out the *performability* of the Action enjoined, and hence it is perfectly entitled to the title of '*Veda*', says the *Bṛhatī* (MS., pp. 29-30). '*Vidhyuddeshādēva kāyāvagatiḥ...Yato hi kartavyatāvagamyatē sa Vēdaḥ... Asmāchcha kāryatāvagamyatē*'.

On this question of the authority of *Arthavādas*—Declamatory Texts—*Murāri Mishra* states the *Siddhānta*, Final Conclusion, as follows, in his *Tripādī-Nītinayana :*—'*What is to be done* needs, for its own expression, the commendation (contained in the Declamatory Text) , as aiding the Injunctive Word ; and it is not the commendation as expressed by the Declamatory Text that is indicative of the *act as to be done.* (P. 23, MS).

The trustworthy and useful character of *Arthavāda-texts* in general has been established. The *Sutra* (1.2.19—25) takes up the consideration of those *Arthavāda-texts* whose exact character—whether they are *Injunctive* or *Declamatory*—is not easily determinable. Says the *Bṛhatī* (MS., p. 30) 'The trustworthy and useful character of the *Declamatory* texts having been established, the question arises as to how to regard those few

texts which are found to be capable of being taken as independently *Injunctive* and also as merely *Declamatory*, related to, and subserving, other clearly *injunctive texts*'.

For example, there is the text—'*Audumbaro yūpo bhavati...ūrgudumbaraḥ ūrk pashavaḥ ūrjo' varudhyai*'—(A) 'The Post is made of *Udumbara* Wood...the *Udumbara* is strong;—(B) One obtains strong cattle by using that wood'. Here there are two sentences—(A) stating that the Post is to be made of the *Udumbara* wood, and (B) stating that one obtains strong cattle by using the said wood. Now it is agreed on all sides that the first sentence is directly *injunctive;* but in regard to the second sentence (B), the question arises—Is the second sentence also *injunctive*—enjoining that 'One should acquire cattle by using *Udumbara* wood'? Or is it merely *Declamatory*, meant to be construed and co-ordinated with the preceding sentence (A),—the meaning expressed by the two sentences being 'One should make the Post of *Udumbara* wood,—it being so powerful as to be conducive to the acquiring of powerful cattle'? This doubt regarding the second text is due to the fact that it has the appearance of an *Injunctive text*, and yet there is no Injunctive word in it. The *Prima Facie View* (under the *Prabhākara* interpretation) is that the exact signification of the text being doubtful, it fails to be a reliable guide and thereby the reliability of the entire Veda becomes vitiated. The *Established Conclusion* is that the exact significance of the text is *not* doubtful; the Sentence in question is purely *Declamatory*, a pure *Arthavāda.* It is admitted on all hands that so long as we can construe and co-ordinate the sentences occurring together as constituting a single complete sentence containing a single Injunction, it is not right to find in them several Injunctions; as the unnecessary multiplication of Injunctions is always to be avoided. Again in the case of the two sentences in question, even if we regard them as containing two Injunctions, the second sentence would enjoin on action that would follow only from the action enjoined by the first sentence. For instance, the second sentence would enjoin the 'obtaining of Cattle' by 'making the Post of *Udumbara* wood';—and it is just this *making* that is enjoined by the first sentence. In this manner also the two sentences are shown to be related, as pointing virtually to the same *action*—'the making of the Post with *Udumbara* wood'. This is thus explained in the *Bṛhatī*—

साध्यद्वयावगमेऽपि प्रमाणतः सिद्धसाध्यतयैव एकार्थावगतिः : (MS., p. 30b)

Explaining this passage, the *Ṛjuvimalā* says (MS., p. 332)—

यद्येकार्थविगतिः तदानुकूलं निमित्तं कल्पनीयम् । एकोऽर्थः
सिद्धरूपोऽभ्युपगम्यताम् अपरश्च साध्यरूपः ।
येन परस्परसम्बन्धे सत्येकार्थविगतिरुपपद्यते ॥

That is to say—'if the whole text is taken as pointing to a single *act*, then sufficient reason should be found for such interpretation; and this reason lies in the fact that one of the acts mentioned (the making of the Post) must be regarded as something *accomplished*, and the other (*i.e.*, the obtaining of Cattle) as something to be accomplished by what has been accomplished before; it is only thus that the two sentences in the text could be construed as laying down a *single act*'.

The *Bhāṭṭa* presentation of this topic is somewhat different. Under the *Prima Facie View* the second sentence is taken as an *Injunction*, laying down the Fruit (Result) of the Action enjoined in the first sentence;—and the *Established Conclusion* is that it does not actually enjoin the Fruit, it is merely *Declamatory*, serving the purpose of *Commending* the action enjoined in the first sentence.

The general Principle derived from the above is that even those *Arthavāda-texts* which resemble an Injunction only serve the purpose of *commending* the act already enjoined by another Injunctive text;—they do not enjoin a different act. (*Vide* Su., 1.2.19-25).

There is another typical *Arthavāda-text* which has been dealt with in *Sūtra* 1.2.26-30;—that kind of text is dealt with here which appears to be putting forward a *reason* for an *act* that has been enjoined in another sentence. For instance, there is the text—'*Shūrpeṇa juhoti—tena hi annam kriyate*, which contains two sentances—(1) 'One should offer the libation with the Winnowing Basket,—(2) [Because] Food is prepared by its means. The first sentence enjoins the act of *making the offering with the Winnowing Basket.* In regard to the *second* sentences there arises the question—Is it to be taken as providing a *reason* for what has been enjoined in the first sentence? Or is it meant only as a commendatory declaration, commending the use of the *Winnowing Basket ?* The *Prima Facie View* is that the particle '*hi*' ('Because') contained in the second sentence clearly shows that it is the Statement of a *reason* in support of what has been enjoined in the first sentence. The *Established Conclusion* is that—the Vedic Injunction does not stand in need of any support; hence, the said Statement of Reason would be entirely fubride. The second Sentence therefore is to be taken only as *commending* what has been enjoined in the first sentence.

The general principle derived from this that whichever Vedic texts are found to be laying down *Reasons*, the Sentence wherein the reason

is stated should be taken as purely *Commendatory*, not as justifying the previous Injunction, nor as a separate Injunction.

It may be noted here that this Principle has been misunderstood by their Lordships of the Privy Council at the instance of a lawyer who himself seems to have been misled. The question before the Courts was—Can an only son of his parents be adopted ?—There are texts distinctly forbidding it ; one of them unfortunately is accompanied by the *Statement of a Reason.* The first sentence of the text forbids the giving or taking in adoption of an only son ; and the second sentence asserts '*because* he is for the perpetuation of the family' ; and it was held that as the prohibition had been accompanied and suggested by the statement of a Reason it could not be mandatory, it must be taken as purely commendatory. Accordingly, it was decided that *an only son may be adopted.* We have seen, however, that what has to be regarded as Commendatory and not mandatory—is *the sentence Stating the Reason*, not the previous Injunction or Prohibition. So that it does not touch the mandatory character of the prohibition of the adoption of an only son. It may be noted that there are other texts also—*e.g.*, one from *Shaunaka* that prohibits such adoption, —without the statement of a reason. The decision of the Privy Council thus is not supported by any Principle of *Mīmāṁsā* at all, as has been alleged in law-books.

Some people have explained Sūtras 1.2.31-53—which we have explained above, under the section dealing with *Mantras*, as establishing the fact of *Mantras* being expressive and serving the purpose of indicating certain details in regard to the enjoined acts,—as treating of cases where there is conflict between what is indicated by the *Mantra-text* and what is declared from the *Declamatory-texts.* The question being as to what should be done in such cases, the *Prima Facie View* is that such a conflict nullifies both the texts and hence such texts cannot be regarded as authoritative or reliable. The *Established Conclusion* is that, while what is indicated by the words of the *Mantra-text* is got at through the Indicative Power of the Words of the Vedic text itself,—and as Indicative Power is more authoritative than Syntactical Connection,—what we learn from the Words of the *Mantra-text* should have preference over what is learnt from the Declamatory text.

(D) Nāmadheya—Proper Names

The four parts of the 'Veda' bearing upon the subject of *Dharma* have been described as—*Injunctive Texts, Declamatory Texts, Mantra-Texts* and *Names.* The functioning of the first three has been set forth above.

Sūtras 1.4.1-30 have dealt with the *fourth part,* which has been called '*Nāmadhēya*' or 'Name', in view of the fact that it deals with those texts whose exact signification depends upon the signification of the individual words in the text, and most of these words are found, after due investigation, to be Proper Names of Sacrifices and other things. In almost all these cases, the *Prima Facie View,* according to *Prabhākara* would be that the exact signification of the word in question being doubtful, the Vedic text containing that word cannot be reliable ; and the *Established Conclusion* is that the exact signification of the word is *not doubtful,* the word is a Proper Name ; hence there is nothing doubtful, about the meaning of the text.

Shabara has taken as a typical text of this class, the sentence '*Udbhidā yajēta*' (*Tāṇḍya Br.* 19.7.2) ; ('One should sacrifice with the *Udbhid*'). In regard to this, the question is—what is the exact signification of the term '*Udbhid*' ? Apparently it should be a material or some accessory with which the enjoined *Sacrifice* is to be performed ; and yet there is another possible interpretation whereby the term *Udbhid* being the *name* of a particular Sacrifice, the text lays down that particular *Sacrifice* which is *named* 'Udbhid'. The *Prima Facie View* is that—"the word should be taken as laying down the material to be used at the sacrifice, as it is only thus that the text would be serving a useful purpose in connection with the *Sacrifice* that has been enjoined by the injunctive word in the Sentance, '*Yajēta*'. On the other hand, if it were taken as the *name* of a Sacrifice the text would not be serving any useful purpose ; as the *Sacrificing* has been already enjoined elsewhere ; and the mere adding of its *name* would be futile". According to *Prabhākara,* under the presentation of the *Prima Facie View* it is pointed out that in being taken as laying down a material substance, it could stand only as *that by which something is pierced* (*Udbhidyatē anēna*) ; and as *sacrificing* with such a *digging instrument* would be absurd, the whole text becomes absurd and thus the authority of the Veda becomes vitiated. The *Established Conclusion* is as follows :—The word should be taken as the *Name* of a Sacrifice. It cannot be taken as laying down the *material,* because no such material substance as *Udbhid* is known among people,—in the way that other words like '*dadhi*', '*dugdha*' are. By being taken as laying down a material, therefore, it would entail the absurdity pointed out by the *Prima Facie View.* On the other hand, if the word is taken as the *Name* of the *Sacrifice,* the clear meaning of the text comes to be that 'one should *perform* that particular *sacrifice* which is called *Udbhid*',—The text, says *Shabara* (*Trs.* p. 128), does not enjoin the name ; what we mean is that the word *Udbhid* serves as a *reference by name* to the particular *Sacrifice* ; and

this reference is based upon the Etymological Signification of the term '*Udbhid*'—by which the term connotes *that by which the desired result* (*cattle, in this case*) *is brought about.* (Sū. 1.4.1-2).

Under Sū. 1.4.1-2, above we have dealt with the case of such words as have no generally-accepted connotation, and whose connotation has to be deduced from their Etymology. The next section (Sū 1.4.3) takes up the case of such words as have well-recognised connotations. The term taken up as typifying such terms is '*chitrayā*' as occurring in the text '*Chitrayā yajĕta pashukāmaḥ*' (T. S. 2.4.6.1). In this case, term '*Chitrā*' is well-known as connoting *a female animal of variegated colour*; and accordingly the text may be easily taken as meaning that 'One should perform the sacrifice with *a female animal of variegated colour*'. The objection against this interpretation is that under this interpretation the single word '*chitrayā*, would be laying down two qualifications of the animal—*feminity* and *variegated colour*—and this would involve a *Syntactical Split*; hence the *Established Conclusion* should be that, in the manner shown in the preceding case, the term '*Chitrā*' should be taken as the *name* of a Sacrifice; and the text therefore should be taken to mean that 'One should perform that Sacrifice which is *named* Chitrā'. (Su. 1.4.3).

Sū 1.4.2. has dealt with words which had to be taken as the *Names* of Sacrifices, because it was found that if they were taken otherwise, as mentioning sacrificial accessories, they could do so, only indirectly through indication; *e.g.*, the term '*Udbhidā*' had to be taken as '*Udbhidvatā.*, *i.e.*, 'that which involves the use of the material *Udbhid*'.

Sū. 4 takes up the case of those words which are capable of being taken as mentioning sacrificial accessories without recourse to indirect signification of any kind. The word '*Agnihotra*' itself is such a word. This word is found in such texts as '*Agnihotram juhuyāt svargakāmaḥ*'. Here the term '*Agnihotra*' has to be taken as a Bahuvrīhi compound as '*agnayĕ hotraṁ yasmin*', 'that in which the libation is offered to *Agni*'; and from this it is clear that the word speaks of *Agni* as the Deity of the offering enjoined by the text. Hence the *Prima Facie View* is that by means of this word '*Agnihotra*', the text lays down the Deity of the offering.—This view cannot be accepted, as the Deity of the offering in question has already been indicated by another text,—in the shape of the *Mantra* '*Agnirjotiḥ* etc'.; so that the indicating of the same Deity by the text in question would be futile. Hence the *Establishd Conclusion* is that the term '*Agnihotra*' is only the *Name* of the offering in question.

Under Sū. 1.4.3. we have dealt with a word which was found capable, in its own natural connotation, to be expressive of a sacrificial material; but this was found unacceptable on account of the 'Syntactical Split' that it involved. Sū. 1..45. takes up a word which is capable of connoting a sacrificial accessory without involving any 'Syntactical Split'. Such a word is '*Shyēna*' contained in the text '*Shyēnēna abhicharan yajēta*'. The word '*Shyēna*' directly denotes he bird 'Kite'; hence the *Prima Facie View* is that this text lays down the *Kite* as the material substance to be offered; the sacrificial offering thus consisting of the *Kite-bird,* in place of the *Soma,* which is the usual substance offered at the *Agniṣṭoma*-Sacrifice,—when this Sacrifice is performed with a view to encompass the death of a certain person; hence the text is to be taken as laying down a particular substance—the Bird, Kite—to be offered at the wellknown *Agniṣṭoma*—Sacrifice. A text following close upon the text in question is found to eulogise the sacrifice herein laid down by likening it to the *Kite;* from which the *Established Conclusion* is deduced that the *Kite* is not meant to be the material offered; and the word has to be taken only as the *Name* of the Sacrifice,—this name being based upon the said Eulogy which likens the Sacrifice to the *Shyēna* (Kite).

Counter-instances where certain terms *cannot* be taken as *names* have been dealt with under Sū. 1.4.9. et. seq. The word '*āgnēya*' may be taken as typical, in this connection; it occurs in the text—'*Āgnēyo' ṣṭākapālo bhavati*'. The question is—Does this word '*āgneyaḥ*' lay down *Agni* as the Deity of the offering ? Or is it the *name* of the offering ? The *Prime Facie View* is that, in accordance with the reasons adduced in connection with the word '*Agnihotra*' above, the term '*Āgnēya*' also should be taken as a *name* of the offering.—The *Established Conclusion* is that in this case there is no other text which could be taken as laying down the Deity for the offering enjoined in the text; hence if this word '*Āgnēya*' were taken as the *name* of the offering, and *not* in its ordinary connotation, whereby it speaks of *Agni* as the Deity to whom the *Eight-pan Cake* is to be offered,—then there would be nothing to tell us who the Deity is to whom this offering is to be made; and this would make the Vedic text futile.

The treatment of the subject of *Names* also concludes with the deduction of two general Principles for determining doubtful cases.—(1) The first of these Principles is presented under Sū. 1.4.29; where it is pointed out that *in doubtful cases, the question is settled with the help of subsequent Commentatory texts.* For example, we have the text—'*Aktāḥ*

sharkarā upadadhāti' ('One should put in wetted pebbles') ; but it is nowhere laid down with what partcular liquid the pebbles are to be *wetted;* and it would seem as if it were left to the whim of the performer which particular liquid he is to use. But later on, we find the passage—'Clarified Butter is longevity itself; and this praise bestowed upon Clarified Butter leads us to conclude that it is with Clarified Butter that the pebbles are to be wetted. —Similarly, there is a text laying down the 'wearing of clothes', but it is not said whether it is *cotton* or *silk* that should be worn; a subsequent passage, however, is found praising *silk* as 'the clothing of the Deities'; and we conclude that silk-clothes should be worn.

(2) The second general Principle is that the *Indefinite is rendered Definite by the capacity of things.* For instance, the substances generally offered at sacrifices consist of Clarified Butter, Meat and Cake; and for the slicing of these substances, three implements have been enjoined—(1) Ladle, (2) Knife and (3) Hand. The uncertainty or indefiniteness arises as to whether or not there is any restriction as to the particular implement to be used for the Slicing of the particular substance. The *prima Facie View* is that there should be no restriction, as we find no texts that would justify such restriction. The *Established Conclusion,* however, is that the indefiniteness or uncertainty in this case is removed by the natural capacity of the things concerned; so that the *Ladle* is to be used for 'Slicing' in the case of the Liquid Substances, like Clarified Butter,—the *Knife* is to be used in the case of solid substances, like Meat,—and the Hand is to be used in the case of the Cake and such things as are capable of being sliced with the Hand.

CHAPTER XXI

SMṚTI AND CUSTOM AND OTHER SOURCES OF THE KNOWLEDGE OF DHARMA

(A) Introductory

It has been shown so far that Veda in all its parts—Injunctive, Declamatory, Mantras and Names—is the reliable source of knowledge relating to *Dharma*, and like the orthodox *Mīmāmsaka Jaimini* has declared under Sū. 1.1.2. that the *Veda* is the *sole* authority in matters relating to *Dharma*, Duty—what we should *do* and *not do* ;—and yet in actual practice he found that by the time that he systematised the Vedic Exigetics, the *Veda* had become so remotely ancient that it was not found sufficient for the purpose of obtaining the proper knolwdge of the whole Duty of man, and the knowledge derived from the *Veda* had to be supplemented by that derived from certain other sources, notably such sources as the works known under the comprehensive name of '*Smṛti*', and also the *Usage* or *Custom* of respectable people. It was in view of this fact that *Manu* and other writers on works relating to the Duty of Man laid down, at the very outset of their works, that the Source of Knowledge of such Duty consists (in the order of precedence) in the *Veda*, the *Smṛti*, the *Usage* of good people, and even *Self-Satisfaction* (Conscience). It was in view of this same fact that *Jaimini* found it necessary to devote a special Section of his Sutras (*Pada* iii of *Adhyāya I*) to the consideration of the authority and reliability of these other supplementary sources of knowledge.

The propriety of this consideration may be explained in several ways :—We can form no idea of the knowledge of the *Veda* itself until we have understood it in all its bearings ; and it is only with the help of *Smṛti* and *Custom* that it can be understood ; it is necessary therefore that the exact nature of these latter should be investigated. Again, finding that *Smṛti* and *Custom* also provide us with the knowledge of the Duty of Man, this fact might be regarded as vitiating the main thesis of the *Mīmāmsaka* that the Veda is the *Sole authority* on the subject ; in order to guard against this, and to ascertain how far *Smṛti* and *Custom* may be allowed to affect the authority of the *Veda* itself, from which alone they derive this authority. Lastly, the subject-matter of *Mīmāṃsā* having been declared to be 'Investigation of the nature of Duty',—of which the foremost and entirely reliable source of knowledge has been declared to consist of the *Veda* in all its parts,—it is only right and proper that the nature of the

other likely sources of knowledge should be considered.—Says *Prabhākara*—'The *Smṛti* also has been accepted by people learned in the *Veda* as authoritative and trustworthy; hence it is necessary to investigate its character'. (*Bṛhatī*, MS., p. 31).

In this connection, *Jaimini's* conclusion is that wherever it does not contradict the *Veda*, the *Smṛti* is to be regarded as authoritative; but in order to be consistent with his main thesis that the *Veda* is the *Sole authority*, he adds that the *Smṛti* is to be regarded as authoritative only in so far as it is based upon, and derives its authority from, the *Veda*. For instance, in considering this matter, *Shabara* and *Kumārila* have cited the *Smṛti*-text laying down the peformance of the *Aṣṭakā*,—a Rite that has not been enjoined in any Vedic text, and in as much as the *Smṛtis* are the work of human authors and are dependent upon their intelligence and memory,—which cannot be infallible,—the authority of the *Smṛtis* cannot be inborn and Self-Sufficient, like that of the Veda; and yet, on the other hand, the *Smṛtis* are found to be accepted as authoritative by an unbroken line of Vedic scholars from time immemorial; hence it is felt that they cannot be entirely untrustworthy. (*Tantra-Vārtika* Trs., p. 105).—The *Prima Facie View* on this question is that "In as much as *Dharma* is based upon the *Veda*, what is *not-Veda* should be disregarded". (Sū. 1.3.1). The *Established View* however is that the '*Smṛti is trustworthy*, as there could be inference of its basis in the *Veda*, from the fact of the agents being the same'—(Sū. 1.3.2.). That is to say, in the case of the *Smṛti* (which represents what has been *remembered* by the writer) of men of the three higher castes, who are Vedic Scholars, there must be actual connection, and basis, for the said Remembrance, in actual *Vedic* texts. The 'previous Cognition' therefore, which is necessary for the validating of Remembrance, is thus traceable to the knowledge derived by the writer from the *Veda*; and it being possible that such Vedic text has been forgotten, —the inference of such a text becomes justifiable. (*Shabara*, Trs., p. 89).

(B) Example—Aṣṭakā-offering

The instance that is cited in illustration of the above is that of the *Smṛti-text* which lays down the performance of the *Aṣṭakā*. The *Prima Facie Veiw* regarding this text is, that the performance not being enjoined in the *Veda*, the *Smṛti-text* prescribing it should be rejected as having no authority. But the *Established Conclustion* is that, it is justifiable to infer the existence of the Vedic Text as the source of the Injunction contained in the *Smṛti*; and thus being based upon the *Veda*, this latter should be regarded as a trustworthy source of knowledge'.

Prabhākara's presentation of this topic is more consistent. According to him, the question of the authority of *Smṛti* (or Custom) does not concern the *Mīmāmsaka ;* the subject-matter of the present Discourse is the *Means of Knowing Dharma ;* and it has been established that the *Veda* is the only reliable Source and Means of this knowledge ; hence the whole of this Discourse should devote itself entirely to the question of the authority *of the Veda only.* In accordance with this view, the text chosen as dealing with the *Aṣṭakā* and the present enquiry is the purely *Vedic Mantra-text—'Yāñjanāḥ pratinandanti, etc., etc'.*—and *not* any *non-Vedic Smṛti-text,* like the one cited above. This *Mantra-text* is found to speak of the *Divinity of the Night,* and thus becomes connected with the *Aṣṭakā-Rite* which has been laid down in the *Smṛti,* in which the *Divinity of the Night* figures as the *Deity.* Now in regard to this *Mantra-text* relating to the *Aṣṭakā.* the *Prima Facie View* is as follows :—"The *Smṛti-Declaration* that the *Aṣṭakā* should be performed is found to accomplish its purpose of enjoining the Rite, only through the help of the said *Vedic* Mantra-text ;—this Vedic text also as indicating the Divinity of the Night, must have had in view the same *Aṣṭakā-Rite* in which the *Divinity of the Night* figures as the Deity, and which has been enjoined only in the work of a human author ;—thus the Vedic text is found to be dependent upon the work of a human author,—and this shakes the inborn and self-sufficient authority of the *Vedic-text,* and thereby the authority of the entire *Veda* becomes vitiated".—The *Established Conclusion* however is as follows :—When we have found that the person who wrote that the *Aṣṭakā* should be performed must have found a basis for the rule in the *Veda* itself,—then the Injunction of the *Aṣṭakā* must be regarded as emanating from the *Veda* itself ;—so that the *Mantra-text 'Yāñjanāḥ, etc'.* also is indicative of the Divinity that figures in an act enjoined originally in the *Veda* itself ;—thus the *Mantra-text* is not dependent upon the *Smṛti-rule ;* it is based upon the *Vedic-text* upon which primarily the *Smṛti-rule* is inferred to rest. (*Ṛjuvimalā*).

The entire *Mantra-text* mentioned here as indicative of the *Divinity of the Night* is

यां जनाः प्रतिनन्दन्ति रात्रिं धेनुरिवायतीम् ।
संवत्सरस्य या पत्नी सा नो अस्तु सुमङ्गली ।

Here *Aṣṭakā* is spoken of as the *Divinity of the Night,* and eulogised as the 'Consort of the Year' ;—herein we have a Vedic text speaknig of *Aṣṭakā* as an object of adoration,—this is what has been taken to be indicative of the desirability of performing the *Aṣṭakā-Rites.*

(C) Connotation of the Term 'Smṛti'

In later classical literature, the term '*Smṛti*' is found to include all *Smṛtis proper*,—such as those of *Manu*, *Yājñavalkya*, *Vashiṣtha*, *Gautama* and others, as well as the *Itihāsas*, *Pūrānas* and the *Sūtras*—*Shrauta*, *Gṛhya* and *Dharma*. In the present context however the term has been taken by *Kumārila* and his followers to include only those *Smṛtis* that are applicable throughout *Aryāvarta* and to *all men* resident therein; and under this category, Kumārila places the *Itihāsas*, the *Purānas* and the *Smṛti* of *Manu* only, (*Tantravārtika*, Trs., p. 244). The other *Smṛtis*,—such as those of *Atri*, *Gautama*, *Vashiṣtha* and others,—he relegates to another category and deals with them separately under Sū. 15-16 Et. Seq. The following relevant remarks of *Kumārila* are instructive and interesting:—'Barring the *Purānas*, the *Smṛti of Manu*, and the *Itihāsas*, all other *Smṛtis*;—such as those of *Gautama*, *Vashiṣtha Shankha-Likhita*, *Hārīta*, *Āpastamba*, *Baudhāyana* and others, as also the works on *Gṛhya*,—are each studied exclusively by only certain sections of *Brāhmanas*, and each of these has its sphere restricted to a single *Veda*. For instance, the *Sutras* of *Gautama* and of *Gobhila* are accepted by the *Chhāndogya* (*Samavedin*) *Brāhmana* only; those of *Vashiṣtha*, by the *Ṛgvedin* only; those of *Shankha-Likhita* by the *Vājasameyin* (*Yajurvedin*) only;—and those of *Apastamba* and *Baudhāyana* by the *Kṛsna-Yajurvedin* only. It is a matter therefore for consideration whether the authority of these is universal or restricted!' (Tantra. Vā. Trs., pp. 244-245). (See below under Sū. 1.3.15-23).

The *Bhāsya* or the *Bṛhatī* does not state definitely what works are meant to be included under the name '*Smṛti*'.

With regard to *Itihāsas* and *Purānas*, *Kumārila* takes a liberal view. In all these works, direct Injunctions are found embodied in a mass of matter of a purely descriptive character; these latter are relegated to the category of '*Arthavāda*', being descriptive of acts done by good and bad men of ancient and modern times. These are regarded as *Arthavāda*, purely declamatory, because, if the stories found therein were really true, then, with reference to these at least, the injunction to recite would be useless, as no useful purpose could be served by the reciting of mere descriptions or stories; hence these have to be taken as implying the *praise or dispraise* of acts, and they need not therefore be taken as absolutely correct in regard to facts. In justification of this method of instruction adopted in *Itihāsas and Purānas*, *Kumārila* makes the following remarks (Tantra. Vā. Trs., p. 26):—'Guided as they were by the study of the Veda, *Vālmīki*, *Vyāsa* and others composed their works on the same lines as the *Veda*;

that is the reason why we find in the works of these writers many apparently useless stories and descripions,—as in the *Veda* and as those for whose benefit these works were intended were persons of varying degrees of intelligence, and of diverse tastes, it was only proper for them to introduce every kind of matter in their works, so that they might be of use to all men. Hence it is that in certain parts we find pure injunctions, while, in others, the Injunctions are interspersed with *Arthavādas*,—the sole motive for this diverse procedure lying in the making of the works attractive and useful to all men'.

As regards the authority attaching to these works, it has been held that some of the Injunctions contained in them are such as are based directly on the *Veda*, while some are based upon considerations of pleasure and pain as experienced in the world ;—among the *Arthavāda* or Declamatory passages also, some are those same that are found in the *Veda*, some are based on ordinary experience, and some are purely imaginary, like ordinary poetry ; but all these have an authority due to the fact that they eulogise enjoined acts and deprecate forbidden ones. As regards those passages that are not capable of being thus taken along with Vedic Injunctions or Prohibitions—some are such as give pleasure in the mere reading ; to this class belong such descriptions as those of the *Gandhamādana* and other sites ;—while others, descriptions of wars and battles serve the purpose of encouraging the brave as well as the coward, and thereby serve distinctly useful purposes for the kings of men. In those cases however where none of these explanations is possible,—e.g., in the Hymns addressed to Deities, —we assume an unseen trancendental result. Then again, the *Purānic* description of parts of the earth serves the purpose of distinguishing places fit for the due performance of religious and other acts. The history of families and races of men serves to differentiate the people of different castes and is based upon the memory of men and also on direct perception. The details as to measures of time and space are intended to regulate the ordinary practices of men ; so also the sciences of Astronomy and Astrology,—all these are based upon direct perception and mathematical calculation. The description of the future state of things serves to point out the character of the various periods of evolving time, and also the results of righteous and unrighteous conduct. These are based directly upon the *Veda*'. (Tantra. Vā. Trs., p. 119)

So far we have dealt with *Itihāsas* and *Purānas*. Now as regards the *Smṛtis* proper,—that is, those that constitute the '*Dharmashāstra*', five hypotheses are possible :—(1) That the author of these *Smṛtis* were totally mistaken in what they said. This view however has been rejected on the

ground that it is not compatible with the fact that all these works are excellent compilations containing useful teachings; and also on the ground that this assumption would necessitate further assumptions as to the stupidity of the people who have accepted these teachings. (2) The second possible hypothesis is that the assertions are based upon the personal obervations of the authors. This view also has been rejected, as it assumes, in the first place, the said 'observation', and, in the second place, the possession of those powers of observation by means of which they could make correct observations regarding *Dharma* which has been shown to be beyond the reach of the ordinary Means of Knowledge. (3) The third hypothesis is that the authors learnt what they have written from other persons,—their authority thus being based upon Tradition. This also has not been accepted, because in matters relating to *Dharma,* no trust can be reposed upon mere Tradition, which, in this case cannot be trustworthy. (4) The fourth hypothesis is that the Authors have intentionally put forward wrong teachings for the purpose of leading people astray. This hypothesis has been rejected bacause it involves a number of baseless assumptions, such, for instance, as a motive sufficiently strong to lead the writers to adopt this deceptive course, and also that people have allowed themselves to fall into the trap laid for them and so forth (5) All the above four hypotheses having been found to be unacceptable, the orthodox *Mimāmsaka* has put forward the view that the teachings contained in the *Smṛtis* are all based upon Vedic texts. This hypothesis necessitates only one assumption,—that of the existence, and the subsequent disappearance from our view, of such Vedic texts as are not found in the Veda-texts that are available at the present day. As a matter of fact, for most of the Injunctions contained in the *Smṛtis,* corroborative Vedic-texts are easily found; but there are some for whom we seek in vain for corroboration in the Vedic texts available to us; and with regard to these latter, it has been held that the Vedic texts corroborative of these also were well-known to the compilers of the *Smṛtis,* and have since become lost along with numerous Vedic Rescensional Texts no longer current.—Instead of compiling these Vedic Injunctions themselves, the Smṛti-writers had recourse to another method, because the order in which the Vedic Injunctions in question were found in the Veda was found, in the later degenerate times, to confuse the ordinary man; and so the writers set about arranging and classifying the various Duties and setting them forth in language more intelligible to the ordinary Householder,—(*Tantravārtika* Trs., pp. 112—114.)

As in the case of the *Itihāsa* and *Purāna,* so in that of the *Smṛti* also those portions that bear directly upon the Duties have their source in the

Veda ; while those bearing upon Pleasure, Pain, etc., are based upon ordinary experience ; and as for the stories that are met with here and there, they serve the purpose of the *Arthavāda*—commending the Good and condemning the Evil act.—(*Ibid.*)

The *Prābhākara* view of the trustworthy character of *Smṛtis* does not differ materially from the above except in regard to such *Smṛti-texts* as are neither injunctive nor prohibitive of action. On this point, says the *Prakaraṇapañchikā*—'The *Smṛti-texts* for which direct corroboration is not available are *inferred* as having such corroboration,—such Inference being based upon the long line of tradition represented by the *Smṛti-writers*, each of whom drew his information from predecessors, and so on and on from time immemorial, to eternity. This eternal corroboration of *Smṛtis* is proved in the same manner as the Eternality of the relationship between Words and their Denotations. (Pp. 100-101). Those *Smṛti-texts* however which do not *enjoin* or *prohibit* any action need not be regarded as authoritative on matters relating to *Dharma*. To this category belong the texts that speak, for instance, of the souls being born in vegetable bodies and so forth. In all these cases, the texts may be regarded as having meanings other than those directly expressed by them. (P. 150.)

(D) VEDĀṄGAS

As regards the *Vedāṅgas*, *i.e.*., the *Six Auxiliary Sciences*, *Kumārila* makes the following observations, in the *Tantravārtika* (Trs., pp. 199—122) :-

Among the Auxiliary Sciences, there are certain portions that treat of things useful in sacrificial performances, while other parts are useful only in the securing of some perceptible worldly purpose ; and these have their basis in ordinary experience. (1) In the *Shikṣā*, Phonetics, we find an account of the organs of Pronunciation, Accents and allied matters. These have their use in the correct recitation of Vedic hymns ; and such declarations as 'the *Mantras* recited with the wrong accent or wrongly pronounced injure the reciter' are based upon the Veda itself. (2) The *Kalpa-Sutra*, Ritualistic Science, contains explanations of the real import of the Injunctions deducible from the rules scattered about in the Veda ; and these have their source in these same Vedic texts. The rules of conduct laid down in the *Sūtras* for the guidance of the Priests are based upon considerations of general convenience. (3) *Vyākaraṇa*, Grammar, provides the knowledge of the correct and incorrect forms of words, and this serves a perceptible purpose, and has its basis in direct perception itself. (4) The case of the *Nirukta*, Philological Exigetics, is similar to that of *Vyākaraṇa*

and it serves the purpose of regulating the sense in which a word may be correctly used. (5) As regards *Chhandaḥ,* Prosody, the correct differentiation of the meters of *Mantras* serves a useful purpose in connection with the *Veda* and also with ordinary experience. (6) Lastly the Science of *Jyautiṣ,* Astronomy, provides the knowledge of dates and Asterisms, based upon mathematical calculations. These serve useful purposes in fixing the time for sacrificial performances. Astrology also, which is another phase of the same Science, is based upon the Veda itself, dealing as it does, with things 'unseen' and also the *future.* The Science of Architecture stands on the same footing as that of *Jyautiṣ.* The Science of *Mīmāmsā* is based partly on the *Veda,* partly on ordinary experience, and partly on Perception, Inference and other means of Knowledge; and like the other main Auxiliary Sciences, this also has been worked upon by a long continuous line of Teachers. The *Science of Reasoning* has its use in saving men from unrighteous paths. Based upon the Veda, in its three parts, *Injuction, Upaniṣads* and *Arthavāda,*—it points out the trend of the ordinary misconceptions from which unrighteous conduct proceeds,—not dogmatically, but in a manner calculated to bring conviction home to the sceptic; it begins with setting forth reasons available in support of conflicting views on a particular issue,—and then, after duly weighing the arguments for and against each view leads on to the correct final conclusion. If such standard typical reasoning were not available in collected form, ordinary men would find themselves at the mercy of any and every clever man that might come up to guide him; and there would be no standard by which to judge of the absurdness or otherwise of the various views and the reasons propounded in support of them.

As regards the philosophical hypothesis relating to the Origin of the world and such other matters, these have their source in ideas arising out of certain *Mantra* and *Arthavāda-texts,* and these Hypotheses serve to point out the general truth that the *Gross* has its source in the *Subtle.* And the use of all this lies in the due comprehending of the relation of Cause and Effect, without which the connection between the Act and its Results could not be grasped. The doctrines of Idealism, of *Perpetual Flux,* etc., etc., have all been propounded for the sole purpose of disuading people from cultivating an undue attachment to the things of the world.

Thus all the *Smṛtis* and the *Auxiliary Sciences* are authoritative; they derive their authority directly from the *Veda.* In the case of all these, we find two kinds of results depicted—those to appear in the very remote future, and those to appear immediately in the present; and the texts

pertaining to the former kind are based upon the *Veda,* while those relating to the latter kind have their basis in ordinary experience.

(E) CASES OF CONFLICT BETWEEN 'VEDA' AND 'SMṚTI'

The autority of *Smṛti* in general has been established; the next question that arises is in regard to the comparative authority of the *Smṛti* and the *Shruti* (*i.e.*, the Vedic text); or, as the question has been put in the *Sūtra-Bhāṣya,*—How are we to regard those *Smṛti-texts* which are found to be inconsistent with *Vedic* texts?

On this question also, as on every question bearing upon this part of the *Sūtra, Prabhākara* (Bṛhatī MS., p. 32) turns the *Prima Facie View* on to the authority of the Veda itself; he states it as follows:—"Where there is contradiction between a well-known *Vedic-text* and a *Smṛti-text*, and through this latter, between the former *Vedic-text* and the Vedic-text presumed as the basis of the *Smṛti-text,* the two must nullify one another; and when such is found to be the case with some Vedic-text, the *Universal* authority of the entire Veda becomes shaken."—The Established *Conclusion* is as follows:—In as much as the *Smṛti text* is not self-sufficient in its authority, needing as it does, corroboration by the *Vedic text,* presumed for certain reasons, whenever a *Smṛti-text* is found to be inconsistent with a *Vedic text* which is *well-known* and has not got to be presumed, there can be no justification for presuming a *Vedic text* contrary to the one already well-known; which presumption would lead to the nullification of both the *Vedic texts.* Hence when it comes to a choice between the *well-known Vedic text* on the one hand and the *Smṛti-text not* corroborated by any *presumed* Vedic text, on the other hand, there can be no hesitation in rejecting the latter in favour of the former. The two opposite courses of action laid down in the two conflicting texts cannot be regarded as optional alternatives; as such option is permissible only in cases where the two texts are possessed of equal authority. This condition is not fulfilled in the case in question, as the authority of the Vedic text is direct and self-sufficient, while that of the *Smṛti* is indirect and dependent upon corroboration by a presumed Vedic text. Hence the conclusion is that no authority can attach to a *Smṛti* which is in conflict with the Veda. (*Sūtra* 1.3.3.)

Sūtra 1.3.4. has been interpreted by the *Bhāṣya* in two ways:—By the first interpretation, it is made to supply a further argument in support of the conclusion arrived at in the preceding *Sūtra*: this further argument being that *Smṛti-texts* conflicting with *Vedic-texts* can have no authority as they are often found to have their source in the ignorance or greed of the officiating priests.

Under the *second* interpretation, the *Sūtra* (1.3.4.) is taken as a Topic by itself—dealing with such *Smṛti texts* as are not in conflict with any Vedic texts, but are found apparently to be due to the ignorance or greed of the priests. For instance, there is a *Smṛti-text* laying down that the cloth with which the Sacrificial Post has been covered is to be given away to the *Adhvaryu* Priest. The conclusion regarding such *Smṛti-texts* is that they have no authority at all. The *Bṛhatī* (MS., p. 32B) adds that what is denied here is, not the authority of all that may be found to have its source in the world of visible effects, but only the authority of those *Smṛti-texts* that claim to pertain to the world of invisible effects, and are yet found to have their source in visible facts. That is to say, the above-mentioned *Smṛti-text* laying down the giving away of the cloth to the Priest has nothing inherently untrustworthy in itself, so far as the mere act of giving is concerned, as bringing warmth to the recipient; but if the said *giving* be regarded as bringing about an invisible result in the shape of *Merit* for the giver, then its authority becomes vitiated by the fact that it has its source in the greed of the Priests.

The above interpretation of the last two Topics, by which many *Smṛti-texts* become deprived of their authority and reliability,—has not been accepted by *Kumārila;* with his orthodox instincts, he is not prepared to reject the authority of any *Smṛti-text.* In the *Tantravārtika* (Trs., pp. 154—163), he has shown that there is no real conflict involved in the instance cited in the *Bhāṣya;* and so long as there is no such conflict, there is every justification for presuming the existence of Vedic texts in corroboration of the Smṛti-texts concerned; and thus the two courses of action, one laid down in the *Vedic text* already available, and the other laid down in the *Smṛti-text* as corroborated by the presumed Vedic text —can be reasonabley regarded as optional alternatives. In accordance with this idea, Sū. 3 should be interpreted to mean that—'in a case where we find the *Vedic text* laying down one course of action, and the *Smṛti-text* another,—there being an apparent conflict between the two texts, it is desirable that *in practice* we should adopt the course laid down in the Vedic text'. This does not imply the rejection of the *Smṛti-text;* it lays down a *preference* for what is enjoined in the *Vedic-text;* and that too on the ground of this latter being independent of extraneous support and corroboration.

There is yet another interpretation of this Topic, suggested by *Kumārila* (Tantra. Vā. Trs., p. 165) :—The *Smṛtis* spoken of in the *Bhāṣya* as to be disregarded are not the *orthodox Smṛtis* compiled by *Manu* and

others, but those so-called 'Smṛtis' that have been compiled by the later Secessionists from the orthodox fold. It is interesting to note what *Smṛtis* have been placed by *Kumarila* under this latter category. (1) First of all, comes the compilation of certain texts bearing upon *Dharma* and *Adharma*, made by '*Shākya*', and by the propounders of the '*Saṅkhya*,' the '*Yoga*', the '*Pāñcharātra*', the '*Pāshupata*' and the like,—all of which have a certain amount of support of the *Veda ;* they derive strength from certain visible results unconnected with the *Veda,* and from arguments seemingly based upon Perception, Inference, Analogy and Presumption. Secondly, there are those compilations that lay down certain instructions with regard to the securing of livelihood, and treat also of certain incantations and recipes for the amelioration of diseases and other ills, the usefulness whereof is relied upon on the basis of success in a few stray cases. (3) Lastly, there are certain compilations known as '*Smṛti*' which lay down some of the most repugnant practices.

According to Murāri Mishra, the *Smṛti,* contrary to *Shruti,* is to be rejected ; he is in agreement with *Prabhākara,* not with *Kumārila.*—(MS., p. 51.)

Sūtras 1.3.5-7 according to *Shabora's* interpretation, embody an independent Topic, dealing with some other instances of conflict between *Veda* and *Smṛti.* Up to Sū.4, we had the treatment of such *Smṛti-text* as lay down acts to be done for the purpose of obtaining desired relusts. Sū. 5—7 deal with those *Smṛti-texts* which lay down such small acts as are performed, not for the purpose of accomplishing desired results, but only on certain occasions during the sacrificial performances. To this cateogory belong the *Smṛti-texts* laying down such acts as the wearing of the *Yajñopavīta* during sacrificial performances, using the *right hand at performances, the Rinsing of the mouth on certain occasions during the performances*, and so forth. The question that arises regarding these is—are the texts laying down these acts to be regarded as being in conflict with the *Veda ?* The *Prima Facie View* is as follows :—"They do conflict with what is laid down in the Veda ; and hence cannot be regarded as authoritative. For instance, when one rinses the mouth in course of a sacrificial performance, in obedience to the injunction contained in the *Smṛti,* he interrupts the sacrificial performance by introducing an act which does not form part of the performance as prescribed in the Veda."—The *Established View* is that the *Rinsing of the Mouth* is a positive act, while the *order of sequence* among the sacrificial details is only a qualifying factor of the act ; and when there is a conflict between an *Act* and a *qualifying factor,* it is only right

that the latter should make room for the former. Hence there is no real conflict in this case; hence the *Smṛti-text* need not be rejected.

On these *Sūtras* 5—7, *Kumarila* holds an entirely different opinion. Aoccording to him, none of the *Smṛti* rules cited in the *Bhāṣya* in this connection—that relating to the *rinsing of the mouth*, etc.,—is in conflict with any Vedic text. (Tantra-Vā. Trs., p. 178.)

He argues thus:—It is not quite correct to cite *the wearing of the Sacred Thread* (Yajñopavīta) as an act in conflict with the Vedic act. Because it has been already declared in the *Veda* in connection with the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* Sacrifices that the wearing of the Sacred Thread is a sign of godliness, and as such it has been laid down as a necessary accompaniment of the said sacrifice. The wearing of the Sacred Thread has also been laid down as a general rule in the *Kaṭha*-Recension of the *Yajur-Veda*, where it has been prescribed, not with reference to any particular sacrificial performance, but as a necessary accompaniment of all sacrificial performances, and also of Vedic Study. Similarly, with regard to the act of *Rinsing the mouth*, this act has been laid down in connection with the daily Vedic Study; and it is implied that it is to be done in connection with all utterances of Vedic texts; from which it clearly follows that it is a necessary accompaniment of the sacrificial performance itself.

From all this *Kumārila* concludes that these three Sūtras (5—7) do not embody a distinct Topic. He therefore proposes another interpretation of these three *Sūtras*. According to this interpretation, *Sūtras* 5 and 6 do not introduce a new Topic, they continue the consideration of the preceding Topic, bringing forward certain arguments for and against the Established Conclusion: and *Sūtra* 7 embodies a distinct Topic by itself. According to this interpretation, the sense of *Sūtras* 5 and 6 is as follows:—If the opponent argues that "a rule emanating even from a heretic should be accepted as authoritative when it is found that it is not contrary to the Veda,—such rules, for instance, as one should *tell the truth, be charitable* and so forth," (Sū. 5),—then we deny this, because the extent and number of authoritative scriptures is limited—(Sū. 6);—the *established conclusion* therefore is that *Dharma* can bring about its results only when it is understood with the help of those scriptures which are recognised as having their basis in the Veda. As for *Sūtras* 7, it stands by itself, embodying the Tpoic of the Authoritative Character of *Practices of Good Men;* the sense of the Conclusion as embodied in the *Sūtra* being that 'those acts which cannot be ascribed to any worldly motive, and which are yet done by Good Men, must be recognised as *Dharma*';—this would be the

Established View in answer the *Prima Facie View* that—"Many practices are found to be repugnant to the Veda, hence no authority should attach to Practice." The meaning of the Established View is that when, in regard to any particular Practice, we find that it is current among good men, and we cannot attribute it to greed or any such sordid motive, we should accept it as authoritative, as *Dharma.*

(See below, for a fuller account of this *Adhikaraṇa,* which is particularly interesting.)

There is another interpretation suggested by *Kumārila* of *Sūtras* 5—7 :—Under this interpretation, Sū. 5 is taken as part of the previous Topic, ending with Sū. 4, and Sū. 6 and 7 are taken as embodying the Topic of the Practices of Good Men ; under this interpretation Sū. 6 embodies the *Prima Facie View* that "Practices cannot be regarded as authoritative in matters relating to *Dharma,* because the number and extent of authorritative scriptures is restricted to the Veda and its auxiliary Sciences", —and the *Established View* is embodied in Sū. 7 in the sense described in the previous paragraph.

There is yet another interpretation suggested by *Kumārilā,* whereby all these three *Sūtras* 5, 6 and 7 are taken as embodying the *Established View* in answer to a *Prima Facie View* supplied from without, bearing upon the Practices of Good Men. The sense of these *Sūtras* in this case would be as follows :—'If the Practices of Good Men are not in conflict with what is taught in the *Veda* and in the *Smṛti,* such Practices can be regarded as authoritative in matters relating to *Dharma ;* but when there is the least thing repugnant to the teaching of the Veda, then, as there would be a conflict of authorities, the Practices cannot be regarded as having any authority at all'. (*Tantravārtika,* Trs., 173—203.)

Kumārila's treatment of the Topic of the *Practices of Good men* is specially interesting (*vide* Tantra. Vā Trs., pp. 182—200).It is as follows :-

In regard to the Practices of Good Men and their authority relating to *Dharma* the *Prima Facie View* is as follows :—

"In the Practices of Good Men we find frequent transgressions of *Dharma,* and also cases of daring excesses, as in the case of (1) *Prajāpati,* (2) *Indra,* (3) *Vashiṣṭha,* (4) *Vishvāmitra,* (5) *Yudhiṣṭhira,* (6) *Kṛṣṇadvaipāyana,* (7) *Bhiṣhma,* (8) *Dhṛtarāṣṭra,* (9) *Vāsudeva,* (10) *Arjuna* and others of old times, as also many good men of our own days. For instance,— (1) We find that *Prajāpati* fell in incestuous love with his own daughter, *Uṣā ;*—(2) *Indra,* and also *Nahuṣa* in his place, is said to have committed adultery ;—(3) *Vashiṣṭha,* when struck down with grief on the death of his

hundred sons, is said to have contemplated suicide, a terrible crime;—(4) *Vishvāmitra* helped a *Chāṇḍāla* to perform sacrifices;—(5) King *Purūravasa* contemplated suicide when *Urvashī* left him;—(6) *Kṛṣṇa-Dvaipāyna*, who was under the vow of life-long celibacy, begot sons on the wives of his young brother, *Vichitrarvīrya*;—(7) *Bhīṣma* led a life contrary to all caste-regulations, and committed an irregularity in performing sacrifices, though he was unmarried (and hence not entitled to perform sacrifices);—(8) *Dhṛtarāṣṭra*, though suffering from congenital blindness and hence not entitled to perform sacrifices, performed several sacrifices and that too with the wealth amassed by his brother Pāndu, to which he had no rightful claim;—(9) *Yudhiṣṭhira* treated as his wife the girl that had been won by his younger brother and told a base lie calculated to encompass the death of his Brāhmaṇa-teacher;—(10) *Vāsudeva* and *Arjuna* used to drink, even to excess. Among modern people also, we find Brāhmaṇa-ladies of *Ahichchhatra* and *Mathurā* addicted to wine; the people of the 'North' carry on the business of giving and accepting in gift, and buying and selling, lions, horses, mules, asses, camels and even animals with two rows of teeth; and they are also in the habit of eating in the same dish with their wives, children and friends,—the people of the 'South' marry the daughter of their maternal uncle, and partake of food while sitting upon chairs;—among the people of the 'North' as well as of the 'South', there are many such instances of gross transgression as the partaking of the remnants of food left by one's friends and relations, taking of beetles touched by men of all castes, not washing the mouth after meals, wearing clothes brought in directly from the back of the washerman's ass, socially associating with people guilty of the most heinous crimes. Then again the Practices of Good Men of various countries are at variance with one another; many of the Practices have their source in such perceptible causes as Greed and the like. Such practices certainly can have no authority on matters relating to *Dharma*. Lastly, those men are regarded as *Good* whose conduct is *Good*,—and again we regard such conduct *Good* which is practised by those men; thus there is an interdependance which leads us nowhere. As regards *Manu's* declaration that 'Practices of Good Men' are an authority on *Dharma*,'—we can place no reliance upon this; as the same writer includes 'Self-Satisfaction' also as such an authority; which is surely absurd. These cannot afford any standard for our conduct; as they are so completely at variance with one another. This declaration of *Manu* therefore must mean something different."

To the above indictment, *Kumārila* has offered the following answer, which embodies his *Established Conclusion* on this subject:—*When no motive can be detected, the Practices in question should be recognised as useful.* (Sū. 1.3.7). That is to say, when we find that certain acts are done by good men, and we cannot attribute them to any such perceptible motive as greed and the like, they should be accepted as *Dharma, as what should be done.* In fact, only those acts are to be regarded as *Dharma* which good men hold to be *Dharma* and do as *Dharma:* and this view has been held because the men who do them are the same persons who perform the sacrifices enjoined in the *Veda.* To this class belong such acts as—Charities, Telling Beads, Offering Libations into Fire, Making Offerings to Ancestors, Celebrations like the *Shakradhvaja* and other such festivites in connection with Temples, Keeping of certain observances by married girls, Illuminations, distributing sweet cakes and other foods, festivities on the seventh and thirteenth days of *Māgha* and the first day of *Phālguna,* on the advent of Spring. Authoritative writers of *Smṛti* admit of the generally authoritative character of such of these as are not repugnant to the teachings of the Veda. And this idea is based upon the fact that we can always assume Vedic texts in corroboration of these Practices on the ground of the performers of these being the same as those of the acts prescribed in the Veda. As a matter of fact, from time immemorial, it has been found that the Practices of Good Men are in keeping with the scriptures.

The 'good men' whose 'Practices' are meant here are those only who are inhabitants of *Āryāvarta*—the tract of land bounded by the Ocean on the East and on the West, by the Himālaya on the North and the Vindhya on the South. This limit has been inferred to be based upon the Vedic texts that speak of the 'Disappearance of the *Sarasvatī*' and 'the Dippings from the *Plakṣa-tree*',—the former expression referring to the place where the *Sarasvatī-satra* was commenced and the latter, where it was completed; and all this has been taken as indicating the tract round *Kurukṣetra,* in the plains of which the river *Sarasvati* is said to have disappeared.

These people are called 'good', not primarily on account of their good conduct, but on account of their being found to be acting always in accordance with the scriptures; when on this ground, they have acquired the reputation of being 'Good',—if they are found to do any other acts, in support of which Vedic texts are not available, it comes to be believed and presumed that the acts concerned must be righteous and good,—otherwise the 'good men' would not have done them.

'Self-satisfaction' also is an 'authority' ,only in the case of such men as have their mind steeped in Vedic lore and in the idea that only those acts are to be regarded as 'Dharma' which have been enjoined in the Veda. And the minds of such people cannot be 'satisfied' on the doing of what is wrong.

As regards of the specific instances of transgression by well-known great and good men that have been cited above,—in the first instance, the passages of the *Itihāsa* and *Purāṇa* that have been understood to be descriptive of the transgressions may have a totally different meaning; and secondly, the laws and rules whose transgressions have been cited may be meant only for ordinary men, and not for superhuman persons like Prajāpati and others ;—or thirdly, the acts may be justified on the ground that the persons concerned were superhuman beings and hence not subject to the same limitations of conduct as weaklier human agents ;—or fourthly, we may explain the said transgressions in such a way as to clear them of all repulsiveness.

The following explanations have been suggested :

(1) When 'Prajāpati' is spoken of as falling in love with his own daughter, the name 'Prajāpati' stands 'one who protects all creatures' ; and as such, it can be taken as standing for the *Sun ;* and it is an ordinary fact in nature that towards morning the *Sun* brings forth the Dawn which is named '*Uṣā*'.—and hence this Dawn or 'Uṣā' is his 'daughter', and the phenomenon of the Sun letting his rays fall on the Dawn has been figuratively spoken of as the male approaching the female.

(2) Indra has been described as the '*Jāra*'—Paramour—of 'Ahalyā' ; —now, the term 'indra' is derived from the root 'idi', *to shine*, and thus denotes *one who is resplendent ;* in this sense 'indra' becomes the name of the *Sun.* The *Sun* is the '*Jāra*'—not *paramour*, but the *destroyer*, in the literal sense of '*Jārayatināshayatī*'—of '*Ahalyā*',—which stands, not for a *lady*, but for the *Night*, in the literal sense of '*Ahani līyatē* 'disappearing during the day' ; when the Sun rises, the Night disappears ; and it is this natural phenomenon that is described as '*Indra*' (Sun) being the '*Jāra*' (destroyer) of 'Ahalyā' (Night).

(3) As regards *Nahuṣa*, it is true that when he attained the position of *Indra*, he made advances towards *Shachī*, Indra's wife ; but through

this misbehaviour, he fell from his exalted place and was born as a snake all which elearly shows that what he had done was wrong, *Adharma*. And so far as *Shachī* was concerned, she proved loyal to her husband and rejected the advances made by Nahuṣa, whereby her greatness and glory became enhanced, which shows that such constancy is *Dharma*.

(4) In the case of Vashiṣṭha, it is clear that what he did was due to excessive grief, and hence no one ever regards it as *Dharma*. It is only what the good men know to be *Dharma* and perform as such that is to be accepted as *Dharma*, while all those acts that are found to have been done even by Good Men need not necessarily be accepted as *Dharma*, when they are found to have been done under the undue influence of Anger, Grief, Greed, Delusion and the like.

(5) Similarly in the case of Vishvāmitra also, as he had reached a high degree of austerity, we may condone a few minor transgressions on his part according to the maxim that "For a powerful man every thing is wholesome"; or we may absolve him from blame on the ground that he was capable of throwing off the sin through penances. But for ordinary men such transgression would be irretrievably harmful and wrong.

(6) As regards *Kṛṣṇa-Dvaipāyana*, it was under his mother's orders that he begot children on the wives of his younger brother, related to him through his mother, in due accordance with scriptural injunctions. Even if his action involved transgression, it was thoroughly atoned by his severe austerities before and after the transgression.

(7) *Bhīṣma*—and *Rāma* also—performed sacrifices when they had no wife. Though both of them knew how essential it was to have the wife, associated with such performances, they did not have their wives, —Rāma not marrying a second wife on account of his great love for his first wife, and *Bhīṣma*, not marrying at all, because of his great regard for his father to whom he had promised that he would never marry;—and as both of them had paid their debt to their ancestors—*Rāma* through his sons, and *Bhīṣma* through the sons of his Mother,—there was no moral impediment to their performance of sacrifices. Then again, it has to be borne in mind that *Rāma* kept by him at the sacrifice, a golden image of *Sītā*, because through his great regard for public opinion, he could not have Sītā herself, and through his anxiety to show his regard for Sita herself he did not take another wife to himself. As regards *Bhīṣma*, the text of *Manu* lays down that if 'among several uterine brothers, even one gets a son, all the rest became *endowed with*

sons, through that one son' (Manu, 9.182); so that he became *endowed with sons* through the sons of his brother *Vichitarvīrya;* (and under the circumstances, if he had married a wife, that would have been only for the purpose of carnal pleasure);—and yet, for aught we know, he may have married a wife for fulfilling the conditions of the sacrificial performances; as it is inconceivable that a man, who was so scrupulous regarding *Dharma* that he refused to hand over at Gayā the offering to his Father into the latter's own hands (when he appeared before him in person), in obedience to the scriptural injunction that the offerings at Gayā must be offered *on the Ground*, should have committed such a blunder as to perform sacrifices without having his wife by him. (See Mahābhārata—*Anushāsana Parva*, 84.)

(8) As regards *Dhṛtarāṣṭra*—We find it related in the *Āshcharya-parva* that through Vyāsa's favour, he obtained his powers of vision for the purpose of looking up on his sons; and from this we should be justified in presuming that through the same agency, he was able to see when the sacrifices were being performed, so that he could not suffer from the disqualification of congenital blindness. Or the 'Sacrifices' that have been attributed to *Dhṛtarāṣṭra* may be taken as standing for charities and other righteous acts.

(9) The irregular matrimonial life of the five *Pāṇḍavas* has been explained by Vyāsa himself. *Draupadī* appeared in the full bloom of youth out of the sacrificial altar; and as such she is the Goddess of Wealth herself, who does not become trained by associating with several persons; He has described her also as becoming younger day by day;—all which goes to show that she was not an ordinary human being; she was super-human, and hence her actions are not to be judged by the ordinary standard of human proprieties. It is for this reason that Kṛṣṇa himself promised to *Karṇa*—who was a brother of the *Paṇḍavas*—that *Draupadī* would go to him on the sixth day, after having been with the *Pāṇḍavas* for five days. If it were not for this super-human character of the Lady, how could such a righteous person as Kṛṣṇa himself have made such an atrocious proposal?—Another explanation of Draupadī's case is that there were five distinct ladies; but they were all so much alike that they came to be known by a common name. The third explanation is that she was the wife of *Arjuna* alone by whome she had been won; and yet she is spoken of as being the wife of all the brothers, only with a view to show that there was not the slightest disagreement among the five brothers. Her super-

human character is further emphasised by the fact that, when dragged to the Assembly of Kings, though she was not really in her courses, yet, on the spur of the moment she made herself appear so, with a view to expose the action of *Dhṛtarāsṭra* and his sons in the worst light. Her character of *Lakṣhmī* too becomes fully recognised when she is regarded as the wife of *Arjuna* alone, who, in his previous life was *Nara*, the counterpart of *Nārāyaṇa* (Viṣṇu). The *Brahma-vaivarta Purāna* (*Prakṛitikhaṇḍa*) provides another supernatural explanation : Under Shlo. 58. Adhyāya 14, it says that in childhood Sītā, being eager to obtain a husband, asked it as a boon from *Shiva :* and in her eagerness she repeated the request five times,—Shiva took her at her word and said she would have five husbands ; it was thus Sītā, who in her next life, was born as *Draupadī.*

(10) Thus too as regards the action of *Yudhisṭhira* in telling a lie to encompass the death of his teacher, some authorities have declared that Expiatory Rites can be performed even when the reprehensible act has been done intentionally ; and as the Rites prescribed for this particular transgression consist of the *Ashvamedha* sacrifice, and *Yudhisṭhira* did perform this sacrifice,—all this shows that he recognised it as *sinful* as *Adharma,* not as *Dharma ;* hence the act cannot be included among the 'Practices of Good Men'.

(11) Then there remains the case of *Kṛṣṇa* and *Arjuna* being drunk with wine and having married the daughters of their respective maternal uncles,—both being instances of direct transgression of the Law. In this connection it has to be borne in mind that it is only wine distilled from *grains* that is called '*Surā*', and it is '*Surā*' that has been forbidden for the three higher castes. As for wine distilled from grapes and other fruits —which is called '*madhu*',—and that distilled from molasses—which is called '*Sīdhu*', —these have not been forbidden for the *Kṣhatriya* and the *Vaishya,* and it is for the *Brāhmaṇa* alone that all 'intoxicating drinks' have been forbidden. Thus the drinking of *Madhu*—wine distilled from grapes,—by *Kṛṣṇa* and *Arjuna* cannot be regarded as a transgression of the Law. There are Vedic texts also which show that the drinking of wine in general is forbidden for the *Brāhmaṇa* only, and that the *Madhu* and the *Sīdhu* are not forbidden for the *Kṣhatriya* and the *Vaīshya.* As regards *Kṛṣṇa* and *Arjuna* having 'married their maternal cousins',—such relationships are often mentioned even in cases where there is no real blood-relationship ; hence it is possible that *Kṛṣṇa* and *Arjuna* have been spoken of 'cousins' simply on account of their close friendship. Though *Subhadrā* has been spoken as *Kṛṣṇa's*

'sister', yet we know only three persons—*Balarāma, Kṛṣṇa* and *Ekānaṁshā** —who have been named as uterine brothers and sisters (*vide* Mahābharata—Vana—217 ; 7-8) ; which shows that *Subhadrā* was probably only a distant cousin of Kṛṣṇa's, not his *sister*,—and not a child of *Vasudeva's*, in which latter case alone she could have been *Arjuna's* maternal cousin. It was in fact impossible for such a universally respected person as Kṛṣṇa to have countenanced such a marriage if it had been incestuous. These same remarks apply also to *Kṛṣṇa's* marriage to *Rukmiṇī* who is said to have been his 'cousin'.

In regard to all such transgressions, another explanation has also been suggested. It is argued that the *Smṛti* is based upon the Veda, so also is the '*Practice of Good Men*' ; and the authority of both is independent ; hence whenever there is conflict between the two, the two courses of action concerned should be regarded as optional alternatives, and neither need be regarded as unrighteous.

This however is not right ; because in the scale of comparative authoritativeness, the place of 'Practice of Good Men' is below that of '*Smṛti*' ;

**Ekānamshā*—

Mahābhārata, Vana p. Ch. 217, 7-8.

महा खेल्लांगिरसी रीप्तिमत्सु महामते महामतीतिविख्याता सप्तमी कथ्यते सुता ।
यां तु दृष्टा भगवतीं जनः कुहुसुहायते । एकानंशेतितामाहुः कुहुमङ्किरसः युताम् ॥

The Goddess *Nidrā*—योगमाया विष्णु—born as the daughter of Yashodā and Nanda, exchanged for Kṛṣṇa, according to Chapter 60 of *Harivamsha*, was called *Ekānamshā :*

सा कयावदधे तत्र वृष्णिसद्मनि पूजिता । पुत्रवत् पाल्यमानसा देवदेवाज्ञया तदा ।
विद्धि चैना थोत्पन्नामंशादेवीं प्रजापतेः । एकानंशां योगकन्यां रक्षार्थं केशवस्य च ॥

Bṛhat-samihitā of Varāhamihira, Ch. 58, W. 37—39.

एकानंशादेवी कार्या बलदेवकृष्णयोर्मध्ये—That is, in installing the Ima in temples.

In the *Harivamsha*, Chs. 166, 168 and 178 we find that the *Yādaras* invoked her aid in times of difficulty p. 47 U. 2.

Brahma-Purāṇa (Ch. 57) calls the central figure in the triad in the temple of Jagannātha at Puri 'Subhadrā' but gives her *namskāra mantra* thus—

नमस्ते सर्वगे देवि नमस्ते शुभसौख्यदे । त्राहि मां पद्मपत्राक्षि कात्यायनी नमोऽस्तुते ।

identifying her with *Kātyāyanī*, that is *Ekānamshā*—[*Ekānamshā* and Subhadrā'—by Jogendranatha Ghosh—J.R.A.S.B. Vol. II pp. 41—46 and plate 7.]

so that when there is conflict between the two the 'Practice' has to go to the wall.

In connection with this subject one important consideration has been urged. *Āpastamba* has clearly asserted that certain acts are not permitted in one part of the country, while they are quite permissible in another. This leads to the conclusion that such 'Practices' would be not *sinful*, only for those persons whose fore-fathers have been used to them; and yet they would be avoided by other people. This explanation also cannot be very helpful; because *Gautama* has declared that "All Practices contrary to the Scriptures are unauthoritative." It might be argued that the 'Scriptures' meant here are the *Vedas*, not the *Smṛtis*. But this is not correct; because the term 'Scripture' includes the *Veda* as well as the *Smṛtis*. It is impossible for us, therefore, to accept the authoritative character of such Practices as are contrary to the *Smṛti-law* laid down by Manu and others. (*Tantra-vārtika.*)

It is interesting to note that the several interpretations of Sūtras 3—7, propounded by *Kumārila*, have not been noticed by *Prabhākara*.

(F) Exact Signification of Certain Words.

It has been established that the *Veda* and the *Smṛti* (and also the *Practices of Good Men*, according to *Kumārila*) are the authoritative means of knowing *Dharma*. Under *Sūtras* 1.3.8-9, Jaimini has taken up the subject of the right comprehension of the correct meaning of the texts that constitute the 'Veda' and the Smṛti'. This question arises because there is an element of uncertainty in regard to the exact signification of certain words which are used in one sense among one set of people and in an entirely different sense among others.

The words selected for discussion under this head are the following: —(1) "*Yava*'—used in the sense of *Barley-corn* among some people, and in that of *Long pepper* among others. (2) '*Varāha*'—stands for the *Hog* among some people, and for the *Black Bird* among others. (3) '*Vetasa*' is used by some people for the *Bañjula-creeper*, and by others for the *Black-berry*. (*Shabora*, Trs., p. 100.)

The question is that when words like these occur in the Veda or in the Smṛti, in which sense are they to be understood.

The *Prima Facie View* is that—"Since both the meanings are found to be signified by the word, the acceptance of the one or the other is a matter of option."

The *Established View* is that—*that meaning is to be regarded as more authoritative in which the word is used by persons who take their stand on the Scriptures because it is more reliable than the other.* (Su. 1.3.8).

Shabara (Trs., p. 101) has found indications among Vedic texts themselves, lending support to one or the other of the two meanings attributed to the words. For instance, (1) in regard to the word *Yava,* he finds support for its denoting the *Barley-corn* in the Vedic text which speaks of the '*Yava-plant*' as 'flourishing while other plants whither away',—which description is applicalbe to the *Barley-corn,* not to the *Long-pepper.* (2) Similarly in regard to the '*Varāha*', the sense of *Hog* is supported by the Vedic text which speaks of 'cows running after the *Varāha*' (*Shatapatha* Br. 4.4.3. 19), and it is the Hog not the Black Bird that is pursued by Cows. (3) In regard to the word '*Vĕtasa*', the sense of *Bañjula-creeper* is supported by the Vedic text which speaks of the *Vĕtasa* as 'water-born', which epithet can apply to the *Bañjula-creeper,* not to the *Black-Berry.*

Kumārila demurs to the above interpretation of *Sūtras* 8-9; on the following grounds—(T.V., p. 207). In the case of all the three words cited by the *Bhāṣya,* the significations that have been sought to be supported by means of scriptural texts are such as are already accepted to be the most authoritative, even according to common usage. In fact, in no counry in the world is the word '*Yava*' used, in common usage, in the sense of *Long-pepper;* nor is the word '*Vĕtasa*' anywhere actually used in the sense of the *Black-berry,* or the word '*Varāha*' in the sense of *Black-Bird.* It is not right therefore to base our discussion upon these words. Then again, as for determining the correct significations of words the *Sūtras* under I. 4 have laid down several guiding principles.

The present Sūtras 8 and 9 should therefore be explained somewhat differently as follows:—The question arises—when we find that there is difference in the usages of the '*Ārya*' and the '*Mlĕchchha*',—are both equally authoritative? Or is one more authoritative than the other? The *Prima Facie View* is that in regard to visible things—and even in relation to *Dharma*—the authority of the 'Ārya' usage and that of the '*Mlĕchchha*' usage are equal.—The *Established Conclusion* is that *What is supported by the Scriptures is more authoritative* (Sū. 9); so that the usage of the *Ārya* is more authoritative than that of the *Mlechchha.* In fact, the inhabitants of *Āryāvarta* take their stand upon the Scriptures; hence their notions alone can have any authority in matters of such significations of words as appertain to *Dharma* and its accessories; and even among those people themselves, we should accept that sense in which the word is used by one who is more learned

in and more conversant with the Scriptures, in preference to those sanctioned by the usage of people less learned in them. (Tantra. Vā. Trs., p. 209).

(G) CONFLICT BETWEEN SMṚTI AND USAGE.

Kumārila has put forward a third interpretation of these same *Sūtras* 8 and 9; by which they are made to deal with cases of conflict between *Smṛti* and *Usage*. The *Prima Facie View* is *that —inasmuch as both have their basis in the Veda, the contest between them is equal.* (Sū. 9). Just as the authority of the *Smṛti* rests upon the fact of its being based upon the Veda, so too does that of *Usage ;* hence there can be no difference between the two in point of authority. We may even go further and assert that Usage is more authoritative than *Smṛti ;* because its effects, in the shape of action, are more easily perceptible—The *Established Conclusion* is as follows ;—*Smṛti* is more authoritative than Usage, because it is based directly upon the Veda ; it leads directly to the inference of its corroborative Vedic-text ; while in the case of *Usage*, the first necessary inference is that of the corroborative *Smṛti ;* and it is in support of this inferred *Smṛti* text that the corroborative *Vedic* text is inferred ; so that the support of the *Veda* for *Usage* is one step further removed than that in support of the *Smṛti* itself. Then again, the *Smṛti* has been compiled by persons well-known as steeped in Vedic lore, which fact lends strength to their work. In the case of *Usage* on the other hand, its exact source is always indefinite and unascertainable ; which fact weakens its authority. (*Tantravārtika*—Trs., pp. 208—212.)

There is yet another interpretation of *Sūtras* 8 and 9 by *Kumārila*—(*Tantravārtika*—Trs., p. 212.)

There are certain words which are found to signify one thing in the Vedic texts, and another thing in common parlance. Such words are (*a*) '*trivṛt*'—in the Veda it is found to convey the idea of *nine*, while in common parlance it stands for *three-fold ;*—(*b*) ''*Charu*'—in the Veda, denotes *cooked Rice*, while in common parlance it denotes the *Saucer ;*—(c) '*Ashva-bāla*' —in the Veda, stands for *Reed*, while in common parlance, it stands for *Horse-hair*. The question is—In every one of such cases, which is the meaning that should be regarded as authoritative and right ?—The *Prima Facie View* is that—""In as much as the two denotations are different, and as both are equally well-apprehended, the two significations should be regarded as equally right and hence to be treated as optional alternatives ; —the sentence containing these words may be construed to convey either the one or the other of the two ideas ;—Or, in reality, as common parlance always comes to one's knowledge long before the reading of the Veda, the former should be regarded as having superior authority."—The *Established*

Conclusion however is that that signification of the word which is based upon the Scriptures is decidedly the more authoritative of the two ; specially in the sphere of *Dharma*. (*Tantra. Vā* Trs., pp. 212—216.)

(H) Words Current Among Mlechchhas.

We find certain words—used even in the Veda,—regarding the exact signification of which we find no guidance in the scriptures ; nor are they found to be current among the *Āryas*, in *Āryāvarta ;* they are found to be current among *Mlechchhas*, Foreigners. Such cases cannot be dealt with according to the conclusion arrived at in Sū. 9, as there is no 'usage' of the *Arya* available here.

'*Pika*', *Nema*', '*Sata*', '*Tāmarasa*' are the words cited in *Bhāṣya* (Trs., p. 103) in this connection. In regard to these, there arises the question—Of these words, are we to deduce their meaning from their Etymology, etc., with the help of Grammar and Lexicons ? Or should we accept that as their meaning in which sense they are used among *Mlechchhas* ? (*Bhāṣya*). The *Second* question to be considered is—Is greater authority to be attached to the meaning deduced from the Etymology of the world or to that indicated by *usage* among *Mlechchhas* ? (Tantravā. Trs., p. 217).

The *Prima Facie View on* these questions is as follows :—"What has so far been established as authoritative and reliable is the *usage* of the '*Shiṣṭa*', the *cultured people ;* hence in the case of the words cited, we should deduce some sort of meaning from their Etymology ; and no reliance should be placed upon the meaning attached to them in the *usage* of *uncultured* people, who are not careful in the use of words. (*Bhāṣya*). And it follows from this that the meaning deduced from the Etymology of the word is to be accepted as more authoritative than that indicated by Mlēchchha-usage ; specially because even though this would be a newly-assumed signification, yet, as being based upon *Scriptures* (Grammartical), it must be held to be more authoritative and reliable. Further, in the first place, it may be possible to hunt-up *Ārya-usage* itself in the vast land of *Āryāvarta*, which is a well-defined tract. The recourse to Etymology and the Commentaries and Lexicons would prove the usefulness of these works, which would not be very useful in connection with words whose meaning is alrady known directly through *usage* itself. Lastly, as Mlechchhas may not have any regard for *Dharma*, it is not unlikely that they may have purposely distorted the meanings of words. From all this the conclusion is that the words current in a certain sense among Mlechchhas, when used in the Veda or among *Āryas*, should not be taken in the sense attached to them in Mlechchha-usage,—their meaing should be deduced from their Etymology."

The *Established Conclusion* on this question is as follows :—*The meaning that has been imparted to a word, even by the Mlechchha—would be duly comprehended and should be regarded as sanctioned by the authority of the Veda; as it is not incongruous.* (Sū. 10). That is, the meaning that has been imparted to a word,—even by uncultured people,—though not known among cultured people,—would be comprehended, and it would not be right to reject what has been comprehended and which is not incompatible with any authority. Due authority may not attach to *Mlechchha-usage* in matters relating to *Dharma* and other supersensuous things ; but these are certain common things in regard to which the Mlechchhas are more expert and reliable than the *Āryas* ;—such things for instance, as the *rearing and catching of birds.* As regards the Lexicons and Commentaries, these will still have their use in the determining of the meaning of such words as are not known or understood even among Mlechchhas. Lastly, if the meanings of words are to be deduced from their Etymology, then there would be no certainty or definiteness attaching to their signification. The right conclusion is that in such cases, the usage of the Mlechchhas should be accepted ; so that the word *'pika'* should be taken to mean the *Cuckoo,*—the word *'nema'* should be understood to mean *half,*—the word *'sata' in* the sense of the *round-topped wooden-vessel with a hundred holes,*—and the word *'tāmarasa'* in the sense of *Lotus ;* such being the usage among the Mlechchhas—(*Bhāṣya,* pp. 103-104.)

While it is true that *Ārya-usage* is more authoritative and reliable than *Mlechchha-usage,* this does not mean that the latter is to be rejected even in cases where the former is not available at all. (Tantra-Vā. Trs. p. 221.). Then again, *Ārya-usage* is to be regarded as more reliable only in matters relating directly to *Dharma ;* not necessarily in regard to worldly matters, such as Agriculture and the like ; where all Established Usage is equally reliable. It is only in the case of words where we fail to find any usage at all—either among *Āryas* or among *Mlechchhas,*—that we would be compelled to have recourse to the assuming of their meanings through Etymological Explanations provided by the *Nirukta* and other works. Though such assumptions would be diverse and confused, yet they have to be accepted under certain circumstances. (*Tantravārtika,* Trs., p. 222.)

(I) Authority of Kalpa-Sūtras.

Sutras 1—3. 11—14 consider the authoritative character of the body of *Smṛti-rules* known under the name of *'Kalpa-Sūtra'.* A distinction is made between these and *Smṛtis* in general which have been dealt with

before, on the ground that while the *Kalpa-Sutras* formulate the rules of Sacrificial Procedure exactly as laid down in the Vedic texts still available, the *Smṛtis* in general are compilations based *presumably* upon Vedic texts, many of which are not now traceable, and whose existence can only be *inferred*. (See above). For this reason, the authority of the *Kalpa-Sūtras* cannot be made to depend entirely upon the arguments adduced in support of the authority of *Smṛtis* in general. And yet the present discussion is necessary because even though the *Kalpa-Sūtras* contain nothing that cannot be found in the Vedic texts, yet as compilations, they are the work of human authors, and to this extent, their reliability is open to doubt.

Kumārila has explained the term '*Kalpa*' in this connection as standing for 'the method and procedure of sacrifices in the form of definite regulations and treatises where these Rules are set forth in detail.' (*Tantra-Vā.* Trs., p. 224.)

Kumārila has evidently drawn a distinction between '*Kalpa*' and '*Kalpa-Sūtra*'; as under '*Kalpa*'—which contain the bare statement of the Rules, without any explanations and embellishments—he names as compilers, *Bhudhāyana*, *Varāha* and *Mashaka*; while as authors of the '*Sūtras*', he names *Āshralāyana, Vaijavāpi, Drāhyāyaṇi, Lātīya* and *Kātyayana*. The *Bhaṣya* (Trs., p. 105) has mentioned the name of *Mashaka, Hastika* and *Kauṇḍinya*.

Kumarila justifies the separate treatment of *Kalpa-Sūtras* on the following grounds :—Under the discussion on *Smṛtis* in general, the chief argument against their authority lay in the fact of the *Smṛtis* and being based upon the *Veda*; and this could not be urged against the *Kalpa-Sūtras*, because the Vedic texts in support of these are directly available. For this reason they could not be dealt with along with *Smṛtis* in general. Then again, under the present Topic we are not going to discuss the authoritative character of the *Kalpa-Sūtra*; because there can be no doubt on that point; all that we proceed to consider is—Is the authority of the *Kalpa-Sūtras* independent and self-sufficient, like that of the Veda—or do they also derive their authority from the Veda ? As a matter of fact, as regards this question, the *Smṛtis* in general also may be included in the present Topic, just as the *Kalpa-Sūtras* may be taken as included under the previous Topic dealing with *Smṛtis* in general. (*Tautravā.* Trs., p. 225.)

The *Prima Facie View* in regard to the *Kalpa-Sūtras* is that they are as independent and self-sufficient in their authority as the Veda itself; and when they declare *all days* fit for the performance of *Darsha-Sacrifice*

[while the *Veda* has declared the *Moonless Day* alone as fit for it], it should be permissible to perform the sacrifice on *all days.*—The *Established Conclusion* however is that, in view of the fact that the *Kalpa-Sūtras* only repeat in more intelligible language what is found to have been already mentioned in the Vedic texts still available, there can be no doubt regarding their authority and reliability; but at the same time, that authority and reliability cannot be self-sufficient; as such authority can belong only to such Scriptures as are independent of human authorship, which the Vedas alone *are*, and the *Kalpa-Sūtras are not.* Says *Probhākara* (*Bṛhatī* MS., p. 33b.): 'It is not possible that what proceeds from a human source should be self-sufficient in its authority, and it is well-known that the *Kalpa-Sūtra* is the work of human authors.'

Kumārila has offered several other interpretations of these four *Sūtras* 1.3.11—14. (a) Under the first of these, he has included the *Smṛti* in general also under this Topic—as we have pointed out above,—and has come to the comprehensive conclusion that *No Smṛti is* self-sufficient in its authority—neither the *Kalpa-Sūtras* nor the *Smṛtis* so-called. (b) Under another interpretation, he takes the Topic as referring to the *Vedāṅgas* —the Subsidiary Sciences—*Shikṣā* ,*Kalpa*, *Vyākaraṇa*, *Nirukta*, *Chhandas* and *Jyautiṣa.* (c) Under yet another interpretation, the Topic is taken as referring to the so-called '*Smṛtis*' of the *Buddha* and others. He thus includes under these four *Sūtras* 1.3.11—14,, four questions—(1) Are the *Kalpa-Sūtras* self-sufficient in their authority ?—(2) are the *Kalpa-Sūtras* and other *Smṛtis* so self-sufficient ?—(3) Are the *Subsidiary Sciences* so self-sufficient ?—(4) Are the Buddhist and other heterodox *Smṛtis* so self-sufficient ?

With the (1) we have already dealt above.

As regards (2) and (3)—the *Prima Facie View* is that real self-sufficient authority cannot be denied to them; because they have been universally accepted as '*Dharmashāstra*'—'Scripture dealing with Dharma'; which name includes *Kalpa-Sūtra, Smṛtis and Vedāngas.* As a matter of fact also, nothing that is taught in these is contrary to or repugnant to any Vedic texts. These should therefore be regarded either as *Veda* itself or equal to Veda in authority. They are as eternal also as the Veda; as we cannot trace them to any beginning in time. The conclusion therefore must be that all these have an authority that is independent and self-sufficient, and they do not stand in need of the support and intercession of the Veda. (*Tantra-Vā.* Trs., pp. 229—231.) The *Established Conclusion* on this Topic (as set forth in *Tantra-Vā.* Trs., pp. 237 et. seq.) is as follows:

—In the case of all *Smṛits and Subsidiary Sciences,*—in as much as we have distinct knowledge of their authors, they cannot be accepted as independent and self-sufficient "Scriptures' bearing upon *Dharma.* The *Bhāṣya* (Trs., p. 106) has advanced against the *Kalpa-Sūtra,* the fact that there is no 'accentuation' in it and hence it cannot be treated on the same footing as the Veda. *Kumārila* (*Tantra-Vā.,* p. 239) takes exception to this argument ; he remarks—This argument would apply also to the case of the *Mantras* that are quoted *in etenso* in the *Kalpas ;* as also to the *Chhāndogya-Brāhmaṇa* texts prescribed in the *Gṛhya-Sutras,*—which latter also would have to be denied real scriptural authority ; because the eight *Brāhmaṇas* with their esoteric Explanations, which are studied by the *Sāmavedis,* have got no definite accentuation and (according to the *Bhāṣya*) this absence of accentuation would deprive them of their 'Vedic' character. The only sound argument, according to *Kumārila,* against the self-sufficient authority of the *Kalpa-Sūtras,Smṛtis* and the *Subsidiary Sciences,*l ies in the absence, in them, of the self-evident *Eternality* and *independence of human agency*—which are found pre-eminently in the Veda alone. (*Tantra-Vā.* Trs., p. 239.)

Kumārila proceeds to point out (p. 240) that though according to Kātyāyana's declaration—'The Injunction, the Enjoined, the Argumentation of the *Mīmāmsā.* all constitute the Veda' though the name Veda becomes applicable to the *Mimāmsā,* yet this has never been treated as *Veda* proper. Similar should be the case with the works under consideration. Under Sū. 14 (*Tantra-Vā.* Trs., pp. 242-243) *Kumārila* has also cited an instance where what is stated in the *Kalpa-Sūtras,* etc., is in conflict with the Veda..

Now remains the fourth question included under the Topic, by which *Kumārila* (see above) has taken the *Sūtras* 11-14 as bearing upon the authority of the So-called *Smṛti* of the Buddha and others.

The *Prima Facie View* on this question has been stated thus (in the *Tantra-vārtika* Trs., p. 232) :—"Even though the teachings of Buddha and others may not be regular *Smṛti,* yet it cannot be denied that they embody the 'Scripture of Action', 'Moral Code', *Prayogashāstra*' (Sū. 11) ; and in this character, these also may be regarded as '*Veda*'. These scriptures also may be proved to be *eternal* by means of those same arguments that have been used to prove the Eternality of the *Veda* itself ; hence like the Veda, these also are self-sufficient in their authority. Again, being, like the Veda, *not* the work of a *human* author, they are free from all the defects due to that origin. Though it bears the name of 'Buddha' and other

persons, that only shows that these persons have *expounded* thete achings, which themselves are Eternal ;—just as has been argued in regard to the names, '*Kaṭhaka*' and others found in the Veda. In fact, all the arguments that have been advanced in support of the self-sufficient authority of the *Veda* can be put forward in favour of the Buddhist and other Scriptures also."

The *Established Conclusion* as contained in the *Sūtras* is as follows: (*Tantra-Vā.*, Trs., pp. 232—237) :—

By asserting the Eternality of his Scriptures, the Buddhist would go directly against his main thesis that all things are in a *perpetual flux* and there is nothing that is lasting. Thus being deprived of *Eternality*, these teachings must be dependent upon the trustworthy character of the Teachers themselves ; and the word of any *person* cannot have independent authority in regard to matters relating to *Dharma*. The reason for this lies in '*asanniyama*' (Sū. 12)—*i.e.*, in the fact of their declaration that all things are evanescent ;—or because they are full of incorrect words and expressions.

(J) Extent and Sphere of the Authority of Customs.

Sūtras 1.3.15—23 *Holakādhikaraṇa.*

Kumārila has established the authority of Custom and Usage—*i.e.*, Practices of Good Men, under *Sutra* 1.3.7. (See above)—in a general way. The question raised and dealt with under Sū. 15—23 is in regard to the extent and sphere of the authority of Customs.

As a matter of fact, it has been found that there are certain customs that are observed by 'Eatserners' ; there are others that are peculiar to the 'Southerners', and so forth. The question is—is the authority of these Customs limited and local, restricted to definite localities—or is it *universal*, like that of the Veda ? The idea underlying this discussion is that these Customs—if at all authoritative, in howsoever a limited manner,—must owe that authority ultimately to Vedic texts ;—it is argued therefore that if Customs have only local authority, then the Vedic texts upon which they may be based should also have only limited authority, and thus the very keystone of the *Mīmāmsaka's* position—the *universal* authority of the Veda—becomes shaken. The *Established Conclusion* on this question is as follows :—The Vedic Injunctions assumed in support of these Customs cannot be qualified by any specifications of time and place ; firstly because the specifications generally spoken of are in such terms as 'among *Easterners*', 'among *Southerners*' and so forth ; and these terms are purely relative ; so that what is 'Eastern' for one man may be 'Western' for another,—and secondly because the Customs in question are not found to be observed by

all men of any limited area: nor are they found to be *not* observed by all persons of other areas. Says *Prabhākara* (*Bṛhatī*. MS., p. 34):—

"There being no fixity attaching to any specification, no limitation is possible. That there is no fixity is proved by the fact (1) that the Injunction (assumed in the Veda) cannot impose any such restriction, as all that an Injunction can do is to lay down that a certain act *should be done*,—and (2) that the names of the Customs themselves, '*Holāka*' and the rest, cannot indicate any such restriction, as all that they indicate is a certain *Act*;—and that (3) there is nothing else that could specify any place or time."

Kumārila (*Tantravārtika*, Trs., p. 244) has taken these *Sūtras* as bearing upon the question of *localised* or *universal* authority of the *Gṛhyasūtras* and such *Smṛti-Sūtras* as those of Gautama, and the like. As a matter of fact, we find that bearing the *Itihāsas* and Purāṇas and the *Smṛti* of *Manu*, all other *Smṛti-works*,—such as those of *Gautama*, *Vashiṣtha*, *Shaṅkha-Likhata*, *Hārīta*, *Āpastamba*, *Baudhāyana* and others—as also the Sūtras on *Gṛhya*, —are studied and follwed exclusively by only certain sections of Brāhmaṇas, and each of them has its scope restricted to one particular Veda. For instance, the Sūtras of *Gautama* and *Gobhila* are followed by the *Chhandogya* (*Sama-Vedin*) Brāhmaṇa only; those of *Vashiṣṭha*, by the *Ṛgvedins* only; those of *Shankha* and *Likhita*, by the *Vājasanēyins*; those of *Āpastamba* and *Baudhāyana*, by the *Kṛṣṇa-Yajurvedins*. Thus the fact of the scope of these *Sutras* being limited affords matter for reflection; the question being—Is each of these *Smṛti-Sūtras* authoritative only for the particular sect mentioned above? Or are all of them equally authoritative for all men?

The *Prima Facie View* is as follows:— "These *Sūtras* are, as a matter of fact, studied only by the said particular sects of Brāhmaṇas; hence their authority also must be restricted to those sects only."

The *Established Conclusion* is that, *on account of the universal character of the Injunctions, the Smṛti-Sūtras must be universal* (Sū. 16); that is, they must be authoritative for all men who may be capable of performing the duties laid down in them; and as a matter of fact, capacity to perform these duties belong to the people of all castes and customs inhabiting the whole country of *Āryāvarta*, except the blind and such incapaciated persons who are excluded Whenever an act is meant to be restricted in any way, such restriction is clearly mentioned—as, for instance, the *Rājasūya* sacrifice has been distinctly enjoined for the 'Rājā' (Kṣattriya) only.

(K) 'Grammatical Smṛti'

Works dealing with Grammar also have been classed as '*Smṛti.*' The use and authority of these, as being upon *Dharma,* have been described under *Sūtras* 1.3.24—29.

Prabhākara has raised an objection against the introduction of this Topic. He says—"What has the authoritative or unauthoritative character of the Grammatical Rules got to do with the authority of the Veda, which is the subject with which we are concerned ? Even if the incorrect or corrupt forms of words—like '*gāvī*' and the like—were really expressive and eternal, in what manner would that affect the Vedic Injunction ?"

The answer to this that *Prabhākara* himself supplies is that, if there were no restrictions and regulations regarding the exact form in which words are denotative of things, then the comprehension of the Vedic texts would remain vague and indefinite and there would be no certaintly regarding a certain word being really expressive of a certain thing ; and this vagueness and uncertainty would shake the authority and reliability of the Veda itself. The Rules of Grammar help us to determine in what form the word really expresses its meaning ; and thus it helps us to obtain a definite and correct idea of the meaning of Vedic Texts. (*Bṛhaṣī* MS., p. 34.)

The question of this Topic, as propounded in the *Bhāṣya* (Trs., p. 112) is—Are, or are not, the corrupt vernacular forms of the word '*go*' (Cow)—such as '*gāvī*' '*goṇī*'. '*gopotalikā*'—really expressive of *the animal with the dewlap* (*i.e.*, the Cow),—in the same manner in which the correct (Sanskrit) form '*gauḥ*' is ? That is, is it only the one sanskrit word, which has behind its use an unbroken tradition, that is rightly expressive of the animal, and all the rest are mere corrupt forms of it ? Or are these also equally eternal and expressive ?

The *Prima Facie View* is as follows :—"They are all equally eternal and expressive. As a matter of fact, we find that the corrupt words also bring about the Cognition of the thing denoted, exactly in the same manner as the correct Sanskrit word. This shows that even a hundred years back, the expressive relationship between these words and the thing denoted was there ; and so on and on ; and this establishes their beginningless (eternal) character. Nor do we know of any creator or originator of this relation between the corrupt word and its denotation. From this it follows that all the words—the original Sanskrit as well as the corrupt Vernacular —are correct,—people should use them ; because they all serve the prupose of expressing the meaning ; and they are to be treated as synonymous, in the same manner as the synonymous Sanskrit words—'*hasta*' '*kara*' '*pāṇi*'

and the rest. In fact, all words are used for the definite purpose of expressing their meaning. *Nor is there any Vedic Injunction regarding the use of words* (Sū. 24),—such as only the correct Sanskrit word should be used, and not the corrupt Vernacular word."—(*Bhāṣya*, Trs. pp. 112-113.)

The *Tantravārtika* sets forth the *Prima Facie View* in a very elaborate form, covering full forty pages—(Trs., pp. 259—299.)

The main points made in this elaborate presentation are the following: —(1) '*Gāvī*' and such other vernacular corruptions are as expressive as the Sanskrit word '*Gauḥ*';—(2) the corrupt forms are as correct as the original Sanskrit;—(3) the Vernacular form is not a *curruption* at all; it is as peceptible by the Ear as any correct word;—(4) they are all—the original Sanskrit and the Vernacular—equally eternal; it is not possible to trace any beginning in time for either (5) no transcendental result can follow from the use of the so-called Sasnkrit form; as the use of this also serves the only purpose of expressing the meaning; specially because such use does not form the subject of Vedic Injunction;—(6) Grammar cannot be regarded as a '*shāstra*', 'Scripture'; because works on the subject are not found to bear the form of the Veda; in fact, the explanations provided by the Science of Grammar do not differ in any way from the ordinary explanation of vernacular words;—(7) The Science of Grammar cannot derive its authority from the Veda; as it does not treat of *Action*, which alone forms the subject-matter of the *Veda proper*; (8) Grammar cannot be regarded as an integral part of the Veda; as it is not found to serve any useful purpose in matters relating to *Dharma;* speciailly in the matter of expressing their meanings, the words of the Veda do not stand in need of the Rules of Grammar;—(9) the ordinary usage of words cannot be based upon Grammar; as Grammar itself proceeds entirely on the basis of Usage itself. (*Tantra-Vā.*, Trs., p. 298.)

There are some portions of this elaborate presentation of the *Prima Facie View* in the *Tantravārtika* which are specially interesting.

It takes up *verbatim* a number of Vedic texts which support the idea of Grammar being the means of accomplishing *Dharma.* (1) The first text quoted is the one where it has been declared that —'A single word, correctly used, becomes the means of fulfilling all desires in Heaven and on Earth.'—But in reality this is a praise of Vedic *Study*, and has no bearing upon the Science of Grammar. (2) The second text quoted is that where it is said that 'the Brāhmaṇa should not behave like the Mlechchha',—where 'behaving like the Mlechchha' has been taken to stand for 'the using

of corrupt forms of words.' But this text only prohibits the distorting of the traditional reading of the Vedic text. (3) The third text quoted is that —'If one performing the *Agnihotra* happens to utter an *Apashabda*, he shall perform the *Sārasvati-Iaṣti*, in expiation of this',—where '*apashabda*' has been taken to mean 'corrupt or wrong word'. But this lays down the Expiatory Rite only as to be performed by one who happens to *tell a lie, or distort a Vedic text*, or *to pronounce a word of foreign origin*, and it has nothing to do with the uttering of words not sanctioned by the comparatively modern rules of Grammar." (*Tantra-Vā.* Trs., 269-270.)

"The greatest authorites on the Science of Grammar are found to have made use of ungrammatical words and expressions; even in the works of *Pāñini*, *Kātyāyana* and *Patañjali*, we meet with many ungrammatical expressions. For instance,—(*a*) we have the *Sūtra* (Pāṇini 1.4.30)—'*Janikaruth prakṛtiḥ;* where we find two grammatical mistakes;—(1) the term '*jani*' stands for the root '*jan*' (*to produce*); and it is in connection with the '*karta*' (creator) of this root that the *Sūtra* evidently prescribes the use of the Ablative Ending; which is absurd; as the said ending can be attached to the *term*—not to the *creator* of it. (2) The second mistake in this *Sūtra* is that the compound '*Janikartuḥ*' itself is ungrammatical; as it is a direct infringement of Pāṇini's *Sūtra* 2.2.15. which lays down that there can be no compounding with nouns ending in '*tṛch*'and '*aka*' affixes; and here we have the compounding of the term '*kartṛ*' which contains the '*tṛch*' affix. In *Kātyāyana's Vārtika* also, we meet with the sentence दम्भेर्हल्ग्रहणस्य जातिवाचकत्वात् सिद्धम्; where the compound is ungrammatical —being an infringement of Panini's Sūtra 2.2.15; as the term '*Vāchaka*' ends in the '*aka*' affix and as such is uncompoundable under the said *Sūtra*. In Patañjali's *Bhāṣya* also, we meet with the expression अविरविकन्यायेन; which is an *Tatpuruṣa* compound containing within itself a *Dvandva* compound; the whole compound being expounded as अविश्च अविकश्च 'अविरविकौ' —अविरविकयोः न्यायेन अविरविकन्यायेन; and in this it was absolutely necessary to delete in the former compoundt he Nominative Termination in '*aviḥ*', in accordance with Pāṇini's Sū. 2.4.71; but this has not been done. The correct form of the expression would be अव्यविकन्यायेन.

"As regards the uses of the science of Grammar, the *Mahābhāṣya* has described several uses, the chief of which are रक्षा-गृह-आगम—लघु—असन्देह. These have been thus explained:—(a) Preservation, of the Veda. It is argued that the text of the Veda is preserved, guarded, against corruption, by the laws of Grammar.—As a matter of fact however, what really preserves the Vedic texts is the work of the teachers and their pupils. The

Vedic texts or their order of sequence have nothing to gain from Grammar; they have been preserved from corruption so far by the care and devotion and the strict discipline under which it is read and studied. (b) The second use ascribed to Grammar is *Ūha*, 'Conjectural Modification';—for example, there is a *Mantra* used in offereing, which contains the name of the substance offered —*Vrīhi*-corn for instance; when the same *Mantra* comes to be used in connection with an offering, where the substance offered is *Nīvaracorn*,—not *Vrīhi*—then the relevant word in the *Mantra* 'is modified', changed; (*vide* Mimāmsā-Sū. 9.3.1.2). It has been argued by the Grammarian that the exact form of this 'modification' can be determined only with the help of Grammar. As a matter of fact however, the rules of Grammar do not help in this matter at all; the exact form of the *Modification* is determined by other means, through the Veda itself. In fact the rules of Grammar, having been made by men, can never have an authority in matters relating to *Dharma* in general, and to the *Veda text* in particular. (c) The third use ascribed to Grammar is '*āgama*' 'scripture'; and what is meant is that Grammar has been included under 'scriptures', where the 'Scripture' has been defined as including the 'Six Subsidiaries' and Grammar is one of these Six. In reality, however, Grammar has no claim to be regarded as one of the 'Six Subsidiary Sciences'; and when the 'Scripptures' are described as containing 'the Six Subsidiaries', what are meant are the *Six Means of Interpretation*, consisting of (1) *Shruti* (Direct Assertion), (2) *Liṅga* (Indicative Word), (3) *Vākya* (Syntactican Connection), (4) *Prakaraṇa* (Context), (5) *Sthāna* (Order of Sequence and (6) *Samākhyā* (Name), and not *Shikṣā*, *Kalpa* and the rest. The Vedic Injunction which enjoins the study of the 'Six Subsidiaries' distinctly asserts that such study does not bring about any Results; hence the assertion in the *Mahābhāṣya* that 'the knowledge of Grammar is *Dharma*'; or the assertion of *Kātyāyana* that 'the using of words in accordance with the Rules of Grammar brings prosperity'—cannot but be rejected as being contrary to the said Vedic Injunction. (d) The Fourth use attributed to Grammar is mentioned as '*Laghu*'; which means that Grammar helps to *simplify* the process of differentiating the correct from the incorrect forms of words. This claim is entirely unfounded; as a matter of fact all that Grammatical works do is to point out the forms of words that are already known,—and they do this by means of an endlessly complicated process of queer roots and affixes and terminations. And yet there are very few students who can rightly apply all this elaborate process to words when actually using them. Thus instead of 'simplifying', Grammar tends only to confound and

complicate the use of words. (e) The fifth use claimed for Grammar is spoken of as '*Asandeha*', which is taken to mean that Grammar helps in removing doubts relating to the exact meaning of Vedic texts. This claim also is not well founded; because Grammar does not in any way help us to ascertain the meaning of words or sentences; in fact it deals merely with the *verbal form* of words and has no bearing on their exact signification.

"The *Mahābhāṣya* has quoted a number of Vedic texts which, it explains, indicate the usefulness of Grammar. But every one of them is capable of other and more rational explanations. For instance, the Vedic text speaks of 'the *four kinds* of speech, which alone are used by learned Brāhmaṇas', and this has been taken as referring to the four kinds of words —*Nouns, Verbs, Prefixes* and *Nipātas;* and it has been argued that the right knowledge of these can be obtained only through Grammar. As a matter of fact however the 'four kinds of speech' stands for the four forms, or stages of speech—*Para, Pashyantī, Madhyamā* and *Vaikharī.*

"Thus then, Grammar is found to consist in random and contradictory statements, and to be devoid of any basis in the Veda; and as such it is entirely useless.

"Grammar thus being found to be useless, there can be no point in regulating our usage of words according to the rules of Grammar. Hence the conclusion is that all the words—the original Sanskrit as well as the corrupt Vernacular—can equally express things and ideas and hence one or the other may be used optionally."

In answer to above *Prima Facie View* the *Established Conclusion* is as follows, as embodied in *Sūtras* 25—29 :—The view that all the words in question—Sanskrit and Vernacular—are similar words having the same meaning and all have an unbroken tradition behind them, is not correct. Because such a view can be held only on the strength of the fact that we find all of them—even the corrupt Vernacular ones—bringing about the cognition of the things denoted. But this phenomenon can be explained as coming about through the correct Sanskrit word itself, which is recalled to the mind by its similarity to the corrupt Vernacular word pronounced. That is, for instance, when the Vernacular word '*gāvī*' *is* pronounced, it brings to our mind the correct Sanskrit word '*Gauḥ*', which latter in its turn, brings about the cognition of the animal denoted. Thus the conclusion is that among all these words, there is only one—the correct Sanskrit word *Gauḥ*'—which is Eternal and really expressive. In case of the several Sanskrit synonyms—like the words '*hasta*', '*kara, pāni*"—the connection

of every one of these with the denotation is equally eternal; such being the teaching of authoritative teachers, according to whom all these words are grammatically correct, while the Vernacular words like '*gāvī*', '*goṇī*, etc., are not grammatically correct. (Sū. 26 and Bhā. Trs., p. 113.)

On this point, the truth can be ascertained only through close attention,—and through the application of certain general principles ((*S*ū. 27) The number of words being endless, it is not possible to read up and collect all of them; hence for the purpose of indicating all correct word-forms, the only means that we have at our command is the laying down of certain broad general principles and definitions that would take in all the correct word-forms. It is exactly this that is done by the Science of Grammar; while this is of great use to us in the ascertaining of both correct and incorrect words. It is not as has been supposed that the expressiveness of words is dependent upon Grammar. As a matter of fact, this expressiveness of words is actually cognised in day to day experience; and it is only when it is found that correct and incorrect words have been mixed up in usage, that the Grammatical Rules step in to help us in distinguishing the correct word from its corruptions. (*Tantra-Vā.* Trs., p. 305). As a matter of fact, (a) we cannot think of any point of time when the grammatical laws did not exist;—(b) we find Vedic texts supplying the requisite basis for all the six Elements of Grammar—*viz.*, (1) the Etymology of words, (2) correct word-forms, (3) injunctions to use only correct words, (4) actual use of such words, (5) prohibition of incorrect word-forms, and (6) avoidance, in practice, of such word-forms. All these therefore are accepted as being beginningless. Then again, common people are unable to distinguish the *expressive* from the *inexpressive* word; and it is only the Rules of Grammar that can help us to do this. Thus both Grammar and Usage conjointly enable us to find out the truly expressive word. And in cases where there is conflict between Usage and Grammatical Rules, the latter has to be regarded as superior; because as *Smṛti* it is more authoritative than Usage, (see above). —(*Tantra-Vā.* Trs., pp. 306-307.)

It is not fair to deny to Grammar the title of '*Shāstra*', 'Scripture', when, in its commonly accepted conventional sense, this term includes all the fourteen Sciences, *Vidyās*, among whom Grammar is also included. Being a "*Shāstra*'— Grammar stands on the same footing as '*Smṛti*'; hence its authoritative character cannot be denied. (*Ibid.*, p. 317.)

As declared in the *Vārtika* (of Kātyāyana), the use of Grammar lies in the laying down of certain restrictions which help in the fulfilling of

Dharma; the two restrictions laid down by it are :—(1) that *one should use only correct forms of words,* the knowledge and using of such words leading the person to Heaven; this is a restriction which is laid down in the Veda also; and (2) that *such words are correct*; this restriction occuring in Grammar alone. (*Ibid.*, p. 319.)

(L) Words in the Veda are the Same as those in Ordinary Usage.

Sūtras 1.3. 30—35.

The correctness of the Word is to be ascertained with the help of Grammar. But what we are concerned with is what is it that the word expresses. In a rough manner we know what is expressed by words in our common parlance. But we are considering the means of knowing *Dharma ;* and the *Veda* and *Smṛti* have been found to be the reliable source of information on this point. In order to find out therefore the exact meaning of *Veda* and *Smṛti* texts, we have to see what is the exact denotation of words. This we have already discussed under *Verbal Cognition,* where we have seen that what the word denotes is the *Universal* or *Class.* This is one part of the Topic discussed under Sū. 30—35. But as a preliminary to this it has been considered whether the word found in the Veda, and the meaning expressed by it there—are the same as in common parlance. This is necessary because the conclusion that words denote *Universals* has been deduced from facts of common experience, whose bearing upon *Veda* and upon *Dharma* is open to question.

The question thus to be considered is—(*a*) Are the words found in the Veda the same as those used in common parlance or different ? (*b*) Are they denotative of the same things as in common parlance ? (*Bhāṣya* Trs. p. 116.)

The *Prima Facie View* is that the words and their meanings in the Veda must be different from those in common parlance. Because they are named differently and their forms also are different. The words in the Veda are named '*vaidika*' while others are called '*laukika*' ;—in the Veda we find that the word '*Agni*' denotes *Indra* and as such must be different from the word '*Agni*' denoting *Fire* in common parlance ;—similarly we find the Veda speaking of '*deva-go*'—the Cow of the Heaven—moving on its *back;* this '*go*' therefore must be different from the ordinary cow which moves on its legs; and so on in several eases. (*Bhāṣya* Trs., p. 116.)

The *Established Conclusion* is that the words in the Veda must be the same as those in common parlance and the things expressed by them also must be the same; *because thus alone are Injunctions possible*—says Sū. 30.

If the two sets of words and their meanings were different then we eould not understand the Vedic Injunctions, which thus would fail in their purpose. Another reason is that as a matter of fact *there is no differentiation between the two sets of words* (Sūtra). That is, we do not perceive any difference between the words in the Veda and those in common parlance; similarly we find the same meaning denoted by both. As for the few stray instances cited above, they can be easily explained. (*Bhāṣya* Trs., p. 117.)

Kumārila is not satisfied with the limited scope given to the Topic by the manner in which the *Prima Facie View* has been set forth in the *Bhāṣya;* by this the usefulness of the whole Topic becomes very much circumscribed. He therefore states the *Prima Facie View* as follows :—"In as much as we find that the words of the Veda differ from those of common parlance, on the points—(1) that the formers are to be read in a prescribed manner of accentuation, etc., not so the latter,—(2) that the verbal forms of the words and sentences in the Veda are irrevocably fixed, while the latter are variable.—(3) that the names and forms of the two are different.—we conclude that *all the words* used in the Veda are entirely different from those in common parlance." (*Tantra-Vā.* Trs., p. 326.)

The form of the *Established Conclusion* however remains the same as before—that the words used in the Veda, as also the things denoted by them, are the same as those in common parlance. (*Ibid.*)

On p. 353 (Trs.) *Kumārila* has emphasised his view that the difference between the two sets must be held to be based upon *accentuation* and such other details,—not upon *denotations.*

CHAPTER XXII

WHAT ARE THE ACTS THAT CONSTITUTE 'DHARMA'?

(A) INTRODUCTORY.

In Discourse I, *Jaimini* has dealt with the *Means of knowing Dharma*,—what should be done. Firstly, it has been shown that the *Vedic Injunction* is the best and most directly reliable Means of knowing it;—secondly that the character of such Means belongs—somewhat remotely,—also to the *Declamatory Vedic Texts*, the *Vedic Mantra-Texts*, the *Vedic Names*, as also to *Smṛti*, and Usage. Thus the first discourse has supplied the full answer to the question—'What are the reliable Means of obtaining Knowledge of *Dharma*?' In answering this question in detail, it has also been shown that the true character of *Dharma* belongs to such actions as—(*a*) the *Agnihotra* and the like—which are directly enjoined in the Vedic Injunctive texts,—(*b*) the *Aṣṭakā* and the like,—which are laid down in the *Smṛti*,—(*c*) the *Hólāka* and the like,—as established by Usage and Custom, and so forth. But so far, these few actions have been mentioned only by way of illustration, bringing out the general principles of interpretation there-in discussed; and the detailed consideration of the particular character of the enjoined acts was left over for the second Discourse.

Thus the second Discourse supplies the detailed answer to the second question—'What are the acts that constitute *Dharma*?'

It is necessary now to consider what enjoined Acts are *Primary* and what are *Secondary or Subsidiary*; and to this end, it is necessary to consider what Acts are *different* and what *non-different*; this is the subject-matter —none other—of the Second Discourse. (*Bhāṣya*, Trs., p. 167.)

On this *Kumārila* (*Tantra-Vā.* Trs., p. 467) has the following remarks:—What is explained in the present Discourse is that one Action is known to be *different* from another on account of the two being mentioned by two different words;—and it is in the wake of difference among the Acts that we have an explanation of difference among the *Apūrvas* resulting from the Acts; and lastly, it is for ascertaining which is the Action that brings about the Apūrva that we have the consideration of division of Actions into 'Primary' and 'Secondary' or 'Subsidiary'. That is to say, (1) *Difference among Actions* is the natural direct subject-matter of the Discourse;—(2) with a view to establish this difference among Actions, it is necessary to consider the question of *difference among the Apūrvas* brought about by the Actions;

—(3) thus far it might appear that all *Acts* bring about *Apūrvas ;* hence comes the necessity of differentiating among Actions, as to which are *Primary* and which *Subsidiary,* because as a general principle the *Apūrva* is brought about by the *Primary* Act. This matter of *Primary and Subsidiary* acts has been dealt with only briefly in this Discourse ; its detailed consideration forms the subject-matter of the Third Discourse.

Prabhākara, ever anxious to turn all discussions to the Vedic text itself, propounds the question in the form—What are the *several texts* that enjoin the *several acts* constituting *Dharma* ?—According to him therefore, the subject-matter of the present Discourse consists of difference among the *texts* enjoining the several *acts,*—not the difference among the Acts themselves ;—these latter being regarded as different clearly on the ground of the different texts enjoining them.

The above view of *Prabhākara* has been criticised by the followers of *Kumārila,* according to whom the subject-matter of the Discourse consists directly of *Difference among Actions themselves,* and the other matters that come in are only those that are directly or indirectly connected with that same subject.

Before proceeding with this main subject of *Difference among Actions,* the *Sūtra* deals with certain matters whose consideration is essential for that main question. We have seen how the main point that may mark out one Action as different from another is the *Apūrva* or Transcendental Effect resulting from them. A preliminary enquiry therefore is necessary on the following questions :—(1) Is there any such thing as the said *Apūrva*? (This is dealt with under Sū. 5)—(2) Which is the particular word in the Injunctive text to which the *Apūrva* resulting from the enjoined act is related ? (This is dealt with under *Sūtras* 1—4). (3) Division of Actions into *Primary* and *Subsidiary.* (Dealt with under Sū. 6—8).

(B) Apūrva.

As regards question (1)—Is there any such thing as *Apūrva*—it has been dealt with under Su. 2.1.5, which starts off with the *Established Conclusion*—*'There is Apūrva because Action is enjoined'* ;—leaving the *Prima Facie View* represented by the question itself.

The *Established Conclusion* has been thus explained in the *Bhāṣya* (Trs., p. 175). There must be such a thing as *Apūrva,*—because Action is enjoined—in such injunctions as 'Desiring Heaven, one should perform Sacrifice'. If there were no such thing as *Apūrva,* such an injunction would be meaningless ; because the *Sacrifice* itself is something perishable,—and

if it were to perish without bringing into existence something else, then the Result, in the shape of 'Heaven', could never come about. From this it follows that the act of *Sacrifice* does bring about something—some Force or Potency—which continues to exist and operate till the final Result—'Heaven'—is accomplished. The act of *Sacrifice* itself cannot and does not continue to exist after it has itself been accomplished; and because the Act is perishable, it must be taken as bringing into existence some such Potency as '*Apūrva*' which leads on to the Result. (*Bhāṣya*)

The *Prima Facie Veiw* on this question has been thus elaborated by *Prabhākara* (*Bṛhatī*, MS., p. 47B)—"The Injunction imparted by the Injunctive Word only ugres the Agent to the performance of a certain *action*, and not towards anything desired by him;—the *Action* is something ephemeral, and cannot be present immediately before the attainment of the result by the Agent;—hence, in order to meet these difficulties, we must accept the *Sacrifice* itself to be either everlasting, or capable of bringing about a certain potency or faculty in the *Agent*, or the favours of the Deity, and there can be no justification for assuming any such thing as *Apūrva*."

In answer to the above *Prima Facie View*, *Prabhākara* continues—At the very outset you commit a mistake in assuming that the Injunctive Word prompts the Agent to *Action*: while what the Injunction really does is to prompt him to *Activity or Exertion*; and the particular *act* denoted by the root of the Injunctive Word is only the *object* of that *Activity* or *Exertion*. Thus then, what is denoted by the Injunctive Sentence is the '*Niyoga*', the Mandatory Force,—this Mandate prompts the man to *Exertion* pertaining to some sort of *action* denoted by the verbal root. The assumption that the Act itself is everlasting is contrary to all evidence. The Soul also, by its very omnipresence must be *inactive*; hence the immediate cause of the Result cannot be something abiding in the Soul.

The whole of this matter has been put clearly, from the *Prābhākara* point of view, in the *Prakaraṇapanchikā* (pp. 185 et. seq.);—from which we learn as follows:—

There can be no doubt as to the evanescent character of the Sacrifice itself; it is borne out by common experience. Nor can the Sacrifice be regarded as laid down for the purpose of securing the favours of the Deity, as there is no evidence to support this idea. As a matter of fact also, Sacrifices are never performed for that purpose; the Deity is there only as a hypothetical Entity postulated as the recipient of the Sacrificial Offering; and there can be no *pleasing* or *displeasing* of such an Entity. Nor can we accept the view that the verbal root with the Injunctive Affix

expresses an Action tending to produce, in the Agent, a certain Faculty which is the immediate cause of the final result. Though this is the view favoured by *Kumārila*, it has not been accepted by *Prabhākara*, as there is no reason for the postulating of any such Faculty in the Agent. That the Act of Sacrifice produces any such Faculty in the Agent is not proved either by Perception or by Inference, or even by Scripture,—there being no Vedic text asserting such a Faculty. Specially as we find that the *act* (of Sacrifice) is brought about by the Exertion (or Activity) of the Agent; and therefore the causal potency must reside in this *Exertion*, which *Exertion*, therefore, should be what is expressed by the Injunctive Word. The appearance of the Faculty in question might be said to be proved by Presumption, based upon the consideration that the Action cannot be the cause of the Final Result, without some such Faculty lasting during the time intervening between the completion of the Act and the appearance of the Result. But what this Presumption can point to is only some such Faculty in the *Act* itself, not in the *Acting Agent*,

The whole matter of this '*Apūrva*' and '*Niyoga*' is thus expounded in *Prakaranapañchikā* (p. 187); *Sūtra* 1.1.2 has shown that what the Injunctive Sentence denotes is the '*Kārya*,' *something to be effected*;—(2) in the beginning of Discourse VI, the *Sūtra* has shown that, of this *Kārya*, denoted by the Injunctive Sentence, the *Niyojya*,—*i.e.*, the person prompted to *effect* or *bring about* that *Kārya*,—is one who is desirous of acquiring for himself some desirable result in the shape of Heaven or some such thing, —which is thus related to the said *Kārya*:—(3) in the *Bādaryādhikaraṇa* (Sū. 3.1.3) it has been proved that it is the *Kārya* that is the direct cause of the appearance of the Desirable Result, which is desired by, and hence qualifies, the prompted person;—(4) in the *Devatādhikaraṇa* (Sū. 9.1.9), the *Bhāṣya* has shown that the *Kārya*, which is *to be effected* is not the *act*; as the *Act* can never be the *Direct* cause of the Desired Result; nor could it be held to lead to the Result through the favour of the Deity to whom the Sacrifice is offered: nor can it be regarded as leading to the Result through a certain potency in the Agent himself; and yet it is well-known that either the Act itself, or some Potency subsisting therein, does not last long enough to bring about the Result directly. (5) In the *Apūrvadhikaraṇa* (2.1.5), we have the final conclusion led up to by all the above *Adhikaraṇas*: *viz.*, That which is denoted by the Injunctive affix is the '*Kārya*'—*something to be effected*—which inheres in the Agent, the perosn prompted by the Injunction, in relation to whom the said '*Kārya*' is indicated;—as this '*Kārya*' is not cognisable by any of the ordinary Means of Knowledge, it has been called '*Apūrva*', *something new, not known before.* The connection

of this '*Kārya*' with the Agent and the Action (of Sacrifice, for instance) may be thus traced :—The '*Kārya*' by its very nature is something brought about by *Kṛti*, or *operation*,—and this *operation* is none other than the *Exertion* of the Agent. In the *Bhāvārthādhikaraṇa* (2.1.1) again, it is shown that no such *Exertion* is possible independently of some *act* denoted by the verbal root. Thus what the Injunctive Sentence denotes in this connection is the Niyoga, *prompting* or *mandate*, relating to that Act. This Act, thus being the object of the Prompting, comes to be spoken of as the 'Instrument' by which that Prompting is accomplished, as shown under Sū. 3.1.3. Even though the said *Kārya* is brought into existence at a time other than the appearance of the final Result, yet, in as much as it is inseparably related to the Prompted Agent,—in whom the desire for the Result subsists,—there is nothing incongruous in regarding that *Kārya* as the direct cause of the Final Result. This '*Kārya*' has been called '*Apūrva*' by the *Bhāṣya*, by reason of its being something *new* to all other Means of knowledge, save the Injunctive Sentence. The name given to it by *Prabhākara* is '*Niyoga*' Prompting, *Mandatory Force*, on account of the fact that it acts as an incentive to the *prompted person* (*Niyojya*) and makes him put forth an *Exertion* towards the action denoted by the verbal root contained in the Injunctive Word. This '*Kārya*' or '*Niyoga*' is denoted, neither by the verbal root, nor by the Injunctive Affix, nor by any other single word in the Injunctive Sentence ; it is denoted by that Sentence *as a whole.* All other necessary factors being expressed by the several words in the Sentence,—what the Senttence *as a whole* denotes is the said *Niyoga* or Mandatory Force as related to the Prompted Person denoted by some other word in the Sentence,—mentioning the Result, the *desirer* of which is the Prompted Person. That the *Niyoga* or Prompting is thus expressed by the Sentence as a whole is also proved by the fact that the general rule is that, that which is the principal factor made known by the Sentence constitutes the 'meaning' of that *Sentence ;* and there is no doubt that of all the factors made known by the *Sentence*, the said *Niyoga or* Prompting is the most important. Even though the Final Result has all the appearance of the most important factor, yet it is the *Niyoga* that is really so ; and the Result also has to be regarded as subservient to the *Niyoga*, in veiw of the fact that the Result comes in as one of the factors necessary for the making up of the full *Niyoga*. That is to say, the *Niyoga* cannot be true *Niyoga* or *Prompting* until there is a *Niyojya*, the Person *Prompted* to *Exertion ;* as unless there is *Exertion*, the *Niyoga* does not attain its full character ; then again without the Agent, there can be no *exertion ;*—and lastly, it is only the Person desiring the Result issuing from the Action who is entitled

to its performance. Thus indirectly, through the Agent, the Result becomes a necessary factor in the *Niyoga* itself. This relation between the *Niyoga* and the *Result* is similar to that between the Master and the Servant; without the 'Servant', the Master cannot be a true 'master', and yet it is the *Master* who is the more important person of the two.

The *Prakaraṇapañchikā* raises an interesting question here:—"The *Niyoga*, the Prompting or Mandatory Force, is an *effect;* hence it must be *evanescent,* like the Action itself; if then the Action cannot be the direct cause of the Result, on account of its evanescence, then the same may be said of the *Niyoga* also".

This same objection applies to the *Apūrva* also, as propounded by the *Bhāṭṭa*. The author himself is unable to provide a satisfactory answer. All that he says is that the *Niyoga* or Prompting does not bring about the Result, immediately on its own appearance; in its action towards the bringing about of the Reslut, it stands in need of certain auxiliaries which are not always available; and until the appearance of these auxiliaries the Result cannot appear. This explanation does not meet the difficulty that the *Niyoga* itself cannot, and does not, exist at the time that the Result appears. He has explained in another place that it is through the Prompted Agent that the *Niyoga,* appearing at the present time, brings about the Result at a future time. This however is as much as to say that the *Niyoga* produces *something in the Agent,* which *something* brings about the Result. This would practically be the *Bhāṭṭa* view, by which the Action produces a certain *Faculty* or *Potency, in the Agent* which Faculty leads to the Final Result. In fact, the *Prābhākara* assumes a *Niyoga* intervening between the Result and the *Something* lasting produced by the *Niyoga,* he does not call it '*Faculty*', *Samskāra*', like *Kumārila;* but it comes to the same thing. *Shālikanātha* has tried to meet the difficulty by calling in the aid of *Adṛṣṭa,* Destiny; he says that it is only when the *Niyoga* is aided by *Adṛṣṭa,* Destiny; that it brings the Final Result.

Another question arising in this connection is that, what has been said above may be all right so far as those acts are concerned which have been enjoined as leading to desirable results, but how would it apply to those which have been enjoined as *compulsory,* without reference to any results, or to those that have been forbidden,—*i.e.*, whose non-performance has been enjoined? The answer to this is that in the exposition of the *Niyoga,* the desire for the Result has been brought in only as something whose presence in the Agent enables and entitles him to perform the Act. In the case of those actions that have been enjoined as *compulsory,* as to be

performed *throughout life,*—any person who is *endowed with life,* is entitled to the performance of the acts; so that the title and character of the Agent become duly accomplished; and this is all that is necessary for the Explanation of the *Niyoga.*

Under *Kumārila's* view (*Tantra-Vā.* Trs. p. 504), the *Apūrva* is 'a potency, *in the Principal Action,* or *in the Agent,* which did not exist prior to the performance of that Action, and whose existence is proved by the authority of the Scriptures'. Before their performance, there is in the Scarifices themselves, in the first instance, an incapacity to lead any one to Heaven,—and in the second place, in the Agent, an incapacity to attain Heaven;—both these incapacities become set aside by the performance of the Sacrifice;—this performance also produces a Potency or Capacity by virtue of which Heaven is attained;—to this capacity, we apply the name *Apūrva.* The proof of the existence of such an *Apūrva* lies in Presumption, based upon the fact that without some such Capacity or Potency, Vedic texts are wholly inexplicable. For instance, there are many Vedic texts asserting that certain Sacrifices lead the Sacrificer to Heaven;—the idea being that he goes to Heaven, not indeed immediately on the completion of the Sacrifice, but after the performer's death. The question then arises that, as a general rule, the Effect comes into existence either while its Cause is still present, or immediately after the Cause has ceased to exist; but in the case in question, the Sacrifice ceases to exist at the persent moment, while the attainment of Heaven comes ten or twelve or more years later. This can be explained only by the hypothesis that the Sacrifice, on its completion, produces directly a certain potency or faculty in the Agent, which resides in him, like several other faculties, throughout life, at the end of which it leads him to Heaven. Without some such intervening Potency or Faculty,—as the connecting link between the Sacrifice and its Result—the causal relation between these two cannot be explained. *Apūrva* thus is nothing more than a Force set in motion by the Action of Sacrifice, this Force being the Direct Instrument whereby, sooner or later, the Action brings about the Result. There is nothing incongruous in this hypothesis; as every action is found to set going certain forces, either in a substance, or in persons connected with the Substance; and the Force thus set going brings about the Result, as soon as it reaches its full development with the aid of attendant auxiliaries.

This whole process is thus systematically stated in the *Nyāyamālāvistara*:—

(1) The Sentence—'One desiring Heaven should perform Sacrifices'—

lays down the fact that the act of *Sacrifice* is instrumental in the bringing about of the attainment of Heaven.

(2) Then there arises the question—How can the *Sacrifice*, which ceases to exist at the moment that its performance is complete, bring about the Result, at a much later time ?

(3) The answer to this is that the Sacrifice brings about the Final Result through the Agency of the Force called '*Apūrva*'.

(4) A further question arises—How is this *Apūrva* brought into existence ?

(5) The answer is —By the performance of the *Sacrifice*.

In all simple sacrifices there is a single *Apūrva* bringing about a single Result. But there are cratian elaborate Sacrifices which are highly complex, being made up of a number of Subsidiary Sacrifices ; such for instance, as the *Dursha-Pūrṇamāsa* of Sacrifice. In all such Sacrifices, there are as a rule, four kinds of Apūrva :—(1) The *Phalāpūrva*, the Productive Potency, that which leads to the Result directly, and as such, is the *immediate* cause of the Result ;—(2) the *Samudāyāpūrva*, the Collective Force ;—in the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* Sacrifices the three main Sacrifices performed on the Moonless day form one group, and the three performed on the Full-Moon day, another group ; each of these two groups, occuring at different points of time, could not have a single *Apūrva* ; hence each group should have a distinct *Apūrva* of its own,—the two *Apūrvas* combining to produce the final *Phalāpūrva* ;—each of these two distinct *Apūrvas* is called '*Samudāyāpūrva*', 'Collective Apūrva',—as brought about by a *group* of three Sacrifices. (3) The *Utpattyapūrva*,—'Initial *Apūrva* ; *i. e.*, the three *Apūrvas* following from each of the three Sacrifices constituting the first *group* of the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*, and the three following from the three Sacrifices constituting the second *group*. (4) *Aṅgāpūrva*—Each of these Sacrifices is made up of a number of minor acts, each of which, in its turn, brings about an *Apūrva* of its own, through which it helps the main Sacrifice in bringing about its Result.

(C) To What Word is the Apūrva Related ?

The second question is—Which is the particular word in the Injunctive text to which the *Apūrva* resulting from the enjoined act is related,—and which would, on that account, indicate the *difference* or *non-difference* among the *Apūrvas*, and thence also among the *Acts* themselves ? This question has been dealt with under Sū. 2. 1. 1—4.

The *Bhāṣya* (Trs. p. 168) begins with a preliminary enquiry ; the question being—Is a different *Dharma* enjoined by each one of the words

in the Injunctive text ? Or is a single *Dharma* enjoined by the Sentence as a whole ?—The *Prima Facie View* is that—"A distinct *Dharma* is enjoined by each one of the words." —The *Established Conclusion* is that one text enjoins only one *Dharma* as bringing about the *Apūrva.*

Then the question arises—Which is that one word which lays down *Dharma* and to which the resultant *Apūrva* is related ? Is it related to the Nouns (denoting Substances and Qualities) ? or to Verbs (denoting Actions) ? The answer to this question is contained in the *Bhāvārthādhikaraṇa* of the *Sūtras* (2.1.1-4). The *Prima Facie View* is that the *Apūrva* is related to both Nouns and Verbs. The *Established Conclusion* is as follows :—That the resultant cannot be related to the *Noun* follows from the very nature of Nouns ; Nouns are the names of things that are already accomplished entities, and do not stand in need of anything else,—being self-sufficient themselves (Sū. 3). That word, on the other hand, to which the Resultant is related must be something that is yet *to be accomplished,* and as such stands in need of such *Apūrvas* as would help in its accomplishment. It is only *Verbs* that are found to be expressive of what does not already exist at the time, but has got to be accomplished with the help of certain agencies. And in as much as the *Apūrva* is also something yet to *be accomplished* it stands to reason that it should be related to the Verb.

As to how the *Apūrva* is related to the Verb, this may be thus explained : Every Verb in an Injunctive Sentence is found to be made up of a verbal root and the Injunctive Affix. This affix denotes what has been called the '*Vidhi*' or '*Bhāvanā*', which stands for *the activity of the Agent towards bringing into existence what has to come into existence.* For instance, the Injunctive Affix in the Injunctive verb '*Yajeta*' means that the Agent should have recourse to an activity towards the bringing about of what is to be brought into existence, in the shape of the *Sacrifice,* which is denoted by the verbal root in the same word, '*Yajeta*'. This is what has been called '*Ārthī Bhāvanā.* [For details about this *Bhāvanā,* the reader is refered to what has gone before just before the section on *Arthavāda Texts.*]

In connection with this subject, the question has been raised as to whether Verbs are always injunctive of action—Primary or Subsidiary—or sometimes they serve other purposes also ? The conclusion on this point is that in many cases, where the Verb cannot, under the peculiar circumstances, enjoin an *Act,* it has to be regarded as merely expressive of a certain act which it serves to recall as being the one at the performance of which the text in which the Verb occurs can serve a useful purpose by being recited.

As this is found to be the case with *Mantras* mostly, the *Bhāṣya* has put forward the view that *Mantras* are never purely *injunctive*. (See above, Section on *Mantras*).

(D) Division of Acts into Primary and Subsidiary.

The general law having been established, that every act enjoined in the Veda brings about an *Apūrva*, the Sūtras (2. 1. 6—8) proceed to note certain exceptions; which leads to the division of Acts into *Primary* and *Subsidiary*. The chief basis of this distinction has been thus explained:—Every Act is related to some material *Substance*; hence this Substance has been regarded as serving the visible purpose of accomplishing the Act. In certain cases, the act mentioned turns upon itself and imparts an aid to the material Substance; for instance, in the case of the act of *Threshing*, which serves to clean the corn;—while in some cases, the Act rests upon itself entirely, its sole purpose being its own fulfilment; for example, a *Sacrificial Performance*. In this latter case, there naturally arises a desire in the mind of the Agent to know what useful purpose would be served by the Act in question; and when no visible purpose is found to be served, we have to assume a transcendental Result in the shape of the *Apūrva*. Where, on the other hand, the Act is found to serve a distinctly visible purpose—*e.g.*, the threshing serving to clean the corn, there can be no justification for assuming any transcendental Result; specially when the Injunction of the Act is fully justified by the visible end. From the above distinction it follows that—*those acts that are not meant to be productive* (or *preparatory*) *of material Substances are 'Primary' Acts,—because the material Substance is a sub-ordinate factor.*—(Sū. 7). The reason for these Acts being regarded as *Primary* is that, as they do not produce any material Substance, nor do they produce any peculiarity in the Substance already extant, they cannot but be regarded as bringing about transcendental Results. On the other hand—*Those Acts that are meant to be productive or preparatory of a Material Substance are to be regarded as 'Subsidiary', because in regard to these, the Material Substance is the dominant factor.*—(Sū. 8). To this latter class belong all such acts as the Consecration of the Sacrificial Fire, the Appointment of Priests to officiate at Sacrifices, the threshing and grinding of Corns and so forth.

It may be noted here that this distinction of Acts into *'Pradhāna'*, *Primary*, and *'Guna'*, *Subsidiary*, is quite different from the subject of *Aṅga* or *Shēṣa* (Auxiliary) and *Aṅgin* or *Shēṣin*, (Principal): as the former distinction is applicable to *Acts alone*, while the latter is a relationship between

Acts on the one hand and *Substances, Qualities and Purifications or Embellishments* on the other. (See Sūtra 3. 1. 1, *et seq.*) [See below, p. 272]

From what has gone above it would seem that there is always an *Apūrva* in connection with, and brought about by, the Act denoted by every verb. In order to remove this misconception, the *Sūtras* (2. 1. 6—8 and 9—12) have pointed out that it is not so, and that Actions have to be classed under two Heads—(1) *Pradhāna* (Primary) and (2) *Guṇa* (Secondary or Subsidiary), and it is the Primary Act only that directly leads on to an *Apūrva*, the Subsidiary Act only helps the Primary. Examples of this have been provided. There is the Vedic text 'One should thump the corn', where the Act of *thumping* is laid down; and in regard to this act, the Established Conclusion is that no *Apūrva* follows this act: it serves only the visible purpose of removing the chaff from the grains, and thereby renders them better fitted for being made into the 'Cake' to be offered; through this same visible Effect, it helps the Sacrifices at which the Cake is offered; so that there is no need for postulating a separate *Apūrva* as resulting from the said Thumping. This act of Thumping therefore is 'Subsidiary' to that Act at which the Cake is offered—*i.e.*, *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* Sacrifice, which thus is the 'Primary' Act. Similarly with the Act of *washing* laid down in the Text 'One should *wash* the *Sruk* and other implements'; where the *washing* only serves to clean the Implements and render them fitter for use at the Acts where they are used; it does not lead to a separate *Apūrva* of its own.

What has been said regarding Verbs occuring in Vedic Tests being Injunctive of Acts might lead people to think that *every* verb that occurs in a Vedic Text enjoins an *Act*, and hence all Vedic texts are Injunctive. This idea is negatived by *Sūtra* 2. 1. 30-31, where it is shown that every such verb is not Injunctive, there are many that are merely *assertive* or *declaratory;* these latter are those occurring in *Mantra-texts* which, as a rule, are *not injunctive* (See above under *Mantra*).

This is followed in the Sūtra by an account of 'Mantra'. (for which see above).

(E) Classification of Acts.

Before proceeding with the subject of Difference among Acts, it is necessary to explain the various divisions and classifications that have been made among Acts. The first division of Acts is into—(1) *Laukika*, Worldly, Secular and (2) *Vaidika*, Superphysical, Religious, Spiritual. The *Religious* Acts are classed under three heads;—(1) *Positive*

or *proper, i.e.*, the *Performance* of an Act, (2) *Negative*, i.e., the *avoidance* of an Act; and (3) *Positive-Negative*, partaking of the character of both Performance and Avoidance. Another division of Religious Actsi s into—(1) *Guṇakarma*, Secondary or Subsidiary Act, (2) *Pradhāna* or *Artha-karma*, Primary, Effective, Act. Of the *Positive Act*, there are three main divisions into the three kinds of Offering'—(1) *Yāga*, Sacrifice, offering to a Deity, (2) *Homa*—offering into Fire (or Water), and (3) *Dāna, giving away*, by waiving one's own proprietory right over the thing in favour of another person.—(See *Mīmāmsābālaprakāsha*, pp. 81 *et seq.*). *Kātyāyana*, in his *Shrauta-Sūtra* has drawn a further distinction between *Yāga* and *Homa*, by which the *Yāga* is the offering made by a man standing and pronouncing the syllable '*Vaṣat*' at the end of the *Mantra*, while *Homa* is the offering made by the man sitting and pronouncing the syllable '*Svāhā*'. A further division has been made among the Vedic or Religious Acts by *Mīmāmsakas*, into the following three classes:—(1) *Kratvartha*, an act helping the fulfilment of the Sacrifice; under this head fall all *Guṇakarma*, Subsidiary Acts; (2) *Puruṣārtha*, accomplishing things desired by the Agent; under this head fall all *Artha-karma*, Primary Acts, as directly bringing about the *Apūrva* which leads to the desired Result;—(3) Those that are neither *Kratvartha* nor *Puruṣārtha;* under this falls the Rite of Fire-installation. These three heads have been accepted by the *Bhāṭṭa* (See *Shāstradīpikā*, 4.1,1,*Dravyārjanādhikaraṇa* *Prabhākara* however admits only the first two of these; nor do we find any authority for the third either in the *Bhāṣya* or in the *Tantravārtika*. The twofold classification is based upon the *Sūtra* itself—4. 1. 1. The first of these, the *Kratvartha* Act, is of two kinds—(1) The *Ārādupakāraka*—helping the Sacrifice *Indirectly*, through distinct subsidiary *Apūrvas, e.g.*, the *Prayājas* helping the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa ;* (2) the *Sannipattyopakāraka*, helping the Sacrifice *Directly*, without any intervening subsidiary *Apūrvas*. This *Sannipattyopakāraka* itself is of three kinds—(1) that which serves a visible purpose; (2) that which serves an imperceptible purpose and (3) that which serves both visible and imperceptible purposes. The first of these again is of two kinds—(1) that which produces a visible effect in the Substance *going to be used* at the Sacrifice, and (2) that which produces a visible effect in the Substance *that has been used* at the Sacrifice, this latter being called *Pratipattikarma*', Act of Disposal. The second kind of the *Sannipattyopakāraka* again is of three kinds—(1) Affecting the Substance *that has been used, e.g.*, the burning of the Substances out of which the offerings have been made; (2) affecting the Substance *to be used, e.g.*, sprinkling water over the corn; and (3) affecting the Substance *at the time that it is being used*. Another division of the *Kratvartha* Act is into—(1) *Utpatti*. Productive Act, *e.g.*,

kneading of the dough, which *produces* the Cake, (2) *Prāpti*, Obtaining, securing,—*e.g.*, milking of the Cow, whereby the milk is obtained; and (3) *Vikṛti*, Modificatory,—*e.g.*, threshing of the Corn, which alters its appearance; (4) *Samskṛti*, Purificatory, Embellishment,—*e.g.*, sprinkling of water over the corn. There is yet another classification of the Vedic or *Religious* Act into the following four classes—(1) *Prakṛti*, Archetypal, *e.g.*, *Agnihotra*; (2) *Vikṛti*, Ectypal, *e.g.*, the *Māsāgnihotra*; (3) *Prakṛti-Vikṛti*,—partaking of the character of both, Archetypal and Ectypal; *e.g.*, the *Agnīṣomīya*, which is the Ectype of the *Darsha-Purṇamasa*, but the Archetype of the *Savanīya* (See *Mīmamsā Sū.* 8. 1. 14), and (4) *Neither Archetypal nor Ectypal*; e.g., the *Darvī-home* (See last *Adhikaraṇa* of Adhyāya 8).

The most important classification of the Religious Act is into —(1) *Nitya*, Compulsory, (2) *Naimittika*, Contingent (Occasional), (Sū. VI), and (3) *Kāmya*, Prospective, performed for a particular purpose.

The above are the divisions of the *Positive Act*, the *Negative Act* consists in *Cessation* from *Activity*, or *Non-performance*. This is of two kinds (1) *Kratvartha*, *e.g.*, the not-holding of the *Ṣoḍashin-Vessels*; and (2) *Puruṣārtha*, *e.g.*, the not-killing of animals.

The third kind of Act, which is *neither Positive nor Negative* is also of two kinds—(1) *Kratvartha*, *e.g.*, the reciting of the *Yeyajāmaha-Mantras* which is done at the main Sacrifice and which is not done at the *Auuyājas*, and (2) *Puruṣārtha*, *e.g.*, the vow *not to look* at the Rising Sun.

(F) Grounds of Differentiation among Acts.

Having explained the more important classifications of Acts, we shall now turn our attention to the main question—What are the Means by which we ascertain the *difference* or *non-difference* among Acts.

The *Bhāsya* (on Sū. 2.1.1) has cited six means of such differentiation :—(1) *Different Words* (Under Sū. 2.2.1), (2) *Repetition* (Under Sū. 2.2.2), (3) *Number* (Under Sū. 2. 2. 21), (4) *Accessory Details* (Under Sū. 2.2.23), (5) *Context* (Under Sū. 2.3.24) and (6) *Name* (Under Sū. 2.2.22).

We proceed to explain each of them :—

(1) Differentiation by *Different Words* :—*When there is a different word, there is a different Act, because of its special equipment*—says the Sūtra (2.2.1). There are such texts as—(1) 'One should Sacrifice with *Soma*', (2) 'One should *pour the Libation into Fire*,' and (3) 'Give gold to *Ātreya*'; where we have three sentences containing three different verbs, denoting Acts. Unless there be reasons to the contrary, these three Acts must be different; as each of them has its own equipment of accessories.

(2) Differentiation by *Repetition* :—In a case where the same verb is used, but several times,—the *Repetition of one and the same word should indicate difference among the acts ; because, if there were no difference, the repetition would be useless.* (Sūtra 2.2.2), For example,—we have such texts as *'Samidho yajati—Tranvūnapatam yajati—Ido yajati-Varhiryajati-Svāhākāram yajati,*—where the same verb '*yajati*' has been repeated five times. On the face of it the idea is that the verb being the same, the Acts denoted by them must be the same. But the *Established Conclusion* is that if one and the same act were meant to be enjoined, then there would be no point in repeating the verb five times ; hence the texts should be taken as laying down five different Sacrifices.

(3) Differentiation by *Number* :—*Number should be a differentiator among Acts,—because it is based upon separateness,* says the Sūtra (2. 2. 21) ; *e.g.*, the text 'One sacrifices *seventeen* animals dedicated to *Prajāpati*'—lays down *seventeen* distinct acts of Sacrifice.

(4) Differentiation by *Accessory Details*—such as the Deity, the Material or other Accessories—*When a word denoting a material is related to a word denoting a Deity other than the one gone before, it becomes a Differentiator of the Acts*—says the *Sūtra* (2.2.23) ; *e.g.*, the text, 'When curd is put into hot milk, the milk becomes turned into curdled solids, called *Āmikṣā*, which is offered to the *Vishvedevas*,—and the liquid, the skimmed milk, is offered to the *Bājins*'—is taken as laying down two distinct offerings.

(5) Differentiation by *Context*—We have the injunction of the compulsory daily *Agnihotra* in the text'One should offer the *Agnihotra*' ; and in a different section of the Veda we have another text enjoining the performance of the *Agnihotra* 'for a month'. In this case the conclusion is that when the *Context* is different, *the purpose must be different* (Sū. 2.3.24) ; so that the *monthly Agnihotra* laid down in the second text must be different form the daily *Agnihotra* laid down in the former text.

(6) Differentiation by *Name* :—*The Name also differentiates Acts, as it occurs in the orginative Injunction,* says the Sūtra (2.2.22) ; *e.g.*, the text —'*Athaiṣa jyotiḥ—atha vishvajyotiḥ—Athaiṣa sarvajyotiḥ*'—is taken as mentioning three different acts named respectively (1) *Jyoti*, (2) *Vishvajyoti* and (3) *Sarvajyoti*.

It is interesting to note that though difference of *Context* differentiates acts, difference of the Veda-Shākhā is not accepted as a ground for differentiation : for instance, the *Agnihotra* is found enjoined by a text occurring in the *Kaṭhaka* Resension. The conclusion is that the act enjoined in all

these texts is one and the same *Agnihotra*,—because there is no difference in connection, in purpose, in form, in *injunction* or in *Name*—says the *Sūtra* (2.4.9).

A certain commentator, says *Kumārila*, has accepted only *four* grounds of differentiation—(1) Different *Words*, (2) Different *Names*, (3) Different *Accessory Details*, and (4) Different *Results*. He has included 'Number' and 'Repetition' under '*Words*', and 'Context' under 'Result'. This however is not acceptable—says *Kumārila*. (*Tantravārtika*, Trs., pp. 885-886).

CHAPTER XXIII

'PRINCIPAL' AND 'AUXILIARY'

Difference among Acts having been established, the next question that arises is—Is every one of these Acts self-contained and independent by itself in bringing about the *Apūrva* ? Or some of them are auxiliary or subsidiary or subsidiary and subordinate to, and subserving the purposes of, some others? And if the latter, then what Acts are subsidiary and subservient to what ? Though this 'subserviency of Acts' is the main subject-matter of this *Third* Discourse, yet as we proceed we shall find that it is not only *Acts* that are so 'subservient' or 'auxiliary', but also *Substances* and their *Properties*. This fact has to be borne in mind, because, as a matter of fact, the whole of the rest of the *Sūtras* (Discourses IV to XII) turn directly or indirectly upon this relation of 'Principal' and 'Auxiliary'. This has been thus declared by *Kumārila* (*Tantra-Vā.*, Trs,. p. 924) :—

शेषस्यैवाधिकारोऽत्र युक्तो नान्यस्य कस्यचित् ।
शेषधीसिद्ध्यपेक्षत्वात् सर्वलक्षणवाग्धियाम् ॥

That is, the question of 'Auxiliary character, has to be dealt with here, because the proper consideration of all other questions of *Motive* and the rest dealt with under Discourses IV to XII, is dependent upon this idea of 'auxiliary character'.

The *first* question is—What is an 'Auxiliary' ?

The answer to this has been provided in Sū. 3.1.2—*The Auxiliary is that which subserves the purposes of something else*; that is, the Auxiliary is to be defined as 'that which helps another' ;—that is, what exists *entirely for* helping others. (*Bhāṣya*, Trs., p. 337). This has been further explained as 'that which is indicated by *Direct Assertion*, etc., *as helping some Action, towards the fulfilment of its Apūrva*; this latter qualification being necessary for precluding mere *verbal* relationship. This *helping*, or *subserving the purpose of*, something else does not necessarily, in *itself*, imply that the Auxiliary must in some way help the Principal; but such *helping* is assumed on the basis of Presumption. For instance, in the case of *Sprinkling water* on the corn, the fact of its having been enjoined in connection with a Sacrifice leads to the Presumption that it must accord some help to this Sacrifice; similarly in the case of the *Prayājas* prescribed in connection with the *Darsha-Purṇamāsa* Sacrifices, we find that these latter stand in need of *help*; and also that certain other Acts in the shape of

the *Prayājas* need something to which they could accord some help ; and this mutual need leads us to the Presumption that the *Prayājas* help, and subserve the purpose of, the *Darsha-Purṇamāsa* Sacrifices.

In this connection there is a question that has created some confusion in the minds of the students of *Mīmāmsā*. In Sū. 2.1. 7-8, we have a division of Acts into 'Primary' and Subsidiary' ; now the 'Subsidiary' Act will naturally be *subservient* to the 'Primary', that is it will help it ; where then is there the use of raising the same question over again (under Discourse III) ?

Two answers have been provided to this question. (1) That the *Sūtras* under Discourse II have taken note of *Acts* only, and those also, only such as are actually found to fulfil only visible ends ; while the present Discourse III takes up not only all *Acts* serving visible and invisible ends, but also such details as *Substances*, *Mantras* and so forth. This answer has been rejected by *Kumārila* (*Tantra-Vā.*, Trs., p. 670), on the ground that under the said explanation, the subject-matter of Discourse II would be only a part of what is dealt with under Discourse III. The explanation that he suggests is that—(2)the fact that the *Acts* dealt with under Discourse II—Threshing of the Corn, for instance,—are 'subservient' to others can be ascertained only from what the *Sūtras* set forth under Discourse III ;—what has been said under Discourse II therefore is only this—that these acts cannot be regarded as bringing about an *Apūrva* by themselves. for the simple reason that they are found to fulfil purely visible purposes in connection with some other acts ; —'and under the circumstances, if they were to produce their own *Apūrva*,— there would be several *Apūrvas* produced by the Act'—adds the *Ṛijuvimalā* (MS., Vol. III, p. 11). (See p. 265)

According to *Prabhākara* (*Bṛhatī*, MS., p. 65 and *Rijuvimalā* MS., p. 1) the connection between the two Discourses (III and IV) is to be explained thus :—What has been explained under Discourse II is only the difference among *Injunctive Texts ;* that is to say, it has been shown there how and where two such texts are to be treated as *different*, by reason of the difference between the resultant *Apūrvas* indicated in each, and also of the difference among the several adjuncts of these ; and as the *Act* is the most important of these Adjuncts, the difference among *Acts* also has been expounded in this Discourse II ; *but this last only as the basis of differentiation among the Texts ;* thus the *difference* dealt with under that discourse is that based upon consideration of connection among the words of the Injunctive Text. On the other hand, the *difference* upon which the subject-matter of Discourse III is based is that of the *Niyoga* or *Apūrva*

resulting from Acts.—(See *Rijuvimalā,* MS., Vol. III, p. 3). The distinction herein drawn becomes clear from the example of the text 'Washes the Cup', where the relation between the *Cup* and the *Washing,* as expressed by the words, is only that of the *Cup* being the objective of the Act of *Washing;* while the relation of 'Subserviency' between the two is based upon the fact that the *Washing helps the Cup* towards the fulfilment of some other result. Thus what is dealt with under Discourse III is closely connected with what has gone before under Discourse II.

The next question is—What is it that can be 'Auxiliary' or 'Subsidiary' ?

The answer to this has been provided by *Sūtra* 3.1. 3—6 ; wherein it is stated that the 'Auxiliary character' can belong to (*a*) Substances, (*b*) Properties, and (*c*) Embellishments, (Sū. 3), also to (*d*) Acts (Sū. 4), (*e*) Results (Sū. 5) and (*f*) the Human Agent (Sū. 6).—(*a*) The Substance helps the Acts; no Act can be performed without a *Substance* ;—(*b*) the *Property* serves the purpose of marking out the Substance to be used ; and thereby helps the Act ;—(*c*) the *Embellishment* is that on the accomplishment of which a certain Substance becomes fit for a certain purpose, and thus helps the Act ; (*d*) the *Act* also is enjoined, not as something to be accamplished in itself, but only as a means of accomplishing the desired Result ; and in this capacity the Act is 'auxiliary' to the Result ;—(*e*) the *Result* of the Act also accrues to the performing Agent, and thereby serves to help and benefit him ; thus the Result also is 'Auxiliary' to the Agent ;—(*f*) the performing *Agent* also figures as 'Auxiliary' to the *Act,* in cases where, for instance, the Sacrificial Post is declared to be 'as tall as the Sacrificer' (*Bhāṣya,* Trs., pp. 339-340.)

There has been a difference of opinion among ancient sages on this matter of what can be an 'Auxiliary' : According to sage *Bādari,* the 'Auxiliary' character can belong to Substances, Properties and Embellishments only (as stated in Sū. 3) ; while according to Jaimini, it can belong to the Act, the Result and the Agent also. These two views have been sought to be reconciled by the 'revered *Vṛttikāra* in the following manner :—In relation to the *Sacrificial Act,* it is only Substances, Properties and Embellishments whose 'Auxiliary character' is *absolute,* these are *always auxiliary ;* while the 'Auxiliary character' of the other three—Act, Result and the Performing Agent—is relative ; for instance, while the Act is 'Principal' in relation to the *Substance,* it is 'Auxiliary' to the *Result ;* the Result is 'Principal' in relation to the Act, but 'Auxiliary' to the *Agent ;* and the *Agent* is 'Principal' in relation to the *Result,* but 'Auxiliary' to the *Act,*—(*Bhāṣya,* Trs., p. 340)

The 'auxiliary character' of the *Agent* in relation to the *Act* (of Sacrifice, as enjoined by the word '*Yajeta*') is clearly indicated by the Injunctive word '*Yajeta*' itself, in the connotation whereof the *Act of Sacrifice* forms the 'Principal' factor; and the *Agent* comes in only because without him, the said Act would not be possible.

The conclusion thus is that while Substances, Properties and Embellishments are *always* 'Subsidiary',—the *Act*, the *Result* and the *Agent* are both 'Auxiliary' and 'Principal' in relation to one another.
—Says *Kumārila* (*Tantravārtika*, Trs., p. 944).

फलयागनराणां च द्यकारत्वं परस्परम् ।

(A) Classification of Auxiliaries.

Auxiliaries have been classified by *Kumārila* and his followers under two heads—(1) Direct and (2) Indirect. Those Auxiliaries which help in the fulfilment of the Sacrifice, and only *through that Sacrifice*, the Final *Apūrva*, are callled 'Direct'; for instance, (*a*) the Substance (Corn) and (*b*) its Embellishments (Washing and Water-sprinkling), (*c*) the Deity (Agni, etc.) and (*d*) *Mantras*;—the water-sprinkling produces in the *Corn a* certain *Embellishment* not otherwise possible; the *threshing* helps the Corn by removing the chaff from the grain; the *Corn* itself helps the Sacrifice by making up the Cake; the *Mantras* help the Sacrifice by recalling and consecrating the Deity; the *Deity* helps the *Sacrifice* by becoming the *Recepient*, without whom no act of *Sacrifice* is possible; as the act of *Sacrifice* consists in offering Substances *to a Deity*. All these are 'Direct' Auxiliaries. On the other hand, those Auxiliaries are called 'Indirect' which produce distinct *Apūrvas* of their own,—these *Apūrvas* being produced in the Performer's Soul—and through these subsidiary *Apūrvas*, help the Final *Apūrva* of the Sacrifice itself. (*Shāstradīpikā*, p. 202).

Prabhākara and his followers (*Prakaraṇapañchikā*, 3p. 202—205) have proceeded on somewhat different lines, in regard to the classification of Auxiliaries. Their classification appears to be more logical and exhaustive. It has been made under the following four heads—(1) *Jāti*, Universal, (2) *Guṇa*, Quality, (3) *Dravya*, Substance, and (4) *Bhāvārthātmaka*, Action. The last of these, Action, has been divided into (1) *Sannipattyopakāraka*, Directly helpful and (2) *Ārādupakāraka*, Indirectly helpful. That which produces its direct effects in a certain entity which is conducive to the fulfilment of the Sacrifice is the *Sannipattyopakāraka*, *Direct* 'Auxiliary', of the Sacrifice (*Prakaraṇapañchikā*, p. 202); *e. g.*, the *Sitting* of the Sacrificer, the thumping of the Corn and so forth, bring about no *Apūrva* of their

own; but are related to the Final *Apūrva* of the Sacrifice to which they are Auxiliary. The *Sannipattyopakāraka*, or Direct Subsidiary, is again divided into the following four kinds—(*a*) that which brings about a certain Substance, *e.g.*, the *kneading of the Flour*, which brings into existence the Dough, which did not exist before;—(*b*) that which leads to the acquiring of a certain Substance that existed already; *e. g.*, the milking of the Cow; which brings about the acquisition of the Milk which was already there in the Cow;—(*c*) that which produces some modification in a Substance; *e.g.*, the *melting* of Clarrified Butter, which changes the semi-solid into the liquid form; and (*d*) that which purifies, sanctifies or embellishes a Substance; *e.g.*, the *Sprinkling of Water* over the Corn, which does not produce any material change in the Corn, but adds to it some-thing invisible and transcendental. (*Prakaraṇapañchikā*, pp. 202—205).

Under the *Bhāṭṭa* view, the *Sannipattyopakāraka* or Direct Auxiliaries lead to no distinct *Apūrvas* of their own; their full effect lies only in the accomplishment of certain material Substances; these have thus only visible Effects (See *Tantra-vā.* Trs. p. 526), and help the final *Apūrva* of the Sacrifice only through the aid that they impart to the *material* fulfilment of the Sacrifice. But even though these Auxiliaries themselves do not bring about distinct *Apūrvas*, yet, according to the followers of *Kumārila*, a certain distinct *Apūrva* does proceed from the choice of the particular Subsidiary; says he *Shāstradīpikā* (P. 203)—

नियमादृष्टं तु कल्पनीयम् । तद्वरमेकमेव दृष्टार्थविघातनियमात् अदृष्टं कल्पितम् ॥

For instance, the visible effect, in the shape of the removal of chaff, for which the Thumbing and Threshing of the Corn have been laid down, can be accomplished by several methods; and hence, though the *Thumping and Threshing* may not produce an *Apūrva*, yet the *choice* that the Performer exercises, in having recourse to the one method of *Thumping and Threshing*, for removing the Chaff, does produce an *Apūrva*. The reason for this is that, according to *Kumārila*, every Vedic Injunction, by its very nature, must be related to an *Apūrva*; and as the *Thumping and Threshing* have been *enjoined*, it must be related to an *Apūrva*; but as the Act of *Thumping and Threshing* itself is found to be productive of a *visible* Result, in the shape of the removal of the Chaff, the *Apūrva* to which it is related can be due only to the *choice* of that particular method of removing the Chaff in preference to other methods; and the real reason underlying all this lies in the fact that the Vedic Injunction must lay down a *Dharma*,—and if that *Dharma* were not conducive to an *Apūrva*, the said Injunction would

lose its character of 'being an Injunction of *Dharma*'; and hence as the act itself is found to be conducive to only a visible end, we must accept an *Apūrva* as proceeding from the *choice* that is exercised. It is for this reason that such Injunctions have been called '*Niyamavidhi*', 'Restrictive Injunction'.

This above view has not been accepted by the *Prābhākara*, according to whom, as explained above, though the *Saninpattyopakāraka*, Direct Auxiliary, is related to the Final *Apūrva* of the Sacrifice, it does not produce any distinct *Apūrva* of its own; as all that the Auxiliary—the *Thumping* of the Corn, for instance, does is to bring about something visible, *e.g.*, the Removal of the Chaff; and yet it is a fit object of Injunction, as it does, through the fulfilment of the Sacrificial performance, help in the bringing about of the Final *Apūrva* of that Sacrifice. That is why such Auxiliary Acts have been called *Sannipattyopakāraka,*—which term has been etymologically explained as—

यागस्वरूपे एव सन्निपत्य तस्यापूर्वसिद्धौ उपकुर्वन्ति

(*Prakaraṇapañchikā*). This relationship to the Final *Apūrva* is deduced from the proximity of the text enjoining the Auxiliary to the text enjoining the Principal Sacrifice as leading to that Final *Apūrva,* and from the words of the text itself. This explanation has been objected to on the ground that, in this manner, as the principal fact of the Subsidiary being related to the *Apūrva* would not be expressed by the Vedic text itself, this text would become practically meaningless. The *Prābhākara's* answer to this objection is that it is not necessary that every Vedic text must mention some purpose to be served; it is only a question of facts; a text that does not mention a purpose cannot be made to mention it. In the case in question however, the text does not become meaningless or purposeless, as it serves the purpose of laying down a certain method of doing a certain Act; and it is only the connection of that method with the *Apūrva* that is left to be implied by the said proximity of the text to the text enjoining the Principal Sacrifice;—and that Proximity forms one of the bases of Syntactical Connection is admitted by all philosophers. Thus the conclusion arrived at by the *Prābhākara* is—(*a*) that all *Sannipattyopakāraka*, Direct Auxiliaries, are 'Subservient' to the *Apūrva*, through Direct Assertion, (*b*) that they are 'Subservient' to the *Substance* conducive to the fulfilment of the Sacrificial Performance, through the very nature of the Substance concerned, —and (*c*) they are 'Subservient' to the *Sacrifice* itself, which is 'instrumental' in the bringing about of the Final *Apūrva,* by virtue of their

providing the *Substance* suitable for being offered at the Sacrifice.—(*Prakaraṇapañchikā*, pp. 232—209).

As regards the second kind of Auxiliary, the *Ārādupakāraka*, *Indirect* Auxiliary,—it is of two kinds—(*a*) That which fulfils only an *unseen* purpose, and (*b*) That which fulfils a *Seen* as well as an *Unseen* purpose. As an example of the latter kind we have the *Payovrata*—the Penance of living on Milk alone,—observed by the Sacrificer and his wife, during the performance of the *Jyotiṣṭoma;* and as examples of the former kind, we have all the Acts that are enjoined by the texts like 'Perform the *Samiṭ*-Sacrifice', which do not mention any effects produced by the Act either in any Sub stance or in the performing Agent, which would help the main Act of Sacrifice; and as it is only effects produced in the Substance or in the Agent that could be *seen*, the *act* of Sacrifice cannot but be regarded as bringing about an *Unseen* result. But all Acts of this class produce an *intermediate Apūrva*, through which they help in the appearance of the Final *Apūrva* of the Principal Sacrifice, to which latter, on that account, they are regarded as 'Auxiliary'. As these Actions do not help the Principal Sacrifice in any perceptible manner, if they were not held to be productive of the *intermediate Apūrva*, then, as they will have disappeared long before the fruition of the Final *Apūrva*, they would not accord any help to the Principal Sacrifice. It is for this reason that in such cases, *Prabhākara* also admits of intermediate *Apūrvas* resulting from the Auxiliaries.

This admission of the intermediate *Apūrvas* might give rise to the idea that a result of this kind would raise the further question regarding the method by which those Intermediate *Apūrvas* are to be brought about. With a view to such a contingency, the *Prābhākara* (in *Prakaraṇapañchikā*, pp. 214-215) has drawn a subtle distinction between the '*Anuṣṭheya*' and the '*Kārya*'*;* that which is recognised by the Agent, independently by itself, as something 'to be done by me' is *Anuṣṭhēya;* while that is *Kārya* which, not existent before, is brought into existence only for the sake of the accomplishment of the former. It is the Final *Apūrva* alone that is *Anuṣṭhēya;* and as a rule, the questions of method and procedure arise only in regard to what is *Anuṣṭhēya*, not in regard to what is *Kārya;* hence no such question can arise in regard to the Intermediate *Apūrvas*, which are recognised only as helping in the accomplishment of the Final *Apūrva*.

It may be noted here that the *Prābkākara* is rather strict in the matter of postulating *Apūrvas;* so long as he can find any perceptible result to justify an act, he will not assume an *Adṛṣṭa* or *Apūrva; Kumārila*, on the

other hand, postulates an *Apūrva* in connection with every Injunction. Being an *Anvitābhidhānavādin,* the *Prābhākara* does not accept the maxim, '*Shābdī ākānkṣā shabdenaiva pūryate*',—by which the Details of Method and Procedure can be sought after only for the sake of a result in the shape of the *Apūrva,* and not for the sake of the Substance. (See *Nyāyamālāvistara,* p. 423). This maxim necessitates the assumption of an *Apūrva* with every Injunction, each of which under this maxim, must be self-contained, having all its needs as an Injunction supplied by itself; hence even that *Apūrva,* which is one of the factors in the *Bhāvanā* denoted by the Injunctive verb, has to be got out of every Injunction, even of the *Sannipattyopakāraka* or Direct Auxiliary; such *Apūrva* arising, if not from the Auxiliary act itself, at least from the *Niyama* or *Choice of* the particular method (See above). The *Prābhākara* however, not accepting the said maxim, takes every Injunction all along with all that it is found to be related to; and thus when the Auxiliary Act mentioned in the Injunctive text is found to be expressive of the *bringing about of a material Substance,* it becomes related to the Injunction of the Principal Sacrifice in the following manner: —The *Apūrva* of the Principal Sacrifice enjoined by the Principal Injunctive text is to be brought about by means of the Principal Act peformed with materials and Substances brought into existence by means of the Auxiliary Acts enjoined by the Auxiliary Injunctive texts. Thus there is no need for assuming an *Apūrva* in connection with these latter acts; the objective of these injunctions resting entirely in the materials and substances brought into existence in accordance with them, which materials and substances are used at the principal Sacrifice.

(B) Means of Ascertaining what is Auxiliary to what

There are six means of ascertaining what is auxiliary to what. These are (1) *Shruti*—Direct Assertion (in the Veda); (2) *Linga*—Indirect Indication; (3) *Vākya*—Syntactical Connection; (4) *Prakaraṇa*—Context; (5) *Krama* (or *Sthāna,*), Order of Sequence, (or Place); and (6) *Samākhyā*—Name.

As an instance of (1) *Direct Assertion,* we have the following;—There are certain *Mantra-texts* which are held to be sacred to certain Deities; one such *Mantra* is named '*Aindrī*;' in regard to this there is the *Direct Assertion,* in *Vajasaneya-Samhitā* (12—66), to the effect that 'With the *Aindrī* one should worship the *Gārhapatya Fire*';—in regard to this *Aindrī-Mantra,* there is a doubt, as to whether it should be used in the worshipping of *Indra,*—as indicated by its name '*Aindrī*'—or in that of the *Gārhapatya Fire,* —as declared in the Direct Assertion of the Veda; the conclusion

is that it should be used in the worshipping of the *Gārhapatya Fire;* and thus the *Mantra* becomes 'auxiliary' to the act of *worshipping* the said Fire. (Mīmā—Sū. 3.2.3-4).

(2) *Linga—Indirect Indication.*—It has been laid down in the Veda that at the *Soma-Sacrifice,* the Soma-juice that is left after all the offerings have been made should not be thrown away, it should be *drunk.* In connection with the *drinking of the Soma-Juice,* we meet with the *Mantra-text*——'*Bhaksēhi etc*'. (Tai. Sam. 3.2.5.1) called the '*Bhakṣanuvāka*'. In regard to this the question arising as to whether this *Mantra* is to be used in connection with the act of actual *drinking* itself—as indicated by the name '*Bhakṣānuvāka*'—or in connection with the several acts attendant upon that act; the conclusion is that it is to be used in connection with the *drinking* and also at all the attendant acts, such as holding the Juice in the hand examining it, swallowing it,—all which collectively go to make up the act of '*Drinking*'. In accordance with this conclusion, the whole of the said *Bhakṣānuvāka* Mantra-text is broken up into four parts,—each part being employed with each of the four acts mentioned above as making up the act of '*Drinking*'. All this is due to the *Indirect Indication* of the words and expressions contained in the said Mantra-text. (a) So that the sentence beginning with the word '*bhakṣēhi*' and ending with the word '*saghyāsam*' is to be used in connection with the *holding* of the juice-cup, such being the Indirect Indication of the word '*saghyāsam*'; (b) the Sentence beginning with the word '*Nṛchakṣasam*' and ending with the word '*Avakhyēṣam*' is to be used in connection with the act of *Looking at or Examining the juice,* through the indication of some of the words; (c) the Sentence beginning with the word '*Hinva*' and ending with the word '*Atigāḥ*', is to be used in connection with the act of *digesting* (swallowing) the juice, through the implication of the words in the *Mantra;* and (d) the sentence begining with the word '*Mandrābhibhuti*' and ending with the word '*bhakṣayami*', is to be used with the act of actual *Eating or Drinking,* as indicated by last word.—(Mi. Su.).

(3) *Vākya, Syntactical Connection.*—In connection with the *Jyotiṣṭoma,* we meet with the declaration (*Shatapatha Brāhmana* 4.4.6.16 and 4.6.17.18) that 'The *Ṛk* should be recited *loudly,* and the *Yajus,* silently', The question arises as to the exact meaning of the terms *Ṛk* and *Yajus* in this connection. Do they mean the *Ṛgveda* and the *Yajurveda?*—or the *Metrical* and *Prose passages* respectively? In the latter case, those *Mantras* which are in the *metrical* form, even though they may be contained in the *Yajurveda,* would have to be recited *loudly;* while, in the former case,

all that appears in the *Yajurveda* would have to be recited *silently.* The conclusion on this point is that the two words stand for the two *Vedas*, not for the *metrical* and *prose* passages; and thus on the ground that, in the earlier part of the passage, at the end of which was found the text in question, we have this declaration—'These *Vedas* came into existence, the *Ṛgveda* from *Agni*, the *Yajurveda* from *Vāyu* etc. etc': and as the aforesaid direction in regard to the *Ṛk* being recited *loudly* is a continuation of this same sentence asserting the origin of the Vedas,—there is *Syntactical connection* between the two parts of the passage, by virtue of which connection it is clear that the terms '*ṛk*' and '*yajus*' in the latter part of the passage refer to the *Vedas* spoken of in the former part; and in accordance with this conclusion the metrical passages occurring in the text of the *Yajurveda* should *not* be recited *loudly.* (Mī. Sū. 3.3.1).

(4) '*Prakaraṇa*', *Context.*—There are the Vedic texts—'(a) Desiring Heaven, one should perform the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* Sacrifices',—(b) 'He should perform the *Samid-Sacrifice*',—(c) 'He should perform the *Tanūnapāt* Sacrifice'—(*Shatapatha* Brs. 1.5.3.9.);—we find that there is no *Syntactical Connection* among these three sentences, and each sentence stands independently by itself, and is, as such, capable of being regarded as the Injunction of a distinct Sacrifice;—nor is there anything in the Sentences to deduce an Indirect Indication of any sort of dependence or connection between the *Samid* and *Tanūnapāt* Sacrifices—enjoined by the second and third sentences respectively—on the one hand, and the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa Sacrifice*—enjoined by the first sentence, on the other. It is found however that no result has been mentioned in connection with either the *Samid* or the *Tanūnapāt* Sacrifice, in the way that 'Heaven' is mentioned in connection with the *Darsha-Purṇamāsa.* We also recognise the fact that, being enjoined by the Veda, those two sacrifices also must lead to some desirable result; and yet at the same time, no such result is found to be mentioned. All this leads to the conclusion that the Injunction of these Sacrifices is wanting in that factor of the Result, as without the Result to be accomplished, the operation of the Injunction remains incomplete (See above). Then again, as regards the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* Sacrifice also, it is found that all the information that the injunction (contained in the first sentence) provides is that 'if one desires to attain Heaven, he should perform the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* Sacrifice'; and it says nothing as to the procedure or method to be adopted in the performance of those Sacrifices. This shows that this Injunction also is wanting in the factor of the *Procedure;* and without this, the operation of the Injunction remains incomplete. Now

then, taking the two sets of Injunctions into consideration, we find that, if taken together, they supply each other's need; the factors wanting in the one being supplied by the other; so that 'the attainment of Heaven' mentioned in the Injunction of the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*, becomes recognised as the result towards the accomplishment of which the *Samid* and *Tanūnapāt* Sacrifices also lend some help;—and also that these two Sacrifices make up the *Procedure* needed by the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*. This *Supplying of Mutual Need* is what has been called *Prakaraṇa* (Context). The conclusion thus is that the *Samid and Tanūnapāt* Sacrifices—collectively known as *Prayājas*—are *auxiliary* to the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*—(Mī. Sū. 3.3.2).

(5) *Krama or Sthāna—Order of Sequence, or Position.*—Under the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* Section there is the Mantra.

दब्धिरसि अदब्धो भूयासम् अमुं दमेयम् ।

'Thou art the Missile, May I remain unhurt; may I strike *so and so* (the enemy)'—(Taitti. Sam. 1.6.2.4.). There is no Direct Assertion in the Veda as to where this Mantra is to be used; nor is there anything in the *Mantra* that could show by Indirect Indication where it is to be used; nor is any guidance available in the shape of Syntactical Connection or Context. We find however that three sacrifices—the *Āgṇeya*, the *Upāṁshu*, and the *Agnīṣomīya*—have been mentioned in a definite order; and subsequently we find three *Mantras* mentioned in connection with these three sacrifices; and as the three sacrifices are mentioned in a definite *order*,—and the three *Mantras* also are mentioned in a definite *order*,—the natural conclusion is that the *first* of the *Mantras* is to be used at the *first* of the Sacrifices, the *second* at the *second* and the *third* at the *third*. The Mantra quoted above happens to be *second* of the three *Mantras*; hence it is taken as to be used at, and be auxiliary to, the *Second* of the Sacrifices,—*viz.*, the *Upāṁshuyāga*. (Mī. Sū. 3.3.12).

(6) *Samākhyā, Name*—There are several *Mantras* mentioned as to be recited by the several Priests officiating at the Sacrificial Performance; in many cases, there are no definite Direct Injunctions as to which Mantra is to be recited by which Priest; nor, in many cases, is there anything to indirectly *indicate* this;—nor is any guidance provided by either Syntactical Connection or Context or Order of Sequence. The conclusion however that there might otherwise arise under the circumstances has been averted by the *Names* that have been applied to the *Mantras*—such as (a) '*Hautra*' indicating that the Mantras (mainly those of the *Ṛgveda*) so named are to be recited by the *Hotṛ Priest*,—(b) '*Ādhvaryava*', indicating that the Mantras

(mainly those of the *Yajurveda*) so named are to be recited by the *Adhvaryu-Priest,* (c) '*Audgātra*', indicating that the Mantras (mainly those of the *Sāmaveda*) so named are to be recited by the *Udgātṛ-Priest.* Thus the fact of the *Hautra-Mantras* being 'auxiliary' to the *Hotṛ-Priest* and so forth is ascertained throguh the *name* of the Mantra.—(Mī. Sū. 3.3.13).

CASES OF CONFLICT

The six Means of determining the character of *Auxiliaries* have been described. Now arises the question—Which of these is to be regarded as most authoritative in a case where two or more of these are applicable, but in conflict with one another ?

The answer to this question has been provided by *Sūtra* 3.3.14. *Among 'Direct Assertion', 'Indicative Power', 'Syntactical Connection', 'Context 'Place', and 'Name',—that which follows is weaker than that which precedes; because it is more remote from the final Objective.* That is to say, when there is conflict between what is *directly asserted* by a Vedic text and what is implied by the *Indicative Power* of a certain word, it is the former that is to be accepted and the latter to be rejected. The principle underlying this supersession of the one by the other is that in all matters relating to *Dharma,* nothing can be accepted as authoritative except what is declared in the Veda ; in the case of *Direct Assertion, what should be done* is directly declared in the Veda ; in the case of *Indicative Power,* on the other hand, even when the *indication* is accepted, the course of action indicated is accepted as authorised only after, on the strength of the said *indication,* a *Direct Assertion* to the same effect is assumed. It is for this reason that whenever there is conflict between these two, the *Direct Assertion,* which is self-sufficient, accomplishes its purpose long before the Indicative Power can accomplish its own, through the *assumed* Direct Assertion.

(1) As an instance of this conflict and supersession, we have the following :—There is the Vedic text ऐन्द्रया गार्हपत्यमुपतिष्ठते—'With the *Aindrī-Mantra* one worships the *Gārhapatya Fire*' (Vā-jasa. Sam, 12.66) ; here we have *Direct Assertion* declaring the use of the *Aindrī-Mantra* in the worshipping of the *Gārhapatya Fire ;* on the other hand in the said Mantra itself

कदा च नस्तरीरसिनेन्द्र सश्चसि दासुषे-

(*O Indra,* you never hurt any one, etc. etc.') (*Ṛgvēda Sam.* 8. 51. 7),—we find the word '*Indra*' which, by its *Indicative Power,* indicates the Mantra as to be used in the worshipping of '*Indra*'. Thus there is conflict between the two—Direct Assertion and Indicative Power ; but before the latter can

become effective, it is necessary to assume, on the strength of this Indication, a Direct Assertion to the effect that 'the *Aindrī Mantra* should be used in the worshipping of *Indra*' ; but the way to this assumption is barred by the actual Direct Assertion to the contrary declaring that 'the *Aindrī-Mantra* is to be used in the worshpping of the *Gārhapatya Fire.* (Bṛhati MS., p. 78B). As a consequence, the Indicative Power loses all its force and becomes superseded by the Direct Assertion to the contrary, and the conclusion is that the *Aindrī-Mantra* is used in worshipping *the Gārhapatya Fire.*

(2) *Indicative Power* in its turn is more authoritative than *Syntactical Connection.* There is conflict between these two in the following case :— In connection with the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* Sacrifice, there is the *Mantra*—

स्योनं ते सदनं कृणोमि घृतस्य धारया सुषेवं कल्पयामि,
सीदामृते प्रतिष्ठित वृहीणाम्मेध सुमनस्यमानः—

['O Cake, I am preparing a nice seat for thee, and with clarified butter I am making it comfortable ; O Essence of Corn, may thou, with a peaceful mind, take thy seat upon this' (Tai. Brā. 3. 7. 5. 2)]. Here the words as *Syntactically Connected* make a single sentence of the two parts of the *Mantra ;* and this would imply that the *whole Mantra* is to be used in the preparing of the Kusha-Seat for the Cake ;—but the words of the two parts of the Mantra distinctly *indicate* that the first part of it is to be used in the *preparing of seat* (*'Sadanam Kṛṇomi'*), and the second part in the *placing* of the Cake upon the *Kusha* (*'tasminsīda'*). What makes this latter indication by the Indicative Power of the words more authoritative than the former implication by Syntactical Connection is that in the case of the Syntactical Connection, it is necessary to assume *firstly,* the Indicative Power of the word *'Kṛṇomi'* indicating the use of the *Mantra* in the *preparing of the seat,* and then *secondly* the *Direct Assertion* in support of the idea that the *Whole* Mantra is to be used in that act of *preparing ;* whereas in the case Indicative Power, the only assumption necessary is that of the *Direct Assertion* to the effect that 'the first part of the Mantra is to be used in the *preparing* of the seat, and the second in *placing the Cake* upon it' ; thus is one step nearer to *Direct Assertion* than Syntactical Connection. This is what is meant by the words of the *Sūtra*—'Because it is more remote from the final objective'. *Prabhākara* has added one more reason for *Indicative Power* being more authoritative than *Sytactical Connection* :—As to how a certain *Yajus-Mantra* is to be used depends upon the useful purpose served by it ; what this purpose is can be learnt,—in the absence of *Direct Assertion* on the point,—only from the signification of the words composing the *Mantra ;* thus then, the use indicated by the Indicative Power of the words is based directly

upon what follows the very foundation of the usefulness of the *Mantra ; Syntactical Connection* on the other hand, indicates the use of the *Mantra* only on the verbal basis of grammatical construction afforded by the words, irrespectively of any useful purpose served by it ;—in this way *Indicative Power* is much nearer to the basis of usefulness than *Syntactical Connection*. (*Bṛhatī* MS. pp. 79A-79B).

(3) *Syntactical Connection* is more authoritative than *Context.* In the *Sūktavāka* mentioned in connection with the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*, there is the text—

अग्नीषोमविदं हविराजुषेताम्—इन्द्राग्नी इदं हविराजुषेताम् ।

(Tai. Brā. 3. 5. 10. 3) ;—as this *Mantra* occurs in the *Context* of the *Darsha-Purnamāsa*, one section of which is performed on the Moonless Day and the other on the Full-Moon Day—it would follow that the word '*Agnīsomau*' should be omitted on the Full-moon Day ; but before this implication of the Context is accepted as authoritative it would be necessary—(1) to assume, on the strength of the *Context*, the *Syntactical Connection* (which is not present) between the two sets of words '*havirā-juṣtām*' *and* '*indrāgni*',—(2) to assume on the strength of this assumed *Syntactical Connection*, the indication of *Indra* etc., by the *Indicative Power* of the words of the first section of the *Mantra*,—and (3) to assume, on the strength of the assumed *Indicative Power*, the *Direct Assertion* to the effect that the *Mantra* is to be used in making offerings to *Indra-Agni*. On the other hand, *Syntactical Connection* directly indicates that the words have to be retained in both cases, in as much as each is syntactically connected with the word that follows ; and for the acceptance of this Procedure, as the *Syntactical Connection* is already present, it is necessary to asume only the *Indicative Power* indicating the Deities and the ultimate *Direct Assertion.* This being one step less remote from the ultimate Direct Assertion, *Syntactical Connection* has been regarded as more authoritative than *Context.* A further reason provided by *Prabhākara* (*Bṛhatī* Ms. p. 79B) is that what is indicated by *Syntactical Connection* is based upon the meaning afforded by the natural construction and interpretation of the words of the *Mantra*,—while what is indicated by *Context* would, at best, be based upon some construction or interpretation forced upon the words in view of circumstances beyond the limits of the *Mantra*-text itself.

(4) *Context* is more authoritative than *Order of Sequence* or *Place.* Under the *Rājasūya* Sacrifice there are several Primary Sacrifices, one of which is the *Abhiṣechanīya ;* close upon the Injunction of this *Abhiṣechanīya*, we find the Injunctions of certain minor acts like *Gambling ;* the Place, i.e.,

the *proximity*—of these latter to the *Abhiṣēchanīya* would indicate that the Gambling is 'auxiliary' to the *Abhiṣēchanīya ;* on the other hand, the fact that the Gambling is mentioned under the Context of the *Rājasūya,* would indicate it as being 'auxiliary' to the *Rājasūya* itself. Under the circumstances, the Gambling has been regarded as 'auxiliary' to the *Rājasūya.* The reason for this preference is the same as in the previous cases—*Context* being one step nearer to *Direct Assertion* than *Place* (Proximity). According to *Prabhākara* (*Bṛhatī* Ms. 79B-80), *Context* is operative only through the mutual need between a certain *act* and a certain *Mantra ;* hence when the Context indicates that the *Mantra* is to be used at a certain act (Sacrifice), it is more direct in its operation than *Order* or *Place ;* because the connection between the Act and the *Mantra* is indicated by Context—or Mutual Need, —directly through *Syntactical Connection.* which is established, through that mutual need, between the words of the *Mantra* and the word denoting the Act ; while, for establishing such a connection, the *Order* or *Place* would stand in need of several more intervening factors ; for instance, the (1) *Order* or *Place* will indicate the Mutual need, (2) the Mutual Need will indicate the *Syntactical Connection,* and (3) the *Syntactical Connection* will indicate the connection tetween the Mantra and the Act.

(5) *Order* or *Place* is more authoritative than *Name.* There is the *Mantra*—शुन्धध्वं दैव्याय कर्मणे ('Become purified for purposes of the Divine Act') (Tai. Sam. 1. 1. 3. 1) ;—this is found in the chapter known as '*Pauroḍāshika*' by *name ;*—this fact would imply that the *Mantra* should be used for the purification of the *Puroḍāsha,* the Cake. On the other hand, the *Mantra* is found in a *Place* in close proximity to the words speaking of the *Sānnāyya* vessels ; on the strength of this latter fact the *Mantra* is used in the cleaning of these latter vessels. The reason for this also lies in the fact that the *Order* or *Place* is one step nearer to *Direct Assertion* than *Name ;* and also according to *Prabhākara* (*Bṛhatī* Ms. p. 80) in the fact that while *Order* or *Place* is something *Vedic,* Scriptural, the *Name* is more or less *Laukika, worldly,* Secular.

It being impossible for every act at the Sacrificial performance to be done by the Sacrificing Householder himself alone, the need arose for the calling in of outside assistance ; this gave rise to the question as to how far the results of the acts done by these other persons would accrue to the *Sacrificer ;* and the conclusion arrived at is that if the *Sacrificer* selects and appoints and pays for the services rendered by these other persons,—he becomes the prime mover of all that is done by these persons ; so that the results and benefits of these acts should all accrue to the *Sacrificer* himself ;

his assistants, being paid officiating priests, get only the Sacrificial Fee provided in connection with each act or office. As such *securing of services* on payment has been laid down in the Scriptures, there is nothing incongruous in it. As a result of this conclusion, the acts that are actually *done* by the Sacrificing Master of the House himself are only (1) the *Saṅkalpa,* the declaring of his resolution to perform the Sacrifice, (2) the *Varaṇa*—the selecting and appointing—of the Priests to officiate at the performance, and (3) the Paying of the Fees to them;—and the rest of the detailed performance is done *for him* by these officiating Priests. (Sū. 3. 7. 18—20).

This is the Principle that may be taken as underlying the law that the *instigator* of the act is as responsible as the actual *doer* of it.

This leads us on to the subject of these Officiating Priests styled *Ṛtviks*'. The first question that arises is—

Is the number of such Priests limited ? or may one engage as many as one likes ?—The conclusion is that the number is limited; because *they should be engaged in accordance with their titles, as it is under these titles that their respective duties have been severally assigned in the Veda,*—says Sū. 3. 7. 22. What is meant is that the number of Priests to-be engaged should be as many as the duties that have been laid down as to be performed by the several performers named in the Veda. The texts naming such performers are the following:—'*First of all, the Adhvaryu* (1) *does the distribution, the Pratiprasthātṛ* (2) *offers the Manthin—the Neṣṭṛ* (3) *brings up the Sacrificer's Wife,—the Unnetṛ* (4) *fills the cup;—the Prastotṛ* (5) *introduces the Chant,—the Udgātṛ* (6) *does the chanting,—the Pratihartṛ* (7) *sings the Pratihāra chant,—the Subrahmṇnya* (8) *recites the Subrahmaṇyā,—the Hotṛ* (9) *recites the Prātaranuvāka hymn,—the Maitrāvaruṇa* (10) *gives directions and recites the Puronuvākyā,—the Achchhāvāka* (11) *recites the Yājyā,—the Grāvastut* (12) *recites the Grāvastotrīya Mantra*'. In accordance with this Vedic Text, there is need for just these twelve priests; hence these must be engaged. All the numerous acts have not been mentioned here. There are however several whose performer is indicated by the titles of the priests; for instance, the act of *Homa*—Pouring Libations into Fire,—is to be done by the priest who holds the title of '*Hotṛ*'. (*Bhāṣya,* Trs., pp. 632-633.)

It might be argued that—"As one and the same person may perform several duties, the enumeration of the Duties cannot determine the exact number of Priests to be engaged" (Sū. 23). The answer to this is that this cannot be right; because in the originative Injunctions laying down the

employment of Priests, it is found that each Priest, before he begins to function, is given a distinct title; for instance, we find such texts as 'He appoints the Brahman Priest', 'He appoints the *Hotṛ-Priest*', 'He appoints the *Udgātṛ-Priest*', 'He appoints the *Adhvaryu-Priest*'; according to this each priest is given the title along with his appointment, before he has begun to function. From this it is clear that in the performance of the Sacrifice, there is need for the Priests of this kind, hence they must be engaged; and in as much as the necessity of engaging the Priests is dictated by the requirements of the Sacrifice, the text quoted is to be taken merely as *describing* the appointment of the Priests, *not* as an *Injunction* of actually *engaging* them. [*Kumārila* has demurred to this and declared, in *Tantra. Vā.* Trs. p. 1622, that 'the number is laid down by the Injunction of the appointments themselves'].—Nor is it necessary for the Veda to declare it in so many words that '*So many Priests* should be appointed'. (*Bhāṣya*, Trs. pp. 633-634).

The exact number of the Priests as the Soma-Sacrifice, as also at the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*, (Says the *Bhāṣya*, Trs, p. 635) is *seventeen*; these are the following, as definitely enunciated in the text prescribing their Initiation. (1) The *Adhvaryu*, who does all that is prescribed in the Yajurvēda—and under him come (2) the *Pratipasthātṛ*, (3) *Nēṣṭṛ*, (4) *Unnētṛ*; (5) *Brahman*, who supervises the performance of the acts prescribed in all the *Vedas*, and under him come (6) *Brāhmaṇāchchhamsin*, (7) *Agnīt* and (8) *Potṛ*;—(9) *Udgātṛ*—who does the chanting,—and under him come (10) *Prastotṛ*, (11) *Pratihartṛ*, (12) *Subrahmaṇya*;—(13) *Hotṛ*, who does the invoking of blessings, —and under him come (14) *Maitrāvaruṇa*, (51) *Achchhāvāka* and (16) *Grāvastut*—(Sū. 3.7.37, *Bhāṣya* Trs. pp. 646-647). The *Master of the Sacrifice*, *i.e.*, the *Sacrificer*, has been regarded as the *seventeenth* 'Priest'—*on the basis of the Similarity of Functions*—says the *Sūtra* (3.7.38). This 'similarity of functions' has been thus explained—Aa a matter of fact, persons taking part in the performance of the Sacrifice are called 'Priests';—the *Sacrificer* also takes part in this performance, and as such is entitled to be regarded as a 'Priest'.

As regards the duties of these *Priests*, their functions are restricted by their names, that is, *there should be a restriction and distribution of functions among the Priests on the basis of their names, as it is for that purpose that distinct titles have been assigned to them.* (Sū. 40). That is on the basis of the particular titles given to the particular Priests. there should be a restriction of their functions. The functions that have been named after a certain priest should be performed by that priest; for example, the functions named '*Ādhvargava*' should be performed by the *Adhvaryu Priest*, those

named '*Hautra*', by the *Hoṭr Priest*, those named '*Audgātra*' by the *Udgāṭr-Priest*. (*Bhāṣya* Trs. p. 650).

That the duties of the Priests are regulated by the names (of the Acts and of the Priests) is the general rule ; but there are exceptions to this. For instance, in certain cases, there are distinct texts enjoining the performance of a certain act by a particular priest. For instance, there is the text laying down that 'the *Maitrā-varuṇa-Priest* gives directions and recites the *Puronuvākyā*' (Tai. Br. 3. 12. 9. 5), where the two functions of *giving directions* and *reciting* are specifically assigned to the *Maitrāvaruṇa-Priest*, though, under the general rule, the work of *giving directions* falls within the scope of the '*Adhvaryu's* functions', and *reciting* is an act falling within the scope of the '*Hoṭr's* functions' ; but in view of the direct Injunction quoted, the said functions are performed by the *Maitrāvaruṇa-Priest*.

Similarly, certain acts have been given distinct names which take them out of the purview of the Priest to whom they would fall under the general rule, and assign them to other Priests. For instance, certain acts have been called '*Potrīya*' and '*Neṣṭrīya*',—which acts would, under the General Rule, have been performed by the *Brahman* and the *Adhvaryu* respectively, but have become transferred by the said special names, to the purview of the *Poṭr* and *Neṣṭr* Priests respectively.—(*Bhāṣya*, Trs. p. 651).

There is an important counter-exception to this exception. The *Shyēna-Sacrifice* is found mentioned in the section called '*Audgātra*' ; under the rule just stated, the whole of this Sacrifice should have to be performed by the *Udgāṭr-Priest alone*. As a matter of fact however, the *Shyēna* has the *Jhotiṣṭoma* for its Archetype ; and the Injunctions relating to the *Jyoṭistoma* distinctly indicate certain acts as to be performed by certain Priests ; hence according to these, the same has to be done at the *Shyēna-Sacrifice* also. (Sūtra 3. 7. 50-51).

There are several special functions assigned to definite persons ; these have been dealt with in the Sū. 3. 8. The following are a few instances : (a) The *Engaging of Services* is to be done by the Master of the Sacrifice (3. 8. 1) ; (*b*) The 'Shaving of the Head' is to be done by the Master (3. 8. 3—8) ; (*c*) the observance of Fasting and the like are to be kept by the Master (3. 8. 3—8) (*d*) the *wearing of the gold necklace*, etc., appertain to all Priests (3. 8. 12).

CHAPTER XXIV

MOTIVE.

'Kratvartha' and 'Puruṣārtha' Acts.

After the disposal of the question of the 'Principal' and 'Auxiliary' chacter of Acts, there arises the question of what has beeen called "Prayukti', *motivating*. This question is dealt with in the form—What is it that provides the occasion for a certain act? What is it for whose accomplishment, the Act is to be performerd, or a thing brought into use ? This question follows upon the question of 'Principal and Auxiliary', because as a rule, it is the 'Principal Act that *motivates*, incites,provides the occasion for, the Auxiliary'. There are some acts however for which the sole *motive*, or inciting cause, is afforded by the Desirable Result expected to follow from it; while there are others which do not accomplish anything desired by the Agent, and yet are performed for the purpose of helping in the fulfilment of some other act, which latter accomplishes something desired by the Agent. Hence the question of the 'Motive' of an Act necessarily turns upon the question as to whether the Act by itself fulfils something desired by the Agent, or something related to another Act. In the former case, the Act would be '*Puruṣārtha*', *subserving the purposes of Man*', and in the latter case it would be '*Kratvartha*', subserving the purposes of an Act'. For the reason, before considering the main question of *Motive*, it becomes necessary to consider what is '*Puruṣārtha*' and what is '*Kratvartha*'.

The definition of '*Puruṣārtha*' has been provided by *Sūtra* 4. 1. 2, which says—'*What subserves the purposes of Man' is that upon which follows the happiness of Man' as its undertaking is due to the Man's desire to obtain happiness and the 'Mans' Purpose' is not different from happiness.* From this definition of the '*Puruṣārtha*', it follows that 'What subserves the purposes of the Act, is that which is of a kind other than the one just descriged —*i.e.*, the undertaking whereof is due to Scriptural injunction not to the Man's desire to obtain happiness,—says the *Bhāṣya* (Trs. p. 709). Thus then, the *Puruṣārtha* is that which a man ordinarily undertakes entirely for the purpose of obtaining a reward in the shape of Happiness; and *Kratvartha* is that which helps in the accomplishment of the *Puruṣārtha* Act, and does not itself bring any reward to the Performer.

There are some Acts again which are neither *Purusārtha* nor *Kratvartha,* such as Fire-installation and Vedic Study,—says the *Tantraratna* (p. 10). But even these are needed for, and hence helpful in the performance of, acts bringing about results desired by Man ; as without Vedic Study and Fire-installation, there could be no performance of any Sacrifice to all.

Under the category of '*Puruṣārtha*' are included all the Principal Sacrifices, like the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa,* as these lead to results desired by the Agent ; while to the category of '*Kartvartha*' are relegated all those *Auxiliary* acts that have their sole purpose in fulfilling the Principal Act itself ; *e.g.*, the *Prayājas,* etc., which are 'Auxiliary' to the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa.* All material substances, along with their embellishments and sanctifications, are regarded as '*Kratvartha*', even in cases where the text mentions some special results as following from these ; the mention of the results being regarded as only *commendatory* (Sū. 4.3.1.). There are certain things which have been regarded as both *Puruṣārtha* and *Kratvartha ;* for instance. the Curd is, in one case, mentioned only as a substance to be offered at a Sacrifice (when it is *Kratvartha*), but in another case, it is mentioned as a substance to be offered for obtaining efficient sense-organs, (when it is *Puruṣārtha*). (*Sūtra* 4.3.5—7.)

Against this definition of *Puruṣārtha* as stated in the Sū. 4.1.2., the *Ṛijuvimalā* (MS., Vol. II, p. 369) makes the following observations :—"The *Puruṣārtha* should not be defined as that which *brings about happiness ;* as this would not apply to the *Nitya* or *Compulsory* Duties, which do not bring about happiness.—[as a matter of fact the performance of compulsory Duties also brings about some sort of satisfaction, which is a form of Happiness].—Nor should it be defined as that to the performance of which only a person with some desire is entitled ; as this would not include such acts as Vedic Study and the like. The *Puruṣārtha* should be defined as that which subserves the Principal Sacrifice and also the purposes of the Agent, *by itself,* and not through being employed in another Act,—helping the Principal Act, only through this other Act ; those of this latter kind being regarded as '*Kratvartha*'.

By a second interpretation, this same *Sūtra* has been made to declare that the Act the Result whereof is desired for its own sake, and to which men are, by their very nature, attached,—do not, and need not, form the subject of an Injuction ; as an Injunction only urges one towards something towards which one would not direct his attention without such Injunction ; while to the Desirable Result the attention is attracted by the mere fact of its

being *desirable* in itself. This interpretation has been put forward by *Kumārila* as the second *Varṇaka* or Corollary to the *Sūtra*. (*Ṭupṭīkā*).

The same *Sūtra* has been taken by the *Bhāṣya* as bearing upon two other instances. For instance, in such csses as that of the text 'The water should, as a rule, be fetched *in cups*, but in the *milking vessel*, for those who desire cattle',—the use of the Milking Vessel is *Puruṣārtha* because, while the mere act of *waterfetching* could be done in other vessels also the particular result,—*obtaining of cattle* could be obtained only if the water were fetched in the *milking vessel*. (See *Bhāṣya*, Trs., p. 710.)

By yet another interpretation the *Sutra* is made to deal with the subject of the *Acquiring of wealth and Prosperity*. It is found that several methods of acquiring wealth have been laid down; for the *Brāhmaṇa*, Receiving Gifts, Teaching and Officiating at Sacrifices,—for the *Kṣattriya*, Conquest and the like,—and for the *Vaishya*, Agriculture, Trade, Cattle-tending and so forth. In regard to this *acquiringof wealth*, the question arises—Is it *Kratvartha*—subserving the purpose of the Action of Sacrifice? or is it *Puruṣārtha*—subserving the purpose of the Man?

The *Prima Facie View* on this question is that the Acquiring of Wealth should be taken as subserving the purpose of the Act of Sacrifice; because it is only in this case that there could be any point in the restrictions laid down in regard to the methods of *Acquiring* it. If it were meant only for the purpose of Man,—only for bringing about his happiness,—then there need be no such restriction; on the other hand, when it is meant to subserve the purpose of the Scriptural Act of Sacrifice, then any deviation from the Scriptural restrictions renders the performance of that act defective.

In answer to the above, the *Established Conclusion* is as follows:—The acquiring of wealth should be regarded as subserving *the purpose of Man*. It is a well-known fact that whenever there is *acquiring of wealth*, it brings happiness to the man acquiring it; hence the *undertaking of the Act of acquiring must be due to the man's desire for happiness* (*Sutra 2*), *i.e.*, for the maintenance of his body in comfort and so forth; when a man's body is properly maintained it indicates that he possesses wealth;—the sacrificial Act has been prescribed only for the man with a capable body;— and it is only in this sense that the Act of Sacrifice can be said to have been laid down for one who has wealth; it is not necessary that the *acquiring of the wealth* should be included in the Vedic Injunction of the Sacrifice. From all this it follows that the *acquiring of wealth* subserves the purpose of the Man. Further, if the Acquiring of Wealth were held to be declared by the Scriptures *to subserve the purpose of the Sacrificial Act*, the Wealth so acquired could not

be rightly used for any other purpose ; and this would put an end to all Sacrificial Acts (on account of the Man's death, which would surely follow if he did not employ his wealth in the maintenance of his body—says *Kumārila* in *Ṭupṭikā*). Then again, if *the acquiring of wealth* were meant to subserve the purpose of the Sacrificial Act only, then every such act would have to start with the *acquiring of wealth* necessary for the performance of that act ; (which is absurd.) From all this it follows that the *Acquiring of Wealth* serves the purpose of the Man—*as it is not different from Happiness* (as the *Sūtra* says). (*Bhāṣya*, Trs. pp. 712-713).

The question of *Kratvartha* and *Puruṣārtha* bears directly on the question of *Motive*. What is *Puruṣārtha*, 'subserving the purpose of Man' contains its own motive within itself ; while what is *Kratvartha*, 'subserving the purposes of the Sacrificial Act', would have its 'motive' in that particular Act towards whose fulfilment it would help, or of whose procedure it would form part. For example, there is the text declaring that—'When curd is put into hot milk, there becomes formed the *Āmikṣā*, consisting of the curdled solid Bits, which is for the *Vishvēdēvas ;* while the *Vājina*, the liquid portion the whey, is for the *Vajins*'. The question arising as to whether the *Solid Pieces* or the *Liquid* forms the *motive* of the act of *Putting Curd into Hot Milk*, the conclusin is that it is the former, the latter being only a bye-product. (See *Bṛhatī* Ms. p. 93B. Sū. 4.1.22—24).

There are certain acts which have no motive behind them, which means that they do not serve any useful purpose at all, either in the way of beinging some reward to the performer, or of helping in the fulfilment of another act. One instance of Acts of this kind is the *Throwing away of the Horn* that has been held by the Sacrificer during the performance. Such acts have been called '*Pratipatti-karma*', 'Acts of Disposal'. (*Sūtra* 4.2.19). To the same category belongs the act of *Throwing away of the Stick* which has been used in restraining the calf. (Sū. 4.2. 10 13).

There are some other acts which do not either help any Sacrifice or bring about any desired results. Such an act is the making of the *Juhu* with leaves of tress. This act has been regarded as *Kratvartha*, as the *Juhū* is used at the Sacrifice. (*Sūtra* 4.3.1). To the same category belong the Embellishments and Sanctificatory acts, which serve only to sanctify certain material things used at Sacrifices and render them fit for use; thus they render help to the acts of Sacrifice, as without the said embellishment and sanctification, the substance could not be fit for use. (*Sūtra* 4.2.11)—

To the same category belongs also the *Vishvajit* Sacrifice, which has been enjoined, but neither as part of another sacrifice, nor as bringing about

a desirable result by itself. The conclusion regarding such acts is that they should be regarded as bringing about the universally disired result, in the shape of *Heaven ;* and as such, being *'Puruṣārtha'*. This principle has been called the *'Visvajit-Nyāya'*, according to which, in cases where no particular result is mentoned, the *Attainment of Heaven* is assumed as the Result. But it is applicable to only those cases where no kind of Result is found to be either directly mentioned on indirectly indicated by supplementary texts ; when any such result is found the act is accepted as bringing about that Result. (*Bṛhatī MS.* p. 97)—(*Sūtra* 4.3.10—16).

An instance of the Result being *indirectly indicated* is found in the *Rātrisattra* Sacrifice, the injunction whereof is followed by a commendatory text speaking of *Reputation for Respectability* and hence this also is *Purusārtha.* (Su. 4.3.17—19)

The *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* Sacrifices have been spoken of as accomplishing all that is desirable ; these are thus *Puruṣārtha.* But one performance of these Sacrifices can bring about only a single result ; so that for each particular result, this performance should have to be repeated. (Sū. 4.3.25—28).

As regards those actions that are distinctly spoken of as accomplishing results pertaining to the physical world, the conclusion is that in every case, where there may be no obstacle in the way of the fulfilment of the result, the same result should be regarded as its 'motive' ; but if in any case, there be some insuperable obstacles in the fulfilment of the particular result, the Action should be regarded as bringing about super-physical results ; thus in either case, the Acts retain their *Puruṣārtha* character. The fact of the matter is that results are to be regarded as pertaining to the 'other world' only in cases where it is found absolutely impossible for them to be obtained and experienced in this world ; *e.g.*, the 'Pleasures of Heaven', which can be obtained in Heaven only. But as for results obtainable and experiencible in the world,—*e.g.*, the obtaining of Cattle,—there is no ground for regarding them as pertaining to any world other than this physical one. (Sū. 4.3.27-28, as differently interpreted, *Bhāṣya* Trs. pp. 816-817)

There are some acts prescribed, the result of which accrue, not to the actual Performer himself, but to his son and other relations. For instance, the *Vaishvānara* Sacrifice, laid down as to be performed at the birth of a son ; the result brought about by this Sacrifice,—in the shape of *welfare*, accrues to the born Infant. These acts also are *Puruṣārtha.* (*Sūtra* 4.3.38-39).

CHAPTER XXV

ORDER OF SEQUENCE

So far, under Discourses I-IV *Jaimini* has dealth with details of *What should be done :* in Discourse V he has dealt with the Order of Sequence in the performance or doing of what should be done.

There are five means by which this *Order of Sequence* is determined. They are —(1) '*Sruti* ' Direct Assertion ; (2) *Artha,* Purpose (or Utility) ; (3) '*Pāṭha*', Verbal Text ; (4) '*Pravṛtti*', commencement (or Tendency) ; (5) '*Kāṇḍa*', Place (in the texts) ; and (6) '*Mukhya*', the Principal.

Before expounding these, one important difference of opinion on this subject has to be noted. The *Bhāṭṭa* and the *Prābhākara* hold entirely different opinions regarding the question as to whether or not this *Order of Sequence* comes within the purview of Injunction proper. According to the *Bhāṭṭa, order* does form an object of the Injunction (See *Nyāyamālāvistara* on 5.1.1.) ; while according to the *Prābhākara* it cannot do so. (*Bṛhatī,* Ms. 100-100B ; *Ṛjuvimalā,* Ms. P. 497 et. seq. and *Prakaraṇapañchikā* P. 220). The reasoning of these latter may be thus summed up : In the case of all Injunctive texts, apart from the enjoined Act itself, we should be justified in admitting that alone as the further object of Injunction without which the enjoining of the Act itself would remain incomplete ;— as a matter of fact, the *Order* of performance does not come under this category ; because whether we perform the Act at one time or the other, it is performed all the same, and the purpose of the Injunction is fulfilled. Thus then, *Order* not being an integral factor in the Act, it cannot, as a rule, be an object of Injunction by the word that enjoins the act itself. In some cases however it is the *Order* itself that is enjoined by the Injunctive Text ; for instanc, the *drinking* or the *eating* of the Sacrificial Remnant having been enjoined by one Injunctive text, there is another Injunctive text enjoining the *Order* in which that Drinking and Eating is to be done ; this text being the one that lays down that 'the Priest who pronounces the syllable *Vaṣaṭ* is to do the *Eating, first* of all'. Such instances however are rare ; as a rule, the Injuctive Text says nothing as to the *Order*' even when it does in certain cases, it does so not by means of the Injunctive Word, but by some other Word.

Now as regards the *Six* Means of determining *Order.*—

(1) *Direct Assertion,* in the Veda itself ; *e.g.,* 'The *Adhvaryu* Priest should initiate the *Brahman Priest, after having initiated the Master of the*

House'; whether the *Order of Sequence* has been Directly Asserted, as this is the sole authority,—says the *Sūtra* 5.1.1.

This same *Sūtra* has been interpreted as determining the preliminary general question—Is *Oredr* to the determined by the Veda, or by some other means? The conclusion is that it can be determined only by the Vedic Injunction. (*Bhāṣya*, Trs. pp. 862-863).

It has also been taken as determining the question as to whether or not the Veda enjoins the *Order*; and the Established Conclusion is that the Vedic Text does enjoin the *Order*. (*Bhāṣya* Trs. P. 863)—though not necessarily by the same word that enjoins the act itself—says the *Prābhākara*.

(2) The *Order* of Sequence among Acts is determined also by *Purpose, Utility*; for instance, though the text enjoining the *cooking of the Yavāgū*—'*Yavāyūm Pachati*'—occurs in the Veda after the text enjoining its *offering*—'*Agnihotram juhoti*', yet the *cooking* is done *before* the *offering*; though considerations of *Utility* or *Expediency*; as the *cooking* would serve no useful purpose *after* the *offering* has been made.—(Sū. 5. 1. 2).

(3) In some cases, the *Order* among Acts is determined by the order in which the Texts enjoining them occur in the Veda,—*i.e.*, by the *Verbal Text*. *E.g.*, in connection with the *Darsha-Purnamāsa* we have the texts—'One should offer the *Samit*,—one should offer the *Tanūnapāt* etc., etc.'; and the conclusion regarding these is *that the Acts should be performed in this definite order of sequence* (Sū. 5. 1. 4),—this order being the one indicated by the order of the Vedic *Verbal Texts* concerned—says the *Bhāṣya* (Trs. P. 868). Hence the perfromance of the *Samit* should come before that of the *Tanūnapāt*.

(4) *Order* is also determined by *Pravṛtti*, Commencement. For instance, the Sacrifice of 'Seventeen' animals dedicated to *Prajāpati* has been enjoined;—it has also been enjoined that each one of these seventeen animals has to go through a series of *embellishments*,—such as *Upākaraṇa*, *Niyojana* and the rest;—when these Embellishments come to be performed, the first of these may be done to any one of the seventeen animals one likes; but when this process has once *commenced* with a particular animal, and the first of the Embellishments has been done to that animal,—the second and subsequent embellishments also should commence with the same animal with which the first started; the order of these latter Embellishments being thus determined by the *Commencement* of the Process. Says the *Sūtra* (5.1.8)—*In a case where it is possible for several details to be performed at one time, their order of sequence is to be determined by THE ORDER OF COMMENCEMENT, as the performance began in that order.*

(5) *Order* is also determined by *Place.* For example, we have the text—'For one desiring *offspring*, one should sacrifice with the *Atirātra-Stoma* containing *twenty-one* verses ;—for one desiring *glory* he should sacrifice with the *Atirātra* containing twenty-seven verses ;—for one desiring social *standing*, he should sacrifice with the *Atirātra* containing thirty-three verses',—(Tai. Sam. 2 2. 4. 7) ;—and in connection with this, it has been explained later on—(under *Sūtra* 10. 5. 26), that these varying numbers of verses have to be made up by introducing additional verses. Now, the question that arises is—when this introducing of additional verses is being done, are these additional verses to be introduced promiscuously, without any regard to the order of sequence ? or, are they to be introduced in the order in which they occur in their respective Vedic texts ? The *Established Conclusion* is that the order of the verses introduced into the *Atirātra* is determined by the *Place* that each verse occupies in the text of the Veda ; so that those that appear *first* in the text of the Veda should be introduced first (*Bhāṣya,* Trs. P. 873). The *Bhāṣya* points out that the above case might well be taken as an instance of *Order* determined by *Verbal Text* (No. 3 above) ; hence it has provided another instance. The *Jyotiṣṭoma* is the Archetype of the *Sādyaskra Sacrifice ;* at the *Jyotiṣṭoma,* three animals are sacrificed in the following order :—(1) the *Agnīṣomīya* animal is sacrificed on the Previous Day,—(2) the *Savanīya* animal is sacrificed on the Extraction Day, at the Morning Extraction, (3) the *Anubandhya* animal is sacrificed after the Final Sacrificial Bath. In accordance with the General Law regarding Archetypes and their Ectypes, the order of the sacrificing of the three animals in connection with the *Sādyaskra* would be the same as the above, had it not been for the special Injunction that 'At the *Sādyaskra,* all the animals should be sacrificed *together ;* it has also been decided that at the *Sādyaskra,* this sacrificing of all the three animals has to be done on the Extraction Day. Now in regard to this, there arises the question, —when all the three animals are going to be sacrificed together on the same day, what is to be the *order* in which they are to be sacrificed ? Should the *Agnīṣomīya* be sacrificed *first,* in accordance with the order indicated by the Verbal Texts mentioning the three animals ? or, should the *Savanīya* be sacrificed *first,*—on the strength of its *Place,* as being the *first* to be sacrificed on that particular day (of Extraction) ?—The *Established Conclusion* on this question is that the *Savanīya* is the *first* animal to be sacrificed, on the basis of '*Place*', which is the *first* for the *Savanīya* for that day. (Bhāṣya Trs. Pp. 873-874).

(6) Lastly, *Order* is also determined by the *Principal ;* that is, *the Order of Sequence at the Subsidiary should follow the order at the Principal because*

Accessories are meant to subserve the purposes of the Principal—says the *Sūtra* (5.1.14). For example, in connection with the *Chitrā-Sacrifice* two offerings have been enjoined, both called '*Sārasvata*', on the ground of one being offered to *Sarasvatī*, a female Deity, and the other to *Sarasvān*, a male Deity. In the actual offering of these, the question arises as to which one of the two should be offered *first*. The *Established Conclusion* is that the Order of Sequence should be determined by the order at the Primary or Principal Sacrifice. In connection with the Principal Sacrifice, in the *Yājyānuvākyā* text, the offereing to the *female* Deity is mentioned *first*: so that the same should be the case at the Subsidiaries also. (*Bhāṣya*, Trs., p. 875.)

There are some cases where there is conflict among the above six Means of Determining the *Order of Sequence* among Acts.

(1) *Sūtra* 15 deals with a case where there is conflict between the *order* indicated by *Verbal Texts* (No. 3 above) and that indicated by the *Principal* (No. 6 above). Under the *Darsha-Pūrnamāsa* Sacrifice, there are two offerings, the *Agnīṣomīya* and the *Upāṁshuyāja* ;—the substance offered at the *Agnīṣomiya* is the *Cake*, while that used at the *Upāṁshuyāja* is *clarified Butter ;* as regards the *Details*, those of the Cake are laid down first, then follow those of the Clarified Butter; but as between the two Principals—the *Agnīṣomīya* and the *Upāṁshuyāja*, the *Upāṁshuyāja* is laid down first, then the *Agnīṣonīya*. Now, in regard to the performance of the Details at the *Agnīṣomīya*, there arises the question—Which are the Details to be performed first ? Those relating to *Clarified Butter*, on the strength of the *order* of the Principals, between which two, the first to be laid down is the *Upāṁshuyāja*, which has the Clarified Butter for its material ? or, those relating to the *Cake*, on the strength of the *Order* of the Verbal Texts, among which those speaking of the Cake come *first* ? The *Established Conclusion* on this question is as follows :—*The Order of Sequence, among Subsidiaries should be that indicated by the Verbal Texts*, (Sū. 5.1.15) ; and the reason for this is that—the order indicated by the *Verbal-Texts* is one that is indicated by the injunctions of the Subsidiaries themselves ; so that if any other *Order* were adopted, the said Injunctions would be violated. Another reason for the superiority of the *Order of the Verbal Texts* is that, it has the support of the specific Injunction of 'Vedic Study,' which lays down the study of the Vedic Texts in the order in which they actually appear in the Veda ; whereas in support of the *Order of the Principals*, there would be only the extremely subtle Syntactical Connection of the entire body of the texts laying down the performance of the Sacrifice ; [*i.e.*, an *order*, not

directly *laid down*, but only assumed by Inference—adds *Kumārila*]. (*Bhāṣya*, Trs., pp. 876-877).

The following explanation has been supplied by *Kumārila*, in the *Ṭupṭikā* :—The 'Order of Verbal Texts' is one that is learnt from the 'Study of the Veda', wherein the texts are found in a definite order ; the *order* therefore is directly perceptible. In the case of the 'Order of the Principals', on the other hand, there is, first of all, the practical principle of expediency that all the details should be performed together ; thus *concomitance of the details* is indicated by the Injunction of the perfromance of the Sacrifice ; and as a necessary corollary to this concomitance, the *Order of Sequence* also comes to be *inferred*. Now this *inferred* Order of Sequence is rightly rejected in favour of the *Directly Perceived* Order of Sequence in accordance with the Verbal Texts.

Among cases of *order* determined by *Verbal Texts*, there are some cases where there is conflict between the order of Sequence indicated by the *Mantra-text* and that indicated by the *Brāhmaṇa text*. *Where there is such conflict, the order of the Mantra-text should be followed, because the capacity to be used as it stands is inherent in the Mantra ; hence it is that the Brāhmaṇa-text is taken as the originative Injunction of Acts*, says the *Sūtra* (5.1.16). For instance, in connection with the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* it is found that the *Mantra-texts* bearing upon the *Āgnēya*—which forms part of the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*, come before,—while the *Brāhmaṇa-texts* bearing upon it come after,—those bearing on the *Agnīṣomīya* Sacrifice. That is, the *Agnīṣomīya* is laid down by *Brāhmaṇa-texts* occurring in the *Fifth Prapāṭhaka* of the *Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa*, and the *Āgnēya* is laid down by *Brāhmaṇa-texts* occurring in the *Sixth Prapāṭhaka;* but in the *Mantra-Kāṇḍa* the Mantras connected with the *Āgnēya* are found before those connected with the *Agnīṣomīya*. The *Established Conclusion on* this point is as follows :—As a matter of fact, the *Mantras* has the capacity to be used as it stands in its own form ; it is by nature of this capacity that the *Mantra* is actually used at Sacrifices ; hence the *Order* in which the *Mantra* appears serves a perceptibly useful purpose of being used in that order ; as regards the *Brāhmaṇa-text* on the other hand, it serves the other purpose of enjoining the performance of Acts and in most cases, it is not meant to be used in its Verbal form as it stands.—(*Bhāṣya*, Trs., p. 878.)

In the case of a number of *Prospective* Sacrifices,—*i.e.*, those performed entirely for the purpose of obtaining a worldly reward,—there is no restriction as to the *Order* in which they are performed, independently, each by itself. When each is performed by itself, it may be performed at every

time that the performer has the desire for securing the particular reward. (*Sūtra,* 5.3.32—36.)

(1) '*Iṣṭi*' is the common name applied to all Sacrifices at which the offerings consist of Milk, Butter, Rice, Barley and other grains, and the '*Soma.*' is the common name applied to all Sacrifices where the offerings consist of *Soma-Juice.* As between the '*Iṣṭi*' and the '*Soma*' Sacrifices, there is no restriction regarding their relative *order of sequence.* (*Sū.* 5.4. 5—9). There is option as to which is to be performed first. (*a*) For one who is not going to perform the *Soma*-Sacrifice, and who installs the Fire without reference to the *Soma-Secrifice,* the *Iṣṭi* should come first; (*b*) but if the *Five-installing* has been done for the purpose of the *Soma-Sacrifice,* then the *Soma-Sacrifice* should come first—says the *Bhāṣya* (Trs., p. 951.)

CHAPTER XXVI

'SACRIFICER'

(A) Qualifications of the Performer of Sacrifices

Sacrificial Acts and their *Order of Sequence* have been dealt with so far. The *Sūtras* in Discourse VI consider the character and qualifications of the Performer. As a rule the Perosn 'entitled' to perform a Sacrifice,—*i.e.*, who is going to perform the Sacrifice—is one who wishes to obtain the result which that Sacrifice is expected to bring about. Hence the first question dealt with is the *fruitfulness* of the Sacrifices,—that is, with the fact of the Sacrificial Acts really bringing about definite results.

The consideration of this is prefaced by the consideration of another question :—When the Vedic text enjoins a Sacrificial Act for the man desiring Heaven, this text asserts a certain relationship bewteen the 'Desire for Heaven' and the Act of 'Sacrifice'. Now in this relationship, does the Sacrifice come in as the *Means* or as the *End* to be accomplished ? That is, is Heaven the 'subordinate' and Sacrifice the 'principal' factor ? or *Vice versa* ? If what is enjoined in the text is the *Sacrifice* as to be accomplished by the Man *desiring Heaven*, then it follows that the Sacrifice can be duly accomplished only by the man who is imbued with the desire for Heaven ; so that in relation to the Sacrifice, the 'Desire for Heaven' would appear to be enjoined as (a Means) for the Man. This would mean that it is only the man who has this 'desire for Heaven' who can be entitled to, and properly perform, the Sacrifice. In this case, the Sacrifice would be the *End* and 'Desire for Heaven' the Means to that End. On the other hand, if what is enjoined for 'the man desiring Heaven' is the bringing about of the desired thing,—then *this bringing about of the desired thing* would have to be regarded as qualified by the 'Sacrifice' ; and in that case, the 'Sacrifice' would be recognised as the *Means* and the 'Desired thing' as the *End*. Thus the text may be construed in both these ways—(*a*) 'the Sacrifice should be accomplished *by means of the* Desired thing—Heaven,' and (*b*) 'the Desired thing, Heaven should be brought about *by means of the Sacrifice*'. And yet both these constructions cannot be possible at the same time. Hence the justification of the question. The *Established Conclusion* on the question is that the Sacrifice is the Subordinate, and Heaven, the Principal, factor (*Bhāṣya* Trs. p., 969). The Text therefore is to be taken as the Injunction of *the act of Sacrifice* for the *Man Desiring Heaven ;* and from

this it follows that *heaven* is the Principal Factor, and *Sacrifice*, the Subordinate factor; which means that the Injunction 'should sacrifice' should be taken as pertaining to the 'Man Desiring Heaven'; and it thus becomes established that the Text in question lays down the qualification of the Performer. (*Bhāṣya*, Trs. p. 971.)

(B) What is 'Heaven'?

In this same connection, the question has been raised regaring the exact nature of *Heaven*. Is it a *Substance*—or only a *Quality*, in the shape of *Happiness*? If it were a *Substance*, then it would naturally have to be regarded as the Principal Factor.

The *Established Conclusion* on this point is that the term 'Heaven' stands only for a form of *happiness*, and it is only in its secondary figurative sense that it is applied to *the thing or substance that causes happiness.*—As a matter of fact, people always describe 'Heaven' as *happiness*—says the *Bhāṣya* (trs., p. 967).

The word *'Svarga,' 'Heaven'*, says *Prakaraṇapañchikā* (pp. 102-103) is applied to that happiness which is totally free from all touch of pain, and which, as such, is desired by all men. It goes on (p. 149) to explain that *Happiness* or pleasure is not mere *absence of Pain:* In the *absence of Pain*, what we feel is that 'there is no pain';—the feeling being a *negative* one; and hence from the very nature of the cognition of Negation, it follows that what we are conscious of in this case is the *Soul by itself*, as without pain, and not as with a positive quality; on the other hand, when we feel *happy* and feel pleasure, we are conscious of something *positive*, of a positive quality belonging to the Soul.

The first qualification thus for the *Performer* is that he should have the *desire* for the Result. The next point is that the 'Person' should be a *human* being; as it is only a human being who can carry out the entire details of the prescribed Act—says the *Sūtra* (6.1.5). Hence, it is Man alone who is entitled to perform Sacrifices. Beings lower than the human are not so entitled, because they are not able to carry out the details of the Sacrifice in their entirety; hence for these beings, the Sacrifice acannot be a means of securing happiness. (*Bhāṣya*, Trs., p. 973.)

The *Bhāṣya* (p. 973) goes on to add that *Deities* also are not entitled to the performance of Sacrifices, because apart from themselves, there are no other Deities to whom they could offer Sacrifices,—and there can be no offering to one's own self; in fact, such an act would be no *offering* at all.

Nor are sages (Primeval) entitled to the performance of Sacrifices —says the *Bhāṣya* (p. 973) ; because they can have no *Gotra ; Bhṛgu* and other sages cannot belong to these same '*Bhṛgu*' and other *Gotras.* Nor is the capacity to perform sacrifices perceptible in Deities and Sages.

This view regarding Deities and Sages has been accepted by *Kumārila* (Sū. 6.1.4-5) (see *Tupṭīkā*, p. 87) ; but *Pārthasārathi Mishra* has demurred to this (see *Tantra-ratna*), and has remarked as follows :—*Time,* with us *Mīmāmsakas* is beginningless ; hence even before one set of sages *Bhṛgu,* etc., there have been other sets of the same sages in other cycles, and these latter would be the *Gotra* of the 'present' Sages ; hence there is nothing to prevent Sages being entitled to the performance of Sacrifices. As regards Deities also, for those philosophers who, like us, hold that Deities exist only in the form of *works* and they have a purely verbal existence, the reason put forward by the *Bhāṣya* has no force ; because the Deity *Indra* also can make offerings through pronouncing the word 'Indra'. The reasoning of the *Bhāṣya* should therefore be taken to refer to those philosophers according to whom Deities are real material entities.

(C) Deities not Entitled to Perform Sacrifices

It is interesting to note the grounds of expediency that have been put forward in the Bhāṣya (Trs. p. 975) against the view that Deities are entitled to the performance of Sacrifices :—'There is a certain Sacrifice which has been enjoined as to be performed *for a thousand years ;* if Deities were entitled to perform Sacrifices, as they do have such long lives, this Sacrifice could be easily performed by them for a *thousand years*, and there would be no justification for taking the word *years* as standing *for days,* and thus bringing it within the capacity of *human* beings (who would naturally become excluded if the word '*years*' stood for *real* years).On the other hand, if *human* beings alone are entitled to perform Sacrifices, there is every justification for taking the word *years* in the sense of *days.* (See in this connection, *Sūtras* 6.7. 31—41.)

In the *Brahmasūtra* 1.3.8—33, this question of the *Title* or Capacity of Deities to '*Brahmajnāna*' has been discussed ; we are told there (Sū. 31) that they are not entitled to it, *according* to *Jaimini*, but according to *Bādarāyaṇa* (the author of the *Brahmasūtra*), they *are* entitled. (Sū. 33). *Shaṅkarāchārya* (under Sū. 1.3.25) has also referred to Mī. Sū. (6.1.1.) in regard to this *Adhikāra* or Title. Under Sū. 1.3.33, he declares that though it may be granted that Deities are not entitled to the various *Upāsanās,* forms of Worship and Meditation, prescribed in the Vedas ; yet there is no

justification for denying their title to *Brahmajñāna*, pure and simple. He also declares in favour of the view that Deities are *embodied beings*, and as such they also are entitled to that Supreme Knowledge of Brahman which leads to *Mokṣa*, Liberation.

(D) Are Women Entitled to Perform Sacrifices ?

In connection with the question of Persons entitled to perform Sacrifices, there have been two wide exclusions; *Women* and *Śhūdras* have come to be excluded from the performance on some-what vague grounds, specially as regards Women.

Sutras 6.1.6—20 deal with the case of Women.

The question has been raised in connection with the general Injunction '*Svargakāmo yajeta*' ('Desiring Heaven, one should perform Sacrifices'). Is this Injunction meant for the *Man* alone or for *Man* as well as *Woman* ?

The *Prima Facie View* is that—"As the word used in the text, '*Svargakāmaḥ*' is in the masculine, the Injunction should be taken as restricted to the *Male* alone. This is the view that has been held by the Sage *Aitishāyana*, says the *Sūtra* 6.1.6; a somewhat unusual form of stating the *Pūrvapakṣa*.

The *Established Conclusion* is that *it is the whole Genus*, the whole Human Community, Male as well as Female,—*that is entitled*, under the Injunction, *to perform Sacrifices ; because there is no ground for distinction ; hence the Woman also should be regarded as entitled to perform Sacrifices,*— says Sūtra 6.1.8. This view has been stated in the *Sūtra* as sponsored by *Bādarāyaṇa.*

As the question of 'Equal Rights' is a moot question even today, we shall devote some attention to the arguments that have been adduced on both sides.

The argument against Women's right to perform Sacrifices may be thus summed up :—(*a*) "To *men alone* should the title to perform sacrifices belong, as they alone possess property ; as a matter of fact, Man alone possesses wealth, not woman ; and wealth is necessary for sacrficial performances. Women cannot possess wealth, because they are bought and sold, —sold by their father, and bought by the husband. That is, having been sold by the Father, the Woman does not have any right over his property ; and having been bought by the husband, she cannot have any right over his property. The 'buying' and 'selling' referred to here is in view of the *Ārṣa* form of Marriage, where the Bridegroom has to give to the Bride's

father a Cow and a Bull. There are several other Vedic texts which show that Women are actually bought and sold ; there is the text, for instance, which says,—'If, upon being *bought* by the husband, the woman has dealings with others, etc., etc.'—(*b*) It might be argued that the Woman may acquire the required wealth on her own account by means of spinning, cooking and such arts. But what she earns will not be her own ; it belongs to her husband ;—यत् ते समधिगच्छन्ति यस्य त तस्य तद् धनम् says *Manu.* (*Sūtras* 10-12.)

The answer to this argument is as follows :—The desire for results is equally present in the woman also. As regards her having no wealth of her own, this absence of property is based upon the authority of the *Smṛti* (of Manu quoted), while her title to the performance of Sacrifices would be based upon the Vedic text—if she fulfils the condition of having the 'Desire for Heaven'. From this we conclude that if the woman desires the results that have been mentioned as following from the Sacrifices, she should not mind what the *Smṛti* has said regarding her not having property, she should proceed to acquire wealth and perform to Sacrifice. (Bhā. Sū. 13). As a matter of fact, however, the *Woman is actually connected with property*—says the *Sūtra* (14) ;—this is clear from the following words addressed to the Bridegroom at the time of marriage—धर्मे चार्थे च कामे च नातिचरितव्या 'In matters relating to Duty (religious acts), to *property* and to *pleasure*, she should not be ignored'. All that Manu's declaration—that 'the woman has no property'—means is that 'the wife should not behave as if she were independent of her husband'.—(*Bhāsya*, Trs., p. 981). As regards the 'Sale' that has been spoken of in regard to the wife, Marriage is a purely religious function, it is not a *Sale* in the ordinary sense of the term ; an article is said to be 'sold' only when its price is a fluctuating factor,—sometimes more sometimes less ; in the case of the Marriage however, the so-called 'price' is a fixed item—'a hundred bullocks' for instance, for the girl, irrespective of her being ugly or handsome. Lastly, there is a Vedic text indicating that Women do have property ; this text is पत्नी वा पारिणाह्यस्येष्टे 'The Wife is mistress over the household property.' (Sū. 16 and Bhāsya.)

We have seen that the Man and the Woman both possess property and are therefore equally entitled to perform Sacrifices. The next question that arises is—Is the Man alone or the Woman alone, entitled to perform Sacrifices? Or are both to perform them only *jointly* ?

This question has been dealt with by *Sūtras* 6.1.17-21.

The *Prima Facie View* is that each of them should perform the Sacrifice saparately; because the Injuctive Word that lays down the Sacrifice—

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'*Yajeta*'—is the singular number, and due significance must attach to this Number; whereby only *one* person should perform the Sacrifice at a time, and there should not be any joint performance by any two or more.

The *Established Conclusion* however is as follows:—*Though both the Man and his wife, possess property, their action should always be joint, because of the declaration to that effect.* (*Sutra* 6.1.17). This 'declaration'is contained in such texts as (*a*) 'In matters relating to Duty, Property and Pleasure, she shall not be ignored'; (*b*) 'Religious acts should be performed jointly'. there are some Sacrifices again which must be performed by the Man and his wife *together;* such for instance, as the two important Sacrifices of *Darsha—Purnamāsa* and *Jyotistoma;* at both these Sacrifices, oblations are laid down as to be offered and of the Clarified Butter that has been 'examined' by the Sacrificer and his Wife; and the performance of such Sacrifices would be defective if either the Man or his wife did not participate in it. Nor can the Man performing the Sacrifice associate *any* Woman he likes with him- self; because the texts definitely assert that the Man should be associated with the woman who is his '*patnī*', and the Patni is his *married wife*, in regard to which the Man has been exorted '*to do jointly with his wife* all those acts that need associating with a woman'. As regards the Singular Number in the Injunctive Word'*yajeta*', if stress were meant to be laid upon this Singular Number, how could the Sacrificer associate with himself as many as sixteen Priests? Further, the functions of the *Wife* at the performance are entirely different from those of the *Sacrificer* himself; so that by performing her own specified functions, the Wife does not disturb the *singleness* of the Husband. It is absolutely essential too that the Sacrifice should be performed by the Husband and the Wife *together*, because the wealth that is used at the performance of Sacrifices belongs in common to the Husband and Wife; hence the Sacrifice should be performed by both *jointly;* or if, either of them is unwilling, it should not be performed at all. There are certain acts in the way of personal Embellishments which may be done by the Man by himself, and no associating of the Wife is necessary there; to this category belong such acts as the *shaving of the head*, the *wearing of the Gold ring* and so forth. As regards the argument that the Wife being a purchased commodity, her 'ownership' over property cannot be real—this has been answered already; as a matter of fact, the idea that 'the Wife is a purchased commodity and is not entitled to own property' is based upon Smrti, while the idea that *She owns property* is based on Vedic texts; and further, it is by virtue of her 'desiring the result expected to follow

from the Sacrifice' that the Wife is entitled to its performance. From all this it follows that both the Man and his Wife are *jointly* entitled to the performance of Sacrifices. (*Bhāṣya* ,Trs., pp. 983—986).

The next question that arises is—Is the Wife to do all that the Husband does ? or are her functions restricted ?

The *Prima Facie View* is that as the Sacrifice is performed by both *jointly,* all the functions laid down as to be performed by the 'Sacrificer' should be performed by the Wife also; because she is as much a 'Sacrificer' as the Husband.

The *Established Conclusion* is as follows :—*To the Wife appertain only such functions as are specifically laid down for her. She has to do also the 'Invoking of Blessings' and observe 'celibacy'.* (Sūtra 6. 1. 24) ;—and the reason for this is that the Vedic text distinctly lays down these acts as to be done by her, and in matters relating to *Dharma,* the Vedic text is our sole guide ; and for the same reason she is to do also the 'Invoking of the Blessings' and also observe 'celibacy'. The reason given for all this distinction is that *She is not equal* (*Sūtra* 24) ; that is, *She does not stand on the same footing as the Husband*—says the *Bhāsya* (Trs. P. 994).

From what has gone before, this 'inequality' would appear to be in reference to the fact that there are some details that can be performed by the Man alone, and others again that can be performed by the Wife alone. The *Sūtra* does not make any mention of the Woman being not entitled to *study the Veda.* The Commentators however, from the *Bhāsya* downwords, have explained the 'inequality' of the *Sūtra* to mean that 'the Husband is a *Male* and hence *learned in the Veda,* while the Wife is a *Female,* and hence *not so learned*' (*Bhāsya* Trs. p. 993) ; and *Kumārila* goes a step further and offers a different interpretation of the words of the *Sūtra ;* he says ;—"The term *Ashīh* literally stands for those Vedic *Mantras* in which blessings are invoked—such as *Āyurdā agnē āyurmē d'ehi' ;* but in view of the fact that the Wife is not learned in the Veda and hence would not be able to recite the said *Mantras* with the proper accent etc., the term *'Āshīh'* should be taken as standing for *Embellishments,* such as *bathing, anointing, applying collyrium* to *the eyes* and so forth ; the term *'celibacy'* also should be taken as standing for *freedom from passions* of all kinds". (*Tuptīkā*). The *Bhāsya* (Trs. P. 993) proceeds—What happens is this :—(*a*) There are certain details subserving the purposes of the Sacrifice which have been declared as to be performed by the 'Sacrificer', and as in all these texts

the 'Sacrificer' is mentioned by means of a name in the Masculine Gender, these details would be performed by the *Man*, not by his Wife ; (*b*) then there are certain details subserving the purposes of the Sacrifice which have to be performed with Mantras ; and these also could not be performed by the *Wife*, as she does not possess the requisite knowledge ; nor can these texts themselves be taken as indicating the presence of such knowledge in women ; as such indication would be justifiable only if the performance were impossible in the absence of such knowledge in the *Wife* ; as a matter of fact, however, even in the absence of such knowledge in the *Wife*, the performance in question could be carried out by the *Husband* himself ; hence there is no justification for assuming such knowledge in the *Wife*, and thus treating an exception to the general rule that prohibits *Vedic Study* for women. Hence it follows that the details requiring the reciting of *Mantras* should be performed by the Husband, not by the Wife. (*c*) As regards the 'Invoking of Blessings' and the 'Celibacy', these subserve the purposes of the Performer ; so that these could not be regarded as complete if done by only one of the couple ; because if only one of these did them, the Embellishment of the other would remain defective. In the texts enjoining these details, the 'Sacrificer' does not figure as the *Subject*, hence the Gender of the word has no significance : which means that these have to be done by both—the Man as well as his Wife. (*d*) What has been specifically laid down as to be done by the *Wife*, e.g., 'Examining of the Clarified Butter',—has to be done by her alone. From all this it follows that on account of this 'inequality' the Wife does not stand on the same footing as the Husband.

(E) Is the Shudra Entitled to Perform Sacrifices ?

The *Shudra* is not entitled to perform Sacrifices at all. The *Established Conclusion* on the subject has been thus formulated in the *Sutra* (6. 1. 26). *The Agnihotra and such Sacrifices can be performed by the three Higher Castes only, as in connection with the Fire-installation Rite, these three only have been mentioned ; the Shudra therefore can have nothing to do with Sacrifices ; specially as the Veda is related to the Brāhmana and the other two castes only.* The Fire-installation Rite has been enjoined in the text—'The *Brāhmana* should install the Fires during Spring, the *Ksattriya* during Summer and the *Vaishya* during Autumn' ; and there is no mention of the *Sudra*. Thus being without the duly-installed Fires, the *Shudra* cannot perform the *Agnihotra* and such other acts. The *Āhavanīya* and other consecrated fires being not available for the *Shudra*, he cannot be entitled

to the performance of those acts where these consecrated Fires are essential. (*Bhāsya* Trs. pp. 995-996). (This view is quoted with approval by *Prabhākara* in *Bṛhati*, p. 111A). Apart from the Restrictive text relating to the Fire-installation Rite, there is yet another Vedic text restricting the title to Sacrifices to the three Higher Castes only—this text speaking of *Initiation* as to be done to the *Brāhmana*, the *Ksattriya* and the *Vaishya*, —the *Shudra* being altogether omitted ; and as no one is fit to perform Sacrifices without Initiation, the *Shudra* should be regarded as *unfit* for performing Sacrifices, on account of not having been'initiated' into Vedic Study ; and hence having not acquired the learning requisite for sacrificial performances. Being without the knowledge of Veda acquired in the proper manner, the *Shudra* cannot have the requisite capacity and is therefore not entitled to perform Sacrifices. (*Bhā.* Trs. p. 1000). Nor is it possible for the *Shudra* to acquire the requisite knowledge later on ; because such knowledge has been strictly forbidden for the *Shudra*—the prohibitive text being 'The *Shudra* shall not read the Veda.' If he did read it, he must be only incurring sin, and not acquiring the title to perform Sacrifices. Even if it were possible for the *Shudra* to acquire the knowledge, he would not thereby become entitled to perform Sacrifices, as he would still be without the Consecrated Fires,—the installing of these having been restricted to the three higher castes (See above) (*Bhāsya* Trs. p. 1000--1002).

Prabhākara (*Bṛhati* Ms. p. 111A) says—'Rightly has the author of the *Bhāsya* summed up the right view by declaring that it is by reason of his not having 'installed' the Fires that the *Shudra* is not entitled to the performance of the *Jyotistoma* and other Sacrifices'.

According to the *Vedānta-Sutra* (and *Shankarāchārya*) also, *Shudras* are not entitled to perform Sacrifices.

(F) The 'Rathakāra' and the 'Niṣādasthapati' are entitled to perform Sacrifices

There are two exceptions to the general exclusion of Shūdras from the performance of Sacrifices,—dealt with under Sū. 6. 1. 44—50 and Sū. 6. 1. 51-52.

(*a*) It has been settled above that it is only the three Higher Castes are entitled to the Installation of Fire. We have a Vedic text however laying down this Fire installation to be done 'during the Rains', by the '*Rathakāra*'. Now who is this *Rathakāra ?* The literal meaning of the word

as the *chariot-maker*. Does then the text refer to Fire-installation as to be done by a person of one of the higher castes who has taken up the profession of *chariot-making ?* or is *Rathakāra* an altogether different caste? The *Established Conclusion* on the question is that the persons meant by the word '*Rathakāra*' are '*the inferior Saudhanvanas*'—says the *Sutra* (6.1.50); this caste is slightly inferior to the three higher castes. This case has been dealt with by *Kātyāyana* in his *Shrauta-Sutra* (1. 11. 12); from which we learn that the '*Rathakāra*' is one whose mother is born of a *Shudra* mother and a *Vaishya* Father; and the Commentator on *Kātyāyana* remarks that the Fire-installation by this *Rathakāra* is only for the purposes of purification, not for that of Sacrificial performances.

(*b*) Similarly we have the Injunction—'This *Raudra* Sacrifice should be performed for the *Nisāda-sthapati*'. The question arises in regard to the exact signification of the compound '*Niṣāda-sthapati*'*;* does this stand for the 'chief' *i.e.*, king, of the *Niṣādas*' *?* or for king who is himself a *Nisda ?* In the former case, there would be no difficulty, as the 'Chief of the Niṣādas' may belong to one of the three higher castes and hence fully entitled to the performance of the *Raudra* and also other Sacrifices. In the latter case however, the chief, being himself a *Nisāda,* would not be a member of any of the three higher castes, and hence not entitled to the performance of the *Raudra* or any other Sacrifice.

The *Established Conclusion* on this question is that the word stands *the chief who is himself a Nisāda ;* such is the direct signification of the compound; as in this case the compound being *Karmadhāraya,* both members of it retain their natural connotations; such is not the case if the compound is taken as *Tatpuruṣa,* in the sense of 'Chief of Niṣādas'. That the Chief of the *Nisāda-caste* is meant is also indicated by the Vedic text lying down 'a false coin' as the Sacrificial Fee at the *Raudra* Sacrifice in question; as a 'false coin' is of use to *Nisādas* only. (*Bhāsya* Trs. p. 1012). This *Nisāda* is a mixed caste; though he is devoid of Vedic learning, yet, in view of the text expressly enjoining the *Raudra*-Sacrifice for him, we have to take it that he is to learn up the texts for the occasion, needed for the performance of that Sacrifice.

This man however has to perform the Sacrifice in the Fire consecrated for the occasion, as in his case there cannot be the regularly installed Fire of the *Agnihotra,* nor the *Upanayana*-Fire (Sū. 6. 8. 20-21).

(G) Disqualification for Performers of Sacrifices

Jaimini has discussed some other incapacitating circumstances also—*e.g.*, (1) Want of necessary wealth and (2) Physical disability.

The case of the man without wealth has been dealt with under Sū. 6. 1. 39-40. The *Established Conclusion* is that the possession of wealth is not a pre-requisite ; it is *not* right that the man without wealth should not be entitled to perform Sacrifices ; because the possession of wealth is a variable factor ; no one is 'devoid of wealth' by birth ; there are always ways and means whereby even a poor man can become wealthy ; so that the *possession of wealth* can always be brought about as the need arises. (*Bhāṣya* Trs. p. 1003).

The other incapacitating circumstance is considered under Sū. 6. 1. 41 ; it is that of the man with bodily defect ; and the conclusion is that a person with such defect is not necessarily excluded from Sacrifices ; as it is always possible that the man may become cured of the defect.

But if the bodily defect is one that is *congenital*, or in any way incurable, then the man is *not* entitled to peform Sacrifices. (Sū. 42).

The view of the *Neo-Mimāmsakas—Mādhavāchārya* for instance—is that it is only the *Prospective* (*i.e.*, *Kāmya*) Sacrifices to which such men are not entitled ; they *are* entitled to perform the *Compulsory* and *Contingent* Sacrifices.

A third incapacitation condition is considered under Sū*tra* 6. 1. 43.

In connection with the *Darsha-Purnamāsa*, we have the Injuction of 'naming three *Gotra-Ṛṣis*.' If a man is unable to name these three *Ṛṣis*, does he become excluded from Sacrifices? Yes, says Sū. 6. 1. 43.

But this does not mean that the *Darsha-Purnamasa* can be performed only by those who can name *three* and only *three* Pravara-Ṛṣis ; all that is meant is that those who are unable to name *three Rsis* are excluded. So that persons who can recount five Pravara-Ṛṣis become entitled ; this is made further clear by the prohibition that '*more than five* shall not be named'. (*Tupṭīkā*).

The question as to who is entitled to perform Sacrifices has been dealt with systematically by *Kātyāyana* in his *Shrauta-Sutra* (1.3-12). Ih Sū. 3 he puts forward the view that all beings—animal, human and divine,—

are equally entitled to the performance of Sacrifices. Sū. 4 rejects this view and declares that *human* beings alone can be so entitled, as it is they alone that can really perform Sacrifices; the Deities cannot do so; the commentator *Karka* adds—because they have all their desires already fulfilled and do not stand need of anything which they would seek to accomplish by means of Sacrifices; and also because apart from these Deities themselves, there is no 'Deity' to whom they could make offerings; the *Rāksasas* and *Pishāchas* cannot perform Sacrifices, as they are by their very nature, impure and hence unfit for sacrificial performances;—nor can animals offer Sacrifices, as they are devoid of the requisite Vedic learning. The disabilities in connection with human beings are mentioned in Sū. 5. Sacrifices cannot be performed by one who has one or more limbs wanting,—who is devoid of Vedic learning,—who is sexless,—and who is a *Shudra.* One who has no legs cannot perform the *walking* involved in the *Visnukrama* prescribed in connection with Sacrifices (*Vide*—Shata-Br. 1.1-2.13; 6.5.2.10; 6.6.4.1);—the blind cannot do the 'Examining' of the Clarified Butter; the dumb cannot recite the *Mantras;* and a Sacrifice in which these details are wanting would be no Sacrifice at all. One who is devoid of Vedic Learning is not entitled, because he cannot know what is to be done and how; the sexless person is not entitled; because the Scriptures have declared such a person to be 'impure' by his very nature. The Shūdra also is not entitled. *Sutra* 6 declares that the Brāhmaṇa, the Kṣhatriya and the Vaishya alone are entitled to perform Sacrifices; because of declarations in the Veda to that effect; the Veda has restricted Fire-installation to the three higher castes only, and no Sacrifices can be performed without these Fires. 'Absence of Learning' is not a disqualification for the *Shudra* only; as it has been mentioned as a disqualification for all castes. *Sutra* 7 distinctly declares that *women* are as much entitled to the performance of Sacrifices as *men*; specially as it is found that the Veda enjoins the Initiation of the Sacrificer and his *Wife,* the former being initiated with the *Mekhalā* and the latter with the *Yoktra* (*Sutra* 8). *Karka* however adds that women are entitled, but *only as associated with their husbands,* and not independently by themselves; he bases this disqualification upon a later *Smṛti text,* which declares that 'there is no independent sacrificing for women', He appears to have lost sight of the fact that the Man also is not entitled to perform Sacrifices, except as *associated with his wife.* Under *Sutra* 11 and 12 *Kātyāyana* has dealt with the cases of the '*Rathkāra*' and the '*Nisādasthapati*'. (See above)

(H) Sattras—Communistic Sacrifices

Jaimini has devoted some special *Sūtras* to the consideration of the question as to who are entitled to perform the Communistic Sacrifices, *Satras ;* this question turns upon the question as to who is the recipient of the rewards accruing from those Sacrifices.

The question is—Who is to perform the Communistic Sacrifices, like the *Sattra?* Is it each individual person of the 'Community' desiring 'the whole fruit of the Sacrifice? or the whole Community', as a Community'?

The *Prima Facie View* is that no individual singly should perform what has been enjoined for the entire 'Community' or Group. The whole Group collectively, as desiring the Result, should be the *Performer*, and the Result should also accrue to all of them collectively.

The *Established Conclusion* is as follows :—*In as much as each man helps in the accomplishment of the desired end, the title to the performance be taken as accruing to each.* (*Sūtra* 6.2.1). As a rule when an act is done by several persons together, each of them helps in the accomplishment of the desired end ; and the Result of an act should always accrue to the performer of that act ; and in the case in question, each of the persons concerned is a 'Performer' of the Sacrifice. So that even though the performance has been undertaken by them *collectively*, the Result should accrue to each of them severally. (*Bhāṣya*—Trs., p. 1014.)

The *Sattra* deffers from the ordinary Sacrifice in that—(1) it cannot be performed by one man (Sū. 10.6.45—50, and 10.6.59-60).and (2) all the priests are from among the 'Sacrificers' themselves (10.6.51—58), (3) for this same reason there is no 'appointment' of Priests (Sū.10.2.35, Bhā. Trs. 1698) ; and the services of the Priests at the *Sattra* are not 'bought' or 'exchanged', for any promised 'Fee' (10.2.35—38) ; and the gift of 'a mare or a slave-girl or a cow', which is prescribed in connection with the *Sārasvata-Iṣṭi* (which forms part of the procedure of the *Sattra*) has been regarded as fulfilling a transcendental result, (10.2.44-45), and not the effect of 'securing the services' of the Priests—which is the usual purpose served by Fees. (See 10.2.44). If one of the Sacrificers at the *Sattra* should happen to die during the performance, his bones have to be kept wrapped ind eer-skin, and his place at the Sacrifice is to be taken up by a person nearly related to him, and at the end of the year, the Sacrificers should perform, for the sake of their dead partner, a special Sacrifice called the '*Samvatsara-yāga*' (Sū. 10.2.47-48). All the seventeen persons performing the *Sattra* should belong

to the same *Brāhmaṇa subsect ; i.e..*, they should all be followers of the same *Kalpa-Sūtra* (Sū. 6.6.1—11). But at the *Kulāyayajña*, it is possible for the King and his Priest to belong to different *Kalpas* (Sū. 6.6.12—15). *Kṣatriyas* and *Vaishyas* cannot perform *Sattras*, to which *Brāhmaṇas* alone are entitled ; and of these also, only those who belong to the *Vishvāmitra-Gotra ;* and of these last, only such as are guided by the same *Kalpa*, (Sū. 6.6.15—26). All persons performing the *Sattra* should be regular performers of the *Agnihotra* (6.6.27—42). To the *Sāmidhéni* however all 'Regenerate' (*Dvija*) persons are equally entitled (Sū. 6.6.3)—39). The *Juhū* and other Implements used at the *Sattra* should be kept common among all the Sacrificers, and nothing should belong exclusively to any one Sacrificers. The reason for this lies in the fact that if any implement belongs to any one person, in the event of his death, it would ave to be burnt along with his body, and this would interfere with the performance. (Sū. 6.6.33—35).

To the performance of the *Vishvajit* Sacrifice, only such persons are entitled as can afford to give 112 pieces of Gold. (Sū. 6.7.18—20.)

The possibility of several performers at the Communistic Sacrifices might lead people to believe that there may be several performers at the *Darsha-Purṇamāsa* and such Sacrifices also. But the conclusion is that at all of them, there is to be a single Performer at each performance. In fact, that is the normal law ; it at the Communistic Sacrifices like the *Sattra*, there are several performers, those are special cases, specially provided for by special Vedic Injunctions ; *e.g.*, in regard to the *Sattra* it has been enjoined that 'there are to be at least *Seventeen* Performers'. (*Sūtra* 6.2.3—12.)

In regard to Sacrifices enjoined as to be performed for the purpose of bringing about visible results, —such as Rain, Cattle and so forth,—the rule is that when the performance has once begun, it must be carried to its end,—even if the result desired should happen to be accomplished before its completion ; as the Veda deprecates incomplete acts and prescribes expiatory rites for leaving Sacrifices unfinished ; and also because cultured people decry men who begin an act but do not carry it out to the end,—says *Bṛhatī* (MS., p. 113B).—(6.2. 13—15). But this rule does not apply to such purely secular acts as the *building of a house ;* because the aforesaid depreciaton of unfinished acts is based upon the consideration that when a Sacrificial Act has been begun, an expectation of receiving offerings is raised in the minds of the Deities concerned, and hence if all the prescribed offerings are not made, it becomes a case of breach of promise. Such is not the case

with the purely secular acts ; specially as the said deprecation is based upon the fact that the Veda has prescribed expiation for unfinished Sacrifices and this could not apply to the secular acts. (Sū. 6.2. 16—18)—(*Bṛhatī* p. 113B.)

(1) Prohibitions—Exact Signification

Sūtras 6.2. 19-20 raise an interesting question regarding Prohibitions. The Veda contains Injunctions as well as Prohibitions. We have been dealing with the question of Persons being entitled or not-entitled to the performance of the acts enjoined by the Injunctions. The question raised now is in regard to the Prohibitions. Who are the persons who are *entitled* to act in accordance with the Prohibitions ? Are they persons who desire for themselves certain results expected to follow from the *avoidance of acts* mentioned in the Prohibitory Texts ? Or are the Texts meant for, and a applicable to, *all men* irrespectively of any desire for results ? For instance, when the Veda *prohibits* the *Eating of Garlic*—, does it mean that here we have the *positive act of vowing* act—to abstain *from Garlic* ? Or does the text only lay down the *Negative* act of *not-eating garlic* ?

The *Prima Facie View* on the question is that the text should be taken as laying down the *positive* act, the *taking of the vow*, which thus becomes a *Dharma*, which, in the absence of the mention of any other result, may be taken as leading to Heaven, in accordance with the '*Vishvajit*-Law' Sū. 4.3.10). The reason in favour of this view,—according to *Prabhākara Bṛhatī* MSS., p' 113B) is that all Injunctive verbs lay down *possitive acts* for the accomplishing of certain desirable results, and there is no reason why the Prohibitive Injunction also should not be regarded as laying down a *positive act, something to be done,*—a mere *avoidance of garlic* (in the case in question,) which would bring about some desirable result.

The *Established Conclusion* however is that in the text prohibiting the Eating of Garlic, the negative word must be taken as enjoining the *negative*, or *avoidance*, of the *act of Eating Garlic*, and not any *positive* act. All injunctions of Positive Acts lay down *something to be done ;* but the Prohibitive text does not lay down anything *to be done ;* what it lays down is the *not-doing* of a certain act ; it cannot therefore be taken as the Injunction of a *positive* act. Nor would such Prohibition be entirely purposeless ; as it would serve the purpose of saving man from the horrors of Hell which would be his lot if he ate garlic. This explanation of the Prohibitive text saves us from the necessity of assuming a Result in the shape of Heaven) as following from the said *Avoidance*, an assumption for which there is no

justification. As to who is entitled to act in accordance with the Prohibition the conclusion is that it is the person who fears the horrors of Hell and desires to save himself from them; not the Person who desires Heaven. For these reasons Prohibitions have been regarded as not contemplating any desirable *positive* results, they contemplate only the saving from undesilable results; and from this it follows as a necessary corollary that what is prohibited leads to undesirable results. These Prohibitions do not stand on the same footing as the Prohibition of certain acts for the Religious Student; because the latter is avowedly prefaced by the words '*Atha vratam*' —'Now follow the *Observances*', which are *positive* by their nature.

As for these Observances and other Duties prescribed for the Religious Student,—the man becomes entitled to these, only after his *Initiation*, *Upanayana*),—not immediately after Birth; so they pertain to the three Higher Castes only, for whom alone there is *Upanayana*— Sū. 6.2. 21-22). —These Duties have been laid down specifically for the Religious Student, only during the period of *Studentship*. (*Bṛhatī* MS., p. 118.)

The *Agnihotra* has been enjoined as to be performed 'throughout one's life'. But this does not mean that the performance is to be carried on incessantly and continuously; all that is meant is that the acts prescribed in connection with the *Agnihotra* should be performed regularly every day *at the times prescribed for them;* and as these times prescribed are *morning* and *evening*, the offerings have to be made every *morning* and every *evening*. Similarly with the *Darsha-Purṇamāsa* Sacrifices also; which also have been prescribed as to be performed 'throughout life'; in this case the performances have to come only on the prescribed days—which are the Moonless and Full-Moon days. (Sū. 6.2. 23—26.) The performances have to be repeated on every Moonless and Full-Moon day; just as the *Agnihotra* has to be performed *every* morning and every evening. (Sū. 6.2. 27-28.)

In connection with these repeated performances of the *Agnihotra* and the *Darsha-Purṇamāsa* on the prescribed days throughout life, the general principle has been deduced that in the case of every prescribed *contingent* act, the act has to be repeated every time that the contingency appears. For instance,—(*a*) there are certain rites to be performed when a pot happens to be broken, or a sacrificial material happens to be spoilt; these rites should be performed each time that there is such *breakage* or *spoiling*, (Sū. 6.2. 29); —(*b*) it has been enjoined that the pupil should salute the Teacher when he happens to meet him; and the conclusion is that he should do this on every occasion that he happens to meet him. (Sū. 6.2.30.)

This is with reference to the *Contingent* Acts. There are certain Acts which, in the way that they are prescribed, bear the resemblance of *Contingent Acts ;* for instance, the Study of the Veda for paying off one's debts to the *Ṛṣis*, the *Performance of Sacrifices* (*E.g.*, Soma-Sacrifice) for paying off one's debts to the Deities, and the *Begetting of Childern* for paying off one's debts to the *Pitṛs*. The question is—Are these acts to be performed by all persons ? Or by only those who have incurred the debts and wish to pay them off, or wish to acquire by their means certain rewards, in the shape of Heaven ? The conclusion is that they have to be performed by *all men ;* so that they are *compulsory*, not *contingent* or *prospective ;* and as such, they have to be performed by all men of the three higher castes. irrespectively of any desire for results.—(Sū. 6.2.31.)

CAPACITY FOR PERFORMANCE

The question as to who is entitled to the performance of Sacrifices leads on to the allied question as to his *ability* or *capacity* to perform them ; and in this connection we have to consider the chances of a man completing the undertaken Sacrifice under certain circumstances.

In regard to the performance of the *Agnihotra*, the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* and other *compulsory* and *life-long* acts, it has been held that in case one is not *capable* of performing the act *with all its details and subsidiaries*, he need perform the Principal only in full and may omit the Subsidiary details,—but only in case he is absolutely and really incapable, beyond all help. (Sū. 6.2.1—7.)

This however applies only to the *compulsory* Acts ; in the case of the *Prospective* Acts—those performed for the purpose of obtaining certain desirable results,—the entire procedure has to be gone through scrupuloulsy ; as the omission of the slightest detail would make the action defective and render it nugatory, unable to bring about the desired result. (Sū. 6.3. 8-10.)

The capacity or ability to perform a Sacrifice turns also upon the ability to secure the proper materials and things necessary for the performance. In connection with the *materials*, it has been held that in case the material prepared for the offering becomes spilt or otherwise rendered unfit for use,—even in the middle of the performance,—if a prescribed substitute is available and is used for the remaining offerings,—the performance of the Sacrifice cannot be regarded as spoilt in any way. (Sū. 6.3. 11—17.) But the substitute must be something similar to the original ; for instance, the *Yava* for the *Vrīhi*. (Sū. 6.3.27.) In case however, another

supply of the original substance is available, this should have preference over all substitutes. (Sū. 6.3.35.) But in no case can we substitute a subtance the use of which has been prohibited ; such substances, for instance, as the *Māṣa*, the *Chaṇaka* and such other substances as have been called '*Ayajñīya*', 'unfit for Sacrifices'. In the case of the offering of *Cakes*, if, in course of baking, the Cake happens to be burnt or otherwise spoilt, another Cake is permitted to be used, but only after certain expiatory rites have been performed. (Sū. 6.4. 17—21.) If the consecrated Fire becomes extinguished, it should be rekindled with all the rites of Fire-installation. (Sū. 6.4. 17—27.)

Though substitutes have been permitted in the case of *Substances*, they are not permitted in the case of *Deities* or *Mantras* ; if the *Deity* happens to be wrongly named, or the *Mantra* happen to be wrongly recited, the whole performance becomes nugatory and cannot be remedied. (Sū. 6.3. 18-19.)

Lastly, as regards the *Sacrificer*, if anything happen to him and he becomes disabled from taking part in the performance, then the action fails entirely ; as no substitute can be permitted for the Sacrificer. (Sū. 6.3.21.) In the case of *Sattras* however, where there are *seventeen* Sacrificers, if one happen to become disabled, his place can be taken by some one else ; the reason for this is that in the case of *Sattras* all the Sacrificers take part in the performance, not only as 'Sacrificers' or 'Masters'. but also as 'Priests' (there being no Priests at the *Sattra* apart from the Sacrificers themselves) ; and as even during the performance, a change of Preists is permissible, the disabled Sacrificer, who has been acting as *Priest*, can, on that account, be replaced by another. (Sū. 6.3.22.) But such a substitute can be treated as a 'Sacrificer' only for the purpose of making up the statutory number 'Seventeen' ; he does not partake of the Result. (Sū. 6.3.23.) The real reason for the exception to the General Principle of the Non-Substitution of the Sacrificer appears to be in expediency ; in the case of the usual Sacrifice with a single Sacrificer, his own disability leading to the failure of the performance, such failure would be easily tolerated ; but in the case of the *Sattra* where there are *seventeen* Sacrificers, if only one of them becomes disabled, during the performance, the other sixteen would not be willing to forego the elaborate Sacrifice and its much-coveted reward ; and further, as there would be *Seventeen* persons concerned, there would be a greater likelihood of one becoming disabled ; hence some latitude had to be allowed in this case. In case any one of these Seventeen Sacrificers

should wish to retire after the performance has begun, he may do so, but he should have to perform the *Vishvajit Sacrifice* in expiation of his failure to fulfil his commitments. (Sū. 6.5.25—27.)

(J) INITIATION

The Sacrificer has to undergo Intiation at the very outset. In connection with the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* Sacrifice,—in regard to the Initiation several numbers have been mentioned—'One, two, three, four and twelve'; which means that the Initiation has to be performed on one day, on two days, on three days, on four days, on twelve days. The question is—Is there to be no restriction and one may choose any one of the numbers ? or should the number *twelve* alone be adopted ? The *Prima Facie View* is that *"in regard to the extent of the Initiation one may do what once likes"*. (Sū. 6.5.28.) The *Established Conclusion* is that *it should extend over twelve days.* (Sū. 6.5.29.)

Such is the explanation provided by *Shabara* (*Bhāsya*, Trs., p. 1129). Neither *Kumārila* (in the *Ṭupṭīkā*) nor *Mandana Mishra* (in the *Mīmāmsānukramaṇikā*) accepts this presentation of the Topic. According to these, *Sūtras* 28 and 29 embody two distinct Topics. In the former Topic embodied in Sū. 28, the question is—Must there be *twelve* days' Initiation ? Or is there to be option ? The *Prima Facie View* is that there must be twelve days Initaition. The *Established Conclusion* is that *one may do as one likes* (Sū. 28); *i.e.*, there is to be no restriction. In the second Topic embodied in Sū. 29, the question is—Does the aforesaid option hold regarding *all* the Ectypes of the Archetype ? Or is there any restriction ? The *Prima Facie View* is that, according to *Sūtra* 28 there is absolute *option* at the Archetype, and hence there should be the same at the Ectypes also. The *Established Conclusion* is that at the Ectypes, and specially at the *Dvādashāha* Sacrifice,—the *twelve days* Course must be adopted.

VISHVAJIT SACRIFICE

There is an interesting point discussed in connection with the *Vishvajit-Sacrifice.* The Fee prescribed for this Sacrifice is *'Sarvasva'* 'one's entire Property,' his 'all belongings'; and the *Established Conclusion* is that the term 'all belongings' stands for the Sacrificer's *riches and wealth,* and not his parents and such relations; (Sū. 6.7. 1-2); of the *Wealth* also the *Horse* should not be given away, because the giving away of 'animals with mein' has been specially forbidden. (Sū. 6.7.4.);—the entire 'Earth,' the Terrestrial Globe, should not be given away by any one, as it does not belong to

any one. (Sū. 6.7.3.) When giving away his 'entire belongings' one should give away such things as are actually in his possession at the time, and he should not secure new things merely for giving away. (Sū. 6.7.5.) One should not give away the *Shūdra* who is serving him for the purpose of acquiring knowledge of *Dharma*. In fact, no *Shūdra* can be legally acquired as 'property', against his will. (Sū. 6.7.6.) The term 'all belongings' does not include all that the man has possessed in the past, or all that may come to him in the future; it means only what he is actually possessed of at the time of the gift. (Sū. 6.7.7.) Whenever the Veda enjoins the giving away of 'unmeasured wealth,' it is only *much wealth* that is meant. Sū. 6.7.22); and it should be taken definitely as standing for 'more than a thousand' gold-pieces. (Sū. 6.7. 23—25.) Similarly, when a Sacrifice is enjoined as to be performed 'for a *thousand years*', it is to be taken as standing for a thousand *days*. In connection with this, several interpretations have been suggested in the *Sūtras* as *Prima Facie View*: (1) That the thousand-year Sacrifice is really performed for a thousand years, and is meant for Performers who are *Superhuman*; (2) it should be performed for a thousand years, and by human beings,—but by *several generations*; (3) 'Thousand *Years*' stand for thousand *months*. All this has been rejected; the accepted view being that 'years' stands for *days*.

Fire-installation is not necessary for certain offerings—such as the *Chaturhotra-Homa*, which is to be offered by persons who have not installed their own Fire. (Sū. 6.8.1—10.) the offerings made at the *Upanayana* are to be made in the ordinary Fire. (Sū. 6.8. 11—19.) So also the Sacrifice called *Sthapati-Iṣṭi* (Sū. 6.8. 20-21);—also the Expiatory Sacrifice of the *Avakīrṇī* (Sū. 6.8.22). So that for the performance of all this, those persons also are entitled who have not installed their own Fires.

There are certain other important matters of general interest that have been dealt with towards the end of Discousre VI. (1) All *Daiva* Acts, *i.e.*, Acts performed in honour of Dieties, should be done during the Northern Solstice ofthe Sun, during the Brighter Fortnight and in the Forenoon. (Sū 6.8.23); all *Pitrya* Acts—in honour of *Pitṛs*—should be done during the Darker Fortnight, and in the afternoon, (Sū. 6.8.25);—(3) at the *Jyotiṣṭoma* and other Sacrifices, the observance of 'Living on milk' is compulsory and essential—(Sū. 6.8.29); but the observance of the rule of 'Eating in the latter part of the night' is not essential—(Sū. 6.8.29).— 4) The animal sacrificed at the Sacrifice must be a *goat*, (Sū. 6.8. 30—42).

CHAPTER XXVII

'ATIDESHA'—TRANSFERENCE OF DETAILS

This closes our study of the first Six Discourses of the *Sutra:* which, as explained by the *Bhāsya* (Trs., p. 1229), have discussed the procedure of the *Darsha-Purṇmāsa* and other Sacrifices, the details of which have been directly prescribed in the Veda, while the later Six Discoourses discuss the procedure of the *Aindrāgna* and such other Sacrifiecs, the details of whose procedure have not been directly enjoined. *Kumārila* however, puts the matter somewhat difierently:—In the first Six Discourses we have discussed the *direct Injunctions* bearing upon the Archetypal as well as Ectypal Sacrifices, and with the *Seventh* Discourse begins the discussion of the *Transference* or Extended Application, by *indirect implication*, of details from the sphere of one Sacrifice to that of another. (*Tupṭīkā.*)

The conclusion regarding the latter Sacrifices is that these also have all their details; but, not having been directly enjoined for them, these details come to them through *Atidesha*, Transference. This 'Transference' is that process by which the details prescribed in connection with one Sacrifice are extended beyond that Sacrifice and *transfered* to another Sacrifice. For instance, after having given full directions regarding the feeding of *Devadatta*, one says 'Feed *Yajnadatta* alike *Devadatta*'. This Transference can be done either by Name or by a Declaration. The *Name* that is made such a means of Transference is of three kinds—(1) Name of the Act, (2) Name of the Embellishment and (3) Etymological Name. The Declaration is of two kinds—(1) Direct Perceptible) and (2) Indirect Inferred). — *Bhāsya*, Trs., pp. 1239-1240).

There are several Sacrifices in connection with which the Veda does not specifically prescribe all the necessary details, but declares that 'such and such a Sacrifice shall be performed in the manner of such and such another Sacrifice'; for instance, with regard to the *Iṣu-Sacrifice*, after having declared its peculiar features, the Vedic text goes on to declare that 'the rest is like the *Shyena-Sacrifice*'. In such cases, the *Shyena-Sacrifice* would be called the '*Prakṛti*,' Archetype, and the *Iṣu-Sacrifice*, the corresponding '*Vikṛti*', Ectype. The *Transference*, then, of the details of the Archetype to Ectype is what is called '*Atidesha*', which has been as 'that process where by a detail becomes extended in its application from

the Primary act to other acts cognate to it'. (Bhā. Trs. p. 1239.) The *Prakaranapanchikā* (p. 227) has defined it as 'that through which the Ectype becomes connected with the details of the Archetypal Sacrifice', or 'the Extension of the details of one Sacrifice to another, when there is no incongruity in such extension'.

Before proceeding with the main subject of Transference, *Jaimini* has devoted the first twelve *Sutras* of Discourse 7, to the discussion of a question upon which the whole subject of Transference rests. In the context of the *Darsha-Purṇamāsa* Sacrifice, the Vedic text has enjoined the *Prayāja*-offerings as the subsidiary details. The question to be considered is—Are these *Prayajas* meant for the *Darsha-Purṇamāsa* only or for all Sacrifices ? This enquiry becomes necessary at this stage, because. if the subsidiaries laid down under one context are intended by the Veda for *all Sacrifices*, then the *Prayāja*-offerings appertain as much to the *Darsha-Purṇamāsa* as to any other Sacrifice ; so that in this case, the question of the Transference of the details does not arise at all ; as the details appertain to *all Sacrifices* equally. If however the details mentioned under the Context of one Sacrifice appertain to that *Sacrifice only*, then if there is need for them in other Sacrifices, they can go over to these latter only by Transference ; and in this case alone could these latter Sacrifices be the *Ectypes* of the former Sacrifice which, thus, would be the Archetype. It is only in this case that there would be an occasion for the consideration of the subject of Transference and other cognate subjects dealt with by the *Sutra* in Discourses 7 to 12.

This question, —as to whether the Details laid down in the section on *Darsha-Purṇamāsa* belong to these alone or to *all* Sacrifices, turns upon the further question as to whether the performance of the said Details is meant only for the accomplishment of the Sacrifices, or for the bringing about of an *Apurva ;* because, in the former case, as *all Sacrifices* would be equally *Sacrifice*, what is laid down for the fulfilment of the 'Sacrifice' would naturally be related to *all Sacrifices* equally,—while, in the latter case, the details would be related to only one *Apurva*, and this one *Apurva* could not but be the one following from the Sacrifice in whose context the details would be mentioned ; as it is only of such Sacrifices, that the said Details could be *Subsidiary*—as explained under Discourse III. And in this case therefore, the Details in question would appertain definitely to only one Sacrifice, and they could become connected with other Sacrifices only through Transference.

The *Established Conclusion* on this question is that the said Details are related to the *Apurva*, as is clearly indicated by the requirements of the Context. (Sū. 7.1.1.—12).

Before we deal with the special cases of Transference, we have to note that there is Transference, not only of *Actions* or *Procedure*, but also of other Sacrificial Details, like *Substancees* and so forth. Says the *Prakaraṇpañchikā* (p. 227) अतिदेशः प्रकारस्य धर्माणां चैव युज्यते It is only of the *Result* that there is no Transference, as explained under *Sutra* 7.1.20—22. The only general law relating to Transference is प्रकृतिवद् विकृतिः कर्तव्या 'The Ectype is to be performed in the manner of the Archetype' ; *e.g.*, the *Iṣu-Sacrifice* in the manner of the *Shyena-Sacrifice* and so forth. What is meant by this 'manner of the Archetype' is that all those details and accessories which are necessary in the performance of the Ectype, and yet are not found to be enjoined directly in reference to that Ectype, are to be brought in, transferred to, it from the Archetype. It is true, as the *Prakaraṇapañchikā* remarks (p. 226), that the first of the Details that come up for Transference are those constituting the *Procedure ;* but that is not all ; if the *offering-material* has not been laid down in connection with the Ectype specifically, that also has to be brought in from the Archetype ; similarly, other accessory details that might be wanting. Nor does this is any way militate against the opering *Sutras* of Discourse 10, because there we have the denial of the Transference of only such details of the Archetype as have had their purpose already fulfilled, and which, on that account, could serve no useful purpose at the Ectype ;—similarly under Sū. 5.1.19. we have an instance of the details of the Archetype not being transferred to the Ectype, through the force of Direct Declaration, whose authority is above everything, and so also above the General Law regarding the Transference of Details from the Archetype to the Ectype. Thus then the Transference of Details being in accordance with the actual needs of the Ectypal Sacrifice, the *need* or *motive* that prompts this Transference may lie either in some transcendental Result expected to follow from what is transferred, or in some purely visible result expected to be accomplished better by what is transferred than by any other means. (*Prakaraṇapañchikā* p. 227).

The question then that is to be dealt with is—In what cases is the Transference possible or desirable ? And in what cases is it not so ? It is on this question that the second half of the *Sutras* of *Jamini* (Discourses 7 to 12) turns.

This Transference of Details is regulated by (1) Context (*Prakaraṇa*) and (2) Position (*Sthāna*) For instance, (1) the details of one Sacrifice will be transferred to another only if the two are found enjoined in the same Context; this is the reason why the details of the *Shyena-Sacrifice* are transferred to the *Iṣu-Sacrifice*, not to the *Saurya* or other Sacrifices; and (2) in this Transference, that which occupies the *Position* of the *Deity* at the Archetype shall take the same place at the Ectype to which it is transferred; what appears in the Archetype as the *offering-material* shall be used at the Ectype also as the *offering-material.*

Primarily, there are four kinds of Transference. (1) Transference by Direct Injunction; *e.g.*, with regard to the *Iṣu-Sacrifice*, we have the Direct Injunction to the effect that 'The rest of it is like the *Shyena*'; which enjoins the Transference of the Details of the *Shyena-Sacrifice* to the *Iṣu-Sacrifice.* (*Vide* Sū. 7.1.13—16). (2) Transference by *presumed Injunction*; *e.g.*, in connection with the *Saurya-Sacrifice* we find no accessory details prescribed; we known at the same time that no sacrifice can be performed without certain details; we know also that the *Saurya* bears a close relationship to the *Darsha-Purṇamāsa-Sacrifice*; from all this we are led to the natural *presumption* that the details necessary for the *Saurya* are to be transferred to it from the *Darsha-Purṇamāsa*: and this Presumption leads to the Inference of an Injunction sanctioning such Transference. (*Vide* Sū. 7.4.1). (3) Transference through *Name*; e.g., the *Māsāgnihotra* has not all its details laid down in connection with itself; and these details are *transfered* to it from the Primary *Agnihotra*; the only justification for this transference lies in the name '*Agnihotra*' which is common to both. (*Vide* Sū. 7.3.1—4)—[That the *Māsāgnihotra* is entirely different from the *Agnihotra* has been shown in the Sū. 2.3.24]. (4) Transference *through the name of Embellishments* (*Samskāras*); *e.g.*, in connection with the *Varunapra-Ghasā-Sacrifice*, we find the *Avabhṛtha Bath* enjoined,—this *Avabhṛtha-Bath* is an *Embellishmnt* the details whereof have been prescribed in connection with *Agnistoma-Sacrifice*; now this same *name* '*Avabhṛtha*', occuring in connection with the Bath connected with the *Varunaspraghāsa*, leads to the conclusion that the details of this Bath are to be transferred to the *Varunaspraghāsa* from those enjoined in connection with the *Agniṣṭoma.* (*Vide* Sū. 7.3. 12—15). In this connection, regarding Transference through *Name*, some writers have introduced a third kind of name—the 'name' applying to the Sacrifice in its literal signiafication; this literal signification of the names of Sacrifices being, according to these writers, a guide as to the Transference of Details to them. (See *Mīmamsābālprakāsha* pp. 118-119).

This view however has been rejected by *Kumarila* (*Tuptīkā* 7.1.5), who says—यौगिकं नातिदेशकम् 'No name, in its etymological sense can be indicative of Transference'.

'Transference by Presumed Injunction' is of three kinds—(1) Transference of Injunction ;—an example of this we have cited above ; in connection with the *Saurya* and the *Darsha-Purnamāsa ;* —(2) Transference of Substratum ; and instance of this is found under Sū. 2.1. 25-26, where it is shown that the Sentence—'One should made an offering of Curds if the Sacrificer be desirous of acquiring efficient Sense-organs'—enjoins only a particular substance in the shape of *Curds ;* and the Substratum of this offering —*i.e.*,—the Sacrifice at which the Curd is to be offered, is got at through Transference,—the *Agnihotra* being the Sacrifice at which the said Curd-offering is to be made ;—Transference of Substitutes ; an instanec of this has been mentioned under, Sū. 3.5.47—51 ; where we find that in the event of certain Sacrifices being performed by the *Kṣattriya* or the *Vaishya*, it has been laid down that when these persons, as Sacrificers, wish to eat the 'Remnant,' they are to be given, not the Remnant of the *Soma-juice*, but a decoction of *Vaṭa-seeds* mixed with Curds ; from this Injunction of the Substitute for *Soma-juice*, it is inferred that the said decoction is to be substituted, not for the *Eating only*, but also for the *offering ;* that is, when the Sacrifice is performed by the Kṣattriya or the Vaishya, the substance *offered* at the Sacrifice is to consist of the said Decoction,—not of *Soma-juice*.

Under Sū. 8.1.1-2—it is shown that when certain particular details are to be transferred to any Sacrifice, those details should, as a rule, be those that have been enjoined in connection with any *one Sacrifice*,—they should not be borrowed from several Sacrifices ;—and the General Principle governing such Transference is as follows :—'When the slightest common factor, —in the shape of Word, Sense, Offering-material, Deity, or the Form or other qualifications of these—happen to be perceived (between two Sacrifices), the Procedure of the one should be adopted at the other'. (*Bhāsya*, Trs., p. 1322).

CHAPTER XXVIII

ŪHA—MODIFICATION

We have seen that in several cases, the Accessory Details of one Sacrifice are *transferred* to another Sacrifice. In some cases it so happens that the particular Detail so transferred does not quite fit in with the other details of the Sacrifice to which it has been transferred. In this case therefore, the detail *transferred* has to be 'modified' to suit the exigencies of the Sacrifice to which it has been transferred. This 'Modification' of Details we have to consider now.

As a preliminary to the discussion on Modification, it is necessary to consider the question—Are the details in question prompted by—that is, performed for the purpose of accomplishing—the transcendental *Apūrva*, or by the Sacrificial Act ? If they are prompted by the *Apurva*, then alone is the Modification possible ; as the *Apurva* of every Sacrifice is different from that of another Sacrifice ; if, on the other hand, they are prompted by the Sacrificial Act,, then there would be a commixture of Details ; because all Sacrifices are equally 'Sacrificial Acts', hence all details would be admissible at all.

The question has been placed in another way also in the *Bhāṣya* (Trs. P. 1418-1419) : (1) Are the Details *contingent* upon the Sacrificial Act and *prompted* by the *Apūrva* ? or are they both *contingent* upon, and prompted by, the *Apūrva* ? The answer is that the details are *prompted* by the *Apūrva* (Bhā. Trs. p. 1419) ; and also *contingent* upon the *Apūrva*. Hence the conclusion is that the *Apūrva* is the *prompter* as well as the *contingent* cause of the Details. (Bhā. Trs. p. 1420).

The following are a few instances of Details prompted by and related to the *Apūrva* :—(1) The Details of the *Agnihotra* are related to the *Apurva* (Sū. 9. 1.1.) ; (2) The loudness or otherwise of the recitation of a *Mantra* is related to the final *Apurva*. (Sū. 9.1.3) ; (3) the Details connected with the Fruit and the Deity are regulated by, and related to the *Apurva*. (9. 1. 4-5.)

In connection with the last instance, we find the important principle enunciated that Details are not prompted by the Deity ; that is, details are not dependent upon the nature of the Deity. This is an important matter, as setting forth the *Mīmāmsaka's* conception of the *Devatā*, Deity, of Sacrifices. We shall therefore set forth the Topic in some detail.

The *Prima Facie View* has been thus set forth in the *Bhāṣya* (Trs., p. 1429). "*The Deity should be taken as prompting the Details of the Sacrifice, because the Feeding is for the sake of the Deity, as in the case of the Guest*—(Sū. 9. 1.6.) All Deities should be regarded as prompters of Details ; because what is called 'Sacrifice' is only the '*Feeding of the Deity*' ; what is done at the Sacrifice is that an eatable substance is offered to the Deity ; and the act is that of *giving or offering*, of which the Deity is the recipient ; in this way the Deity cannot be regarded as a subordinate factor ; on the contrary, the *Substance offered* and the *act of offering* are both subordinate to the *Deity*. Then again, the Sacrifice is a form of *worship* of the Deity and the *act* of *worship* must be subordinate to the *object worshipped*. The case of the Deity should be analogical to the case of the Guest , whatever service is rendered to the guest regarded as prompted by the Guest ; similarly, whatever is done in the course of the Sacrificial Offering to the Deities, should be regarded as prompted by these Deities. It has to be admitted, in this connection, that the Deity has a physical body and actually eats what is offered. That this is so is clearly indicated (*a*) by *Smṛti-texts*, (*b*) by *Custom* and (*c*) by *Indicative Vedic Texts*. (A) There are *Smṛti-texts* clearly declaring that Deities have material bodies, and *Smṛti-texts* are authoritative ; (*b*) it is *customary* with people to treat the Deity as having a material body; for instance, they paint the Deity *Varuna* with a noose in his hand, and so forth ; (*c*) lastly, there is a Vedic text where the Deity *Indra* is accosted with the words—'O, Indra, I take hold of your right hand'.—That the Deity actually eats the offerings is also indicated by—(*a*) *Smṛti-texts*, (*b*) *Custom* and (*c*) *Indicative Vedic texts*. (*a*) There are *Smṛti-texts* actually asserting that the Deities eat the things offered ; (*b*) People treat Deities as if they actually ate the offerings ; and (*c*) There are such Vedic texts as clearly indicate such *eating* and *drinking* by Deities; *e.g.*, the *Mantra* addressed to *Indra* says:—'O, *Indra* please eat and drink what has been offered.' That the substances offered are still visible is due to the fact that it is only the Essence of the Substances that is eaten or drunk by the Deities. From the same sources again, we learn that Deities own property also ; for instance, (*a*) there are *Smṛti-texts* declaring that the Deity owns property ; (*b*) the *Custom* is current of dedicating landed property to Deities ; (*c*) *Vedic texts* speak of *Indra* as the Heaven', which also indicates that Deities own property. 'master of (Sū. 9.1.7.)"

As against the above *Prima Facie View*, the *Established Conclusion*, set forth under Sū. 9.1. 9-10, is as follows :—*In fact it is the objective of the Sacrifice—i.e., the Apurva—that should be regarded as the principal factor;*

because the matter is one that can be determined only by the Vedic Word ; and the Deity is spoken of only as a subordinate factor. (Sū. 9.1.9.). The Vedic Word clearly asserts that the Fruit of the Sacrifice proceeds from the *act of Sacrifice,* not from the *Deity.* The Deity and the *offering-material* are both accomplished entities, while the *Act of Sacrifice* is what is to be accomplished : from all this it is clear that the Deity cannot be the *prompter* of Details. In fact, that alone can be regarded as the *prompter* of Details which brings about the desired Result ; hence it is the *Apūrva* that should be regarded as the Prompter of the Details. The view set forth above makes it necessary to admit of Deities having material bodies and actually eating and drinking the Substances offered ; and this idea is utterly repugnant to the Veda, which does not lend support to any such idea regarding Deities. The text quoted above regarding the 'right hand' of Indra does *not* mean that 'Indra has got a right hand' ; what it means is—'We have taken hold of *what is Indra's right hand' ;* because even so, the text cannot be taken as literally true ; because even if Indra has a 'right hand', it cannot be possible for any human being to 'take hold' of it. As regards the invocational words addressed to the Deity, these are not meant to be addressed literally ; they are meant only to indicate the particular Deity ; and the sense of the invocational words would be mere eulogy, the sense of the Eulogy being that 'the Deity is such an efficient instrument of accomplishing the desired result that it accomplishes it, on being invoked, in the same manner as ordinary persons equipped with bodies and organs, etc.' Having been thus invoked, if the Deity is told 'I have taken hold of your hand', all that these words mean is that 'we are dependent upon you', and this serves the purpose of reminding us that we should proceed to perform the rites in honour of this particular Deity. As regards the text speaking of the '*fist* of *Indra* holding Heaven and Earth', all that it means is the praise of *Indra*, the sense being that '*Indra* is such a being that *if he had a fist*, it would be so large as to be able to hold Heaven and Earth'. Thus there is no Vedic text that could justify the presumption that Deities have bodies like human beings. The texts that speak of the 'arms of *Indra* being 'hairy', or his eyes as 'tawny', —all these are purely eulogistic. Nor is there actual *feeding* or *eating* at Sacrifices ; in fact, the Deity never eats ; hence the argument that 'the feeding is for the Deity' (Sū. 9.1.6.) is not true. In fact, the idea of the Deities actually *eating* the offering-materials is negatived by the fact that Deities have no material body. If the Deities actually ate the substances offered, then these would diminish in quantity. Nor is there any proof for the asse-

rtion that "the Deities partake of the *Essence* only of the viands offered and hence there is no dimnishing of the quantity." We cannot therefore accept the notion that the Deities actually eat the offerings. Then again, it is not possible for the Deity to *own propety ;* and not owning anything, it cannot give anything ; the texts generally quoted as indicative of the fact of Deities *owning property* are purely eulogistic. From all this it follows that the Deity cannot be the *prompter of Details.* The case of the Deities is not the same as that of the Guest. (*Bhāṣya*,Trs., pp. 1432—1437.)

According to the *Bhāṭṭabhāskara* (MS., pp. 92-93) there are three means of ascertaining the 'Deity' of a particular Sacrifice.—(1) Nominal Affixes —for instance, the term '*Āgnéya*' is formed of the noun '*Agni*' with the nominal affix '*dhak*', according to *Pāṇini* 4,2.24 ; so that *Agni* becomes indicated as the 'Deity' of the *Āgnéya-Sacrifice ;* (see Mī. Sū. 10.4.25) ;—(2) the Dative Ending ;—when it is said '*Agnayé*', 'Sacrifices to Agni', *Agni* is indicated as the 'Deity' of the Sacrifice. This latter is weaker in authority than the former, because the Deity, not being a personal entity, cannot be the 'recipient of a gift' in the real sense of the term ; this 'recipientship' being what is denoted by the Dative, the Dative can apply to the Deity only figuratively, while the exact signification of the nominal affix '*dhak*' is 'Deityship', 'āgnéya' being that 'of which *Agni is the Deity*', and this is applicable to *Agni directly.* (3) *Mantras*—Some word or expression in the *Mantras* also serve to indicate the Deity ; *e.g.*, the Mantra *Kētum kṛṇvannaketave, etc.*' indicates *Ketu* as the Deity.

This *Modification—Ūha*—is of two kinds—(1) one that is *directly laid down ;* for instance, when it is declared that at the Ectype, a certain corn has to be thumped *once,* and not as many times as may be necessary for the removal of the chaff, as is done at the Archetype ; and the *Mantra* accompanying the *thumping* is also to be recited only once. (2) That which is *inferred or presumed ;* this latter is of three kinds—(*a*) *The Modification of the Mantra ; e.g.*, at the *Āgnēya-Sacrifice,* the substance offered is the *Vrīhi-corn,* and the offering is made to *Agni,* and the *Mantra* used is——'*Agnayētrā justam nirvapāmi———vrīhīnām sumanasyamānah*' (Vājasa—Sam. 1.13) ; this *Āgnēya*-Sacrifice is the Archetype, of which the *Saurya*-Sacrifice is an Ectype ; but at this latter the substance offered is the *Nīvāra* corn ; and the offerings are made to *Sūrya ;* in view of these facts, certain Modifications in the accompanying *Mantra* appear to be called for ; consequently, even though there is no Vedic Injunction laying down such modifications of the *Mantra,* the necessary Injunction is *inferred* from the needs of the

situation and the *Mantra* is used in the form—"*Suryāya* (instead of *Agnaye*) *tvā juṣṭam nirvapāmi———nīvārāṇām* (instead of '*vrīhīnām*') *sumanasyamānah*"—(*Sutra* 9.3. 12). (*b*) The second kind of Modification is that of the *Sāman*; for instance, for the *Vaishyastoma* Sacrifice, the *Kaṇvarathantara* has been prescribed; while at the original Sacrfice, as performed by *Brāhmanas*, of which the *Vaishyastoma* is the Ectype,—the *Samans* used are the *Bṛhat* and the *Rathantara*. The question then arises as to whether the *Sāman* at the *Vaishyastoma* is to be sung in the manner of both the *Samans* of the Archetype or of one of these only. In the answer to this there is a marked difference between *Shabara* and *Kumārila*: According to *Shabara*, (Trs., p. 1543) it has to be sung in the manner of both,—there being an option only with regard to such details of *singing* in which the *Bṛhat* is directly incompatible with the *Rathantara*; as for instance, while the *Bṛhat* is sung *loudly*, the *Rathantara* is sung *not-loudly*;—according to *Kumārila* (*Ṭupṭīkā*) on the other hand, there is *option* in reagrd to all the details of *singing*; that is to say, when singing the *Kanvarathantara* at the *Vaishyastoma*, one should sing either wholly like *Bṛhat* or *wholly* like *Rathantara*, (Sū. 9.2.48). (*c*) The third kind of Modification is that of the *Embellishment*; for the *Vājapeya-Sacrifice* the *Nīvāra-corn* has been prescribed; while at its Archetype, the corn used is the *Vrīhi*, in connection with which, *washing,thumping*, and other *Embellishments* have been prescribed. Though no such *Embellishments* have been directly prescribed for the *Nīvara-corn*, yet they have to be done in connection with this latter also; for the simple reason that without such *Embellishments*, the corn would not be fit for use at Sacrifices. (Sū. 9.2.40.)

The Modification of *Mantra* again is of various kinds. The *Mīmāmsā-bālaprakāsha* (p. 131, et. seq.) has noted the following ten kinds:—(1) Alteration of the Basic Noun;—'*Agnaye*' changed into '*Sūryāya*' (see above); —(2) Alteration of Gender; the *Mantra* '*Vasvyasi rudrāsi*, etc., (Feminine) is addressed to the *Heifer*; and it is changed into '*Vasvasi rudrosi*' (Masculine) when addressed to the *Calf*;—(3) Alteration of *Number*: the *Mantra* '*Chhāgasya vapayā, etc.*' is changed into '*Chhagānām vapaya, etc.*' (Plural) at the *Prājāpatya-Sacrifice*, where there are several goats concerned; (4) Alteration of the *Basic Noun and Gender*; *e.g.*, '*Agnaye juṣṭam*' is changed into '*Adityai juṣṭam*':—(5) Alteration of *Basic Noun and Number*: *e.g.*, '*Agnayē juṣṭam*' is changed into '*Vishvebhyo devebhyo juṣṭam*';—(6) Alteration of *Number and Gender*; '*Prāsmai agnim, etc.*' changed into '*Prābhyah agnim*'; (not so according to *Shabara*, see Trs. p. 1572)—(7) Alteration of the *Basic* Noun, Gender and Number: for the consecration of the water

used for the washing of the corn, we have the *Mantra 'Āpodevīḥ shuddhāḥ sthaḥ'*, where the words *'Āpodevīḥ, etc.'* are Feminine-Plural; this same Mantra when used for the consecration of Clarified Butter, is read as *'Ghṛtadeva-shuddhamasi'*; (8) Alteration in the form of repeating the whole of the original twice over; *e.g.*, in the cutting of the Skin, the *Mantra* used begins with *'Ekadhā'*, when there is only one skin; when there *are two* skins concerned, the *Mantra* begins as *'Ekadhē-Ekadhē'* (Sū. 9.3. 29—31); (9) Alteration of the word with the Nominal Affix; *e.g.*, the *Mantra*—*'Mitrāvaruṇau tvā uttarataḥ*, etc.' (Vājasa-Sam. 2.3) is changed into *'Mitrāvaruṇau tvā purastāt, etc.*; (10) Alteration of Indeclinables; *e.g.*, the *Mantra*—*'Agnim gṛhṇāmi .... shvo yajñāya ramatam'* is changed into *'.... adya yajñāya*, etc.', where for *'shvaḥ'* in the original, we have *'adya'* in the Modification.

In this connection, it has to be noted that the *Mantra* in its modified form is not regarded as *'Mantra'* in the strict sense of the term; even though it serves the purpose of a *Mantra*, it is not a *Mantra*, it is only an auxiliary to the *Mantra*; the reason for this lies in the fact that the learned do not regard the *modified Mantra* as 'Mantra', and it is entirely upon the usage of the learned that it depends whether or not a certain text is to be regarded as *'Mantra'*. (Sū. 2.1.34; *Bṛhatī*, M.S., 50B).—(See above).

CHAPTER XXIX

'BĀDHA'—EXCLUSION

We have seen that under the General Law—that 'The Ectype should be performed in the manner of the Archetype'—certain accessory details are 'transferred' to the Ectype from the Archetype;—also that in certain cases, there is 'modification', at the Ectype, of details 'transferred' to it from the Archetype; now we proceed a step further and consider those cases where there is complete 'Exclusion' (Suspension or Anulment) at the Ectype of the details which are indicated as to be 'transferred' from the Archetype to the Ectype.

The General Principle on this subject of *Exclusion* has been discussed under *Sūtras* 10.1. 1—3. (*Bhāṣya*, Trs., p. 1635 et. seq.). The question has been put in the *Bhāsya* thus—When the details of the Archetype are indicated as to be 'transferred' to the Ectype,—by virtue of the General Law that 'the Ectype is to be performed in the manner of the Archetype',—are all the details of the Archetype to be adopted at the Ectype? or is there anything that may be excluded?

On this question, the *Prima Facie View* is as follows:——"*In as much as the entire procedure—of the Archetype—is transferred to the other Context—i.e.*, to the Ectype,— without any reservation, *—it follows that all the details should be adopted.*" (Sū. 10.1.1)".

The *Established Conclusion* however is that—*In reality, it is only when the need is there that the Mantra, the Embellishment or the Substance is to be employed.* (Sū. 10.1.2). As a matter of fact, it is not right that all the Details of the Archetype should be adopted at the Ectype; in some cases, the *Mantra* or the *Embellishment* or the *Substance*—used at the Archetype—becomes excluded from the Ectype, when its need has ceased. Every one of these Details is used only when there is need for it. There is no Vedic text laying down the use of anything that is to needed. In fact, the Ectype is not syntactically related to the Archetype at all; all that the text enjoining the Ectype means is that 'the desired result should be accomplished by means of the Ectype'; and the manner of this accomplishment is indicated by the General Law—'in the same manner in which it is accomplished by the Archetype'; and the effect of this is that those details that are adopted at the Archetype for the fulfilling of a certain need become excluded from

the Ectype, if there is no need for them at the latter ; hence the conclusion is that the General law does *not* indicate the employment at the Ectype of those details of the Archetype of which the need has ceased. For example, (*a*) at the Archetype, the *Kusha-grass* has got to be lopped with special *Mantras ;* but in connection with the Ectype, it is said that 'the grass used should be that which has fallen off by itself' ; hence there is no need for the adopting of the grass *lopped* with special *Mantras.* (*Bhāsya.* Trs., *pp.* 1636-1637.) (*b*) In connection with the Ectype, it is enjoined that 'the *Charu-offering* is to consist of a *Hundred Gold Pieces' ;* of this special kind of 'Charu' there can be no 'threshing' which has been enjoined in connection with the '*Charu-offering*' of Rice, offered at the Archetype ; this threshing therefore, not being needed in the case of the *gold pieces* becomes excluded from the Ectype. (*Bhāṣya,* Trs. p. 1638.) (*c*) Similarly at the *Charu-offering* to *Vishvedevas,* the Invocation to *Viṣṇu* becomes excluded, as there is no need for it. (Bhā., Trs.,p. 1639.)

In regard to case (*b*) above, that of the offering consisting of *gold-pieces* there is a counter-exception ; we have seen above that the 'threshing' has become excluded from it ; now it would seem that the 'Cooking' also that is done at the Archetype, to the *grain-offering,* should be excluded from the *gold-pieces ;* as there is no need for *cooking* in their case. But there is a direct Injunction laying down the '*cooking*' of the gold-pieces 'in Clarified Butter' ; and by virtue of this Injunction, it has to be done,—though not for the purpose for which it is done at the Archetype. (Sū. 10.2. 1-2. Bhā. Trs. p. 1076.)

There are two kinds of this *Exclusion* (Bādha)—(See *Mīmāmsābālaprakāsha,* p. 131 et. seq.) (1) *Prāpta-bādha* (or *Prameyāpahāra* as called by Pārthasārathi Mishra)—is the 'Exclusion' of a Modification indicated by 'Transference' ;—this *Exclusion* applies to the Modification which is, by its very nature, inadmissible ;—(2) *Aprāptabādha* (called *Mūlochccheda* by Pārthasārathi Mishra),—is the 'Exclusion' of a Modification not indicated by any of the valid forms of 'Transference', which is therefore not admissible. The *Prāpta-bādha* again has been divided into two kinds—(*a*) 'Exclusion', through the Six Means of Right Cognition, Sense-perception and the rest, —and (*b*) 'Exclusion' on the strength of 'Scripture'. Of this latter again, there are several subdivisions. For instance—(*a*) What has been laid down as to be done under normal conditions is *excluded* by what has been laid down as to be done under special circumstances of the case ; for instance, *Fifteen Sāmidhēnī verses* have been laid down as to be recited at the *Darsha-*

Sacrifice, and it is also laid down that *if the Sacrificer happens to be a Vaishya*, the number of *Sāmidhenī verses* to be recited should be *Seventeen;* accordingly under the latter circumstances, *seventeen* are recited. (*b*) What has been enjoined as merely helping in the accomplishment of the Sacrificial act it 'excluded' in favour of what has been enjoined as accomplishing a results desired by the Sacrificer; *e.g.*, in regard to the same *Sāmidhenī verses*, it has been laid down that, in the event of the Sacrificer being desirous of acquiring 'fame' or 'honour', the number of verses should be *twenty-one;* this number thus excludes the *fifteen* and *seventeen* mentioned above. (*c*) That which has gone *before* becomes 'excluded' by what comes *after* it; *e.g.*, in connection with the going of the Priests out of *Havirdhāna*, it is laid down that—'If the *Udgātṛ-Priest* breaks the line, the Sacrifice should be finished without Fees; if the *Pratihartṛ* breaks it, the Sacrificer should give away 'all his belongings';—now if it so happens that the line is broken by both these Priests, the Sacrificer has to give away 'all his belongings.' —the latter rule 'excluding' the former. (*d*) What serves no useful purpose becomes 'excluded'; *e.g.*, the process laid down for the removal of chaff from the grain to be offered becomes excluded at the Ectype when the offering consists of 'gold-pieces'. (See above). (*e*) Some details that are 'transferable' from the Archetype to the Ectype under the General Law, are 'excluded' by Direct Assertion in the Veda itself prohibiting such details; *e.g.*, the Appointment of the *Hotṛ-Priest* is 'excluded' from the *Paitrī-Sacrifice.* (*f*) A 'transferable' Substance becomes 'excluded' by the Direct Injunction of another Substance for the same purpose; *e.g.*, at the *Shyena-Sacrifice*, the *Kusha* is 'excluded' by *Reeds;* and though the Fee prescribed at the Archetypal *Agnyādhāna* is the Cow, it beomes 'excluded' from the Ectypal *Agnyādhānas* by '*the old cart duly repaired*', which is the fee specially prescribed for the latter. (Sū. 10.3. 30-33.) (*g*) What is laid down by the General Rule is 'excluded' by the Special Rule; *e.g.*, in connection with the *Varuṇapraghāsa*, there is a Substance specially prescribed in the shape of the *Niṣkāsa* (the whey, left after the removal of the curdled pieces of milk); and this 'excludes' the *Cake* which would come into the *Varuṇapraghāsa* by the General Law regarding the Ectype being performed in the manner of the Archetype. (Sū. 7.3.16.) (*h*) The *Useless* is 'excluded' by the *Useful;* *e.g.*, among the *Mantras* laid down as to be recited as '*Nigadas*',—*i.e.*, words addressed to others,—there are some *Yajuṣ* texts also;—with regard to the reciting of the *Yajuṣ-texts* it is laid down that it should be done *not-loudly—Silently;*—now if, the *words meant to be addressed to others* were

recited *Silently*, they would entirely fail in their purpose ; for this reason, the '*slient*' 'reciting' of the *Yajus* becomes, in this case, 'excluded' by the 'loud reciting', which would serve a *useful* purpose when heard by the other person to whom it is addressed. (*i*) The *Smaller* is 'excluded' by the *Larger ; e.g.*, in connection with the *Pañchadasharātra-Sacrifice*, when we come to consider the matter of 'names', we find that the single name '*Agniṣṭut*',—which would indicate the reciting of the *Āgneyī Subrahmaṇyā* verse—is 'excluded' in favour of the several names '*Jyotis*' and the rest, by virtue of which the *Aindrī Subrahmanyā* is recited. (*j*) That which has room for itself elsewhere becomes 'excluded' by that which, if not adopted on the occasion in question, would have no place anywhere else ; *e.g.*, with reference to recitation preceeding the *Agnīṣomīya* offering, it is laid down that it is to be done *silently ;* but with regard to the *Dīkṣanīyā Iṣṭi*, a distinct accent has been prescribed, showing that the *Mantras* have to be recited loudly enough to allow of the accentuation being marked ;—now as regards this latter recitation, the *Silent* method is 'excluded' in favour of the *louder*, in view of the fact that the *Silent* method, if dropped at the *Dīkṣaṇīyā*, could still be adopted at the recitations on other occasions, while the particular *accent*, if dropped at the *Dīkṣaṇīyā* Recitation, could not be adpoted at any other reciataion ; so that it would be dropped entirely ; which cannot be permitted in regard to anything that has been directly enjoined in the Veda.

In all these cases we had the 'Exclusion' of details the adoption of which was indicated by some valid Means of Knowledge. There is 'Exclusion' also of such things as do not have their adoption indicated by any valid means. As there can be no limit to such things, the number of 'Exclusions' of this kind cannot be fixed. *Shaṅkara-Bhaṭṭa* enumerates and exemplifies no less than 556 'Exclusions' of this class. (See *Mīmāmsābāla-prakāsha*, pp. 134—137..)

There are several instances, where there is 'Exclusion', not of *all* the details transferable from the Archetype, but of only a portion of these. For instance, for the *baking* of the Cake dedicated to *Agni*, *eight* Pans have been prescribed, in connection with the *Āgneya*-Sacrifice ;—in connection with its Ectype, the offering to *Dyāvāpṛthrī*, only *one* Pan is prescribed ; hence when transfering the Pan from the *Āgneya* to the Ectypal offering, only *one* of the eight pans shall be brought in,—and that too only the *first* —and the remaining *seven* shall be 'excluded'. (Sū. 10—5.1—3.)

In some cases of *Transference* the order of the details transferred is altered; for instance, at the Archetypal *Jyotiṣṭoma*-Sacrifice, there are certain Cups dedicated to certain Deities;—when these are 'transferred' to the Ectype, the order in which they were held at the Archetype,—when the cup dedicated to Indra came first,—is changed and the cup held first is that dedicated to *Shukra;* and this in accordance with the Direct Injunction to that effect. (Sū. 10.5. 67—69.). This change of *order* has been called '*Pratikarṣa*'.

In some cases the Details 'transferred' from the Archetype are not sufficient for the Ectype; *e. g.*, at the Archetype only *fifteen Sāmans* are sung, while for the Ectype, *twenty-one* have been prescribed; in this case the remaining *Six-Sāmans* have to be *added* over and above the *fifteen* transferred from the Archetype; and the number *twenty-one* is *not* to be made up by repeating *twice Six* out of the same *fifteen Sāmans.* (Sū. 10. 5. 15—25.) Similarly, the Archetypal *Jyotiṣṭoma* is performed by only *one* Sacrificer; but the Ectypal *Sattra* must have *seventeen* Sacrificers, according to a Direct Injunction to that effect. (Sū. 10.6. 45—50.)

The Subject of *Bādha*, 'Exclusion'. leads on to that of its antithesis, *Samuchchaya*, 'Inclusion', or 'Combination'; by virtue of which there is 'Combination' of what is prescribed for the Ectype specifically with what is 'transferred' to it from the Archetype. For instance, in connection with the *Nakṣatrēṣṭi,* certain additional Libations have been prescribed as to be poured after the principal offerings,—these libations being offered to the *Kṛittikās*, to *Amba* and to *Dulā,*—at the Archtype however, after the principal offerings come the *Nāriṣṭa-homas;* these *Nāriṣṭa-homas* are transferable to the *Nakṣatrēṣṭi;* and in this case there is no 'exclusion' from the *Nakṣatrēṣṭi*, of either the before-mentioned libations to the *Kṛittikās*, etc., or of the *Nāriṣṭa-homas;* both sets of offerings are 'combined' and offered; and the reason for this *non-exclusion* lies in the fact that these offerings serve transcendental purposes and there can be no justification for abandoning either of them.

MEANING OF THE NEGATIVE TERM

As 'Exclusion',—which is practically the same as 'Prohibition,'—is generally expressed by the Negative Term, *Jaimini* has discussed the signification of the Negative Term under Sū. 10.8.1. et. seq.

(1) In most cases, we find 'Exclusion' or Prohibition' relating to such details as are indicated as to be transferable to the Ectype from the Archetype, under the General Law relating to the Archetype and the Ectype;

—and (2) in some cases it is found to relate to details that have been enjoined in a general way without reference to any particular Sacrifice.

(1) An instance of 'Exclusion' or 'Prohibition' of a Detail indicated as transferable to the Ectype from the Ārchetype, under the General Law, —we have the case of the *Appointment of the Priests*, this has been laid down in connection with the Archetype, and as such is transferable to the Ectype ; in but regard to the Ectype it has been directly prohibited by a Vedic text ;—this prohibition is regarded as modifiying, in regard to the Ectype, the Archetypal Injunction and its indications to this extent that it is taken to mean 'that at the Ectype one should employ all the details of the Archetype, *with the Exception of the Appointment of Priests*'. Thus in this case, the Prohibition signifies *Exception*. (Sū. 10.8. 1—4.)

(2) In a case where there are two mutually contradictory assertions in two *Vedic* texts themselves,—*e.g.*, one text says 'the *Ṣoḍaṣhin* vessel *should be held* at the *Ātirātra*', and another to the effect that 'the *Soḍaṣhin should not be held* at the *Ātirātra*'. —the Negative Term in the latter text does not signify *Exception*, as it negatives the previous declaration *entirely ;* hence in this case, the Prohibition expressed by the Negative Term modifies the Archetypal Injunction and its indications to this extent that the particular detail of *Holding the Vessel*—is made a matter of *option*. (Sū. 6. 10.6.)

In some cases, the Negative Term signifies only the *praise* of something other than what is negatived. *E.g.*, in connection with the *Agnihotra*, we have a Vedic text to the effect that—'One should offer the *Wild-Sesamum*', and this ends with the words 'the *wild sesamum* is no offering at all' ; the first part of the text lays down the *Wild Sesamum* as something *to be offered*, while the second part speaks of the same as *not to-be-offered ;* with a view to reconcile these two contradictory statements, the negative assertion in the second part of the text has been taken to mean that—'the *offereing not milk* at the *Agnihotra* is so praiseworthy that even such an excellent substance as the *Wild Sesamum* may not be offered in its place' ; in this case, the negation, *i.e.*, exclusion, prohibition—of the *Wild Sesamum* signifies the praise of *Milk*. (Sū. 10.8.7.)

(4) In some cases, the Negative Term signifies only *partial* 'Exclusion'. *E.g.*, in connection with the *Jyotiṣṭoma* we have the text—'The man who has been initiated for the Sacrifice should not make gifts or offer libations', —where certain acts are forbidden for the Initiated Sacrificer ;—these same acts are also found to be enjoined by another texts as *what should be done*,

for the purpose of securing certain desirable results ;—these same acts are also 'transferable' to the *Agnihotra,* as helping the accomplishment of the Sacrifice. The question arises as the where these two sets of the acts are meant to be negatived by the said Prohibition—(*a*) at the *Jyotiṣṭoma* itself, where it is to be performed for obtaining certain results, or (*b*) at the *Agnihotra* where it accomplishes the Sacrifice, or (*c*) at both of these ? The *Established Conclusion* is that the acts are not prohibited in connection with *both,*—they are prohibited *only* in connection with the case where they are performed with a view to desirable results ; and the reason for this conclusion lies in the fact that the text containing the Negation or Prohibition in question follows clearly upon the Injunction of the Acts as leading to certain desirable results for the performer. (Sū. 10.8. 12—15.)

CHAPTER XXX

'TANTRA' CENTRALISATION

We have dealt with 'Exclusion' and 'Inclusion', of Details ; these enable us to determine the *extent* and the *scope* of the Ectypal Sacrifice. This leads us to consider the means of determining the *extent* and *scope* of the entire Sacrifices—specially the composite ones—which consists of a *Primary* and a number of *Subsidiary* Sacrifices. This subject lends itself to a twofold division—(*a*) There are certain Subsidiaries which, if performed once, effectually help, by that single perfromance, more than one Acts ; this help accorded by a single performance of the Subsidiary to several Primaries has been called '*Tantra*' (Centralisation, Collectivation ;—(*b*) there are, on the other hand, soem Subsidiaries which have to be repeated in connection with each Primary to which they are related ; this repetition of the Subsidiary with each Primary has been called '*Āvāpa*' (De-centralisation, Distribution).

As a preliminary to the consideration of this question of 'Centralisation' and 'Decentralisation', it is necessary to consider whether in the case of a composite Sacrificial performance, consisting of a number of minor Sacrifices, the specified result follows from all *collectively* or from each severally. There are similar questions that arise in regard to all composite Sacrifices. (*Bhāsya*, Trs., pp. 2080-2081.)

The Established Conclusion on this question is that the result follows from all the Sacrifices *collectively*.

This is the case with the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* for instance, which is a composite Sacrifice, *consisting* of six Sacrifices—the *Agneya* and the rest ; and 'Heaven' has been declared to be the Result following from them. The question is—Does this result proceed from all the six Sacrifices in *common, collectively* ? Or from each of them *severally* ?—The *Established Conclusion* on this question is that —these Sacrifices, *though made up of several Acts, should be regarded as one Act* (*Composite*)—*because they are related to a single purpose and because they are called by a single name.* (Sū. 11.1.1.) That is to say, though the *Agneya* and the other empmponents of the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* are distinct from each other, they should be regarded as 'one act', because they are all related to the same Result, *collectively ;* and those Sacrifices which lead to the same single Result must be

'one act'. That these acts are related to the Result *collectively* follows from the fact that *they are called by a single name,* which name signifies all the component acts collectively, and it is through this name that the text has connected the Acts with the particular Result. (*Bhāsya*, Trs., pp. 2082-2083.)

The use of this discussion lies in the fact that, if the Result followed from all the component Sacrifices *collectively,* then the Subsidiary, Details should have to be performed only once,—*not* with each of the component Sacrifices ; whereas if the Result followed from each of the component Sacrifices *severally,* then the Subsidiary details should have to be performed with each one of these components. Thus then, in the former case, there would be *Tantra,* 'Centralisation', and in the latter case *Avāpa,* 'Decentralisation'.

The same question arises in regard to the *Subsidiaries* also :—Do all the prescribed Subsidiaries help their Primary *collectively* ? Or does each Subsidiary accord its help *independently* of the rest ? The *Established Conclusion* here also is that it is *collectively* that the Subsidiaries hlep the Primary ; so that here also we have *Tantra,* 'Centralisation' (Sū. 11.1. 5—19).

A typical instance is provided by the *Prayājas* which are Subsidiary to the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa ;* and the conclusion is that these *Prayājas* have to be performed only *once,* and thereby they help the whole of the composite *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa.* (Sū. 11.1. 29—37.)

Another general question dealt with in this connection is in regard to the *Prospective Sacrifices, i.e.,* Sacrifices performed with a veiw to a definite result. Should these be performed only *once* ? Or should they be repeated ? The *Established Conclusion* on this question is that such Sacrifices may be repeated as often as one may have the desire for the particular result. (Sū. 11.1. 20—25.) In the case of *acts* with visible results, they have to be repeated as often as it may be necessary for the obtaining of that result ; *e.g.,* the *Threshing* of the Corn has to be repeated until the *removal of the chaff* has been accomplished. (Sū. 11.1.27.) But these same acts, if performed with a view to *unseen* results, should be performed only *once.* (Sū. 11.1.28.)

The following are some other typical instances of *Tantra.* (a) Bearing upon the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* Sarcifice, we have a number of Injunctions laying down details in connection with them such as 'the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* should be performed upon level ground', 'the *Pūrṇamasā* should be performed on the Full-Moon day', 'there should be four Priests at it', and so forth. From these Injunctions it would seem that the entire *Darsha-*

Pūrṇamāsa should be perfromed on *level ground,* on the Full-Moon day and so forth,—the whole Sacrifice being repeated at each place and time mentioned. But the *Established Conclusion* on this point is that the entire *Darsha-Pūrūamāsa* is to be performed *once* only, and that this one performance should be done at the place and time laid down in the text; and the reason for this lies in the fact that the numerous acts composing the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* are to bring about their Result collectively, as combining to make up the single performance of the Sacrifice as a whole. (Sū. 11.2. 1-2.) (*b*) All the *Subsidiary, Sacrifices* entering into a *Primary* Sacrifice should similarly be performed only once at the same time and place as that *Primary.* (Sū. 11.2. 3—10.) (*c*) A third instance of *Tantra* is provided by the *Agnyādhāna,* Fire-Installation,—which is done only once in life and is used at the subsequent Sacrifices. (Sū. 11.3.2.)

This same *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* supplies an instance of *Āvāpa,* 'Decentralisation', also :—This Sacrifice consists of two sets of Sacrifices—one called '*Darsha*' and the other '*Pūrṇamāsa ;* though the Subsidiaries prescribed for each set are nearly the same, yet they have to be repeated with each of the two sets ; and the reason for this lies in the fact that, though the two sets together make up a *single* Sacrifice, leading to a signle Result, yet, in asmuch as the two sets are performed on two different days—fifteen days apart—the Subsidiaries performed with one set would be performed on the day on which that set is performed; and thus they would not be performed on the day prescribed for the second set, which latter would, therefore, be left incomplete, bereft of the prescribed Subsidiaries. In such cases therefore, the Subsidiaries have to be repeated, (Sū.11.2. 11—17.)

There are however certain Subsidiaries which, by their very nature, —and also by virtue of Direct Injunctions,—cannot be performed on the same day as their Primary ; for instance, the *Erecting of the Altar* has been enjoined as to be done on the day preceding the performance of the *Darsha ;* and hence this Erection cannot be done on the same day as the *Darsha* Sacrifice itself. (Sū. 11. 3. 1.)

CHAPTER XXXI

(A) 'PRASAṆGA'—*EXTENDED APPLICATION*

'*Tantra*' has been defined as consisting in the single performance of a Subsidisry benefiting more than one Primary,—that single performance being enjoined and intended by the Sacrificer to help more than one Primary Act In certain cases, the scope of this '*tantra*' is further extended, and the single performance of a Subsidiary,—even though prescribed and intended to help *one* Primary,—is accepted as helping another Prinary also, when this latter is performed by the same man and at the same time and place as the former Primary. This is called '*Prosaṇga*', *Extended Application.* For instance, in connection with the *Agnīṣomīyā* Animal-Sacrifice, there is an offering of Meat-Cake, laid down in the text,—'Having offered the omentum of the animal sacrificed to *Agni-Soma*, one should offer the *Meat-cake*, dedicated to *Agni-Soma*'. The question in regard to this is —Should the *Subsidiaries* —*i.e.*, the *Prayājas*—which have been prescribed for the *Agnīsomīyā Sacrifice*, be performed separately for the *Meat-cake Offering*? Or is this *Meat-cake offering* to be regarded as having received the requisite help from those Subsidiaries as performed in connection with the *Agnīsomīyā Animal-Sacrifice*,—and there is no need for a separate performance of these? The *Established Conclusion* on this question is that the *Meat-cake-offering is accomplished through the Subsidiaries performed during the Procedure of the Animal-Sacrifice; because it has been enjoined in the middle of the Process.* (Sū. 12.1.3.) That is, as a matter of fact, the *Cake-offering* has been laid down in the middle of the Procedure of the Animal-Sacrifice; by virtue of which the help rendered by the Subsidiaries operates both ways—*i,e,*. it helps the *Animal-Sacrifice* as well as the *Cake-offering;* the Subsidiaries performed in connection with the *Animal-Sarifice* are in proximaty to the *Cake-offering* also; and by virtue of this proximity, they render help to this latter offering also; like the lamp lighted in the house illumining the road also. (*Bhāṣya*, Trs., p. 2255.) Even though we have no such Injunction as that 'What is done for the *Animal-Sacrifice* helps the *Cake-offering* also', yet the circumstances brought into existence by the performance of the Subsidiaries with the intention of helping one act, could not cease to exist and withdraw their help from another Act also, which latter might happen to be performed at that same time and place and by the same Performer. (Sū. 12.1. 1—6.)

Similarly, when one has erected the Sacrificial Altar in connection with the *Agniṣṭoma-Sacrifice*,—if he wishes to perform an *Iṣṭi* also, after that *Agniṣṭoma*, he need not erect another Altar for the latter ; the same Altar can serve for both Sacrifices. (Sū.12.2. 8-9.)

There are certain exceptions to this also For instance, the *Armabhaṇīyā Iṣṭi* has been enjoined as to be performed at the commencement of the *first Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* that one undertakes to perform,—as shown under 9.1. 34-35 ; though this *Iṣṭi* is meant to be only purificatory or preparatory in character,—tending to purify the Sacrificer and prepare him for the Sacrifice,—yet, in asmuch as a single performance helps *all* the Sacrifices performed by the man in course of the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*, it has to be repeated along with each of the Ectypes that the man performs ; and the reason for this lies in the fact that the qualification 'life-long' does not pertain to the Primary *Sacrifice*, but to the performer of each Sacrifice (as shown under 2.4.1), and hence there is no 'Extended Application' of the *Ārambhaṇīyā Iṣṭi* in this case (12.2. 19—21).

(B) 'VIKALPA' OPTION

We now proceed to consider the subject of '*Option*,' '*Vikalpa*', which may be regarded as an antithesis to *Sammuchchaya*, 'Combination, or 'Inclusion', dealt with the by *Sūtra* under Discourse 9. (See above). In cases of 'Inclusion', there is performance of several Subsidiaries together, while in cases of 'Option', only one of the several possible Subsidiaries can be performed ; and the choice in the matter lies with the Sacrificer.

Before taking up the particular instances of *Option*, a few general observations on the subject appear to be called for. As a rule, *Option* is not permissible except under strict necessity ; because its acceptance gives rise to *eight* undesirable contingencies. For instance, there is the typical instance of *Option* between *Yava* and *Vrīhi*, both of which are optional alternatives ;—accepting this option, (1) if we use *Vrīhi*, and not use *Yava*, we reject the authority of the Vedic text enjoining the use of *Yava*,—(2) we assume the untrustworthy character of this text,—(3) if, on the other hand, we use *Yava*, and not use *Vrīhi*, we reject the authority of the text prescribing *Vrīhi*, and (4) assume the untrustworthy character of this text ; (5) in this latter case again, we accept the authority of the *Yava-text* which we had rejected before, (6) we thereby reject the previously-assumed untrutworthiness of the *Yava-text ;* (7) in using the *Vrīhi* again, we accept the authority of the *Vrīhi-text* we had rejected before, and (8) we also reject the previously-assumed untrustworthiness of that text.

It many be noted that these objections apply only to the case of those options which are *not-restricetd,* that is, those where the choice is left to the will of the Agent; it does not apply to those cases where the option is restricted, *vyavasthita.* ऐच्छिकेऽष्टविधो दोषः—says *Devanātha Ṭhakkura* in his *Adhikaraṇakaumudi* (p. 1).

Options have been grouped primarily under *three* heads: (*Vide Mīmāmsābālaprakāsha,* p. 152—65) (A) Indicated by Reason, (B) Indicated by Direct Declaration, (C) Dependent upon the wish of the Agent.

(A) Of *Option indicated by Reason,* there are eight sub-divisions:—(1) Option between two '*kinds*', *e.g.*, between the *kind of corn,* called '*Vrīhi*' and that called '*Yava*';—(2) between two particular individual things, *e.g.*, at the *Darsha-Pūrnamāsa, for the Agnīṣomīya-offering,* the Cake offered may be the one baked either on *eleven* or *twelve* pans, as laid down in the texts of two different Vedic Rescensions (*Vide* 2. 4. 8—32);—(3) between two Qualities; *e.g.*, between the *Black* and the *Red* colours of the Goat for the *Agnīsomāya-offering:* (4) between two Acts; *e.g.*, at the *Jyotiṣṭoma* when the Priests go out of the *Havirdhāna,* forming themselves into a line, if the line happens to be broken by one Priest, one set of Expiatory Rites is to be performed,—if by another Priest, then another set,—if both should happen to break the line simultaneously, then there is *Option* between the two sets of Expiatory Rites, (See Sū. 6. 5. 51—53);—(5) Between the using of one *kind* of things and the total abandoning of it; *e,g,*. for the *Vājasaneyins,* it has been laid down that they may or may not recite the *Nakṣatra Mantra*' so that the Recitation of the *kind* of *Mantra* called '*Nakṣatra Mantra*' may be done or may be entirely omitted; (6) Between the *using* and *abandoning* of a particular *Individual* thing; *e.g.*, the particular *Mantra* called '*Sambhāra*' may be recited or entirely omitted; (7) Between the *adopting* and *abandoning* of a Quality; *e.g.*, for the Altar of the *Darsha-Sacrifice,* a particular size has been prescribed,—and at the same time there is a declaration to the effect that 'there need be no exact measurement for the Altar'; hence the specially-prescribed *Size* may or may not be adopted; (8) Between the performing and abandoning of an Act; *e.g.*, the *Holding* of the *Ṣoḍashin* vessel at the *Atirātra* may or may not be done.

All these eight kinds of Option may be either *Kratvartha,*—helping the fulfilment of the Sacrifice—or *Puruṣārtha,* accomplishing something desirable for the Agent, All the instances cited above belong to the former class; *i.e.*, they are all *Kratvartha* Options. At the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa Sacrifice,* the water is fetched in a vessel which has a handle four inches long

and a cavity eight inches deep and about nine inches in diameter ; if the Sacrificer is desirous of securing *Brahmic-Glory*. the vessel should, according to one text, be made of *Wood*, while, according to another text, of *Bell-metal ;* and this gives rise to *option*. There are *Eleven* kinds of this *Puruṣārtha* option.

All these nineteen options are *Indicated by Reason*.

(B) Of Option *Indicated by Direct Declaration* also there are nineteen kinds. As an example of one of these, we have the Option indicated by the Vedic text—'One who desires to Sacrifice with *corns, or with animals, or Soma* should perform the Sacrifice *on the Moonless day or on the Full-Moon day*' ; where we have the option regarding the *material substances*, as also regarding *time*. In *Smṛti* also we have the text to the effect that 'the *Pitṛs* remain satisfied for a month, with offerings of *Sesamum* or *Barley*' ; where we have an option between the two substances Sesamum and Barley.

(C) Of the third kind of Option—that *dependent on the wish of the Agent*,—also, there are *nineteen* kinds. As an example of this, we have the following :—In connection with the *Ashvamēdha*, it has been laid down that 'A Brāhmaṇa is to be sacrificed to *Brahmā*' ; the *Brāhmaṇa*—thus Sacrificed may be one belonging to the *Kauṇḍinya* or to any other *Gotra ;* this depends entirely on the wish of the Sacrificer.

There is another division of Options into two classes—(*a*) *Vyavasthita*, 'Restricted',—where, among the alternatives, there is a limit or restriction, and (*b*) *Avyavasthita*, 'Unrestricted',—where there is no such restriction or limit. Each of these again is *Indicated by Reason* or *Indicated by Direct Declaration*. Examples of this latter class—*i.e.*, Restricted Option Indicated by Direct Declaration, we have in the cases already cited. As an example of the *Restricted Option Indicated by Reason*, we have one from the *Smṛtis*, discussed by *Kumārila* (in the *Smṛti-pāda* of the *Tantravārtika*) ; it has been laid down that—'The Brāhmaṇa should devote *twelve years* of his life to the study of each of the Vedas,—*or as many years as may be necessary*' ;—on the face of it, this appears to indicate an *unrestricted* Option, to be determined entirely by the wish of the Student whether he will complete the entire course of the study of the four Vedas in 48 years or in 4 only ; but by means of Reasoning, it has been shown by *Kumārila* that here we have the Option of the *Restricted* kind,—the meaning of the text being that 'if the Student is not going to take to the life of the householder, he should devote 48 years to Vedic study,—if however he is going to enter that life, then he should devote only 5 years to each Veda and complete the course in 20 years ; but

in case he is not able, under his peculiar circumstances, to devote-more than 2 or 3 years to each Veda he should adopt this last course, and so on. (See *Tantravārtika*, p. 112.)

Restriction of Options *indicated by Direct Declaration* is of *seven* kinds :—(1) Restriction regarding *Place ; e.g.*, the Consecration of Fire having been laid down as to be performed during Spring, the question arises as to which of the two methods of counting the seasons is to be adopted ; Seasons are as a rule calculated by the 'Lunar' month has been taken by some people to begin with the Moonless Day, and by others, with the Full-Moon day. The idea derived from all this would be that there is no restriction regarding the calculating of the month, and hence of the Seasons ; but the requisite Restriction is provided by another text in the *Trikāṇḍmaṇḍana*, which asserts that—'The system of the counting of the *month* as commencing with the *Dark Fortnight* is not accepted in countries lying *to the South of the Vindhya Hills' ;* so here we have the Option restricted to Place. (2) Restriction in regard to the reciting of the *Vārtraghṇī* and the *Vṛdhanvatī Mantras* at the *Darsh-Pūrṇamāsa*, there being an uncertainty as to which of the two sets is to be recited on the *Moonless* and which on the *Full-Moon* day, we have the restrictive rule to the effect that the *Vārtraghnī* are to be recited on the *Full-Moon day* and the *Vṛdhanvatī* on the *Moonless day' ;* so here the Option becomes *restricted* in regard to *Time.*—(3) Then there is restriction in regard to the *Agent* also ; *e.g.*, at the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*, a *Mantra* is to be recited by the sacrificer, and in this connection three *Mantras* have been mentioned (1) '*Agṇē vratapatē*', (2) '*Vāyo vratapatē*' and (3) '*Aditya vratapatē*' ;—from which it would seem as if any Sacrificer may recite any one of these three *Mantras ;* but there is the distinct rule to the effect that—'The *first* of the three *Mantras* is to be recited by the *Brāhmaṇa*, the second by the *Kṣattriya* and the third by the *Vaishya*, Sacrificer'.—(4) There is Restriction also in regard to *Action* itself ; *e.g.*, in connection with the *Varuṇapraghāsa-Sacrifice* two *Vihāras* (Place for keeping the offering-materials) have been prescribed, one to the North and another to the South ;—and the impression being that any one of the performers might deposit anything on any one of the *Vihāras*, the Option becomes *restricted* by the further rule that 'the *Adhvaryu-priest* is to keep eight of the articles on the Northern one and the *Pratiprasthātṛ-priest* is to keep the *Mārūtī* on the Southern One', (5) There is Restriction also with regard to the *Result ; e.g.*, with regard to the several Optional *Nidhanas* (additional syllables added to the text of the *Sāman*, by the exegencies of the music) to be adopted at the *Jyotiṣṭoma-Sacrifice*, there is a rule laying down that —'When the Sacrificer desires *rain*, the

Nidhana to be used is *Hīṣ*,—when he desires *food*, it is to be *Ūrg*,—and when he desires *Heaven*, it is to be Ū' *;* hence we have Restriction of the Option through the *Result*.—(6) There is Restriction also in regard to the *Occasion* or Contingent Circumstances ; *e.g.*, there is the rule—'In the case of the death of a *Sapiṇḍa* the period of impurity is to be *ten days*,—or till after the day of *Bonepicking*, or *three days*,——or *one day*' :—here we have a number of Options which would be very confusing ; but the wide Option has been *restricted* by another rule, which says—'When the dead *Sapiṇḍa* is one whose *Upanayana* had been performed, the period shall be *ten days ;* if his *Tonsure* had been performed, and *not* the *Upanayana*,—then only *four days*...... *one day* being the period in the case of the dead child having only just cut its teeth'.—Lastly, there is the *Conditional Restriction ; e.g.*, *Yava* and *Vrīhi* are both enjoined as approved alternative grains to be used as offering materials ; and this option has been restricted *conditionally*, by the rule that 'if one has commenced the preformance with *Vrīhi*, he should proceed with the *same* to the end of the performance.'

In regard to *Option*, the following facts are noteworthy :—

In several cases, where there may appear to be Option, there is no real *option* at all ; *e.g.*, in cases where several details have been laid down with regard to the same act,—each of these details being intended for a distinct purpose ; in such cases every one of the details has to be adopted. (Sū. 12.3.9.) But in cases where the details are for the same purpose, there is Option. (12.3. 10—14.) Similarly in regard to the several Expiatory Rites, if these are all prescribed in connection with the same delinquency, then there is to be Option (12. 3—15) ; but there is to be no Option when they are prescribed in connection with different deliquencies, in which latter case, all have to be performed. So with *Mantras*, it is only when several have been prescribed for the same purpose that we have Option, (12.3.28). But when, of such *Mantras*, one is found to be indicative of mere *Recitation*, another of *Praise*, and another of *Invocation of Blessings*,—every one of these has to be recited (12.4. 1-2). With regard to *Gifts*—where several numbers, 6, 12, etc., are prescribed, there is to be Option. (Sū. 12.4.9.)

CHAPTER XXXII

ACTS—SACRIFICES

The Rules of Interpretation evolved in the *Mīmāmsā-Sūtra*, are of universal application,—useful wherever texts have to be interpreted. But they have suffered from the fact that the Commentators on the *Sūtras*, from the earliest times it seems, chose for their illustrations the texts bearing upon Sacrifices; the reasons for this are obvious. Hinduism is a religion of 'Sacrifices' in the highest sense of the term; as ordinarily understood however, the term has been understood to stand for the Sacrifices offered on the physical plane, represented by the offerings of material substances to 'Deities'. During the time the Commentators known to us lived, these Sacrifices formed the most important factor in the life of the Hindu. Naturally therefore the performance of these appeared to them to be the most familiar instances with which to illustrate the rules of interpretation. Circumstances have entirely changed, and 'Sacrifices' are now known merely by name; so that the illustrative examples have become all but unintelligible. A clear study of Sanskrit Literature will however reveal the fact that the rules have been drawn upon to elucidate knotty points in other branches of study and investigation also,—notably so in the domain of legal studies; and naturally so, because the 'Law' of the Hindus is based, directly or indirectly, on Scriptural texts (see above); and the interpretation of these texts had to be done through the Rules of Interpretation evolved in the *Mīmāmsā Sūtra*. We shall see later on how effectively these Rules have been utilised in the Literature of Hindu Law, as also in other branches of Literature. (See below)

In the meantime however, in order to make intelligible the discussions and arguments carried on by the *Mīmāmsaka* in the earlier chapters of this work, it is necessary to provide a short account of these Sacrifices.

As we have seen above, the subject-matter of *Mīmāmsā* is '*Dharma*', and this term stands for *what the man should do;* but in common usage the term includes such acts as *Yāga* (*Sacrifice* proper), *Homa* (Pouring of Libations), *Dāna* (Making Gifts), *Snāna* (Bathing), *Dhyāna* (Meditation), *Japa* (Repeating *Mantras*) and so forth; but the principal forms of *Dharma* that form the subject-matter of *Mīmāmsā Shāstra* are *Yāga*, *Dāna* and *Homa*. The *Bhāsya* says—'The Primary act is in the form of *Yāga* (Sacrificing), *Dāna* (Giving), and *Homa* (Pouring into a receptacle)'—(Trs., p. 784). Every

one of these acts consists in the offering of a certain thing to some one else; and the 'offering' common to all these has been defined as 'the setting aside of one's own ownership over the thing offered and the bringing about of the ownership of another person (the recipient of the gift)'—(*Bhāsya*, Trs., p. 785). (a) This offering becomes a *Yāga*, *Sacrifice*, when '*it brings about the connection between a substance and a Deity*'—says the *Sūtra* (4.2.27). In this case, there is a simple offering to the Deity;—(*b*) *Homa* also is the same, with the further element of 'Pouring'; so that *Homa* is an act of offering a substance by pouring it into a receptacle (Bhā., Trs. p. 785).

The *Tuptikā* remarks that the *Bhāsya* has used the word '*āsechana*'., 'Pouring', because this element is present in most *Homas*, where the substance generally used is Clarified Butter or some such liquid subastance; as a matter of fact however, there are several *Homas* at which *Sesamūm* and other grains are offered; so that what differentiates the *Homa* from the *Yāga* is this, that in the *Homa* the substance is thrown into some suitable receptacle, as remarked by *Tantraratna* and *Prakarnapanchikā* (P. 105). It is not necessary that this 'receptacle' of the offering should be *Fire* in order to make it '*Homa*', as has been asserted in the *Bhāttabhāskara*, because in many *Homas*, the Substance is put into Water; *e.g.*, at the *Arabhṛtha-Isti* performed on the completion of the *Agniṣṭoma*.

(*c*) In *Dāna*, 'Gift , there is offering of the Substance followed by the actual bringing about of the ownership of the Recipient. (Bhā. Trs.p. 785). The difference among *Yāga*, *Homa* and *Dāna* is as follows :— The relinquishment of one's own ownership over the offered substance is the factor common to all three; but in *Yāga*. the relinquishment of one's ownership is merely *verbal*, the substance offered not being actually taken away by the Recipient (Deity ; in *Dāna*, what is offered is actually taken away by the Recipient; and in *Homa* what is offered thrown into some suitable receptacle, Fire or Water.

The 'Deity' to whom the Sacrifice is offered is, for the *Mimāmsaka*, a purely hypothetical entity, posited for the sake of the *Sacrifice*, which would not be an act of 'Sacrifice' unless there were a Deity to whom the offering is made; hence the Deity is subordinate to the Sacrifice. This, as we have seen (above) has been clearly brought out in Sū. 9. 1. 6—10, in which connection we have learnt from the *Bhāṣya* that the Deity has no physical body,—It does not eat anything,—It is not either pleased or displeased, nor can it award rewards and punishments as the results of Sacrifices. (*Vide* above Sec. on *Ūha*, Modification).

The main classification of Sacrifices is on the basis of the Substances offered. On this basis, they have been classified under the following three heads :—

I. *Iṣṭi* (including also the *Haviryajñas*). These consist of the offering of Milk, Butter, Rice, Barley and other grains,—made by the *Yajamāna* (Sacrificer accompanied by his wife, and helped by four Officiating Priests). These Priests are—*Adhvaryu, Brahman, Hotṛ* and *Agnīdhra ;* the *Adhvaryu* is the most important among these, chosen before the rest and operating as the General Executive, from beginning to the end of the performance ; his seat is on the Eastern side ;—the *Brahman* is the second to be chosen ; he is the general supervisor and inspector, well-versed in ritualistic details and in the three Vedas ; it is his function also to perform the Expiatory Rites; his seat is on the Southern side:—the seat of the *Hotṛ* is on the *Western* side, and his duty is to recite all such hymns as the *Sāmidhēnīs*, and the rest ;—the *Agnidhra* is seated on the *Northern* side, holds the wooden sword and offers the responses with the word *'astu'* to some of the acts done by the *Adhvaryu*. According to the last Topic of Discourse XII of the *Mīmāmsā-Sūtra*, all the Priests officiating at the Sacrifice shall *be Brāhmaṇas.*

The *Prakṛti* or Archetype of the *Iṣṭi* class is the composite *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* Sacrifice (described in *Shatapatha Brāhmana* I and II) ; this, along with the following six *Vikṛtis* or Ectypes, constitutes the seven *Samsthās* (Forms or Stages) of the *Iṣṭi*. These Six Ectypes are—(1) *Agnyādhyāna* described in Kātyayana's *Shrauta-Sūtra* 4. 179 *et. seq.*), (2) *Agnihotra*, along with its own Ectype, the *Māsāgnihotra* (described in *Shatapatha* 1. 7. 1. et seq. ; and in *Shrauta-Sūtra* 4), (3) *Agrayaṇēṣṭi* (*Shatapatha* 4. 2. 2) ; (4) *Chāturmāsya* (*Shrauta-Sūtra* 5), with its four sections, the *Vaishvadeva*, the *Varunapraghāsa*, the *Shākhamedha* and the *Shunāsīrīya ;* (5) *Pashubandha* (*Shrauta-Sū.* 6 and *Shatapatha* 11. 7. 1), and (6) *Sautrāmaṇi* (*Shatapatha* 11). *Kātyayana's Shrauta-Sūtra* deals with the first five only. *Gautama* has mentioned these *Samsthās* in the following words :—

अग्न्याधेयम्-अग्निहोत्रम्—दर्शपूर्णमासम्—आग्रयणम्—चातुर्मास्यम्—
निरूढपशुबन्धः—सौत्रामणी—इति सप्त हविर्यज्ञसंस्थाः ।

In *Shatapatha* (10. 1. 5), we have the following passage :—

सायम्प्रातर्ह वा अमुष्मिंल्लोकेऽग्निहोत्रहुदश्नाति । अर्धमासेऽर्धमासे
दर्श पौर्णमासयाजी । चतुर्षु चतुर्षु मासेषु चातुर्मास्ययाजी—
षट्सु षट्सु पशुबन्धयाजी......काममश्नाति ।

Though without the *Agnyādhāna*, Fire-installation, no *Iṣṭi*-Sacrifice can be performed,—as these have to be offered in the Fire consecrated by

the Rites of *Fire-Installation* (as laid down in *Shatapatha* 1. 6. 3—20),—yet it is the *Darsha Pūrṇamāsa*, not the *Agnyādhāna*, that has been treated as the Archetype of the *Iṣṭi-Sacrifices ;* firstly ; because, as remarked by *Karka*, the *Shatapatha* begins with the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*, and, secondly, because the *Agnyādhāna* is only the consecration of the Fire, and as such, cannot be regarded as a 'Sacrifice', in the strict sense of the term, on whose model the other Ectypal Sacrifices could be performed.

Among some other Sacrifices mentioned in this connection in the *Shatapatha* are the *Dākṣāyaṇa* (described in *Shrauta-Sūtra* 4. 104) and the *Traiyambaka*.

II. The second class of Sacrifices has been called *Pākayajñas*. These are offered in the ordinary Domestic Fire, not in the Fire consecrated by *Agnyādhāna*.

The *Seven Saṁsthas*—Forms—of the *Pākayajñas* are—(1) the Fire *Mahāyajñas* (ennumerated and described in *Shatapatha* 10. 5. 6), which constitute the Archetype of the group ;—(2) the *Aṣṭakās*, (3) the *Pārvana-shrāddha*, (4) the *Shrāvanī*, (5) the *Agrahāyanī*, (6) the *Chaitrī*, and (7) the *Ashvayujī* (See *Parāshara-Mādhava—Vyavahāra* Section, P. 157, Note). These Sacrifices have been dealt with in *Gṛhya*—not *Shrauta—Sūtras*. It is on this ground, and also on the ground of these being offered in the *Domestic*—not the *Consecrated*—Fire, that these Sacrifices appear to have been placed in a class apart from the *Haviryajñas* or *Iṣṭis* described above. Consisting of the offering of Clarified Butter, Milk and Grains, these are as much '*Haviryajñas*' (in the literal sense of the term) as the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* and other *Iṣṭis*.

III. The third class of Sacrifices are the *Samayajñas*, which consist of offerings of Soma-juice of this the Archetype is the *Jyotiṣṭoma* (also loosely known under the name of *Agniṣṭoma*). The *Seven Saṁsthās* (Forms) of this class are (1) *Agniṣṭoma*, which is the *Archetype*, (2) *Atyagniṣṭoma* (3) *Ukthya*, (4) *ṣoḍashin*, (5) *Vājapēya* (*Shatapatha* 5 ; *Shrauta-Sūtra* 14), (6) *Atirātra* and (7) *Āptoryamā*. [See *Shabara-Bhāṣya*, Trs. P. 941, on the confusion regarding the names '*Jyotiṣṭoma*' and '*Agniṣṭoma*']. All these latter six and other 'Ectypes' or 'modifications' of the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, have been also called '*Ekāha*', so called because they last for *one day* only. There are other *Soma-Sacrifices*—which also have the *Jyotiṣṭoma* for their Archetype—that last for from two to twelve days, and these are called '*Ahīna*'. To this class belongs the *Dvādashāha* (described in *Shatapatha* 4. 5. 1), as also the *Sattras* or Communistic Sacrifices, or properly speaking, *Sacrificial Sessions ;* these

latter last more than twelve days and are performed by several 'Sacrificers' (generally *seventeen*) in combination (See *Shatapatha* 4. 4. 2—12). These *Sattras* form the subject-matter of several Topics under the *Mīmāṁsā-Sūtra* (See above). Under the class of 'Soma-Sacrifice', *Shatapatha,* and also *Kātyāyana,* have included the elaborate Sacrifices of the *Gavāmayana* (*Shrauta* Sū. 13), the '*Rājasūya*' (*Shatapatha* 5, *Shrauta* Sū. 13), the *Sautrāmanī* (*Shatapatha* 11, *Shrauta* Sū. 19), the *Ashvamedha* (*Shatapatha* 11—13, *Shrauta* Sū. 20), and also some minor Sacrifices, like *Vasordhārā, Rāṣṭrabhṛt, Vājaprasavīya, Payovrata* and so forth. (*Shatapatha* 4). Almost all *Soma Sacrifices* involve the killing of an aminal (which must be a goat, according to Mīmā. Sū. 10. 2. 69, *Bhāṣya* Trs. P. 1733) ; hence the older writers have included the '*Pashu*' (Animal) Sacrifices under '*Soma*'. Later writers appear to make some sort of a distinction between 'Soma' and 'Animal' Sacrifices ; such distinction is found in the *Shrautapadārthanirvachana,* a modern work written towards the end of the nineteenth century. There is however no authority for this distinction either in *Shatapatha* or in the *Shrauta-Sūtra,*

'DAKṢIṆĀ'-SACRIFICIAL FEE

The 'Sacrificial Fee', *Dakṣṇā,* payable to the Priests for officiating at Sacrifices, has been made the subject-matter of several 'Topics' under the Mīmā. Sūtra.

Under Sū. 10.2.22—28, *Jaimini* has discussed the purpose for which the Fee is given ; and the conclusion he has arrived at is that *it should be regarded as serving the purpose of hiring or securing the services of the Priests,* (Sū. 10.2.23) ; and it is not for the purpose of bringing about any *merit* or such transcendental results. But at the *Kāmeṣṭi* Sacrifice, the Fee serves a transcendental purpose (Sū. 10.2.44).

Under Sū. 10.3. 53—55, he has discussed the question of the apportionment of the Fee among the serveral Priests. The conclusion on this point is that in the matter of wages—*i.e.,* the Fees—there is to be *inequality ;* but this *inequality* is based, not upon the basis of work done,—as the *hiring of services* is equal for all, —but upon the basis of the *titles* of the Priests—(Sū. 10. 3—55). That is to say, it is not right to regard the 'inequality among Priests as due to their work, it should be due to the help rendered by the Priests as indicated by their titles ; these titles are 'Halfist', 'Tertiarist', 'Quarterist' ; these titles are found in the following text—The *Adhvaryu Priest,* having initiated the Master of the House, initiates the *Brahman Priest,* then the *Udgātṛ,* then the *Hotṛ ;* thereupon the *Pratiprasthātṛ Priest,* having initiated the *Adhvaryu,* initiates the *Halfists—i.e.,* (1) the *Brāh-*

maṇāchchhamsīn Priest, who is related to the *Brahman Priest,* (2) the *Prastotṛ Priest,* who is related to the *Udgātṛ Priest,* (3) the *Maitrāvaruṇa Priest,* who is related to the *Hotṛ Priest;* then the *Nēṣṭṛ-Priest,* having initiated the *Pratiprasthātṛ Priest,* initiates the *Tertiarists,* —*i.e,* the *Agnīdhra Priest,* who is related to the *Brahman Priest,* the *Pratihartṛ Priest,* who is related to the *Udgātṛ Priest;* then the *Unnetṛ-Priest,* having initiated the *Nēṣṭṛ,* initiates the *Quarterists,*—*i.e.,* the *Potṛ Priest,* who is related to the *Brahman Priest,* the *Subrahmanya-Priest,* who is related to the *Udgātṛ-Priest* and the *Grāvastut-Priest,* who is related to the *Hotṛ-Priest*'. The reference to the Priests by these titles—'Halfist,' 'Tertiarist' and 'Quarterist'—would be justifiable only if, at the Archetypal Sacrifice, the shares of the Fee given to these men were actually in accordance with these titles. We conclude therefore that, on actount of their being referred to as 'Halfists' etc., the diversity in the Fee received by them should be treated as based upon these titles. (*Bhāsya,* Trs. p. 1777).

Jaiminī has discussed a few other details regarding the Sacrificial Fee, under Sū. 10.3.39 *et. seq.*

(1) The Sacrificial Fee for the *Jyotiṣṭoma* has been laid down in the text—'The Cow, the Horse, the Mule, the Ass, Goats, Sheep, Corns, Barley, Sesamum, *Māṣa,—Dvādashashatam of this is the Fee*'. The question raised is—Is the Fee to consist of 112 of *each* of the things mentioned ? Or 112 of one of the things mentioned ? or 112 made up of all the things together?

[The term '*Dvādashashatam*' has been taken as standing for Twelve and Hundred, *i.e.,* 112, in his presentation of this *Adhikaraṇa, Maṇḍana* has said '*Shatam gavāmeva tu dakṣiṇā syāt;* and the *Nyāyamālāvistara* has explained the term '*Dvādashashatam*' as '*Dvādashādhikam, Shatam*'; hence the number should be taken as 112, not 1200].

The *Established Conclusion* is that the particular number 112 qualifies only one of the several kinds of things mentioned; hence the prescribed Fee should consist of 112 of *one* of the several kinds enumerated. (*Bhāṣya.* Trs. p. 1769). (Sū. 10.3. 39—44),

(2) The next question is—To which *one* thing does the number 112 refer ? The answer to this is that it refers to one of the *animals* named (Sū. 10.3.45),—and among *animals,* the *Cow* (Sū. 10.3.47). Hence 112 *Cows* should be given as the Fee (*Bhaṣyā,* Trs. p. 1772).

(3) Next question—Should 112 Cows be given to each of the Priests ? Or should 112 Cows be divided among them ? The answer is that *the Fee should be given by apportionment* (Sū. 10.3.50).;—and this 'apportionment'

shall be according to the titles of the Priests as already explained. (Sū. 10.3.53—55). (See above).

This 'apportionment' is described as under (in the *Jyotiṣṭoma Paddhatis*) where only 100 Cows are mentioned along with 100 gold-pieces—12 each to the (1) *Brahman*, (2) *Udgātṛ* (3) *Hotṛ*, and (4) *Adhavaryu* ; 6 each to the (1) *Pratiprasthātṛ*, (2) *Prastotṛ*, (3) *Maitrāvaruna* and (4) *Brāhmaṇāchchhamsin* ; 4 each to the (1) *Potṛ*, (2) *Neṣṭṛ*, (3) *Achchhāvāka* and (4) *Agnīdhra* ;—3 each to the (1) *Unnetṛ*, (2) *Grāvastut*, (3) *Subrahmaṇya* and (4) *Pratihartṛ*. The total of these comes to 100 only. This would appear to be in keeping with the words of *Maṇḍana*—शतं गवामेव तु दक्षिणा स्यात् ।

CHAPTER XXXIII

INFLUENCE OF MIMĀMSĀ ON LEGAL AND OTHER BRANCHES OF LITERATURE.

The *Mīmāmsa-Sūtra* has evolved a set of principles for the interpretation of texts. It has based its Discussions on texts dealing with the details of sacrificial ritual; and the reason for this lay in the fact that at the time that the *Sūtra* was written, and the principles of *Mīmāmsa* systematised, the performance of elaborate Sacrifices was a familiar occurrence in the life of the ordinary Hindu. At a later age, when these Sacrifices fell into desuetude the study of the *Mīmāmsā* was found difficult, and it fell in the popular estimation. But before long it was discovered that though the illustrations chosen in *Mīmāmsā* Literature, showing the application of the Principles of Interpretation, may not appeal to the learner, yet the Principles were as useful as ever, in other fields, wherever original texts had to be studied and thier exact signification discussed. This was specially so in the domain of Law. This branch of study had to deal with a large number of original texts, from the *Vedas* and from the *Smṛtis*; and the range of this study therefore extended from the Vedas down to the most recent *Smṛti*-compilations; and as there were some discrepancies in these texts bearing on many points in regard to the practices of men, the only reasonable basis for the explaining away of these discrepancies lay in the Principles of Interpretation that had been worked out by the *Mīmāmsaka* in connection with Vedic texts bearing upon the details of Sacrificial ritual. We accordingly find all writers of Legal Digests making free use of these Principles of Interpretation.

We shall cite a few instances from the more authoritative Legal Digests, of cases where the said Principles have been utilised in coming to a conclusion.

(1) Under 2. 126, *Yājnavalkya* has laid down that after the regular Partition has been finished,—if some property is found to have been surreptitiously hidden away by any of the partners, that property should be recovered from him and divided among all the co-partners in equal shares. In this connection the question is raised as to whether this surreptitious possession is reprehensible or not;—the argument in support of the view that "it is not reprehensible" is that the partner who has been in wrongful

possession has also some right over the property concerned, and hence, as he has been keeping the property only under the misconception that it is *solely* his own, his conduct cannot be regarded as entirely reprehensible;—this argument is based upon what has been argued under *Mīmāmsā-Sūtra* 6.3.20,—where, the question being raised as to the propriety of changing the *Mudga-corn* that has been kept for the making of the *flour* but has become spoilt,—the other party has argued that—if the Sacrificer has substituted an equal quanitity of the *Māṣa-corn*, under the honest misapprehension that it is *Mudga*,—his action cannot be regarded as a contravention of the rule that forbids the use of the *Māṣa;* because, though he has actually used the *Māṣa*, he has used it as *Mudga*, under the *Mīmāmsā-Sūtra* referred to, this view has been rejected, and the conclusion arrived at is that the use of the *Māṣa* under the circumstances certainly constitutes an infringement of the rule that forbids the use of *Māsa*, *Kodrava* and *Chaṇaka*. In accordance with this conclusion the conduct of the Partner who has been in wrongful possession of a part of the common porperty has been regarded as reprehensible.

(2) In regard to the widow's rights of inheritance, some writers have argued that—in as much as all property is meant primarily for the purpose of performing Sacrifices,—to which the Woman is not entitled,—she can have no business to inherit the Property;—that the Woman, apart from her husband, is not entitled to perform Sacrifices has been shown under *Mīmāmsā-Sūtra* 6. 1.17—21; though in the preceding *Sūtra* it has been shown that she cannot be held to be absolutely *not-entitled* to such performance, as, in the company of her husband, she has her place at all Sacrifices. (See above).

The argument against the rights of Women has been met by another reasoning based upon *Mīmāmsā-Stūra* 3. 4. 26—30; where it has been shown that the *Wearing of Gold* by the Sacrificer and the Priests has no bearing upon the Sacrificial Performance;—and on the basis of this conclusion it has been argued that, if *all* Property were meant of Sacrificial Performance, from where would the gold be got for the said *wearing*? The Gold worn is certainly 'property', and yet it does not have any bearing upon the Sacrificial Performance. The *Mitākṣarā* on 2. 135 has argued—'If all Property were meant for Sarcrficial Permfrmances, there would be no charity or workds of Public Utility, like the digging of Tanks and the like'.

(3) In regard to the share to which the Wife is entitled, there are following texts :—

(*a*) यदि कुर्यात्समानंशान् पत्न्यः कार्याः समांशिकाः ।

'If the Proprietor effects an equal division of his property during his life-time, he should assign equal shares to his wives'.

(*b*) पितुरुर्ध्वं विभजतांमाताप्यंशं समंहरेत् ।

'If the partition is effected after the Father's death, the Mother should receive an equal share'.

According to these texts, the Wife's share in the property of her Husband is equal to that of each of his sons.

Some writers have held that the Wife is entitled to a mere subsistence-allowance, not to any share in the Property; and they have interpreted these texts to mean that—If the Property is extensive, the Wife is to receive just enough to maintain her; but if the Property is small, she is to share it equally with her sons. Against this view, it has been argued that such an interpretation would cause an incongruity in the above texts; as, under the proposed interpretation, the first would mean that she is to receive merely a subsistence-allowance, while the second would give her a share equal to that of the sons. That such incongruous interpretation of Injunctive Texts is not permissible has been shown under *Mīmāmsā-Sūtra* 7. 3. 19—25. The argument adumberated under these *Sutras* is as follows :—In connection with the *Chāturmāsya-Sacrifice*, the Vedic Injunction has laid down '*Agni-Praṇāyana*', the Fetching of Fire ;— there are two such 'fetchings' —one connected with the *Agniṣṭoma*-Sacrifice, which is accompanied by many other details, and the other connected with the *Darsha-Pūrṇāmāsa* which is simpler, and without any other details the question arises as to which of these two *Fetchings* has to be adopted at the *Chāturmāsya ;* the conclusion is that it must be the latter.—Upon this, there arises the further question —At which of the four sections of the *Chātrmāsya*—the *Vaishvadeva*, the *Varunapraghāsa*, the *Shākamedhīya*, or the *Sunāsīrīya*,—is the said *Fetching* to be done ? The conclusion is that it should be done at the *second* and *third* sections ;—though the *Prima Facie View* is that—"the *fetching* should be done at the *first* and *fourth* sections, because the *Fetching* has to be done on the *Uttaravedī*, and the use of the *Uttaravedī* is related to the *First* and the *Fourth* sections only,—this relationship being deduced from the prohibition of the use of this *Vedī* at the *First* and *Fourth* Section, which prohibition implies the possibility of such use at the said sections ;" —in answer to this argument it has been shown that such

an interpretation of the texts concerned leads to an incongruity in the text enjoining the use of the *Uttaravedī* ;—that is, in regard to the *First* and *Fourth* sections, its use is implied by the Prohibition (as urged above),—and as such, it could be intended for partial acceptance only, while with regard to the *second* and *third* sections, the use of the *Uttaravidī* has been laid down directly and hence permanently ;—in this way the *Veda* would be laying down two entirely divergent courses of action,—under the *Prima Facie View ;* and this cannot be desirable. This argument has been applied to the case of the above-mentioned texts bearing upon the Wife's rights ; and it is argued that so long as a text affords one coherent meaning, there can be no justification for breaking up its meaning into two incoherent parts ; hence there can be no justification for the interpretation placed upon the texts to mean that the Wife is to receive only a subsistence-allowance and so forth.

(4) In connection with the rights of the Parents over the Property left by their childless Son, the question arises as to which of the two parents—the Mother or the Father—has the prior claim. The text bearing upon the question mentions the word '*Pitarau*'—'Parents' ; and would therefore appear to leave the matter doubtful ; but it has been argued that in as much as the word '*Pitarau*' has been etymologically explained in authoritative Grammatical works as equivalent to '*Mātāpitarau*',—and as in this the *Mātā* (Mother) is mentioned *first*, hers should be the prior claim. This reasoning is based upon *Mīmāmsā-Sūtra* 5—14 to 7, where it has been shown that the *Prayājas-Samid*, *Tanunapāt*, etc.—are to be performed in the order in which they are mentioned in the injunctive texts,—in accordance with the accepted Principle that the Priority of *mention* leads to priority in *action.* (*Mitākṣarā*, on 2. 135).

(5) The adoption of a son, has to be done with full *Vedic* rites and ceremonies, even when done by the *Shudra*, who would be entitled to the performance of such Rites, in accordance with the conclusions arrived at in connection with the '*Nisāda-chief*'—under *Mī. Sū* 6. 1. 51,—and the '*Rathakāra*' under *Mī. Sū.* 6. 1. 44 ; where it has been shown that though as a general rule the *Shudra* becomes entitled to such performances, and hence also yet in the special cases of the *Nisāda Chief*, and the *Rathakāra*, the *Shudra* becomes entitled to such performances, and hence also to the learning of the relevant *Mantra-texts* and reciting them at the performance. According to some writers, though the special Sacrifices have been laid down for the *Shudra*, the Vedic Mantras have to be recited by *Brāhmaṇa-proxies* of the *Shudra Sacrificer*. But the generally

accepted conclusion is that these are to be treated as exceptional cases and thus do not vitiate the general conclusion that the *Shudra* is not entitled to the performance of Vidic Rites, as propounded in *Mīmā.* Sū. 6. 1. 25.

(6) In regard to Adoption, it has been declared that the woman can 'adopt' a Son only in the company of her husband, of when permitted by him ; as she, alone by herself, is not entitled to perform Vedic Rites and Ceremonies, and the performance of such rites is inseparable from all regular Adoption. The exclusion of Women from Sacrificial Performances has been discussed above, as dealt with in *Mīmā. Sū.* 6. 1. 6. The 'permission' of the Husband has been regarded as implying the 'presence' of the Husband himself at the ceremony of Adoption.

(7) In connection with Adoption, *Manu* has declared that a child that has been adopted in another family cannot inherit the peoperty of his Progenitor-Father, nor perform his *Shrāddha ;* and though the text directly prohibits these two things only, yet it has been accepted as implying the prohibition of other cognate things also,—such as all relationships and connections due to the Progenitor-Father. This is in accordance with the principles laid down in *Mīmā. Sū* 3. 7. 13 (*Shabara-Bhāṣya,* Text, Page 71, Line 15) ; wherein it has been shown that the texts—(*a*) '*Antarvedi minoti*' (Measures in the central Altar') and (*b*) '*Jātaputrah kṛsnakesho—'gnīnādadhīta*' ('One should install the Fires after he has got a Son and while his hair is still black'), even though directly mentioning only a few definite characteristics, are to be regarded as implying (*a*) '*any place* within the Altar, not necessarily the *centre,* and (*b*) any particular period of the man's life, not necessarily the time when his hair is black.

(8) It has been ruled by the Privy Council that the adoption of an only son of his father is legal. This decision has been sought to be based upon Mīmā. Sū. 1. 2. 26-27. It has been shown above that in this case the *Mīmāmsā-Rule* has been misunderstood and misapplied. (See in this connection a detailed account of this in K. L. Sarkar's Mīmāmsā Rules of Interpretation pp. 451 *et seq.*). The case referred to here is the one cited as Sri Balasu Guru Linga Swami *vs.* Sri Balwan Ramalakṣamina and others ; Rādhāmonhan, representative of Beni Prasad *vs.* Hardei Bibi L.R. 26 I.A. 113, S.C.I. L.R. 21,, Allahabad 460.

The above are only examples—just to illustrate how the Mīmāmsā Rules have influenced the administration of Law, even by the present Courts of Law. In this connection the Reader is referred to the above-mentioned book of Sarkar's ; Lecture XI of this book is to be read by persons interested

in the comparative study of Law ; as here Dr. Sarkar has shown the resemblance between the Mīmāmsā Rules of Interpretation and Maxims and those adopted and used in modern Law.

The following are a few instances of the use made of the Mīmāmsā Maxims in other branches of Sanskrit Literature.

(1) The *Kalanjanyāya* (*Jaimini Su.* 6. 2. 19-20) has been used —(*a*) by *Anandagiri* in his comment on the *Shārīraka-Bhāṣya* (under 3. 4. 28 and 4. 1. 13) ;—(*b*) in *Samsepashārīraka* (1. 417—20) ;—(*c*) in *Shrī-bhāṣya* (1. 1. 4).

(2) The *Grahaikatvanyāya Jaimini* Sū. 3. 1. 13—15) is used—(*a*) in *Nyāyamanjarī* (P. 287) ;—in *Vedāntashikhāmani* (P. 120) ;—(*c*) by *Kayyaṭa* on *Mahābhāṣya* (1. 1. 69) ; and (d) by *Nāgesha* on *Kayyaṭa* (1.1. 14).

(3) *Rātrisattranyāya* (*Jaimini* Sū. 4. 13. 17—19) has been used—(*a*) in *Vedāntakalpataru* and *Parimala* on Sū. 3. 3. 38, and on 1. 2. 24 ;—(*b*) in *Panchapādikāvivaraṇa* (pp. 122 and 134) ; and (*c*) in *Tattva-mukhtākalāpa* (5. 81).

(4) *Vishvajinnyāya* (*Shabara* p. 496.) is used—(a) in *Bhāmati* (1. 1. 4); (*b*) in *Vedāntakalpataru* (P. 430) ;—(*c*) in *Panchapādikāvīvarana* (pp. 134. 137. 164) ; and (d) in *Nyayāmanjarī* (P. 524).

Shankarāchārya has quoted and utilised the *Mīmāmsā-Sutra* and *Nyāyas,* very profusely. The following are a few Examples. The page-references are to the *Shārīraka-Bhāṣya* with *Ratnaprabhā-Bhāmatī* and *Anandagiri*. published by the Nirṇayasāgara Press, 1909.

P. 675—Sutra 3. 3. 1—*Agnihotranyāya* applied.

P. 717—Sū. 3. 3. 25—'*Shrutilinga-vākya,* etc.' (3. 3. 13) quoted and applied.

P. 724—Su. 3. 3. 26—*Mīmāmsā-Sutra* quoted—'*Api tu vākyashesah syāt* ,etc,'

P. 730—Sū. 3. 3. 31—'*Prakaranādya-niyāmakatvam.*

P. 737—*Mīmāmsā-Sutra* 3. 3. 8 quoted.

P. 740—'*Abhyāsāt karmabhedah,*'

P. 749—under Sū. 3.3.4.

P. 750—under Sū. 3. 3. 42.

P. 760—under Sū. 3. 3. 49, where the *Vedanta-Sutra* itself asserts '*Shrutyādibalīyastvāchchana bādhah*'.

P. 762—Under Sū. 3. 3. 50.

P. 764—under Sū. 3. 3. 53—*Shabara-Bhāṣya* referred to.

P. 793—under Sū. 3. 4. 20.

P. 797—under Sū. 3. 4. 21.

P. 803-804—under Sū. 3. 4. 27.

P. 813—under Sū. 3. 4. 42.

P. 899—under Sū. 4. 4. 12.

The following instances of the influence of *Pūrvamīmāmsā* upon several branches of Literature have been called from Colonel Jacob's *Handful of Popular Maxims* :—

(1) When there is a crowd of people, and some of them are umbrellas'. It is the maxim which has been set forth in *Tantravārtika* (1. 4. 13) ; and this has been utilised by *Shañkara* in his *Bhāṣya* on the *Vedānta-Sūtra* where he says 'Though the text '*Ṛtampibantau*' speaks of *drinking* by both *Jīvātmā* and *Paramātamā*, yet to the *Paramātamā*, it applies only on the analogy of the *Men with Umbrellas*, whereunder even though the man is not carrying the umbrella, yet he is spoken of as such on account of his being accompanied by *men with umbrellas*.

(2) When rice is being cooked, the cook becomes assured of all of it having been properly cooked, when he persses a single grain and finds it sufficiently softened. On the analogy of this, the condition of the whole class is inferred from that of a part. This is found in *Mīmāṁsā-Sūtra-Bhāṣya* under 7. 4. 12. It is called the *Sthālīpulākanyāya*.

(3) As a Post is driven into the ground by repeated efforts, so a proposition is strengthened by the bringing forward of a succession of facts and arguments. This forms, the basis of the maxim styled स्थूणानिखननन्याय, which finds place in *Shañkar's Shārīraka-bhāṣya*, under Sūtra 2. 1. 34 and 3. 3. 53.—This maxim has its origin in *Shabara-Bāṣya*, on Sū. 7. 2. 1.

Shāñkara in his *Shārīraka-bhāṣya* on 1. 3. 25 says—"The *Shāstra*, though propounded without distinction, is in reality, meant for *human beings* only, and for those of the three higher castes only, because these alone are capable of complying with the precepts of the *Shāstra*, etc. etc. This point has been explained in the definition of *Adhikāra*—that is, in the *Pūrva-mīmamsā-Sūtra* 6. 1. 1—3. This is called the *Adhikāranyāya*.

(5) The *Vivaraṇapramāyasangraha* (P. 247)—speaks of 'abundance of fruit produced by abundance of labour involved in the effort towards

the performance of a large number of Subsidiary details'. This is a paraphrase of what the *Shabara-Bhāṣya* has declared under Sū. 10. 6. 62 and 11. 1. 5.

(6) Under Sū. 12. 2. 34, Shabara says—"It is incumbent upon the Pupil to eat out ot the plate made of bell-metal; it is not so incumbent for the Teacher; yet whenever it so happens that the Pupil has to eat out of the same plate as the Teacher, the latter eats out of the plate of bell-metal; so as not to disturb the vow of the Pupil". This has been called the '*Kāṁsya-bhoji-Nyāya*' which has been used in *Bhāmatī* (P. 478), *Vedāntakalpataru* (Pages 314, 425, 502, 517), and also in *Parimala* (P. 462, 572, 666).

(7) Under 1. 1. 2, Page 6, of the *Tantravārtika Kumārila* says —"Even if it be necessary to ascend the mountain-peak in order to see an object, that object, cannot be regarded as invisible".—This has been quoted and used in the *Nyāyamañjarī* (P. 422).

(8) *Shabara* on Sū. 2. 4. 20 and *Kumārila* in *Tantaravārtika* P. 16, have declared that—"When a Vedic text condemns the condemnable thing, it is not for the purpose of *condemning*, but for the purpose of commending what is commendable". This has been quoted by *Ānandagiri* in his comment on the *Bṛhadāraṇyakabhāṣya* 2. 5. 16; and has been utilised in the *Āgama-prāmāṇya* (P. 51).—Another reference to this maxim is found in *Nyāyamañjarī* P. 273.

(9) *Shabara* under Sū. 11. 1. 60 says—"The lamp, though placed near one person among a number of persons dining together, helps all of them. This same idea is found expressed in the *Mahābhāṣya* on 1. 1. 49;—also by *Nāgesha* in his *Uddyota*.

(10) Under Sū. 4. 4. 19, *Shabara* has laid down the principle that—"A Sacrificial Act is to be regarded as Primary or independent when a special result is declared as following from it; if, therefore, an act is enjoined without the specification of any result following from it, it must be regarded as Subsidiary to some other *Primary* act." This occurs in *Shaṅkara's Shārīraka bhāṣya* on Sū. 2. 1. 14; also used by *Vāchaspati Mishra* in the *Tātparyaṭīkā* (P. 178, line 2); and by *Vidyāraṇya* in *Vivaraṇaprameyasaṅgraha* (P. 117, line 11 and P. 147, line 9 from bottom).

(11) *Kumārila*, in *Tantravārtika* (1. 3. 22) says—"Where a certain conclusion to the contrary has been set forth in an exceptionally powerful manner, if one proceeds immediately to point out the correct view, this becomes a difficult task; hence with a view to lighten the task, *Jaimini*

proceeds, at first, to weaken the contrary view by throwing it open to doubt." This principle has been adopted by the *Nyāyamañjarī* (p. 419).

(12) *Kumārila* in *Shlokavārtika* (p. 520) says that—"men whose eyes are smeared with the fat of frogs mistake bamboo-pieces for snakes". This illustration has been used in *Tātparyaṭīkā* (P. 314), by *Vāchaspati Mishra ;* by *Sarvārthasiddhi* on *Tattvamuktā-Kalāpa* (2. 64) ; and by Parimala (P. 43, line 9).

(13) *Kumārila,* in *Tantravārtika* on Sū. 1. 3. 31 (P. 730) has declared that—"a man who has accepted the teaching of *Shruti* will not allow it to be upset by a contrary *Smṛti*" ; and in support of this he has cited the illustration that 'the Donkey can never get at what has been already carried away by the Horse'. This illustration has been borrowed by *Nyāyamañjarī* (P. 262).

(14) *Shabara* on Sū. 2. 3. 2, has declared that as a rule, words should be taken in the sense actually expressed by them. This maxim has been repeated by *Kumārila* in *Tantravārtika* on 3. 5. 19. It occurs also in *Bhāmatī* (on 4. 1. 14,and 4. 3. 4) ; and also in *Nāgesha's Uddyota,* Vol I, p. 574.

(15) *Kumārila* in *Tantravārtika* (p. 132) says—"Just as in the case of Salt-mines, and that of Mēru, the Golden Mount, what is produced therein becomes Salt and Gold, respectively, so also in the case of the inner satisfaction of one who knows the Veda, Vedic authority becomes imparted to whatever is affected by it. This has been adopted by Vāchaspati Mishra in his commentary on *Yogabhāṣya* (4. 14) ;—also by *Venkaṭanātha* in *Tattvamuktākalāpa* (5. 28).

(16) 'What is done at the wrong time is as good as not done'. This occurs in *Shabara-Bhāṣya* on Sū. 6. 2. 25, with reference to the times prescribed for the *Agnihotra* and *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* Sacrifices. It occurs in the *Nyāyakandalī* (P. 284).

(17) *Mīmā. Sūtra* 6. 2. 23—26, discusses the Injunction that 'one should perform the *Agnihotra* throughout life', which is taken by the *Pūrvapakṣin* to mean that every moment of one's life should be taken up by the Performance of *Agnihotra.* The *Established Conclusion* is that the *Agnihotra* is to be performed only in the morning and the evening, as expressly laid down in another Vedic Injunction. This discussion has been used by Shaṇkara in the *Shārīraka-bhāṣya* (3. 4. 2).

(18) *Shabara* (on 12. 2. 27) lays down the principle that—"what is intimately connected has greater force than what is remotely connected".

This principle has been utilised by *Ānanda-giri* on Shārīraka-bhāṣya (2. 1. 4), in *Vivaraṇaprameyasaṅgraha* (p.15); also by *Anandagiri* on *Sureshvara's Sambandhavārtika* (Verse 367). This same principle is embodied also in one of the Grammatical *Paribhāṣās* असिद्धं वहिरङ्गमन्तरङ्गे ।

(19) 'A thing, though made for one purpose, may also serve another.' This maxim is found in *Shabara* on Sū. 3. 1. 12. and also in *Tantravārtika* on the same Sūtra. It has been used in *Pañchapādikā* (P. 45); and also in *Vivaraṇapremayasaṅgraha* (P. 118, line 9). The *Mahābhāṣya* (on 1. 1. 23) adds another illustration : Where canals are made for irrigationg paddy-fields, they also provide water for bathing and drinking.

(20) '*Apachchhēdanyāya*' :—Under Mī. Sū. 6. 5. 40—56, we have discussed the rule whereby, when the Priests are proceeding from the *Havirdhāna* in a line in a certain order, holding each other's garments, if the line is disturbed by any one, an Expiation has to be performed. This maxim has been employed by writers on *Vedānta*, in *Vēdāntakalhataruparimala* (P. 10. line 8). It has also been called the *Paurvāparya-nyāya*, in accordance with the wording of the Mīma. Sū. 6. 3. 54. This *Sūtra* is quoted in *Bhāmatī* (P. 5) ; and by the same author in his *Tātparyaṭīkā* (p. 59). The *Apachchhēdanyāya* occurs in *Sarvārthasiddhi* (pages 210, 359 and 374) ; also in *Shrī-bhāṣya* (P. 143).

(21) 'The Scripture has its use in regard to things not known by other means of knowledge.' This maxim has been adumbrated in Mī. Sū. 6. 2. 18. It has been used in *Shārīraka-Bhāṣya* (3. 3. 18) ; also in *Shri-Bhāṣya* (P. 554) ; in *Nyāyakandalī* (p. 5) ; in *Chitsukhī* (1. 7) ; in *Sarva-ḍarshanasaṅgraha* (P. 69) ; in *Sarvārthasiddhi* (P. 893 and 263); and in *Tattvadīpana* (P. 544).

(22) 'Gourds sink in water—and Stones float'.—Often quoted as an instance of absurd assertion. It is found in *Shabara-Bhāṣya* (1. 1. 5 and 4. 3. 10) ; and is used also in *Sankṣēpashārīraka* (2. 2).

(23) The maxim of the red-one-year-old-cow', mentioned in Mīmā. Sū. 3. 1. 12. It is based upon the Vedic text—'One buys Soma with the red-one-year-old', which does not mention the object to which these qualifications belong ; and it is argued that according to this text, these qualifications are auxiliary to the act of *buying ;* but only through the object, the *Cow,* to which they belong, This maxim has been used in *Shri-Bhāṣya* (1. 1. 13).

(24) 'The conventional denotation of a word is more acceptable than its etymological signification'. This is used by *Kumārila* on *Tantravārtika* (P. 150, line 12) ;—also in *Nyāyamañjari* (P. 534 line 15).

(25) 'How could a sane person riding a horse forget the horse?' This has been said in *Tantravārtika* (1. 3. 18) in connection with authoritative writers on Grammar making use of ungrammatical expressions. This has been used by *Mallinātha* in his comment on *Tārkikarakṣā* (P. 20). It is found in *Nāgārjunia's Mādhyamikāvṛtti* (P. 502).

(26) 'When Verbs express their meanings, Potency is a contributary cause'. This has its origin in what *Shabara* has said under Mī. Sū. 1. 4. 30. It has been employed in the sense that when the Vedic text enjoins a certain act, the capacity of a person is an important factor. It has been used in *Surēshvara's Sambandhavārtika* (75). See also *Tantravārtika* under 2. 2. 27 ; Page 558, Line 9.

(27) '*Kapiñjalanyāya*'—'The maxim of the Partridges'. In *Vājasaneyi-Samhitā* (24. 20), there is a text laying down the sacrificing of '*partridges*' ; and under Mīmā. Sū. 11. 1. 38—45, we have the discussion as to the exact number of birds to be sacrificed ; the conclusion is that *three* should be Sacrificed ; as that is the lowest figure representing that *plurality* expressed by the word of the text—'*Kapiñjalān*'. This has been used in *Nyāyakanndalī* (P. 50) ; also in *Parimala* (P. 550, line 3) ; in *Shikhāmaṇi* (P. 303) ; by *Kulluka* in *Manu*'. p. 105.

(28) 'The Cleansing of the Blanket'. The practice of dusting the blanket by beating it against one's feet and thus dusting the feet also, has been used by *Shabara* (on Sū. 2. 2. 25), to illustarate the double purpose served by the Curd ;—it accomplishes the particular offering and also brings about the desired result. This forms the basis of the well-known saying of 'killing two birds with one stone',—This has been used also in connection with the offering of water to the *Pitṛs* at Gayā, on the roots of mango-trees, in connection with which offering we have the verse—एकाक्रि याद्व्यर्थकरी प्रसिद्धा आम्राश्च सिक्ताः पितरश्च तृप्ताः ।

(29) 'The maxim of the Kalañja'. The Vedic text says—'*Kalañjam na bhakṣayēt*'. The question is raised in Mīmā. Sū. 6. 2. 19—whether this contains a positive injunction—meaning that 'one should take the vow of not eating the *Kalañja*'—or a negative injunction—meaning that 'one should *not eat the Kalañja*' ; and the conclusion is in favour of the latter—that the text serves the purpose of the *prohibition* of an act. It has been quoted by *Ānandagiri* on *Shārīrāka-Bhāṣya* (3. 4. 2 and 4. 1. 13) ; also in *Sankṣepashārīraka* 1. 417 ; and in *Shri-Bhṣāya* (1. 1. 4).

(30) '*Kāṇḍānusamayanyāya*'—Set forth in Mī. Sū. 5. 2. 3—'When a number of operations are performed over a number of objects,—all the opera-

tions over one object should be completed before they are taken up over the second object,—and so on.' This is used in *Ashvalāyana's Gṛhyasutra* (1.24. 7), where, during the process of the receiving of the Priests, the various acts prescribed are laid down as to be completed with one Priest, before the reception of the second Priest. The reverse of this is the '*Padārthānukramanyāya*'. (See below).

(31) The maxim of the *Base Coin*—is used in *Tantravārtika* 1. 3. 3 (P. 95); when arguing that where the *Smṛti* is found to be in conflict with *Shruti*, it should be rejected;—just as the counter-feit coin is to be rejected as soon as it is found to be counterfeit. It has been used in *Nyāyamañjarī* (P. 162 and 169, 187 and 531).

(32) The maxim of the *Gārhapatya Fire*, is presented in Mī. Sū. 3. 2. 3-4, where it is concluded that where there is conflict between *Direct* Injunction and *Implied* Injunction, the former is to be accepted. This maxim has been used in *Bhāmatī* under Sū. 3. 3 25, and also in other Vēdānta works.

(33) The maxim of the Milking Vessel— represented in Mī. Sū. 4. 1. 2., —as dealing with cases where a particular rule sets aside the general Law; Water is fetched in ordinary jars, but at the Sacrifice performed for the purpose of acquiring cattle, it should be fetched in the milking vessel. It is found in *Tantravārtika* (3.6.43); in *Nyāyamañjarī* (P. 166); in *Shārīraka-Bhāṣya* (3. 3. 42); in *Sureshvaravārtika* on *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* 3. 3. 51.

(34) *Barhirnyāya*—The maxim of the Kusha (grass;—The sense of this is that in a case where a word may be taken either in the *primary* or in the *secondary* sense, it should be taken in the *primary* sense. This is the conclusion arrived in Mī. Sū. 3. 2. 1-2. It is found in *Mahābhāṣya* 1. 1. 15, and 6. 3. 46; also in *Shārīrakabhāṣya* 4. 3. 12; and in *Kalpataru* P. 346, line 3.

(35) *Grahaikatvanyāya*—The Maxim of the *Single Cup*. This is illustrated in Mī. Sū. 3. 1. 13—15, where it is argued that when the text lays down the washing of the *Cup*, ग्रहं सम्मार्ष्टि, though the word 'Cup' is in the singular, yet the washing should be done to *all the cups*. *Kumārila* has explained this under Sū. 3.1.14. It has been used in *Nyāyamañjarī*, p. 287, line 4; in *Vēdāntashikhāmaṇi*, p. 120; by *Nāgesha* in his comment on *Kayyaṭa* on 1. 1. 14.

(36) *Jātēṣṭi-nyāya*—treated by *Jaimini* under Mī. Sū. 4.3.38-39; where, in regard to the Sacrifice on the birth of a son, the question is raised whether the reward thereof accrues to the Father or the Son, and the conclusion

arrived at is that it accrues to the Son. It is used in th Commentory on *Lakṣaṇāvalī*.

(37) *Tatprakhyanyāya*—Embodied in Mī. Sū. 1.4.4., which explains one of the four means for ascertaining that a certain text mentions the Proper Name of a Sacrifice; *e.g.*, the word '*Agnihotra*' as occurring in the text '*Agnihotreṇa juhoti*'. It is employed in *Vēdāntakalpataru-parimala*, p. 150, line 7; and in *Nāgesha's Uddyota* (Vol, 3, p. 623; under Sū. 2.3.3.).

(38) *Tadāditadantanyā*—Embodied in Mī. Sū. 5.1. 23-24. This has been adopted in *Vedāntakalpataruparimala* p. 581, line 9).

(38) The maxim that—'a certain thing is sure to appear when a certain other thing appears';—this has been employed by *Kumārila* in *Tantra-vārtika* (p. 348) in establishing the invariable concomitance between the Affix and the *Bhāvanā*.

(40) '*Tadvyapadeshanyāya*'—is represented by Mī. Sū. 1. 4. 5, which sets forth another means of ascertaining that a certain word is the Proper Name of a Sacrifice.

(41) 'Acts which impel others to action are not always of the same kind'. This is exemplified by *Kumārila* in *Shlokavārtika* (p. 710). 'In battle, the soldier acts through moving his sword, the commander acts giving orders, and the King acts by his mere presence'. This has been used by *Shankarāchārya* in his *Bhāṣya* on the *Muṇḍakopaniṣad*.

(42) *The maxim of* the *Dancer*. The Dancer, dancing before a number of persons, gives pleasure to all at the same time. See *Nyāyavartika* 1.10, and also *Tātparyaṭīkā*.

(43) 'One does not undergo the expense of performing a Sacrifice, for the purpose of recovering a Shell'. This occurs in *Shabara*, under 4.3.39.

(44) Maxim of 'the Cow's Milk contained in a vessel made of Dog-skin'; based on *Kumārila's Vārtika* on Mī. Sū. 1.3.7; to show that even a pure thing becomes impure by association or contact with impure things: hence the teaching of sound morality contained in the Scriptures of heterodox people cannot be as reliable as those contained in the Veda. This has been employed in *Āgamaprāmāṇga* by *Yāmunācharya* (on page 11, line 8). cf. *Viṣṇu-Smṛti* 29.9; and *Manu-Smṛti* 2.114.

(45) 'Man is not so prompted by even a hundred Injunctions as he is by Greed'. This is found in *Tantravārtika* under Mī. Sū. 3.4.34. This is used in *Nyāyamañjari* (p. 361);—also in *Nyāyakaṇikā* (p. 407); and in

Sambandhavārtika (Verses 1040 and 1041); and in *Anubhūtiprakāsha* (13. 277). Cf. *Mahābhāṣya* 1.3.72.

(46) 'If a Potency is not present in a thing by itself, it cannot be produced in it by something else'. This occurs in *Kumārila's Shlokavrtika* (2. 47); it is used in *Shārīratha-Bhāṣya* 2.1.24; —in *Nyāyakaṇikā* (P. 168); —and in *Nyāyamañjari* (P. 165).

(47) There can be no cognition of the Qualified unless there is cognition of the Qualification'.—*Shabara* on Mī Sū. (1.3.33). It is used in *Kusunāijali* (3. 21); in *Saptapadārthī* (p. 2, line 6); in *Tānkikarakṣā* (pp. 47 and 107); *Nyāyasutravṛtti* (2. 126); and in *Nyāyamañjarī* (pp. 320, 433, 449, 538, 543).

(48) 'Maxim of the *Niṣādasthapati*'. Mī. Sū. 6. 1. 51-52 deals with the text '*Niṣādasthapatim yājayēt*'; where a question is raised as to the exact signification of the term '*Niṣādasthapati*':—Does it mean the '*Sthapati*, king of the *Niṣādas*' (the *Niṣāda* being a sub-caste not entitled to perform Sacrifices)—or 'the king *who is a Niṣāda*'? The latter interpretation makes the *Niṣāda king* entitled to perform Sacrifices. The conclusion is in favour of the latter interpretation, which makes the *Niṣāda* king entitled to perform the one particular Sacrifice. This explanation implies the Grammatical Convention that as a general rule the *Karmadhāraya* compound is to be given preference to the *Tatpuruṣa*. This has been employed by *Vāchaspati Mishra* in the *Bhāmatī* on Sū. 1.3.15; in justifying his explanation of the compound '*Brahmaloka*'; so also by *Rāmānuja* in the *Shri-bhāṣya* on the same *Sūtra*. It is found in the *Vēdāntakalpataru* and also in the *Parimala*, on the same *Sūtra*; it is quoted by *Ānandagiri* on *Sharīrakabhāṣya* on 3. 3. 24; and by *Nāgēsha* on *Kayyaṭa* (1.3).

(49) '*Padārthānusamayanyāya*'. The obverse of the '*Kāṇḍanusamayanyāya*' (above, No. 30); represented by Mī Sū. 5.2. 1-2; according to this the whole set of operations are to be performed on one object, before the other object is taken in. See *Karkabhāṣya* on *Kātyāyana-Shrauta Sūtra* 1.114.

(50) 'In regard to the external world, the Mind is dependent upon other's (*Vidhivivēka*, p. 114); found in *Sarvadarshanasangraha* (Chapter I); in *Chitsukhī* (1. 12); in *Vidyāsagarī* on *Khuṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya* (p. 307).

(51) '*Parṇamayī-nyāya*'—indicates the invariable presence of something; the *Juhū* made of *Parṇa* (Leaves, or the wood of *Palasha* tree) being used at all Sacrifices; as dealt with by *Shabara* under Mī. Sū. 3.6. 1-8. Used in *Bhāmatī* on 3.3.61; and *Parimala*, pp. 624 and 626.

(52) *Pāṭhakramanyāya* ;—the Maxim of *Textual Sequence.* In the Fifth Discourse of Mīmā. Sū. Pāda 1,—we find Six kinds of *Sequence* set forth—(1) Directly enjoined Sequence, (2) Logical Sequence, (3) Textual Sequence, (4) Practical Sequence, (5) Sequence of Place, and (6) Sequence of Primary. When acts are performed in accordance with the order in which they are mentioned in the Vedic text, *e.g.*, (1) '*Samidho yajati*—(2) *Tanūnapātam yajati*, etc'. we have the *Pāṭha-krama*, Textual Sequence. Four of the above Six kinds of Sequence are mentioned in *Bhāmatī* on 1.1.1 ; which have been enlarged upon in *Kalpataru*, pp. 32—34 ; again in *Bhāmatī* on 4.3.6, where the Sequence of the *Sūtras* adopted in this explanation is the Logical one, in preference to the *Textual* one. The *Pāthakrama* is mentioned by *Ānandagiri* on Sū. 2.3.15.

(53) '*The Base and the Suffix conjointly signify principally what the Affix denotes*', A declaration by *Shabara* on Sū. 3.4.13, and also 10.8.24 ; and also in *Tantravārtika* on 3.1.12 and 2.1.1. It is found in *Mahābhāṣya* also on Sū. 3.1.67. It has been employed in *Nyāyamanjarī* (P. 403).

(54) '*Pratinidhinyāya*—'The law of Substitutes' ; dealt with in Mī. Sū. 6.3. 13—17 ; where the question is discussed as to what can be adopted as a *Substitute* for what, at a Sacrificial performance ; as the rule is that 'whenever the prescribed material is not available, a suitable substitute should be used'. Rāmānuja in the *Shri-bhāṣya* mentions this Law on p.508, under Sū. 3.3.40; where the *Shāriraka-bhāṣya* mentions it. It is referred to as a maxim of the '*Nyāyavidaḥ*', in *Māhabhāṣya* on 1.1. 5-6.

(55) 'The Subsidiary Act has to be repeated with each Primary Act'. Dealt with in Mī. Sū. 3.1.7.

(56) 'Perception is more reliable than Inference'. This occurs in *Shabara* on 3.1.12. This is referred to in *Nyāyamañjari* (p. 461 and 609) ; in *Nyāyakaṇikā*, p. 268 ; and *Tātparyaṭīkā*, (p. 27) ;—cited by *Shaṅkara Mishra* in his Comment on *Vaishesika-Sūtra* 3.2.10.

(57) 'Even numerous unseen Inferences may have to be assumed, if justified by reason'. This occurs in *Tantravārtika* on 2.1.5, Trs. p. 514. It is found also in *Sureshvara's Bṛhadāraṇyakavārtika*, p. 1124 and 1797 ; also in *Chitsukhī* (1. 23) ; and in *Khaṇḍana* (p. 74).

(58) 'Even a foolish man does not act without a purpose'. This occurs in *Shlokavārtika* (p. 653) ; it is referred to in *Nyāyamañjarī*, p. 191 ;—also in *Nyāyakaṇikā*, p. 339. It is quoted in full by *Anandagiri* on *Shārīraka-Bhāṣya* 2. 2. 1.

(59) '*Bhūtam bhavyāyopadishyatē*', 'An *accomplihed thing* is prescribed for the bringing about of *what has to be accomplished*'. For instance, the *accomplished* Sacrificial Act has been prescribed for the bringing about of the *Apūrva*, which is *to be accomplish*ed. Found in *Tantravārtika* on Mī. Sū. 2. 1. 5; in *Saṅkṣepa-shārīraka* 1.143, where the Commentator quotes this as 'the opinion of *Jaimini and Shabarasvāmin*':—in the same work again on 1.3.12; and in the *Tattvadīpana*, p. 377.

(60) *The maxim of the man making drawings of the chariot on the ground*:—this is found in *Shabara* in Mī. Sū. 7.2.15, and again on Sū. 9.2.13; where it is explained that the man who makes drawings of the chariot on the ground does so for the purpose of instructing his pupils as to making the chariot go faster in battle;—so the Teacher recites the Vedic Text for teaching the pupil, and the Pupil repeats it for getting it up.

(61) 'Maxim of the lost opportunity'—referred to in *Tantravārtika* 3.5.46, page 1060, as indicating *Lost Opportunity*. What is done after the opportunity for it has lapsed becomes defective'.

(62) Under Mī. Sū. 1. 3. 8-9, *Jaimini* and *Shabara* have declared that words that are in use among *Āryas*, have to be taken in the sense in which they are used by them; but those that are used only among *Mlechchhas*, have to be understood in the sense attributed to them by the latter people. This is quoted by *Shaṅkara* in his *Sharīrakabhāṣya* on 3. 4. 42. It is used also in *Bhāmatī* on 13..52; and in *Kalpataru*, pp. 461-462; *Tātparyaṭīkā*, p. 292;—*Kusumāñjali*, Vol. II pages 130 and 154;—and *Nyāyamañjarī*, p. 288.

(63) 'When the same fault attaches to both sides of an argument, it cannot be urged against one only'. *Shabara* on Mī. Sū. 8.3.14;—*Nyāyakaṇikā*, p. 225; *Aniruddhavṛtti* on *Sāṅkhyasūtra* 1.6. See *Tantravārtika*, p. 947; *Nyāyamañjarī*, p. 95; *Tarkabhāṣā*, p. 88. The author of the *Khaṇḍana* (p. 53.) attributes the maxim to *Kumārila*.

(64) 'When a man has no Son, toys are not made for his son'; this is said by *Shabara* in his illustration of *Jaimini's* Sū. 10.3.5; wherein it is declared that 'there could be no injunction of accessories for an act which has no accessories at all.' It has been used to illustrate futile activities.

(65) The maxim of the *Rathakāra*. A Vedic Text lays down that Fire-installation is to be done during the Rains, by the '*Rathakāra*';—Who is this *Rathakāra*? It he the man who has adopted *chariot-making* as a

profession ? Or is he a man belonging to one of the mixed sub-castes ? This question has been discussed in Mī. Sū. 6.1. 44—50, where the latter view has been accepted. This maxim has been used by Nāgesha in his commentary on *Paribhāsa* 98, which declares that the conventional meaning of a word (the sub-caste, *Rathakāra, e.g.*) is more acceptable than the one indicated by the Etymology of the word (the chariot-maker, *e.g.*). It has also been used in *Nyāyamañjarī*, p. 140.

(66) *Rātrisatranyāya*. This is presented in Mī. Sū. 4. 3. 17—19 ; and deals with the Vedic text laying down the *Rātrisatra-Sacrifice*. There is no result mentioned in the text as to follow from this Sacrifice; and the conclusion is that in all such cases, ther esult is found in the corresponding Declamatory Texts, *Arthavādas*. This has been utilised in the *Shārīraka-bhāṣya*, on Sū. 3.3.38; as is clear from *Ānandagiri, Kalpataru and Parimala :* the last work quoting it again under *Vedānta Sū.* 1.2.24. It is found also in *Pañchapādikāvivaraṇa*, p. 122, and 134 ;—also in *Tattvamuktākalāpa*, V. 81.

(67) '*Varchonyāya*'. The Topic of Glory'. Mī. Sū. 3.8.25—27 discusses the point whether the using of the *Mantra* '*Mamāgnē varcho, etc.*', brings glory to the Priest who recites it, or to the Master of the Sacrifice ; and the latter view is accepted as the correct one. This embodies the principle that the Promoter of an act is the person responsible for it ; which, in its variants, has been used in several places.

(68) 'The Law of the *Vishvajit Sacrifice*'. The *Vishvajit-Sacrifice* has been prescribed in a Vedic text which does not mention any result obtainable from it; nor is it possible to deduce any result from the *Arthavāda* texts ; the conclusion is that in all such cases, the attainment of Heaven should be taken as the Reward ; as this is something that is desirable by all men. This has been dealt with in Mī. Sū. 4.3. 10—16 ; (and also in Sū. 6.7. 1—20 ; in a different context) ; used in *Pañchapādikāvivaraṇa*, p.134, 137 and 164 ; and in *Nyāyamañjarī*, p. 524.

(69) 'The Reward promised in the Scripture is for the Performer'. These are words of Mī. Sū. 3.7.18. Quoted in *Vedāntatattvavivēka* ;—in *Tātparyaṭīkā*, p. 296 and 403, and in *Bhāmatī*, p. 28 and 492;—in *Shrībhāṣya* under 2.3.33 and 3.4.45.

(70) 'The meaning of an ambiguous Sentence is to be ascertained from what follows in the context'. This is Mī. Sū. 1.4.29. It has been employed in *Shārīrakabhāṣya* 1.3.14 ; and also by *Ānandagiri* on 3.3.52 ; and in *Bhāmatī* under Sū. 3.3.34.

(71) 'So long as a sentence can be taken as one Syntactical Unit, it is not right to split it up'. These are *Kumārila's* words. in *Shlokavārtika* (p. 135), in refrence to Sū. 1.1.4. It has been quoted in *Bhāmatī*, under 1.1.28; 1.3.13; 1.4.3; 1.4.16; 3.3.57; and 3.4.20;—by *Ānandagiri* on *Shārīrakabhāṣya* 1.2.15; and *Shaṅkara* himself says a good deal on this matter under 1.4.3.

(72) 'A qualification is admissible only where one is possible, and where in its absence, there is an incongruity'. These are the words of *Kumārila* (*Tantravārtika* on 1.3.18 or 24). This law has been quoted in the commentary on *Sankṣēpashārīraka* 1.347; —in the *Vidyāsāgarī* on *Khaṇḍana* p. 401 and 592. It is found also in the *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad-bhāṣya* (6.2.).

(73) 'All is right for the powerful'—quoted by *Kumārila* (in *Tantravārtika*, p. 134), in answer to the argument against the reliability of the Practices of Good Men. It is found in the *Shrīmadbhāgavata* (10. 33. 30-31); and in the *Tātparyaṭīka* (opening part). The same statement is represented in two *Dharmasūtras* of *Āpastamba*.

(74) 'The Act prescribed in the various Vedic Texts is one and the same'. That is, for instance, the *Agnihotra* enjoined in a text of the *Mādhyandina Shākhā* is the same as the *Agnihotra* enjoined in a text of the *Kāṇvashākhā*.This has been dealt with in Mī. Sū. 2.4. 8—42. It is frequently quoted in philosophical works;—in *Panchapādikāvivaraṇa*, p. 167;—in *Nyāyamañjarī*, p. 256;—in *Vivaraṇaprameyasaṅgraha*, p. 169; and in *Shrī-bhāṣya*, 3.3.53.

(75) 'If a man with eyes is led by some one else, it means that he does not see with his own eyes'. These are the words of *Shabara* on Mī. Sū. 1.2.31. This illustration is quoted in *Nyāyamañjarī*, p. 286.

(76) 'An Injunction in general terms is always indefinite'. These are the words of *Kumārila* in *Tantravātika* (3.4.47; p. 1020). It has been cited in *Parimala* (p. 253). This lack of definiteness in general statements is alluded to also by *Shabara* on Mīm. Sū. 10.8.16.

—: *END* :—

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APPENDIX

CRITICAL BIBLIOGRAPHY

PREAMBLE

As directed by the author of the *Pūrva-Mīmāmsā in its Sources*—the Revered Mahāmahopādhyāya Dr.. Sir Gaṅgānātha Jhā, when I handed over the Index of his book to Professor R. D. Ranade of the Allahabad University, I was asked by the latter to write a short critical bibliography on Mīmāmsā containing texts published and unpublished and explanations and criticisms as well as articles in Reviews and Journals which have hitherto appeared on Mīmāmsā, as an Appendix to this work. Prof. Ranade wrote to Dr. Jha who gladly expressed his agreement and wrote to me, "If you and Prof. Ranade agree on any point, you need not ask me about it. It is a stupendous task that Prof. Ranade has set you. I hope you will make it as complete as you can." This was no longer a mere request of a colleague but an *Ajnā* of the Great Master, and I began the work in right earnest. The notes were finished in due course and, when Dr. Jhā returned to Allahabad in serious ill-health, I had the good luck of discussing with him some of the more important points of my notes. After this I began to fair out my notes hoping to finish the work and present it to him while he was alive. But unfortunately, before I could complete my work, he left us. However, his immortal *Ātman* which is ever with us, will now see that his *Ājnā* has been obeyed; but to what extent, it is for others to judge. It was not possible to make the work as exhaustive as I wanted it to be, but as far as I think no important author has excaped my notice.

As this is the last work which I had the fortune to do at his instance, and which he did not live to see, I dedicate this humble *offering*—an *Anjali of respectful love*—to the divine memory of the Great Master.

THE UNIVERSITY,
ALLAHABAD,
December 3, 1941.

UMESHA MISHRA

कुसुमाञ्जलिः

शाकेत्र्यङ्कसमुचन्द्रलसिते (१७९३) मासे नभस्येऽधिके
पक्षे शौक्लचयुते जगतद्धितकरे पूर्णेन्दुसंज्ञे तिथौ ।
गायत्रीसमुपासनेन सकलं देशं समुद्दीपयन्
गङ्गानाथसुतं वरं समजनीच्छ्रातीर्थनाथो द्विजः ॥१॥

लब्ध्वा जन्म सुगन्धवारिनगरे देशे विदेहप्रभो-
र्गङ्गानाथमहाशयः सुकृतिनां सच्छ्रोत्रियाणां कुले ।
काशीं प्राप्य दिगन्तविश्रुतगुरोरभ्यस्य शास्त्राणि यः
पाण्डित्येन मनोहरेण बहुलामादाय कीर्त्तिं पराम् ॥२॥

शाके वह्निरसाष्टभूमिसहिते (१८६३) मार्गे दले श्यामले
षष्ठ्यां सूर्यदिने निशीथसमये पद्मासने संस्थितः ।
लीलां तीर्थपतौ प्रयागनगरे संहृत्य तां लौकिकीं
गातोऽस्मान् स्वजनान् विहाय रुदतो देवान् पुनः सेवितुम् ॥३॥

पुत्रास्तस्य विपश्चितो विलयने शोकं परं प्राप्नुवन्
प्राप्ता दीनतमां दशां परिजनाश्छात्रास्तथा पण्डिताः ।
विद्या सा गतभर्तृकेव विकला याता शुचा सर्वतो
हंहो तीर्थपते ध्रुवं कथय नस्त्वं कामयस्थां गतः ॥४॥

आसीद्यो नववर्त्मलालसनृणां पाश्चात्यशिक्षावतां
पूर्वेषामपि सत्क्रियादिकरणे विद्यावतां सर्वथा ।
आदर्शो नु पुनः सदैव शरणं प्राचीनसत्पद्धतेः
प्रज्ञानामुपकारश्च सततं योऽभूदनौपम्यभाक् ॥५॥

शास्त्रे यः प्रतियातना सुरगुरोरासीच्च नीतौ पुन-
र्लौकिक्यां विदुरोपमः सहृदयश्छात्रे सगोत्रे तथा ।
मीमांसातरुसंञ्चितैः सुकुसुमैः सम्यक् कृपां श्रद्धयो-
मेशः श्रीगुरवे समर्पयति सन्मालाममुष्मा इमाम् ॥६॥

CRITICAL BIBLIOGRAPHY OF MĪMĀṀSĀ

(Mīmāṁsā—Kusumāñjali)

It is necessary to say in the very beginning that there exists a very close relation between Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā and Dharmashāstra. In fact, the Principles of Mīmāṁsā form the very background of our Dharmashāstra. All the rules of our Dharmashāstra have to be interpreted with the help of the *Mīmāṁsā-Nyāyas*. So a Dharmashāstrī has necessarily to become a Mīmāṁsaka first. Thus, almost all the writers on Dharmashāstra, from Manu down to any author of the present day, have been good Mīmāṁsakaś also. In this bibliography, however, I have confined myself to those authors mainly whose work has come to my notice in any form. But that there were many more Mīmāṁsakas is quite evident from our studies of the Shāstras.

Pre-Jaimini

The earliest available work in the systematised form of the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā School is the *Sūtra*-work of Jaimini. But that there were several other teachers who taught the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā Principles before Jaimini is quite evident from the various references made to them and to their views by Jaimini himself in his *Sūtra*-work. A short account of all such references is given below.

Bādarāyaṇa

Under Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā-Sūtra, I.i. 5, Jaimini says that according to Bādarāyaṇa "the relation of the word with its denotation is eternal; instruction (in the form of word) is the means of knowing *Dharma :* (words are) infallible regarding all that is imperceptible; it is a valid means of knowledge, as it is independent."

Again, under V. ii. 19, Jaimini says that according to Bādarāyaṇa "the Ectypal details should come at the end; because, those that come from the Archetype are such as are included in what is expressed by the words laying down the Principal sacrifice."

Again, under VI. i. 8, in answer to the *prima facie* view that men alone are entitled to perform the sacrifice, Jaimini quotes the view of Bādarāyaṇa which is the *Siddhānta*, that "in reality, it is the whole class (*jāti*), that is, both men and women, that is entitled to perform the sacrifice; because there is no ground for distinction."

Under X. viii. 44, in refutation to the *prima facie* view, Jaimini again quotes Bādarāyaṇa who holds that "the offering of the curd-butter-mixture comes before the *Soma* sacrifice also."

Again under XI. i. 64, in answer to the *prima facie* view, Jaimini quotes Acārya Bādarāyaṇa according to whom "there should be a single performance in common of the subsidiaries ; because, there is no separation of context. There is one and the same context for all the main sacrifices, as they function jointly."

It is clear from the above that in support of purely Mīmāṁsā topics Jaimini quotes Bādarāyaṇa with great reverence and is in agreement with his views. The name of Bādarāyaṇa is more known to us as the author of the Brahmasūtra. But we cannot, on the basis of the evidence of the views quoted above, have the least doubt that Bādarāyaṇa, quoted in the Jaiminīya-Sūtras, is a Mīmāṁsaka.

Now, regarding the identification of these two Bādarāyaṇas, it is very difficult to say anything for or against definitely. Neither any external nor any internal evidence is available. But it may be suggested that as the two systems of Mīmāṁsā and Vedānta, generally known as *Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā* and *Uttara-Mīmāṁsā*, are not quite distinct from each other, rather they represent separately the two aspects of one and the same Goal and which is also supported by the terms, *Pūrva* (preliminary) and *Uttara* (final), used for the Mīmāṁsā proper and the Vedānta respectively, the teacher of the *Uttara* school also may have been the teacher of the *Pūrva*. In fact, the study of the *Uttara* school necessitates the study of the *Pūrva*. It is, therefore that the great Mīmāṁsā teacher Kumārila deliberately has asked the enquirer after the nature of Self to refer to the Vedānta. So it seems quite possible that Bādarāyaṇa must have had his own contributions to the school of Pūrva-Māmāṁsā also. Hence, it may be said that the two Bādarāyaṇas were identical. There are some critics who are opposed to this identity, but they appear to overlook the fact that one and the same person can hold views on two different schools of thought. Bādarāyaṇa could equally have had authoritative views on Mīmāṁsā as well as Vedānta. We know that there were several authors, Vācaspati Mishra I, etc. for instance, who were equally authoritative as Naiyāyikas, Mīmāṁsakas, Vedāntins, and so on.

References : i) Indian Antiquary, Vl.. L, pp. 167—174 ; ii) Journal of Oriental Research, Madras, 1937 ; iii) Introduction to Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā, Pashupatinatha Shastri, pp. 25—42.

Bādari

Bādari is another important teacher whom Jaimini refers to in his *Sūtra*-work. Under III. i. 3, according to Jaimini, Bādari is of opinion that the auxiliary character (*sheṣalakṣaṇaṁ*) belongs to substances, properties and preparations. This view, however, is not accepted by Jaimini.

Again, under VI. i. 27, Bādari, as a supporter of the *prima facie* view, says "that the text quoted in support of the statement, that the *Shūdra* is not entitled to the performance of sacrifices, is only a contingent one ; hence, all the castes should be entitled to perform the sacrifices." This view also is not the accepted *Siddhānta*.

Again, in connection with the *ṣaṭtriṁshadrātra*—sacrifice, regarding the question—are the details to be adopted at it to be those of the *Ahan* offerings comprising the *Dvādashāha* or those of the *ṣaḍaha* ? Bādari, under VIII. iii. 6, says—even though there is repetition of the time, yet inasmuch as the actions are diverse, the details adopted should be those of the *Drādashāha*. This view has also not been accepted by the *Siddhāntin*.

Next, in the case of such injunctions as—one sings the *Rathantara Sāman* over the *Uttarā* verses, the question is raised whether the singing is to be done in accordance with the syllables of the *Uttarā* verses or with those of the basic verse—Bādari, under IX. ii. 33, is in agreement with the *Siddhānta* that the singing should be done in accordance with the syllables of the *Uttarā* verses and not in accordance with the part of the basic verse.

Again, Bādari believed that the auxiliary character (*sheṣatā*) belongs to substance (*dravya*), quality (*guṇa*) and disposition (*saṁskāra*) only and to no other category (*vide* Bhāvanāviveka, Pt. I, p. 41, Saraswatibhavana Text Series edition.)

In the *Brahmasūtras* (I.ii.30 ; III i. 11 ; IV.iii. 7 ; IV.iv. 10) also certain views are attributed to one Bādari. Regarding the identity of these two Bādaris, again, one may differ, but in the absence of any definite proof I do not see any reason why the same Bādari be not allowed to speak authoritatively on both the Mīmāṁsās. Kātyāyana-Shrautasūtra (IV.96) makes a reference to one Bādari. There is nothing to prevent us to regard him also as identical with the two other Bādaris referred to above. Dr. T. R. Chintamani thinks that "Bādari may have been the son of one Badara and an ancestor of Bādarāyaṇa, and consequently, slightly older than Bādarāyaṇa." This is merely a suggestion.

AITISHĀYANA

Another important Mīmāṁsaka is Aitishāyana. Jaimini refers to him thrice. Thus, under III. ii. 43, while propounding the *Siddhānta* Jaimini holds with him that "one and the same *Mantra* should be used at the eating of the remnants of all offerings."

Again, under III. iv 24, in answer to the objection of the upholders of the *prima facie* view, Jaimini refers to the opinion of Aitishāyana who says, "In reality, there must be some connection between the acts under consideration and a result, just like the connection of other things with particular results. It must therefore be regarded as an action accomplishing the purpose of man in general."

Lastly, under VI.i. 6, Aitishāyana says, "On account of the use of the particular gender (that is, masculine in the text-*svargakāmo yajeta*) only men are entitled to perform the sacrifice." Jaimini does not agree with this veiw.

Nothing more we know of this Acārya.

KĀRṢṆĀJINI

Kārṣṇājini is another important teacher whose views Jaimini has referred to twice. Thus, under IV. iii. 17, regarding the *Rātri* sacrifice text प्रतितिष्ठन्तीह य षता उपयन्ति । ब्रह्मवर्चस्विनोऽन्नादा भवन्ति य एता उपयन्ति— "those who have recourse to these sacrifices become famous ; those who have recourse to these sacrifices become endowed with *Brāhmic* glory and also eaters of food," Kārṣṇājini, in support of the *prima facie* view says—that the above-quoted sentence is commendatory in regard to the sacrifice, like the sentence speaking of the accessory details.

Again, under VI. vii. 36, regarding the thousand-year sacricfice, he, in support of the *prima facie* view, says, "What is laid down should be regarded as a function for generations, as it is impossible for a single man to live for thousand years and complete the sacrifice."

In both the cases, Jaimini respectfully disagrees with Kāṣṇājini. He is, like so man others, referred to both in the Mīmāṁsā and Brahmasūtras, (cf. Brahmasūtra, III. i. 9). This name is also very familiar in our *Dharmashāstra*. In *Kātyāyana-shrautasūtra*, also, we find his name mentioned in one of the sūtras, (I. 144). It is just possible that one and the same Kārṣṇājini might have written on Mīmāṁsā, Vedānta an Dharmashāstra. Nothing more is know about him at present.

Lāvukāyan

Lāvukāyana's view has been only once given by Kamini under VI. vii. 38, where in support of the *Siddhānta,* Lāvukāyana says that there being mutual inconsistency in the text—पञ्चपञ्चाशतस्त्रिवृत: संवत्सरा:—one of the two terms must be taken in the indirect figurative sense. We do not know more about him as yet.

Kāmukāyana

Regarding the text—there are fourteen oblations at the *Pūrṇamāsa*-sacrifice and thirteeen at the *Darsha,* under XI. i. 57, supporting the *Siddhāntin,* Kāmukāyana says that there should be a single performanc, so that there may be no incompatability with the limitation of the number of oblations fixed at fourteen and thirteen. The same argument has been reiterated by Kāmukāyana under XI. i. 62. No more about this author also is known to us as yet.

Ātreya

The name of Ātreya is found in several places. *Baudhāyana-Gṛhya-sūtra* (III. ix. 6) refers to one Ātreya as a *Padakāra* (Ātreyāya Padakārāya) *Bodhāyana-Shrautasutra* (XXI. 21) also speaks of one Ātreya. In the Mahābhārata (XIII. 137. 3) also the name of a sage, called Ātreya, is mentioned as a teacher of *Nirguṇa-Brahmavidyā.* In the Brahmasūtra (III. iv. 44) also there is a reference to one Ātreya. Dr. T. R. Cintamani quotes a few verses from the *Caturvargacintāmaṇi* which are attributed to one Ātreya. Besides, Jaimini refers to the views of one Ātreya thrice in his Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā-Sūtras. It is just possible that all these names may refer to one and the same person. Thus, under IV. iii. 18, in answer to the *prima facie* view advanced by Kārṣṇājaini, Ātreya gives us the *Siddhānta* that—What is spoken of should be taken as the actual result ; because, it is so mentioned ; if no result were mentioned, one would have to be inferred So, Ātreya holds that the results actually follow from acts like the *Rātri*. sacrifices, and hence, the sentence—प्रतितिष्ठन्ति ह वा एते, य एता उपयन्ति, etc, in connection with the *Rātri* -sacrifice, is not a mere commendatory-declaration.

Again, under VI. i. 26, regarding the performance of sacrifices by the *Shūtra,* Ātreya gives us the *Siddhānta* that—in reality, the acts in question can be performed by the three higher castes only, as in connection with the *Installation of Fire,* these three alone have been mentioned. The *Shūdra,* therefore, can have no connection with sacrifices. The Veda being applicable to the *Brāhmaṇa* and the other two castes only.

Lastly, under V. ii. 18, regarding the performance of the *Nāriṣṭa-Homa*, Ātreya says—"What belongs to the Ectype should be performed immediately after the principal sacrifice ; as it is equal to it in being prescribed by a Vedic text : as for those that come from the original Archetype, they may be removed further."

Ālekhana

Ālekhana is another Mīmāṁsaka who is referred to by Jaimini. Under VI. v. 17, in connection with the performance of the *Abhyudayeṣṭi* on the Moon rising, before the material has been prepared, Ālekhana proppounds the *Siddhānta* that the material should be prepared and consecrated for those deiteis who partake of the subsequent offereings.

Besides, it is said that there is also a reference to him in the *Saṅkarṣa-kāṇḍa* under XVI. ii. 1. This Ālekhana is very often quoted in the *Shrautasūtra* attributed to one Bharadvāja or Bhāradvāja. This Bharadvāja may be identical with that Bharadvāja whose views are found in the *Arthashāstra* of Kauṭilaya, who, again, perhaps is the same as the teacher of the *Rājashātra* mentioned in the Mahābhārate (shāntiparva, 58.3). If all these identifications be correct, then as the date of the *Arthashāstra*, according to Dr. A. B. Keith, cannot be placed earier than 100 B. C. but not later than second century A.D., Bharadvāja should have floruished earlier than Kautilya ; and Ālekhana, in that case, must have lived long before Bharadvāja, that is, earlier than 100 B. C. Nothing more about Ālekhana is known as yet.

Jaimini

The name of Jaimini in the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā-Sūtra occurs in five places (III. i. 4 ; VI iii. 4 ; VIII, iii. 7 ; IX. ii 39 ; and XII. i. 8). Of these references, except one (VI. iii. 4), all the rest refer to the *Siddhāntas* and can easily be attributed to Jaimini, the author of the Pūrva-Mīmaṁsā-Sūtras. But the reference to Jaimini in the Sūtra VI. iii. 4, as it represents the *prima facie* view, is doubted whether it refers to the same Jaimini of to some other Jaimini. Had he been identical how could have it been possible for him to hold simultaneously both the *prima facie* view and the *Siddhānta* view regarding the same topic ? Moreover, while commenting upon the rest of the Sūtras, Shabara adds the word '*Ācārya*' to the name of Jaimini, while in the present case, he simply says इति जैमिनिः मन्यते स्म and omits the usual term of respect. Similarly, although the name of Jaimini is not mentioned in the Sūtra VI. iii. 1, yet Shabara attributes

the view expressed therein, which is the *prima facie* one, to Jaimini, and there also Shabara omits the use of the usual term showing respect.

It is concluded from all these that there were two Jaiminis—one, the author of the existing Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā-Sūtras and the other, who was also a Mīmāṁsaka but not identical with the author of the present Sūtras. The other Jaimini is certainly earlier than the present Sūtrakāra. There was also an astrologer of the same name who wrote a Sūtra-work on Astrology.

Regarding the view that as it is impossible to name one's ownself in his own work he two cannot be identical, it may be said that there is no incongruity in it; for there are innumerable instances in Indian literature where such references are found. Perhaps this is an Indian characteristic of expression.

Almost all these *Pre-Jaimini Mīmāṁsakas*, whether they had written any work on Mīmāṁsā or not, were, undoubtedly, great teachers of Mīmāṁsā who had their independent views on the school. It is also just possible that he who was a Mīmāṁsaka might have been a Vedāntin too. It is corroborated by the respectful references of the various *Ācāryas* in both the systems.

KĀSHAKṚTSNA AND ĀPISHALI

Besides these, there were many more Mīmāṁsakas who lived and taught before the beginning of the Christian Era and who have been mentioned in our earlier works, although Jaimini does not make any reference to them. For instance, the names of *Kāshakṛtsna* and *Āpishali*, as teachers and perhaps founders of independent schools of Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā, are found in the Vyākaraṇa Mahābhāṣya and the Pāṇini's Sūtra (*vide* Mahābhāṣya, IV, i. 3, 14, and Pā Sū. VI. i.92). In fact, these two teachers must have been very old. Āpishali is, undoubtedly, older than Pāṇini himself. Both of these two Mīmāṁsakas were great Grammarians and perhaps, were authors of some work also.

On the basis of these references it may be said that the Principles of Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā were systematised long before Jaimini; for, the various views of the various Ācāryas would not have been so very clear and distinct without it. Besides, the expressions, like—*Āpishalī Mīmāṁsā*, *Kāshkaṛtsnī Mīmaṁsā*,* etc. from the mouth of Patañjali, would have never been, other-

*Patañjali tells us that a Brāhmaṇī studied 'काशकृत्स्नी', that is, काशकृत्स्निना प्रोक्ता मीमांसा—*vide* Mahābhāṣya IV.i, 3; IV.iii. 2. pp. 111, 311, Benares Edition.

wise, possible. This is further supported by the fact that in the *Āpastambadharmasūtra* we find several Sūtras similar in substance to the Jaiminīyasūtras. A few instances are given below to illustrate the above:

ĀPASTAMBADHARMASŪTRAS	JAIMINĪYASŪTRAS
1. श्रुतिर्हि बलीयस्यानुमानिकादाचारात् —I. 1. 4. 8.	विरोधे त्वनपेक्ष्यं स्याबसति ह्यनुमानम् —I. iii. 3.
2. विप्रतिषेधे श्रुतिलक्षणं बलीय: —I. 11. 30. 90.	
3. यत्र तु प्रीत्युपलब्धित: प्रवृत्तिर्न तत्र शास्त्रमस्ति—I. 4. 12. 11.	यस्मिन् प्रीतिः पुरुषस्य तस्य लिप्सार्थलक्षणाविभक्तत्वा—IV. i. 2.
4. Sūtra—I. 1. 4. 9-10.	दृश्यते चापि प्रवृत्तिकारणम् । प्रीतिर्ह्युपलभ्यते—हेतुदर्शनाच्च—I. iii. 4.
5. अङ्गानां तु प्रधानैरव्यपदेश इति न्यायवित्समय:—II. 4. 8. 13.	प्रयोगशास्त्रमिति चेत्—I. iii. 11. नासंनियमात्—I. iii. 12. अवाक्यशेषाच्च—I. iii. 13. सर्वत्र च प्रयोगात्सन्निधानशास्त्राच्च —I. iii. 14.
6. अथापि नित्यानुवादमविधिमाहुर्न्यायविद:—II. 6. 14. 13.	अर्थवादो वा विधिशेषत्वात् तस्मान्नित्यानुवाद:—VI. vii. 30.
7. तस्यां क्रयशब्दः संस्तुतिमात्रम् । धर्म्माद्धि सम्बन्ध:—II. 6. 13. 11-12.	क्रयस्य धर्ममात्रत्वम्—VI. i. 15.
8. विद्यां प्रत्यनध्याय: श्रूयते, न कर्मयोगे मन्त्राणाम्—I. 4. 12. 9.	विद्यां प्रति विधानाद्वा सर्वकालं प्रयोग: स्यात् कर्मार्थत्वात् प्रयोगस्य —XII. iii. 19.

Besides these, there are several other similarities between these two Sūtra-works. Shabara, Kumārila and other later writers have very often referred to the Sūtras of Āpastamba. It is very difficult to say whether Apastamba was influenced by Jaimini or he flourished earlier than Jaimini and had some other Sūtra-work of Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā before him. However, it is certain that Jaimini was not the first systematiser of the Principles of Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā. The *Guru-Paramparā* tradition found in several later works also supports the antiquity of the system. Pārthasārathi Mishra in his commentary on the Shloka-vārttika, called *Nyāyaratnākara* (p. 8), says that Brahmā, Indra, Prajāpati, Āditya, Vasiṣṭha, Parāshara, Kṛṣṇadvaipāyana and Jaimini were the teachers of Mīmāṁsā one after another. Rāmakṛṣṇa, in his conmentary, called *Siddhānta-candrikā,* on the Shāstradīpikā,

reads Agni in place of Āditya, and says that according to others Maheshvara should be substitute in place of Brahmā. The third view is that the first teacher of Mīmāṁsā was either Brahmā or Maheshvara who taught to Prajāpati. The latter had four pupils—Indra, Āditya, Bṛhaspati, and Manu. Manu taught to Vasiṣṭha who, in his turn, taught to Parāshara who taught to Kṛṣṇadvaipāyana and he, in his turn, taught to Jaimini (vide *Mīmāṁsāsūtrārthasangraha* by Parameshvara).

About the personal history of Jaimini we know from the Pancatantra that he was crushed to death by an elephant (*vide II 36*). From the Bhāgavata Purāṇa (XII. vi 55) we learn that he was taught Sāmavedasaṁhsitā by his teacher Vyāsa. He, in his turn, taught the same to Sumantu.

Regarding the date of Jaimini, Prof. Jacobi thinks that he cannot be earlier than the second century A.D. ; for he, being a contemporary of Bādarāyaṇa, was quite conversant with the theory of *Shūnya* advocated by Nāgārjuna in the second century A.D. Dr. Keith holds that he cannot be later than 200 A.D., but not much earlier. But Prof. Jacobi's argument is not quite correct. The reason is that though Nāgārjuna was a great advocate of *Shunyavāda*, yet it is quite wrong to hold that he was the originator of the theory. One can easily trace the theories of *Shūnya* and *Vijñāna*, which came to be associated with the Buddhist thought later, even to some of the oldest Upaniṣads and also to the works of Ashvaghoṣa and other ancient Pāli works (*vide* Introduction to the Hindi Translation of *Ratnaprabhā*, by Mm. Gopinatha Kaviraja, p. 3). So the fact is that these Buddhist thoughts in some form or other did exist long before Nāgārjuna could record them in his Kārikās. Hence, the above view is untenable. Again, it is believed that the earliest commentator of the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā-Sūtras is perhaps the *Vṛttikāra*-Upavarṣa ; and as he, according to the critics, is placed long before Patañjali, we may easily push back the date of Jaimini to a period earlier than 200 B.C. at least.

References—i) Jacobi—Date of Indian Philosophical systems—Journal of American Oriental Society, XXXIII ; ii) Journal of Oriental Research, Madras, Vol. III ; iii) M Hiriyanna's Introduction to Naiṣkarmyasiddhi, Second Ed. ; iv) Indian Antiquary, Vol. L—Jaimini and Bādarāyaṇa ; V) Dr. Keith's Karma-Mīmāṁsā.

The Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā-Sūtra is divided into 12 chapters, each chapter devoted to one particular topic, due to which it is also called *Dvādashalakṣaṇī*. There is also a belief that there are four more chapters of the Jaiminīya-sūtra

known as the *Śankarṣa-Kāṇḍa* but this portion has not yet been verified* (*vide*—Text. pp. 11-13). Like other Sūtra-works, each chapter is divided into certain *Pādas*. Now, there are certain peculiarities regarding this Sūtra-work :—

(1) Unlike other Sūtra-works, the number of *Pādas* in each chapter is not fixed at four, which might have had some special convention about it. Here, we have four *Pādas* in Chapters I, II, IV, V, VII, VIII, IX, XI, and XII ; while Chapters III, VI and X have each 8 *Pādas*

(2) In no other Sūtra-work there is so much repetition of any Sūtra, either in full or in parts, as here. For instance, the Sūtra 'लिङ्गदर्शनाच्च' occurs 30 times ; again, the Sūtra 'तथा चान्यार्थदर्शनम्' occurs 24 times, of course, in each case of repetition, the meaning changes according to the context ; while the Sūtras लिङ्गदर्शनात्, पूर्वं च लिङ्गदर्शनात्, लिङ्गाच्च, धर्मानुग्रहाच्च, तथा च लिङ्गदर्शनम् अन्ते वा कालकृतत्वात्, विकारे तु तदर्थं स्यात्, etc., etc., have also been repeated several times.

(3) In order to illustrate Mīmāṁsā topics even the Sūtrakāra takes help of instances from phenomenal life (*vide* IV. i.6).

He is also said to be the author of a work called—*Chāndogyānuvāda* (*pada ?*) cf. एतज्जैमिनिनैव छान्दोग्यानुवादे—Tantravārttika, I, iii.2(5) Some also attribute the authorship of a *Shrautasūtra* and a *Gṛhyasūtra* to him (cf. Keith, pp. 4—5).

The special field covered by Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā is an enquiry into the nature of *Dharma*, duty of man, and topics directly or indirectly connected with it. The twelve topics are—1) Means of knowing *Dharma*, 2) Differentiation among Action (*Karmabheda*), 3) Auxiliaries (*Sheṣatva*) ; 4) Mutual subserviency among Actions (*Prayojya-Prayojakabhāra*) ; 5) Order of Sequence (*Krama*) ; 6) Qualification of a sacrificer etc. (*Adhikāra*) ; 7) *Sāmānyātidesha*, meaning that there are details in connection with other sacrifices; 8) *Vishesātidesha*, meaning that such and such details appertain to such and such sacrifice ; 9) Modification of details (*Ūha*) ; 10) Exclusion and Inclusion (*Bādha* and *Abhyuccaya*) ; 11) Common, Centralisation (*Tantra*) ; and 12) Uncommon, Decentralisation (*Āvāpa*).

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*The work, bearing the title—*Saṅkarṣa-Kāṇḍa* along with the commentary called *Bhāṭṭa-candrikā* published from Benares, is not the authentic work. Devaswāmī's Commentary on the *Saṅkarṣa-Kāṇḍa* may throw more light on the problem.

The first three chapters were translated into English by Sir Ganganatha Jha which was published in the Sacred Books of the Hindu Series from Allahabad in 1916. The whole of the Jaiminīya-sūtra (I—XII Adhyāyas) was translated into English by Pt. Mohanlal Sandal, and was published from Allahabad. Dr. Ballantyne also translated the first *Pāda* along with the Shabarabhāṣya, as early as 1851.

UPAVARṢA AND BODHĀYANA

After Jaimini it appears that no other independent work was written on the system. There have been, undoubtedly, great scholars, but they have all based their contributions upon the Jaiminiya-sūtras though they have given ample evidence of their originality in their commentaries. We have not as yet been able to unearth any work on the Sūtras between Jaimini and Shabara, but from the various references found here and there we think that there were at laest two commentaries called *Vṛttis* by Upavarṣa and Bodhāyana. Shabara himself makes references to Upavarṣa with great reverence in his Bhāṣya and it is believed that the reference to the *Vṛtti-grantha* is a reference to Upavarṣa's *Vṛtti.*

Regarding the personality of these two writers there have been different opinions amongst the critics. Mm. S. Kuppuswāmī Shāstrī holds that they are identical personages, but it appears from the reference to them in the *Prapancahṛdaya* that they were not identical. Both of these two authors wrote separately on Jaiminīya-sūtras (vide *Prapancahṛdaya*, p. as Trivandrum Sanskrit Series Ed). This Bodhāyana is perhaps the same 39, that on whose *Vṛtti* Rāmānujācārya has based his *Shrībhāsya.*

The date of these two is as much in dark as their life-history. Nothing can be said with any certainty except that Upavarṣa lived before Shabara. Dr. Ganganatha Jha places him before the Christain Era (*vide* Text, p. 14). The same date may be fixed for Bodhāyana also, as most likely, they were contemporaries.

BHAVADĀSA

After these two Vṛttikāras, we come to Bhavadāsa who also wrote a *Vṛtti* on the Sūtras. This assumption of ours is based on the single evidence of the *Prapancahṛdaya*, which definitely says that Bhavadāsa preceded Shabara. That Bhavadāsa was a great Mīmāṁsaka, who wrote a commen tary called *Vṛtti* on the Sūtras, is also quite evident from the *Shlokavārttika* and its commentary by Pārthasārathi Mishra. While commenting on the Kārikā—वृत्त्यन्तरेषु केषाञ्चित् लौकिकार्थव्यतिक्रमः verse 33), Pārthasārathi says—

'केषाञ्चित्—भवदासादीनां वृत्यन्तरेषु' Even Kumārila himself refers to him in the Shlokavārttika—प्रदर्शनार्थमित्येके केचिन्नानार्थवाचिनः। समुदायादवच्छिद्य भवदासेन कल्पितात्" (pp. 21-22).

Regarding Bhavadāsa's view we can only glean from Kumārila that he thought that the terms अथ and अतः in the first Sūtra should be read together, so that both together may give us the meaning of आनन्तर्य (after). Again, we are told by Kumārila that Bhavadāsa split up the fourth Sūtra into two parts—i) सत्संप्रयोगे पुरुषस्येन्द्रियाणां बुद्धिजन्म तत् प्रत्यक्षम् and ii) अनिमित्तं विद्यमानोपलम्भनत्वात्—the first half gives us the definition of *Pratyakṣa,* while the second half speaks of the unauthoritativeness (अप्रामाण्य) of it regarding *Dharma.* So says Pārthasārathi—भवदासेनैतत्सूत्रं द्विधा कृत्वा 'सत्संप्रयोगे' इत्येवमादि 'तत्प्रत्यश' मित्येवमन्तं प्रत्यक्षलक्षणपरम्। 'अनिमित्त'मित्यादि च तस्य धर्मं प्रत्यनिमित्तत्वपरं व्याख्यातम् (pp. 133—34), Shabara, Kumārila and their followers all rejected these views of Bhavadāsa.

SHABARASWĀMĪ

We now come to the great Bhāṣyakāra of the Jaiminīya-sūtras. His *Bhāsya* is the first complete work that we have got on the Jaiminīya-sūtras before us. As for the personal history and date of Shabara we are still in dark. The tradition current amongst the Paṇḍitas is that he had six sons—one from his Brāhaṇa-wife, named *Varāhamihira,* the great Indian astronomer; from the Kṣattriya wife he had two sons, Rājā *Bhartṛhari* and the King *Vikrama:* from his vaishya-wife he had the great Vaidya—*Haricanda* and *Shanku,* and lastly, from the Shūdra-wife he had *Amaru.* Nothing can be based on his tradition with any certainty. He has referred to, in his Bhāṣya the names of Kātyāyana, *Vārttikakāra* (X, viii. 4), Manu (I. i. 2), Pāṇini, Piṅgala (I. i. 5); *Sphoṭavādino Vaiyākaranāh* (I. i. 5) and many more. But none of these helps us much to fix his date. So Dr. Ganganatha Jha thinks that if his relation with Varāhamihira be believed in, we may say tha the lived before 400 A.D. which is the probable date of the great astronomer.

It is said that his original name was Ādityadeva which he changed to Shabara when he disguised himself as a forester for fear of Jain persecution. Dr. Jha, on the basis of certain facts from his Bhāṣya, suggests his being a Northerner. Dr. Jha even goes so far as to say that he perhaps lived in Kashmir or Takṣashilā (*ride* Introduction to his English Trans., No more him we know. A few facts gleaned from his Bhāṣya are given below which are quite interesting and also may help us to come nearer the truth regarding his native place:

(1) The text 'तस्माद्बराहं गावोऽनुधावन्ति (I iii. 9) meaning—Cows run after the *Barāha* (Shata Brā. 4,4.3.19)—quoted by Shabara refers to a custom, regarded as a religious duty, which falls on the day following the *Dīpāvalī*. This is even now prevalent in Mithilā where it is called *Hurāhurī*.

2) Shabara says—"In the case of pegs in the wall we find each of them severally serving the purpose of supporting the hanging noose" (II. ii. 1).

(3) The text—'पयसा षाष्टिकं भुञ्जीत, यदि शालिं भुञ्जीत तत्र दधि उपसिञ्चेत्' meaning one should eat *Śātṣṭika* (a kind of grain having black husk, called *Gamharī*, in Mithilā) with milk ; if eats *Shāli* 'paddygrains), he should mix curd with it (II. iii. 1). This indeed refers to the practice prevalent even now in Mithilā that people eat *Sāsṭika* with milk and *shāli* with curd (*Dahī-Curā*).

(4) The text—'गर्भदासः कमर्थि एव स्वामिना क्रीयते' (III. i. 2), meaning—Born slave is purchased for the sole purpose of working for the master—refers to the custom of slavery existing in North-East India for a very long time.

(5) The text—'दशापवित्रेण ग्रहं समार्ष्टि' (III. i. 13), meaning—Cleanses the *Soma*-vessel with 'the hem of the garment—refers to the practice prevalent amongst the ladies in the North-East of India.

(6) The text—'अग्निचितापक्षिणो न अशितव्या' '(V iii. 26), meaning that birds should not be eaten by one who is अग्निचित्—shows that birds were regularly eaten in those days and which was known to Shabara.

(7) Again, the text—'शालिसूपमासापूपैर्देवदत्तो भोजयितव्यः' (VII. i. 12), meaning that Devadatta should be fed on rice, pulse, meat, and sweet-cakes (*apupa*)—shows that he lived in that part of the country where the above-mentioned things were eaten during meals.

(8) Not only meat as an ingredient of food was known to him but he knew the details of fish-eating too. For instance, the text—'ये एकस्मिन् कार्ये विकल्पेन साधकाः श्रूयन्ते ते परस्परेण विरोधिनो भवन्ति। विरोधिनाञ्च न सह प्रवृतिः। लोकवत्—यथा मत्स्यान् न पयसा सयश्नीयादिति। यद्यपि सगुणामत्स्या भवन्ति तथापि पयसा सह न समश्यन्ते' (X. VII. 66), meaning—'When several things are spoken of as accomplishing the same purpose, they are always regarded as mutually incompatible ; and things that are mutually incompatible cannot function jointly ; as in the ordinary world ; for instance, when it is said "one should not eat fish with milk" the meaning is thet "even though the fish be possessed of excellent qualities,yet it is not eaten

with milk" clearly shows that he was very familiar with the process of fish-eating.

(9) The sentence—'वाससि रागः श्रूयते—वासो रञ्जयतीति, वाससि च क्रियते। (असौ) स्त्र्यर्थः पुरुषार्थो वा' (VII. i. 7), meaning—'Though the colour is poken of in connection with the cloth,—in such sentences as'—'one colours the cloth'—, and it is also done or produced in the cloth,—yet it does not subserve the purposes of the cloth; subserves the purposes of man or woman (who wears the cloth), indicates that he knew that both man and woman put on coloured cloth. I do not think that man puts on coloured cloth either in Kashmir or in the North-Western side.

(10) Again, the statement—'बाह्लीकोऽतिथिरागतः यवान्नमस्मै प्रक्रियताम्' (VII. i.8), meaning that 'when it is said, that a *Punjābī* (*Bāhīka*) has come as guest, prepare for him barley-meal' shows that though he was aware of the manner of showing hospitality to the guests of the Punjab, yet we think that he would have given this information to non-Punjabis who did not know the above-mentioned custom. Had he been an inhabitant of the Punjab, perhaps he would not have found any opportunity to convey this information to others.

(11) The instance—"the cooking of rice is of one kind, while that of molasses is of a totally different kind; so that the man who has learnt the cooking of rice cannot know how to cook molasses" (VII-ii-20), shows that he must have lived in that part of the country where cooking of both the rice and the molasses were known and he also knew the difference between the two methods.

(12) The statement—'ओदने दधि दत्वाऽभ्यवहर्त्तव्यम्' (IX. iv. 32), that is, one should put curd into cooked rice and then eat it'—refers to the custom of eating cooked rice and curd together (*Dahī-bhāta* of Mithilā). This very idea is repeated again when he says that—'Devedatta should be fed with curds, clarified butter and rice' (X. vi. 22).

(13) Lastly, we find that the eating of oil like clarified butter, has been repeatedly referred to by Shabara. For instance, he says "Just as when oil or clarified butter is drunk,—though this drinking is ephemeral, yet it brings about strength, improvement of intelligence, memory and so forth" (VII. i. 5); again he says—"Yajnadatta should be fed with oil; the purpose that is served in the food by the clarified butter is in the latter case understood to be served by oil; hence, even though it is not asserted in so many words that the food should be lubricated with oil, yet the oil serves to exclude the

clarified butter (and no other substance)" (X. ii. 66); again, he says—"for a month Devadatta is to be fed on clarified butter and oil" (X. vi 5); again, he says—"the oil is used for the purpose of lubricating the food". "Yajnadatta should be fed like Devadatta with oil" (X. vi 22); again, he says—"feed Yajnadatta with oil," "oil is mentioned as of use in the feeding"—"It is to be used in the place of clarified butter, the purpose of which alone can be served by oil, etc." (X. iii. 16). In those days when there was no scarcity of pure clarified butter, even then that he repeatedly mentioned the custom of using oil for food shows that he must have lived in that part where oil was much in use. It is but natural that ingredients of food like rice, fish and oil should go together. Even now we find it so in Bengal and Mithilā.

(14) In one place he says—'there are certain illnesses which appear at fixed intervals, namely, the Terian and the Quartian ague (*Tṛtīyakāshcāturthakāshca*)—(VI. i. 5. Undoubtedly, he must have lived where malerial diseases were quite known.

(15) He refers to a Vedic custom of cooking coarser rice in curds and the finer rice in boiled milk (IX. iv. 41). Now, this is what is exactly the custom in Mithilā where the former preparaton is called '*ghoracāura*', while the latter is known as '*khīra*'.

These are some of the facts referred to by Shabara in his Bhāṣya which may suggest a nearer appoach to his place of residence.

Besides this Bhāṣya, he also wrote a commentary on the *Sankarsa* which is clear from his own words (*vide* his Bhāṣya X. iv. 32; XII. ii. 11).

One more characteristic of his Bhāṣya is that in many places he refers to the worldly customs in order to explain the Vedic injunctions, which shows the importance of the worldly instances even in Pūrva-Mīmāmsā.

The *Shabarabhāṣya* has been edited in full, thrice—1) from the Asiatic Society of Bengal, Calcutta; 2) from Vidyavilasa Press, Benares; and 3) from Poona, in the Anandashrama Sanskrit Series. All the editions are more or less of the same nature. This Bhāṣya has just been for the first time translated into English by Dr. Jha and published in 3 volumes in the Gaekwad's Sanskrit Series. The first Pāda of the first Adhyāya has been also printed from Madras and Chowkhamba, Benares. These are well edited along with the *Bṛhati and the Ṛjuvimalā*. Reference: Jacobi-Journal, American Oriental Society, Vol. XXI.

Bhartṛmitra

Before coming to the great *Vārttikakāra* Kumārila we should know something about Bhartṛmitra whose views have been referred to and refuted

by Kumārila himself. As interpreted by Pārthasārathi Mishra, Bhartṛmitra introduced many *apasiddhāntas* (wrong theories) into the system and thus made it a *Nāstika* system. Pārthasārathi says that Bhartṛmitra taught that there is no fruit—good or bad—accruing from the performance of *nitya* and prohibited acts—which is a wrong view. He wrote a commentary on Mīmāmsā according to Pārthasārathi (*vide* मीमांसायाश्चिरन्तनानि भर्तृमित्रादि-रचितानि व्याख्यानानि विद्यन्ते etc., Nyāyaratnākara, pages 3-4). Again, while discussing the nature of *'shrotra'* (the auditory sense-organ), Kumārila says that 'it is this *Samskāra* (modification) of the auditory sense as the means of apprehending sound, that some *'Panditammanyāh'* (thinking themselves to be learned) hold to be the auditory sense which, according to Pārthasārathi, Kumārila attributes to Bhartṛmitra and others (*vide* Shloka, p. 763). On this very question, Jayanta Bhaṭṭa quotes Bhartṛmitra in his Nyāyamañjarī (p. 213, Vizia. Ed.). Again, he too, like Kumārila, retorts Bhartṛmitra's view in the following words 'यत्तु भर्तृमित्रस्तमेव संस्कारं श्रोत्रेन्द्रियमभ्युपैति तदिदमपूर्वकं किमिपि पाण्डित्यम्' (p. 226). Yāmunācārya in his *Siddhitraya* also refers to one Bhartṛmitra (p. 6). Mukula Bhaṭṭa also refers to one Bhartṛmitra in his *Abhidhāvṛttimātṛkā* (p. 17); and most probably, they refer to one and the same person.

On the basis of these references, we may say that Bhartṛmitra flourished earlier than Kumārila.

One more point we learn about Bhartṛmitra from the *Shlokavārttika* (vide *Citrākṣepaparihāra*, verse 14), as explained by Pārthasārathi, regarding the result accruing from the performance of the *Citrā* sacrifice, that according to him the result accrues in the very life-time of the sacrificer, which, of course, Kumārila does not believe in.

Kumārila Bhaṭṭa

Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, variously known as Kumārila Swāmin or Mishra, Tūtāta Bhaṭṭa, is one of the greatest scholars that India has produced. As a Mīmāmsaka, perhaps, his position is unchallenged. At that time, Buddhism, which has been, since its very inception, a great enemy of the Vedic ritualistic culture, had spread its influence far and wide in the country. The Buddhist University of Nalanda was then in a flourishing condition and there were a large number of Buddhist thikners all over the country. They were attacking Hindu religion, philosophy and culture vehemently; and it was but necessary to refute their views for bringing about the downfall of Buddhism. It was also a fact that instead of all the Royal patronages

due to the various corruptions, Buddhism was on the point of declining. Thus, it was a very opportune moment for Kumārila to take his cudgle against Buddhism and criticise its viewpoints, and which he did so well in his masterly works—*Shlokarārttika* and *Tantrarārttka.* Such was the condition of the country when Kumārila flourished.

There are many stories recorded in the *Shaṅkaradigvijaya* and the Tibetian works regarding the nature of controversies which were carried on between Kumārila and the Buddhist Philosopher, Dharmakīrti. In one place we are told that Dharmakīrti, desirous of knowing the secrets of Hinduism, lived with Kumārila in disguise and having learnt all the secrets from him challenged the Hindu orthodox Phillosophers in open debates, defeated them and converted them to Buddhism. Kumārila also was likewise defeated. Then the tradition says that Kumārila, also in disguise, learnt all the secrets of Buddhism from Buddhist monks and then defeated them in open challenge. Thereby Kumārila committed a great sin against his own *guru* also whom he defeated in debate ; and for the expiation of which he came over to *Prayāga* where he burnt himself alive on the banks of the *Tribeṇī,* the only method of expiation for such a sin. It was here that the great Shankarācārya met him when Kumārila was half-burnt and expressed his desire to bring him (Kumārila) back to life which Kumārila did not like (*vide* शङ्करदिग्विजय, VII).

This was perhaps the reason why Kumārila's knowledge of Buddhist Philosophy was much more profound and accurate than that of the Great Shaṅkarācārya even, which is quite evident from the study of their individual works. Anyhow, the place of Kumārila is unique in Indian thought.

About his native place it is very difficult to say anything definitely. Some hold that he was a native of Southern India. But it is much more probable, so says the tradition, that he was a Brāhmaṇa living in North Bihar—Mithilā, in Northern India ; and from here he went to the South also. It was, therefore, so very easy for him to fight against the Buddhist crusaders who lived on the borders of Mithilā. Anandagiri in his *Shaṅkaravijaya* also says that he came from the North. He uses the word '*Udakadesha*' for the North. In fact, the term which means "Place of Water" is very vague and cannot give the exact information. Mithilā, which is also known as *Tairabhukti* (meaning those who lived or that *desha* which was situated on the banks of the rivers, so says the *Bṛhadviṣṇu Purāna,* Mithilākhaṇḍa, 'सदा भुवनसम्पन्नो नदीतीरेषु संस्थितः। तीरेषु भुक्तियोगेन तैरभुक्तिरिति स्मृतः ॥ 'गंगाहिमवतोर्मध्ये नदीपञ्चदशान्तरे। तैरभुक्तिरिति ख्यातो देशः परमपावनः'),

may also be called rightly *'udakadesha'*, and this being the place of hundreds of Mīmāṁsakas in later centuries and also being quite close to the home of Buddhism, seems to me to be the native place of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa also. This will also be in keeping with his relations with Maṇḍana Mishra who, as both Anandagiri and Mādhavācārya hold, also most probably came from Mithilā.

We learn from the Tibetian sources that Kumārila was a family man and had a large number of rice fields and five hundred male and five hundred female slaves. No more about his personal history is known to us. He had perhaps a son named Jaya Mishra.

Regarding his date, Tārānātha, the Tibetian Lama, in his History of Indian Buddhism, says that Kumārila was a contemporary of the Tibetian king *Srong-tsan-Gampo* who ruled over Tibet in the 7th century. Again, that he had controversy with Dharmakīrti, whose date is about 635 A. D. and after, also lends support to his being in the 7th century. Next, Bhavabhūti, who calls himself Kumārila's pupil, lived in the court of Yashovarman of Kanauj who ruled about 730 A. D. which also suggests that Kumārila lived towards the end of the 7th or the beginning of the 8th century. His reference to the lines of *Vākyapadīya* of Bhartṛhari who died about 650 A. D. shows that he lived sometime after him. From all these it appears that Kumārila, who was a senior contemporary of the Great Shaṅkara, lvied sometime towards the end of the 7th century.

Professor S. Kuppuswami Shastri holds that he lived between 600 and 660 A. D. (*vide* Introduction to the Brahmasiddhi). Dr. Jha makes him a junior contemporary of Prabhākara whose date he thinks to be between 600 and 650 A. D.

He is the reputed author of the *Shlokavārttika*, the *Tantravārittka*, and the *Tupṭīkā*, the well-known three parts of his commentary on Shabara's Bhāṣya. Besides, he is also ascribed to be the author of one *Bṛhaṭṭīkā* and another *Madhyamaṭīkā*. According to Pārthasārathi Mishra, Kumārila himself refers to his *Bṛhaṭṭīkā* in the *Shlokavārttika*, Sūtra 5, *Arthāpattipariccheda*, verse 9 (*vide*, अर्थापत्त्यन्तराणामप्युदाहरणप्रपञ्चः पक्षदोषावसरे 'श्रोत्रादिनास्तितायां' मित्यादिना 'बृहट्टीकायां' दर्शित इत्याह—पक्षदोषेष्विति).

Shlokavārṭṭika is a commentary in verse on the first *Pāda*, generally known as the *Tarkapāda*, of the first chapter of the Shabara-Bhāṣya. So it deals mainly with the Philosophical topics according to Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā. He refutes the Buddhist view particularly on almost all the Philosophical

topics. As his own views have been given in the body of the text itself, under different heads by the author of this very work, Dr. Jha, it is needless for me to repeat them here. I shall, however, refer to some other points, which are not less interesting from the *Shlokavārttika,* below:

1. *Conception of Mokṣa; Mokṣa* is possible through the absence of the cause of bondage, which is brought about by the exhaustion of the past actions (through the experiencing of the results of those acts). It is this negative character (*abhāvātmaka*) which is the cause of the eternality of *Mokṣa:* And ,he says, no negation (*abhāva*) can ever be the effect of any action, hence *Mokṣa* which is of the nature of negation can never be the result of *Jnāna.* Regarding the process of the exhaustion of actions, he says that for those who have realised the true nature of the Self, all their past actions having been exhausted by experience, and there being no subsequent residue of action, there is no more production of any organic body. This is what is required for *Mokṣa* (*vide* Shloka, pp. 670-71, Benares edition).

In this very connection he says that a desirer for *Mokṣa* should not perform *Kāmya* and prohibited actions, but he should perform daily (*nitya*) duties and *Naimittika* actions for the expiation of sins. The performance of these two types of action is meant for the annihilation of the demerits of previous births. Then alone the *upāsanā* regarding the *Atman* will annihilate the previous actions and thus will also help the cause of *Mokṣa* (*ibid*).

2. Regarding the nature of the *Atman,* he says that it is self-illumined. (आत्मनैव प्रकाश्योऽयम्) and that it is manifested by itself (*vide,* Sholka, Atmavāda, Verse 142).

3. *Kāla* (time), he says, is one, eternal and all-pervasive (*ibid*, p. 806).

4. Regarding the existence of a subtler body, called *Ativāhika-sharīra,* Kumārila thinks that the subtle body, endowed with all sorts of subtle forms, suddenly appearing at death to carry the *Jīva* away and disappearing at rebirth, is only an imaginary assumption. So thinks, he says, *Vindhyavāsin,* an old Philosopher (*ibid,* p. 701).

Tantravārttika—This is a commentary on the Shabarabhāṣya, mainly in prose, and runs from *Adhyāya* I, *Pāda* ii to the end of the *Adhyāya* III. This is an unique work which shows the deep scholarship of the author. Here Kumārila has shown his mastery over the other schools of thought as well. Below are given some of the noteworthy facts from this book:

1. He believes in the creation and the dissolution of the universe p. 28, Benares edition).

2. His acquaintance with the non-Indian language is clear from the use of the following words : जर्भरी, तुर्फरी, नैताशन्, पर्फरिका, जेमनौ, मदेरू, मशयु (*ibid*, p. 65). etc.

3. Regarding the nature of *Mīmāṁsā*, he says—it is based upon the Vedas, upon ordinary experiences, and also upon direct Perception and Inference base upon these, and its has been reared up by an unbroken line of sceintific teachers (p. 50).

4. Putting on of the sacred thread is a godly sign (p. 123).

5. He quotes several instances showing the transgression of the rules of the *Dharmashāstra* which were found even in his own days. Thus, he says—

(i) the *Brāhmaṇīs* of *Mathura* and *Ahicchatra* drink wine ;

(ii) the people of the North carry on the business of giving and accepting in gift, buying and selling loins, horses, mules, asses, camels and such other annimals who have got two rows of teeth ;

(iii) the people of the North are also used to eating in the same dish with their wives, children and freinds ;

(iv) the people of the South marry daughters of their maternal-uncles and partake of food while sitting on chairs ;

(v) Besides, among the people of the North as well as of the South, (*a*) partaking of food left by one's friends or relations, (*b*) taking of betels touched by the people of all castes, (*c*) the non-washing of the mouth after meals, (*d*) wearing of clothes brought directly from the back of the washerman's ass, (*e*) and keeping in society of people committing the greatest crimes, with the sole exception of killing a *Brāhmaṇa* were very common (*ibid*, page 183).

6. *Akāsha, Dik, Kāla, Ātman* and *Paramānu* are all eternal, like the Veda (p. 236).

7. He knew the Dravidian language so well that some have gone so far as to say that he was a *Drāviḍa* (*vide* p. 157), which is, of course, not correct. He also finds fault with the use of the term *Āndhra,* as used by Shabara and suggests that it should have been *Draviḍa* (p. 591).

In the *Shlokavārttika*, Kumārila is found to differ from Shabara regarding the nanifestations of sound (p. 786), and in the *Tantravārttika* he says that Shabara has omitted the interpretation of six of the more important Sūtras (pp. 915-16).

Tupṭīkā is the third part of his commentary on the Shabarabhāṣya. It is very brief, and does not give us, like the first two parts, hosts of information or view-points.

Kumārila's writings are all very lucid and his criticisms of the views of the opponents are quite convincing. He has, in both the *Vārttikas*, shown enough originality of thought and interpretation. He has suggested many new lines for explaining the knotty points and has finally thrown aside all the objections of the Buddhist. Indeed, his contributions have been an unique one. We do not know as yet anything about the contents of his other works.

Both the *Vārttikas* have been translated into English for the first time by Dr. Gangaṇatha Jha and have been published in the Bibliotheca Indica Series. The Sanskrit text of the *Shlokavārttika* was first printed in the *Kāshīvidyāsudhānidhi*, a Sanskrit Journal which used to be published from Benares. Then it was published along with the *Nyāyaratnākara* of Pārthasārathi Mishra in the Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, Benares. Then another incomplete edition of it has appeared along with the commentary called, *Kāshikā*, of Sucarita Mishra, in the Trivandrum Sanskrit Series, Trivandrum. Recently, another incomplete edition of it, along with the commentary of Bhaṭṭa Ubmeka, called *Tātparyaṭīkā*, has been published by the University of Madras in its Sanskrit Series. This commentary extends only up to the *Sphoṭavāda*. The *Tantravārttika* has been so far published twice, first in the Benares Sanskrit Series, Benares, and then in the Anandāshrama Sanskrit Series, Poona. Both the editions are defective and it is very necessary to have an editon of this most important work with the help of all the available materials. The *Tupṭīkā* was first published in the Benares Sansrit Series, Benares, and then from Poona.

It will not be out of place to mention that according to a manuscript found in the State Library Alwar, Kumārila, to the sorrow of all learned men, could not complete his *Shlokavārttika* and died. It was, therefore, at the instance of his patron *Shiva*, called *Chatrapati*, son of Shāhajī of the family of Bhosalā, Vishweshwara *alias* Gāgā Bhaṭṭa, son of Dinakara, grandson of Rāmakṛṣṇa, great grandson of Bhaṭṭa Nārāyaṇa, completed it. This work is known as the *Shivārkodaya*.

Of the various commentaries on the *Shlokavārttika*, the earliest is the *Tātparyaṭīkā* by Umbeka Bhaṭṭa. It extends up to the *Sphoṭavāda* only. This has been recently published in the Madras University Sanskrit Series. It is held that Kumārila had a son, named *Jaya Mishra*, who wrote

a commentary on his father's work in continuation of the work left unfinished by Umbeka. The only manuscript of it is with the Madras University which was discovered alongwith that of Maṇḍana Mishra's work (*vide* Introduction to the *Tātparyaṭīkā* by Umbeka, page V). But the most important commentaries on the *Shlokavārttika* are the *Kāshikā* by Sucarita Mishra which has been partly published in the Trivandrum Sanskrit Series and the *Nyāyaratnākara* by Pārthasārathi Mishra. The last has been published in full in the Chowkhabma Sanskrit Series, Benares. This is the only good and complete commentary which is available to us on the *Shlokavārttika.* Although Kumārila had a long list of followers, yet we do not find that more than a few commentaries were written on his works. Either some of them are lost and so we have not got them or there were only a few.

The *Tantravārttika* which is his *magnum opus,* on the other hands, seems to have attracted a larger number of commentators. Thus, we have 1) *Nyāyasudhā,* generally known as the *Rāṇaka,* also called *Sarvopahāriṇī,* by Someshwara Bhaṭṭa, son of Bhaṭṭa Mādhava . It is the most popular commentary on the work. It has been published in the Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, Benares. 2) *Bhāvārtha* by Kamalākara Bhaṭṭa, son of Rāmakṛṣṇa and Umā. This commentary was written in censure of the *Rāṇaka* (*vide* यस्तु राणकचौर्येण स्वपाण्डित्यं प्रकाशयन् । निनिन्द बहुभाषितत्वात् तस्य शिक्षेह तन्यते ।। मूर्खान् प्रतारयद् बालान् यः सिद्धान्तमनीनशत् । विन्यस्य तस्य शिरसि दशार्धं कमलाकरः ।। 3) *Mitākṣarā* by Gopāla Bhaṭṭa. 4) *Ajitā* by Paritoṣa Mishra, a Ms. copy of it is in Dr. Jha's Library. 5) *Subodhanī* by Annaṁ Bhaṭṭa, son of Tirumalācārya of the Rāghava Somayājī family. It is also called *Sudhādhārā* and *Rāṇakojjīvanī.* 6) *Nyāyapārāyṇa* by Gaṅgādhara Mishra. 7) Pārthasārathi Mishra also is said to have written a commentary on it which has been referred to by Kṛṣṇadeva in his *Tantracūḍāmaṇi.* But it appears that it is the same as his *Mīmāṁsānyāyaratnamālā,* and in that case, it cannot be called a commentary on the *Tantravārttika.* But it is just possible that the name of his commentary on the *Tantravārttika* may be also the same ; and if it is so, then it is a separate work. One Rāmānujācārya, quite different from the author of the *Shrībhāṣya* on the Brahmasūtra, has written a commentary on this commentary of Pārthasārathi, which is called *Nāyakaratna* or *Nyāyaratna.* 8) The author of the *Shāstradīpikā* tells us that Maṇḍana Mishra also wrote a commentary on the *Tantravārttika* (*vide* विवृतं चैतन्यमण्डनेन, etc., II. i. 1, p. 101, Nirṇayasāgara Press, Bombay Edition.) 9) Bhavadeva Bhaṭṭa also wrote a commentary on it.

Though the *Tupṭīkā* is not so important, yet it has attracted great scholars to write commentaries on it. The most important of which is the *Tantraratna* by Pārthasārathi Mishra. This is a very eleborate commentary. It has been partly published in the Saraswatibhavana Sanskrit Text Series, Benares. The other one known so far is the *Vārtikābharaṇa* Veṅkaṭesha of the 17th century. It seems that the *Tupṭīkā* is also called *Laghuvārttika*. The other commentary on this *Laughuvārttika* is the *Laghunyāyasudhā*, by Uttamashlokatīrtha.

Kumārila became so famous for his scheoarship that he founded a school of his own with a large number of followers.

PARBHĀKARA MISHRA

The more important, intelligent and independent interpreter of the Shabarabhāṣya is Prabhākara Mishra. He is generaly calleed '*Guru*'. He was, according to the ancient tradition, the pupil of Kumārila and many stories are current about his relation with Kumārila amongst the scholars (*vide* Text, pp. 15-16). There has been much controversy regarding this question in our own days. Sir Ganganatha Jha thinks that Prabhākara was senior to Kumārila and the two were perhaps contemporaries. The reasons are : 1) Prabhākara's commentary called *Bṛhatī* is a comment on the Shabarabhāṣya in the strictest sense of the term. He has therein simply explained the Bhāṣya, and has nowhere criticised it ; nor has he tried to criticise others' views mostly, while Kumārila has criticised Shabara in several places and has given his own original interpretation of several of the Sūtras. It is felt that had Prabhākara written after Kumārila, he would have said something either in support of or against Kumārila's views. While Kumārila, on the other hand, is found to have refuted some of the views found in the *Bṛhatī*. 2) In point of style also Prabhākara shows distinct signs of his being older than Kumārilā. The style of *Bṛhatī* resembles that of Shabara in its natural grace, simplicity and directness (*vide* Text, pp. 15—20). But there are other scholars, such as Mm. Pt. Kuppuswāmī Shāstri of Madras, who think that Prabhākara is a younger contemporary of Kumārila (*vide* Proceeding of the Third Oriental Conference, 1924), and so Pt. Shāstri has placed him between 610 and 690, while he has placed Kumārila between 600 and 660 (*vide* Introduction the *Brahmasiddhi*, p. lviii). Dr. Jha is quite in agreement with Prof. Keith's view and has placed Prabhākara betwween 600 and 650. We do not know practically anything about his personal hisotry . Pt. Pashupatinātha Shāstri agrees with Dr. Jha's view.

Prabhākara also, like his contemporary Kumārila, wrote a very faithful commentary on the Shabarabhāṣya, which is known as the *Bṛhatī*. He became very famous and founded a school of his own in the system. His school came to be recognised as the *Pracbhākara School* or the *Guru School*. Both these two Mīmāṁsakas—*Bhaṭṭa* and *Guru*—became so very prominent that they eclipsed the name and fame even of the great Jamini and Shabara. In fact, these two became the founders of the two different schools of Pūrva-mīmāṁsā in much more systematized form. Almost the entire later Mīmāṁsā literature came to be based on these two authors. Even those who coming after them wrote direct commentaries on the Jaiminīyasūtras belonged to either of these two schools. Practically, the entire system of Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā—became monopolised by these two schools; and henceforth, the system became for a few centuries split up into two—one as the *Bhāṭṭa School* and the other as the *Prabhākara School*, to which the *third school* was added by *Murāri Mishra II*, whose views are known as the *Mishramata*, in the 15th century.

Prabhākara wrote, it appears, two commentaries on the Shabarabhāṣya—one is called *Vivaraṇa*, also known as the *Laghvī*, while the other is called *Bṛhatī*, which is also known as the *Nibandhana* (*vide* Journal of Oriental Research, Madras, 1929, pp. 281—91). According to the *Sarvadarshanakaumudi* by Mādhava Saraswatī (Ms. fol. 122), the *Vivaraṇa* consists of only 6000 *shlokas*, wnile the *Nibandhana* consists of 12000 *shlokas*. Upon both these works, Shālikanātha Mishra has written his commentaries, which are named the *Ṛjuvimalā* and the *Dīpashikhā* respectively. Of these two, the *Bṛhalī* is found up to the middle of Adhyāya VI only. The *Tarkapāda* section of it has been published from Madras and Banares along with the *Ṛjuvimalā-Pañcikā*.

In the main body of the present text, Dr. Jha has given us the comparative views of both these two schools on almost on all the topics and it is needless to dwell upon the same again here. So I will only refer to some such points which have been noted by me in course of my studies and perhaps not included in the body of the text. They are:

1. They believe in the determinate knowledge also (*Bṛhatī*, p. 53, Madras Ed.)

2. *Sādṛshya*—resemblance—is a distinct category (*ibid*, p. 107).

3. Inference and Analogy have been recognised as distinct means of cognition (*ibid*,. pp. 107-108).

4. Negation is not a distinct *Pramāṇa* (*ibid*, p. 118).

5. He believes in the theory of the *Satkāra*: for, according to him only *Laukikas*, that is, the *Tārkikas*, believe in the distinctive nature of cause and effect (*ibid.*, p. 83).

6. Cognition is self-valid. It does not require another means of cognition to support its validity (*ibid*, p. 84).

7. Motion is, according to Prabhākara, an object of Inference (अदृष्टस्वलक्षविषयमनुमानमस्ति क्रियादिषु, p. 98), so he differs from the Vaisheṣika according to whom it is cognizable through direct perception (*vide*—संख्या: परिमाणानि...कर्म च...चाक्षुषाणि. Vai. Sū. IV. i. ii).

8. *Ākṛti* is a category and it depends upon the usage of an old man carried on through the methods of Agreement and Difference (अन्वय-व्यतिरेकगम्य इति) which requires the help of *Pratyabhijñā* (*ibid*, pp. 328-29).

References; 1) Prabhākara, JRAS, Bengal, Vol. IV, New Series. 2) Kumārila, JRAS, Bombay Branch, 1903, New Series. 3) Mm. Pt. Gopīnātha Kavirāj's Introduction to the English Translation of the Tantravārttika by Dr. Jha. 4) Pt. Rāmaswāmī Shāstrī's Introduction to the *Tattvabindu* 5) Works of Prabhākara by Dr. T. R. Chintamani, JOR, Madras, 1929. 6) Prābhākaras—Old and New, by Mr. Hiriyanna, JOR, Madras, 1931.

Maṇḍana Mishra

Tradition, as current amongst the Sanskirtists, makes *Maṇḍana Mishra* a very great scholar of Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā. According to the *Shaṅkaradigvijaya*, he had his *Shāstrārtha* with the great Shaṅkara who defeated the former and converted him to his own faith, and renamed him *sureshwarācārya*, the famous author of the *Vārttikās*. But this identity is still regarded as doubtful by many eminent scholars of the country. Even Dr. Jha himself is doubtful about this equation. But the difficulty to reject the tradition is that there is no definite proof against it. Thus, according to the tradtion he was a Maithila Brāhmaṇa who lived at *Māhiṣmatī* (the present Mahiṣī in the district of Bhāgalpur), It is believed that at the time of his controversy wih Shaṅkara he was fairly old, while Shaṅkara was only a youth. According to Ānandagiri, he was the husband of Kumārila's sister; while, according to another tradition, he was a disciple of Kumārila. It appears from all these that he was a contemporary of both Kumārila and Shaṅkara. Mm. Pt. S. Kuppuswami Shastri has fixed his date between 615 and 695 A.D. Paṇḍita P. V. Kane, however, who does not believe in the Sureshwara and Maṇḍana equation, has placed him

between 690 and 710 (*vide* his History of the Dharmashastra, Vol. I,. pp. 252—64).

Anyway, it is a fact that Maṇḍana Mishra was a very great Mīmāṁsaka of the Bhāṭṭa School. He was also recognised as a profound scholar of the Advaita school of Vedānta. The wellknown work of his is the *Brahmasiddhi* which has been recently published from Madras. Amongst his contemporaries and, also later on, he had very great influence.

His works on Mīmāṁsā are: 1) *Vidhivireka* where he discusses the import of the *vidhi-liṅ*. Here he refutes the standpoint of both *Bhaṭṭa* and *Guru*. It has been printed along with a commentary of vācaspati Mishra I, called *Nyāyakaṇikā*, from Banaras. 2) *Bhāvanāviveka*. Here the author discusses the topic of *Bhāvanā* which is so very important in Mīmāṁsā. This has been commented upon by Umbeka. Both the text and Umbeka's commentary have been edited by Dr. Jha in the Saraswatibhavana Sanskrit Series, Banaras. Regarding this Umbeka, the entire truth is still shrouded in mystery. I 'would simply refer to be very fine note on him by Dr. Jha in the introduction to the *Bhāvamāviveka*. It has also been commented upon by Bhaṭṭa Nārāyaṇa. 3) *Vibhramaviveka*, which deals with the five types of *Khyātis*, has been edited by Mm. S. Kuppuswami Shastri in the Journal of the Oriental Research, Madras. 4) *Mīmāṁsānukramaṇikā*. It is in verse written *Adhikaraṇa*-wise. This is a very useful book for recapitulating all the topics of the *Adhikaraṇas* of Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā Its utility has been enhanced by the addition of an easy and elucidative running commentary called, *Mīmāmsamaṇḍana*, by Dr. Jha. It has been published in the Chowkhabma Sanskrit Series, Benares. 5) *Sphotasiddhi*. It has been written, it seems, in defence of the theory of *Sphoṭa* against the *Varṇavādins*. Here the author even criticises the views of his own *guru*—Kumārila. As a *Vedantin*, Maṇḍaṇa is the author of 6) *Brahmasiddhi*. Upon this, vācaspati I wrote his *Brahmatattvasamīkṣā* which is perhaps lost for ever. The *Brahmasiddhi* has been very recently published from Madras with a very elaborate Introduction by Mm. S. Kuppuswami Shastri. 7) *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi* which has been well edited by Prof. Hiriyanna in the Bombay Sanskrit Series. 8) The most important works are his two *Vārttikas* on the Bhāṣya of Shaṅkarācārya on the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* and the *Taittirīya Upanisads*.

Almost all the works of Maṇḍana are quite stiff and it becomes difficult to follow him easily. Fortunately, we have got fine comments on almost all his works.

References ; i) Introductions to his published works, specially to the *Brahmasiddhi,* and ii) Introduction to Umebeka's commentary.

UMBEKA

Umbeka was a great Mīmāṁsaka. He has been identified with Maṇḍana Mishra by Vidyāraṇya in his *Shaṅkaradigvijaya* (VII 111—117) where it is said that Umbeka was the popular name of Maṇḍana (अयञ्च पन्था यदि ते प्रकाश्यः सुधीश्वरो मण्डनमिश्रशर्म्मा। दिगन्तविश्रान्तयशो विजेयो यस्मिन् जिते सर्वमिदं जितं स्यात् ॥...उम्बेक इत्यभिहितस्य हितस्य लौकेरुम्बोत बान्धवजनैरभिधीयमानः, etc.). Again, in support of this we have the statement of Pratyagrūpa Bhagvat 'भवभूतिरुम्बेकः' (*vide* his commentary on the Citsukhī, p. 265, Nirṇayasāgara Press, Bombay Edition); and lastly, we have the famous verse—ये नाम केचिदिह, etc., of Bhavabhūti in place of the *Mangalācaraṇa* in this commentary on the *Shlokavārttika.* But against this there are strong arguments to disprove the equation. Thus—i) we cannot always rely upon the *shaṅkaradigvijaya :* ii) Citsukhācārya in the same breath refers to both *Bhavabhūti* and *Umbeka* (न हि पुराप्त एव सन्नाटकनाटिकादिप्रबन्धविरचन मात्रेणानाप्तो भवति भवभूतिः, उक्तं चैतदुम्बेकेन, etc., p. 265) which shows that Citsukha knew them to be two different persons ; iii) Umbeka has commented upon the *Bhāvanāviveka* of Maṇḍana Mishra. In this commentary in several places Umbeka notes differences in readings (*vide* pp. 17, 28, 63, 77, 81, 82), and in three cases, at least, he prefers only one of the readings and rejects the other (*vide* pp. 28—स साधुरेव; 77—इति तु समीचीनः पाठः; 82—स शोभन एव). Now, had Umbeka been the same as Maṇḍana, the author of the text, then there was no ground for any such references to and preferences in the readings ; iv) Regarding the so-called *Maṅgala* verse, it is enough to say that there is no point in having that verse in any form in the beginning of his Commentary. Some one by mistake might have put it there, and which the later scribes or editors have preserved. Hence, it is needless to try to establish any equation between these two writers. Similarly, the view that he had relations with Kumārila or Prabhākara cannot be supported on any sound reasoning.

Umbeka wrote a commentary, called *Tātparyaṭīkā*, on the *Shlokavārttika* extending up to the *Sphotavāda.* It is generally brief and quite elucidative. It refers to सांक्यनायक-माधव (p. 112), वृत्तिकार and उपवर्ष (p. 123), विशाखिल (p. 179), भर्त्रीश्वरादयः (p. 38), वैद्याचार्य (p. 39) and दिङ्नाग, etc. He denies सत्कार्यवाद (p. 48), कारणगुणप्रक्रमेण कार्ये गुणारम्भः (p. 49), प्रामाण्यं नाम परिच्छेदोत्पादिका शक्तिः (p. 49), बोधकत्वं नाम प्रामाण्यं (p. 50), बोधात्मकत्वमात्रं प्रामाण्यं

(p. 50), श्रोत्रवृत्तिरेव शब्दं समीपं गच्छति (p. 130), etc. It has been published in the Madras University Sanskrit Series. Its Introduction is quite good. His another work is a commentary on the *Bhāvanāviveka* of Maṇḍana. It has been published in the Princess of Wales Saraswatibhavana Texts Series. It is a good commentary and explains the terse language of Maṇḍana very well. In this, several Kārikās from *Bhaṭṭ-pāda* are quoted. In one place he says that *Ākāsha* is not imperceivable and that it is perceived has been already made clear before (न त्वप्रत्यक्षत्वं नभः, तत्प्रत्यक्षत्वस्य प्रागेव प्रतिपादितत्वात्—p. 85). Again, he says that *Ākāsha* is the substrate (p. 27).

SHĀLIKANĀTHA MISHRA

Shālikanātha Mishra is generally believerd to be the direct disciple of Prabhākara. The only reason advanced in support of this is that he, in several places, says—'प्रभाकरगुरोः'. But the reason is not at all convincing; for had he been a direct pupil he would have named his *guru* quite in a diffirent way. He must have added to Prabhākara's name some word showing due reverence to his *guru*; while here in the benedictory verse of the *Ṛjuvimalā*, he only says—"नमस्यामः प्रभाकरम्". So the relation that they want to establish is not free from doubts. According to Pandit Ramaswami Shastri and Mm. S. Kuppuswami Shastri, Vācaspati Mishra I quotes from the *Ṛjuvimalā-Pañcikā* (*vide* Introduction to the Tattvabindu, p. 48) of Shālikanātha Mishra. It being so, we can easily place him before the 9th century; and hence, he cannot be a contemporary of Udayanācārya as Mm. Pandit Gopinatha Kaviraj thinks (*vide* Saraswatibhavana Studies, Vol. VI, pp. 167-68). Shālikanātha himself quotes two verses from the *Vidhiviveka* (pp. 243, 302) in his *Prakaraṇapañcikā* (p. 178). So, he must have lived after Maṇḍana and before Vācaspati Mishra I No more about him we know. Again, if the term *Gauḍamīmāṁsaka* (*vide* Udayanācārya's *Kusumāñjaliprakaraṇa*, p. 466, Biblio. Ed.) really refers to Shālikanātha as the author of the *Pañcikā*, as interpreted by Varadarāja Mishra, in his *Bodhanī* on the Kusumāñjali (p. 123), then we can say that he belonged to the province of *Gauḍa* which at that time extended even beyond Bengal.

He is the author of the two commentaries on the commentaries of Prabhākara, namely, *Dīpashikhā* on the *Laghvī* and the *Ṛjuvimalā-pañcikā* on the *Bṛhatī*. He himself makes a reference to these two commentaries, which he names the *Pañcikādvaya*, in his third work, the *Prakaraṇapañcikā* (p. 46). All his commentaries are called *Pañcikā*, which led people to call him as the *Pañcikākāra*. Of these three *Pañcikās*, the *Ṛjuvimalā-Pañcikā*

has been partly printed along with the *Bṛhatī* from Madras and Banaras. The *Prakaraṇa-Pañcikā* has been published long ago from Banaras; while the *Dīpashikhā* is still unpublished. *Prakaraṇa-Pañcikā* is a very important work on the Prabhākara School. It gives us the views of the school on almost every topic. In fact, it is indispensable for the comprehensive study of the Prabhākara school. Its language is simple and lucid. Simplicity and lucidity are really the most important characteristics of Shālikanātha's writings. A commentary on the *Prakaraṇa-Pañcikā* was partly published by the late Pandit Kiñjawadekara of Poona. But for his *Ṛjuvimalā*, the *Bṛhatī* would have remained mostly unintelligible. There is another work, called *Mīmāṁsābhāṣyaparishiṣṭa*, which is also attributed to Shālikanātha Mishra (*vide* Introduction to the Tattvabindu).

VĀCASPATI MISHRA I

The renowned author of the *Bhāmatī* on the *Shaṅkarabhāṣya* on the *Brahmasūtra* was also a great Mīmāṁsaka. He was a versatile scholar and wrote commentaries on almost every school of thought. Paṇḍitas are also of opinion that he wrote on the six non-orthodox schools also. About his personal history we have simply to depend upon the traditions current amongst the Paṇḍitas who hold that he was an inhabitant of Mithilā. *Trilocana* was his *guru*. A king named *Nṛga* was his patron (*vide* the end of the Bhāmatī). This king, they say, ruled over Mithilā before the *Kārnāṭaka* king *Nānyadeva*, about 1019 A.D. He had no issue and in order to perpetuate the memory of his wife, he named his commentary after her name—*Bhāmatī* *Ratnakīrti*, a Buddhist logician, author of the *Apohasiddhi* and the *Kṣaṇabhaṅga-siddhi*—small treatises, refers to Trilocana's views (*vide* Six Buddhist Nyāya Tracts, pp.13 and 58 and 70 respectively). He also refers to Vācaspati (*vide* Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi, p. 58). Now, according to Mm. Haraprasada Shāstrī, Ratnakīrti lived before 983 A.D. So both Trilocana and Vācaspati must have lived long before 983 A.D. Vācaspati himself, in his *Nyāyasūcīnibandha*, says that this work was composed in 898, that is, 841 A.D.

His well-known work on Mīmāṁsā is his commentary on the *Vidhiviveka*, called *Nyāyakaṇikā*, which was wrongly taken to be a Nyāya work by the late Mm. Dr. Satishcandra Vidyābhūṣaṇa. Although Vācaspati mostly wrote commentaries, except the *Tattvabindu*, yet he has shown ample originality in almost every commentary. He has given us his own independent views on almost all the systems. So, he is generally called सर्वतन्त्रस्वतन्त्र and also द्वादशदर्शनटीकाकार.

He discusses in the *Nyāyakaṇikā* many important philosophical topics, such as, the *Satkāryavāda* where he gives about seven reasons in support of it, the *Asatkāryavāda*, the *Khyātis*, validity of dream cognition, *Tamas* as a substance, and several Buddhist topics. According to him, Maṇḍana Mishra refers to the views of the old followers of Prābhākara in several places [जरत्प्राभाकरमतमुपन्यस्यति (p. 109), जरत्प्राभाकरोन्नीतार्थं गुरोर्वचः (p. 96)], which indicates that Prabhākara must have lived long before Maṇḍana, and consequently, before Kumārila also, if his relations with Maṇḍana be accepted as valid. In the *Tattvabindu*, which is an independent work of his, he mainly discusses the processes of the *Shābdabodha* according to various schools and he himself closely follows the view-point of the Bhāṭṭa school. It is needless to mention that he is equally authoritative in almost every system of thought.

Nyāyakaṇikā has been commented upon by Parameshwara (*vide* Mss. Cat. No. 10606, Oriental Library, Govt. of Madras). Both of his works have been published.

Devaswāmī and Sucarita Mishra

We do not know more about Devaswāmī. That he wrote a commentary on the *Shabarabhāṣya* is known to us from the *Prapañcahṛdaya*. He is also believed to have written on the *Saṅkarṣakāṇḍa*. There is a manuscript of it even with Dr. Jha, but we are not yet sure that the text of the *Saṅkarṣakāṇḍa* is quite genuine. As the *Prapañcahṛdaya* is believed to be a work of the 11th century, it may be easily said that Devaswāmī must have lived before the eleventh century.

Sucarita Mishra is another important Mīmāṁsaka. He is known to us as the famous writer of the commentary, called *Kāshikā*, on the *Shlokavārttika*. In certain aspects it is more elucidative than the *Nyāyaratnākara* of Pārthasārathi Mishra. Rāmakṛṣṇa Bhaṭṭa, the author of a commentary on the *Shāstradīpikā* pp 30, 47), Pratyagrūpa Bhagavān (1400), Vedānta Deshikācārya (13th century) refer to Sucarita Mishra and his work. A manuscript of this *Kāshikā* belonging to the Saraswatibhavana Library, Banaras, is dated *Saṁvat* 1507, that is, 1450 A.D. So he may be placed sometime in the beginning of the 12th century. A portion of this commentary has been published in the Trivandrum Sanskrit Series. He is believed to have flourished in Mithilā.

Ramakṛṣṇa in his *Siddhāntacandrikā* says 'वार्त्तिकानुसारेण विधिस्वरूपं निरूपितं सुचरितमिश्रैः' (pp. 47, 48). Does this indicate that Sucarita Mishra

wrote separately a treatise, named विधिविचार from Kumāṛila's point of view ?

PĀRTHASĀRATHI MISHRA

Pārthasārathi Mishra was perhaps the most important writer on Mīmāṁsā after Kumārila and Prabhākara. Just as Shālikanātha Mishra was a devoted follower of Prabhākara and elucidated the latter's views in his works, so Pārthasārathi Mishra was devoted to Kumārila and explained the entire Shāstra according to Kumārila in his works. Although Pārthasārathi is devoted to Kumārila mainly, yet he was equally well versed in both the schools [*vide* अविभक्तविभक्तमार्गयोर्मतयोर्भट्टगुरूपदिष्टयोः । (उभयोरपि पार्थसारथिः प्रथितोथाता था (?)मतेऽभियोगवान्—नायकरत्न Ms. on न्यायरत्नमाला)]. He was most likely a native of Mithilā. He tells us at the end of his *Nyāyaratnamālā* that he learnt the Shāstra from his father *Yajñātman* who was a great scholar (भुवनत्रयविख्यातश्रीमद्यज्ञात्मनन्दनः । तत एव श्रुतं प्राप्य विश्रुतः पार्थसारथिः—p. 212). Nothing more is known to us about his personal history.

As I have already said in my Introduction to the *Mīmāṁsā-shāstra-sarvasva* of Halāyudha that there are two kinds of commentaries on the Jaiminīyasūtras : 1). The first type of commentary, however brief it may be, is a running commentary on almost each and every Sūtra. It is represented by the commentaries of Shabara, Prabhākara and Kumārila and others 2) The second type of commentary is that which runs only on the main Sūtra of each and every section (*Adhikaraṇa*), and, by the way, gives the substance of other Sūtras included under that section. This kind of commentary is more popular. Perhaps the earliest commentary of this type is that of Pārthasārathi Mishra, namely, *Shāstradīpikā.* This is a very important work on Mīmāṁsā on the lines of Kumārila. There is hardly any other work of its merit on this system.

He has been referred to by Pratyagrūpa Bhagavan (1400) in his commentary on the *Citsukhī*, by Mādhavācārya in his *Nyāyamālāvistara* and *vivaraṇaprameyasangraha*, and by Cidānanda Paṇḍita of the 13th century. Besides, I have shown in my Introduction to the *Mīmāmsāshāstrasarvasva* of Halāyudha (pp. 30-31) that the latter has quoted freely from the *Nyāyaratnākara* and *Shāstradīpikā* of Pārthasārathi ; and as Halāyudha was the *Raja-Paṇḍita* of king Lakṣmaṇasena of Bengal who ruled over it from 1170 to *circa* 1200 A.D., Pārthasārathi Mishra must have lived long before Halāyudha and can easily be placed in the 10th century A. D. (*ibid.*, p. 31). Dr. Surendranatha Dasgupta has placed Pārthasārathi in the 9th ; while

Mm. Pandit G. N. Kavirājajī has placed him in the 13th. But to me their conclusions do not seem to be final.

He has written several standard works. They are mentioned here in the same order in which they were written: 1) *Nyāyaratnamalā.* This is an independent treatise on certain important topics of Mīmāṁsā. The first chapter deals with the *adhyayanavidhi* in 43 verses with a very lucid and elaborate explanatory prose comments of his own on each verse. The second chapter deals with the *Svataḥprāmāṇyanirṇaya.* I do not think there is any other standard book where this topic has been so well discussed. He has carefully examined almost all the then existing views on the topic and has given his own *Siddhānta.* In fact, he has removed all possible misunderstandings against the theory of the self-validity of knowledge; so he himself says 'व्याख्याविवादसञ्जातमोहव्यावृत्तये कृतः'. The third chapter is on *Vidhinirṇaya.* Here he quotes from Maṇḍana Mishra in support of his own statements. The fourth deals ith the theory of *Vyāpti.* He discusses the views of almost all other schools and then establishes his own *Siddhānta* that it is the *Niyama* which establishes the relation between the *Liṅga* and the *Liṅgin.* The fifth chapter discusses the import of proposition. The sixth deals with the difference between *Nitya* and *Kāmya* actions. Then in the remaining five chapters he discusses the various aspects of *Aṅgatva* (auxiliary nature of the acts). The book is well written and the author is very humorous throughout. He is very bold in his assertions.

There are a few points from this book worthy of being noted here: 1) He believes that a substance is porous and that the chemical action takes place in the composite (*Piṭharapāka*), which is clear from the following 'काष्ठेभ्यस्तैजसाः परमाणवः समुद्गताः स्थाल्युदरमनुप्रविशन्तस्तण्डुलान् विक्लेदयन्ति' (p. 144). 2) *Manas* cannot come in contact with things outside the organism (p. 59). 3) He believes in four kinds of contact संयोग, संयुक्तसमवाय, संयुक्तसमवेतसमवाय, and समवाय. Again, the contact is either due to *Karman* or another contact. He also believes in the *ajasaṁyoga* (eternal contact).

He mentions in this book Maṇḍana Mishra and quotes from his *Vidhiviveka*, *Tikākārapādāḥ*, *Vivaraṇakāra* and *Nibandhakāra* (p. 148); and from his writing it is clear that the *Vivaraṇakāra* is different from the *Nibandhakāra* (p. 148). Rāmānujācārya, the author of the *Tantrarahasya* of the 18th century, has written a commentary, named *Nāyakaratna*, on it.

2) The second work of his is the *Tantraratna* which has been partly edited by Dr. Jha and myself for the Saraswatibhavana Sanskrit Text Series,

Banaras. This is although a commentary on the *Tupṭīkā* of Kumārila, yet in fact, it explains mostly the lines of *Shabarabhāṣya* in its, as has been made clear in the foot-notes given by me in the first Part. It is very lucid and elaborate in its exposition and a study of it is essential for every student of Mīmāṁsā as Dr. Jha tells us in his brief Prefatory Note. As the author himself says—इति न्यायमालायां दर्शितम्' (vide *Tantraratna*, Pt. I, p. 9), it must have been written after the *Nyāyaratnamālā*. So it cannot be the earliest production of the author as Pandit Ramaswami Shastri says (*vide* his Introduction to the *Tattvabindu*, p. 61).

3) His next and the most important work is the *Shāstradīpikā*. It is a commentary on the *Jaiminīyasūtras adhikaraṇa*-wise. It is the first work known to us which elucidates the views of Kumārila on Mīmāṁsā. The treatment of the subject has been made easier by separating the five well-known constituents of an *adhikaraṇa* (विषयः संशयश्चैव पूर्वपक्षस्तथोत्तरम् । निर्णयश्चेति पञ्चाङ्गं शास्त्रेऽधिकरणं विदुः). He gives us the substance of the entire *adhikaraṇa* in a few verses in the beginning of each *adhikaraṇa* and then elucidates the same in very easy prose. His style and language both are marked with simplicity and humour. In a way, it has surpassed the importance of the previous works on the *Shāstra* and has become a model work for the later writers. Its importance can easily be imagined from the fact that it has attracted a large number of scholars of name and fame to write commentaries on it. It is so very comprehensive that by studying this single book one can perfectly understand all that the school of Kumārila has contributed to the *Shāstra*. He has criticised the views of Prabhākara from time to time. He discusses very clearly the views of other schools of thought before giving his own *Siddhānta*.

He refers to Maṇḍana Mishra, his own *Nyāyaratnamālā* and *Tantraratna*, Shaṅkarabhāṣya on the Brahmasūtra and the *Bhagavadrāmāyaṇa* (p. 87, Nirṇayasāgara, Bombay Edition).

The following are some of the more noteworthy views of his :

i) The four external sense-organs, namely, *ghrāṇa*, *rasanā*, *cakṣus* and *tvak* are products of the ultimate particles of earth, water, *tejas* and *vāyu* respectively. The auditory-organ, however, is the *Dik*.

ii) *Manas*, which is either of the nature of one of the *bhūtas* or something different from these, is not self-dependent in cognising the external objects (*vide* मनस्तु पृथिव्यादीनामेवान्यतमात्मकं तेभ्योऽन्यद्वा—*ibid.*, p. 36). Its function, in cases of memory, is due to *Saṁskāra* (disposition). It is, however

Svatantra (free) only in relation to the qualities of the individual-self (*ibid.*, p. 36).

iii) He believes both in the determinate and indeterminate knowledge (*ibid.*, p. 40).

iv) He says that according to the Mīmāṁsakas a syllogism consists of three factors alone—either the first three or the last three factors of the Nyāya-syllogism (*ibid.*, p . 64).

v) Cognition is inferential (*ibid.*, pp. 56-57).

vi) *Shabda* is divided into *Pauruṣeya* which is called the *Āptavākya*, and *Apauruṣeya* which is the *Vedavākya* Both, being free from the defects of being spoken of by an unreliable authority, are valid—self-valid (*ibid.*, p. 72).

vii) As against the view of the Naiyāyikas, he believes that *Saṁyoga*, existing between any two objects, is not one but two (*ibid.*, p. 103).

viii) *Shakti* is a separate category. It has *Ātman* as its substrate in the case of sacrifices (*ibid.*, p. 80).

ix) Between a *Jāti* (universal) and a *Vyakti* (individual) there is the relation of difference-*cum*-identity (cf. भिन्नाभिन्नत्वमेव युक्तम् *ibid*, p. 100). So is the case with a composite (*avayavī*) and its constituents also. Thus, a composite represents only a different state of the constituents and is not different from the latter (cf. वयं तु भिन्नाभिन्न त्वम्...उभयात्मकत्वम् । तस्मादवयवानामेवावस्थान्तरमधयवी न द्रव्यान्तरम्—*ibid.*, p. 106). The constituents, however, due to their peculiar combination, appear before us as *one* composite, and so a particular object thus produced is *one*, but with reference to its constituents it is also *many* (*ibid.*, p. 107).

x) The view that the qualities present in a cause produce the qualities in the effect, as held by the Nyāya-Vaisheṣika, is not recognise by Pārthasārathi Mishra ; for, he holds that the quality present in the effect is not at all different from the same quality present in its cause. For instance, it is the very colour of the threads which appears as the colour of the cloth and so there is no causal relation between these (*ibid.*, p. 107).

xi) He does not believe in the variagate-colour (*citrarūpa*) as a distinct form of colour (*ibid.*).

xii) The *Prapañca* (world) is not merely illusory (*ibid.*, p. 110).

xiii) The *Ātman* is not self-luminous (*svaprakāsha*) ; for, if it were so, then the self-luminosity would have been manifest even in the state of sound sleep (*suṣupti*), which is not the fact (*ibid.*, p. 124).

xiv) *Mokṣa* has been defined as the destruction of the contact of the *Ātman* with the *Prapañca* existing in the form of a physical organism, sense-organs and objects of *bhoga*. It is said to be free from any relation or contact with anything and also it is without bliss (cf. निस्सम्बन्धो निरानन्दश्च मोक्षः—*ibid.*, pp. 128-29). As there is the destruction of pain in it, it is also regarded as a *Puruṣārtha* (*ibid.*).

xv) During the state of final emancipation the *Ātman* is not associated with the *Manas* (cf. मुक्तस्य मनसोऽभावात्—अमनस्कत्वश्रुतेः—*ibid.*, p. 130).

xvi) *Kāla* (Time) is not cognised by any of the external sense-organs independently, but only as an attribute of the sense-objects organs (*ibid.*, p. 139).

It has been commented upon by several standard authors ; for instance, 1) Somanātha, whose commentary is called *Mayūkhamālikā :* 2) Appayya Dīkṣita, whose commentary is named *Mayūkhāvalī* ; 3) Rājacūḍāmaṇi Dīkṣita, whose commentary is called *Karpuravarttikā :* 4) Dinakara Bhaṭṭa ; 5) Yajñanārāyaṇa, whose commentary is named *Prabhāmaṇḍala :* 6) Anubhavānanda Yatī of the 17th century, whose commentary also is named *Prabhāmaṇḍala :* 7) Campakanātha, whose commentary is called *Prakāsha :* 8) Vaidyanātha Bhaṭṭa, whose commentaty is named *Prabhā :* 9) Rām-akṛṣṇa, whose commentary is known as *Siddhāntacandrikā*, also called *Yuktisnehaprapūraṇī* and *Gūḍhārthavivaraṇa*, on the *Tarkapāda* only ; 10) Shaṅkara Bhaṭṭa, son of Nārāyaṇa, whose commentary also is named *Prakāsha :* 11) Kamalākara Bhaṭṭa, whose commentary is called *Āloka :* 12) Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa, father of Shaṅkara Bhaṭṭa, the author of the *Prakāsha :* 13) Bhīmācārya ; 14) and Sudarshanācārya, whose commentary extending only up to the end of the *Tarkapāda* is called *Prakāsha.* Of these, the commentary of Rāmakṛṣṇa appears to be the earliset, as he himself says in the beginning verses of his commentary that no one had written any commentary on it before him (*vide* न शास्त्रदीपिकाटीका कृता केनापि सूरिणा। तदपूर्वध्वसञ्चारी नोपहास्यः स्खलन्नपि), This commentary is indeed very the lucid, elaborate and informative. The *Mayukhamālikā* and *Siddhānta-candrikā* along with the *Gūḍhārthavivaraṇa* have been published from the Nirṇayasāgara Press, Bombay. There have been several editions of this work. The first and complete edition of it was published by E. J. Lazarus and Co., Banaras. This contains only the text. It was edited by the late Mm. Paṇḍita Rāma Mishra Shāstrī, Professor, Government Sanskrit College, Banaras. He has given a very good introduction and very brief ofot-notes here and there. Then came the best edition along with the two

commentaries from the Nirṇayasāgara Press, Bombay. Then there is the edition of Paṇḍita Sudarshanācārya along with his own commentary called *Prakāsha* extending up to the end of the *Tarkapāda*. In this edition the author has given a few points of similarity and dissimilarity between the schools of Kumārila and Prabhākara. Another edition of the *Tarkapāda* alone along with the *Siddhāntacandrikā* has been brought out from Banaras.

(4) His last work is the famous commentary on the *Shlokavārttika*, called *Nyāyaratnākara*, a name which is so popular amongst the Mīmāmsakas. It is one of the best commentaries. Besides explaining the lines of the text, it explains the views of the orthodox and the non-orthodox schools very clearly before giving his own criticism of their views. His language is marked by simplicity and lucidity. This is his last work. He refers to his own works *Nyāyaratnamālā* and *Shāstradīpikā* very often. He has also referred to the *Bṛhaṭṭīkā* by Kumārila (p. 452). He also refers to Bhavadāsa, Dharmakīrti, Bhikṣu, Diṅnāga and Bhartṛmitra. It has been published along with the text in the Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, Benares. Except the *Tantraratna* which is only partly published, all the rest of his works have been published.

BHAVANĀTHA MISHRA

Bhavanātha Mishra, also known as Bhavadeva Mishra (*vide* Varadarāja's Commentary on the *Viveka*, verse 10 of his benediction), was a great advocate of the Prabhākara School. The only work of his known to us is his *Nayaviveka* which is now partly published from the Madras University along with the commentary of Varadarāja. It is an independent commentary on the Jaiminīyasūtras. The author does not indulge in any literary show or criticism against the rival views (cf. विहाय विस्तरं शब्दसौन्दर्यपरनिन्दने । व्यज्यते भवनाथेन तत्त्वं नयविवेकतः). The author follows the trend of thought of Shālikanātha Mishra as found in the latter's two *Panjikās* (*vide*—i) महता प्रणिधानेन...शालिकोक्तं प्रसाध्यते; ii) पञ्जिकाद्वय-तन्त्रार्थसम्मोहविनिवृत्तये । उद्ग्राहिणी भवेनैषा etc,).

The *Viveka* is indeed the masterpiece of the author. Though it is very lucid and elaborate, yet it is not so easy, and in many places it is quite obscure without the help of a commentary. Amongst many others, he refers to Shālikanātha, Vācaspati Mishra I and Shrīkara. Candra, Mīmāmsaka of the 11th century (*vide* Dr. Umesha Mishra's article in the Jha Commemoration Volume, pp. 245—46), Murāri Mishra II of the 12th century (*vide* Dr. Umesha Mishra's Introduction to the Ekādashādyādhikaraṇa, Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Vol. X,

pp. 235—37,1929), Pratyagrūpa Bhagavat of the 14th century and many others refer to Bhavanātha and his *Nayaviveka.* This being so, we may place our author before the 11th century and just after Pārthasārathi Mishra. This disproves the view advanced by some that the author of the *Viveka* and the father of Shaṅkara Mishra of the 15th century are identical. No doubt, Shaṅkara Mishra's father was also a Mimāmsaka but he was quite different from the author of the *Viveka.* He was an inhabitant of Mithilā.

The importance of this work can be easily gathered from the fact that there are several commentaries on this work. Thus, 1(*Dīpikā* by Varadarāja, son of Raṅganātha, grandson of Devanātha and great-grandson of Praṇatārtihara who was living on the bank of the river named *Shukā.* His teacher was named Sudarshana. It extends up to the *Tripādī* section only. Part of it has been now published from the Madras University; (2) *Shaṅkādīpikā* by a pupil of Rāmārya and Govindopādhyāya (*vide* Hall; p. 180); (3) *Alankāra* by Dāmodara Sūri, son of Mādhava Yogin (*vide* Benares Sanskrit College Mss. Cat.); (4) *Vivekatattva* by Ravideva of the 14th century; and *Pancikā* by Shaṅkara. Except of the *Dīpikā* all are unpublished so far.

Gurumatācārya Candra

Mahāmahopādhyāya Candra was a follower of the Prabhākara School. He has made original contribution also to the thought. He was the son of Mahapādhyāya Guṇarati who was a native of Mithilā. He was held with great respect by later writers. Murāri Mishra II of the 12th century refers to his views in his *Tripādīnītinyanaṁ*, Caṇḍeshwara Ṭhakkura, the great Maithila *Nibandhakāra*, of the 14th century, speaks of him as *Gurumatācāryah*, Shaṅkara Mishra of the 15th century refers to him as *Prabhākaraikadeshīyaḥ* in his *Vādivinoda* (p. 53), Jayarāma Bhaṭṭācārya gives us his views in his *Nyāyasiddhāntamālā.* From all these references it appears that he must have lived before 1100 A.D.

His works known to us on Mīmāṁsā are : (1) *Nayaratnākara* a commentary on the Jaiminīyasūtras. Only a portion of this commentary is with the writer. The style of this commentary is simple. (2) *Amṛtabindu* —an independent treatise on Mīmāṁsā. A manuscript of it is in the Adyar Library and also with the writer. Candra, amongst so many others, refers to Shrīkara, *Viveka*, *Vivaraṇa* and *Panjikā.* He believed in eleven categories, namely, substance (*dravya*), qualities (*guṇa*,) action (*karman*), generality (*sāmānya*), number (*sankhyā*) inherence (*samavāya*), resemblence

(*sādṛshya*), energy (*shakti*), in common with others of the Prabhākara School, while succession (*krama*), auxiliary (*upakāra*), and impression (*saṁskāra*) as his own independent addition to the above-mentioned eight categories *vide* Dr. Umesha Mishra's article in the Jha Commemoration Volume.)

BHAVADEVA BHAṬṬA

Bhavadeva Bhaṭṭa *alias* Bālavalabhībhujaṅga was a follower of the Bhaṭṭa School. His native place was perhaps Bengal. Mr. Kane has placed his date about 1100 A.D. He has written several works on the Dharmashāstra. On Mīmāṁsā, the only work known to us is his commentary on the *Tantravārttika*, called *Tautātimatatilaka*. *Tutata* was a pet name of Kumārila. This is not yet published.

SOMESHWARA BHAṬṬA ALIAS RANAKA

Someshwara Bhaṭṭa was regarded as a rival of Pārthasārathi Mishra in the field of Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā by later writers. He was the son of Mādhava Bhaṭṭa. He was indeed a great Mīmāṁsaka and his views have been very often quoted though sometimes very adversely criticised also. His *Nyāya sudhā*, also known as *Sarvopakāriṇī Sarvānavadyakāriṇī*, or only *Rānaka*, is a very important commentary on the *Tantravārttika*. It is very lengthy. Sometimes, it indulges into literary shows also. Kamalākara Bhaṭṭa (1612 A.D.) calls him a plagiarist (*Rāṇakacaurya*) in his own commentary on the *Tantravārttika*. It has been published in Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, Benares. His another work, the *Tantrasāra*, referred to by himself in his *Nyāyasudhā*, is not yet published. He is placed about 1100 A.D.

PARITOṢA MISHRA

Paritoṣa Mishra was an inhabitant of Mithilā. He is the author of a commentary named *Ajitā* or *Tantraṭīkānibandhana* on the *Tantravārttika*. It is easier and perhaps more useful to the readers for understanding the *Vārttika*, but unfortunately it is still unpublished. The author is an old writer and is generally placed in the 12th century. Anatanārāyaṇa Mishra, son of Sūryaviṣṇu Mishra of the 14th century, wrote a commentary called *Vijaya* on the *Ajitā*. It was therefore that the title of *Ajitācārya* was given to Anantanārāyaṇa. He was also a Maithila. Its Ms. is in the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute and also in the Library of Dr. Ganganatha Jha.

MURĀRI MISHRA II

'मुरारेस्तृतीयः पन्थाः' has become a proverb in Sanskrit which has got its origin in Murri Mishra II. He was one of the greatest Mīmāṁsakas who

held independent views on several topics of Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā. His views were so distinct and convincing that he was regarded as the founder of the *Third School* of Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā. Although he held distinct views on several topics of Mīmāṁsā, yet perhaps it was due to his having an independent view on the theory of the *Validity of Knowledgē* (प्रामाण्यवाद) that he became known as the founder of the *Third School* (*vide* Murāri Mishra's distinctive views by Dr. Umesha Mishra).

It will not be out of place to state that the Mīmāṁsakas in general are the supporters of the theory of the self-Validity of Knowledge स्वतः प्रामाण्यवाद while the Naiyāyikas in general are the upholders of the *Parataḥ Prāmāṇyavāda*. But when we very carefully examine the views of both Kumārila and Prabhākara, we find that truly speaking the viewpoint of Prabhākara alone is the supporter of the *Svataḥ Prāmāṇya* theory. Kumārila's viewpoint is somewhat different from the former. Murāri Mishra's view is, however, different from both these two, and as he was a great Naiyāyika, his view is slightly influenced by that system (*vide* Dr. Umesha Mishra's article in the Proceedings of the Oriental Conference, Lahore).

Only a few years back his views were known only from references found here and there. But fortunately, I could discover two small, though very important, fragments of his commentary on the Jaiminīyasūtras in 1928. They are (1) *Tripādīnītinayanam* and (2) *Ekādashādyādhikaraṇaṁ*. The former is a commentary—*adhikaraṇa*-wise on Adhyāya I, Pādas 2 to 4; while the latter deals with the *Tantra* and *Avāpa* which form part of the first *adhikaraṇa* of the 11th Adhyāya of the Jaiminīyasūtras. Both of these fragments have been printed now. In both there are references to *Vivaraṇa*, *Viveka*, *Pañjikā* and *Paribhāṣā* and to authors *Candra*, *Bhaṅga*, *Vindhyavāsin*, *Nandana* and *Shrēkara*. These are, undoubtedly, old works and authors. As he refers to the *Pañjikā* and Candra, he must have lived after Shālikanātha an Candra. Again, he himself is referred to by Vardhamāna, son of Gangesha Upādhyāya, in several of his works; and as Vardhamāna is palced in the 13th century, Murāri must be place before him. So I have placed him between the 11th and the 12th centuries. Dr. Jha has given his views in the text, so it is needless for me to repeat them here.

Halayudha Bhaṭṭa

Halāyudha Bhaṭṭa, the author of several works bearing the common name *Sarvasva*, was a court Paṇḍita of king Lakṣmaṇasena of Bengal who ruled over the country from 1170 to 1200 A.D. This helps us to fix the

date of Halāyudha about this very period. He was the son of Dhanañjaya and Jani of the *Vātsyāyana-gotra.* He had two elder brothers—Pashupati and Ishāna. The only work of his on Mīmāṁsā is the *Mimāṁsā-shāstra sarvasva.* It is an *adhikaraṇa*-wise commentary on the Jaiminīyasūtras. Up to the end of the Pāda iv, Chapter III, it has been edited by me in the Bihar and Orissa Research Society Journal, and it is difficult to say whether the work was complete or left at this place.

This work is very disappointing. It appears from our studies that the author did not exert in the least to write it himself. In fact, as I have already said in its introduction that the author has copied down *verbatim et litteratim* in almost every *adhikaraṇa* either from the *Shāstradīpikā* or the *Tantravārttika.* Although he is regarded as a very great writer in Bengal on Mimāṁṣā, yet I do not see any utility of a work like this in any branch of learning.

Nandīshwara, Cidānanda, and Gaṅgādhara Mishra

These three writers must have lived before the 14th century. Nandīshwara, the author of the *Prabhākaravijaya,* published from the Sanskrit Sahitya Parisad, Calcutta, is a follower of the Prabhākara School. This is a good compendium of the Prabhākara School. He refers to two *Nāthas,* perhaps Shālikanātha and Bhavanātha, in the beginning of the book upon whom he has based his *Vijaya* (*vide* नाथद्वयात्तसारेऽस्मिञ्छास्त्रे मम परिश्रमः).

Cidānanda Paṇḍita is the author of the *Nītitattvāvirbhāva* which is not yet published. The work, however, seems to be important; for, there exists a very good commentary on it by Parameshwara, a standard writer. He discusses about 44 *Vādas* in it and everywhere he follows the treatment of Kumarilā. He belonged to the South.

Gaṅgādhara Mishra was a Maithila. He lived in a village named *Simarī.* He was the son of Bhaṭṭa Someshwara. The only work of his on Mimāṁsā known to us is a commentary on the *Tantra vārttika* called *Nyāyapārāyaṇa* (*vide* शाल्मलीग्रामसम्भूतभट्टसोमेश्वरात्मजः। गङ्गाधरोऽतिगम्भीरं व्यवृणोत् तन्त्रवार्त्तिकम्). He was a follower of the Bhaṭṭa School. He is placed between 1230 and 1300 A.D.

During the fourteenth and the fifteenth centuries the study of Pūrva-Mīmāṁsa appears to have been very popular both in the South and in Mithilā, the two main centres of Mīmāṁsā. Several writers flourished and contributed to the thought. Vedānta Deshika, Mādhavācārya, Bhaṭṭa Viṣṇu, Ravideva, Parameshwara, and many others flourished in the South.

In Mithilā, on the other hand, it seems that the study of Pūra-Mīmāṁsā reached is zenith. We have not been able to write out a complete history of Mithilā but we know from several sources recorded here and there that during the reign of Rānī Vishwāsa Devi, wife of Rājā Padmasimha, younger brother of Rājā Shiva simha, the patron of Vidyāpati Ṭhakkura of the 15th century, there was a big gathering of Paṇḍitas in the *Cātushcaraṇa-yajña* of a tank where about fourteen hundred Mīmāṁsakas alone were invited, a list of whose names has been recently unearthed from the private collection of a Paṇḍita in Mithilā.

VADĀNTA DESHIKA

He was a great scholar of the *Vishiṣṭādvaita* school. He was born in a village near Conjeevaram about 1269 A.D. His works on Mīmāṁsā are : (i) the *Mīmāṁsā-Pādukā*, which is written in verse and extends up to the end of the *Tarkapāda*, and (ii) the *Seshwara-mīmāṁsā* the name which he gave to his prose commentary beyond the *Tarkapāda*, The *Mīmāṁsā-pādukā* and a portion of the latter have been published from Conjeevaram. His position throughout seems to be somewhat influenced by his Vedāntic thought.

MĀDHAVĀCĀRYA

Perhaps the most important figure of this period was Mādhavācārya. He occupies a unique place in the history of the revival of Vedic Culture in the Medieval Period. He is said to have lived for about 90 years, from 1297 to 1386. His patron was Bukka Raya of Vijayanagram. His contribution to Mīmāṁsā is the famous *Nyāyamālā* in verse along with the *Vistara* in prose. We get in this work the gist of all the *adhikaraṇas* in very easy and lucid language. The treatment is so good that in later centuries this book alone came to be recognised as a suitable standard book for the beginners. The author gives the views of both the schools of Mīmāṁsā. There have been several editions of this from Bombay, Poona and Calcutta.

BHAṬṬA VIṢṆU

Bhaṭṭa Viṣṇu was a Mīmāṁsaka of the Prabhākara School. The only work of his on Mīmāṁsā known to us is the *Nayatattvasaṅgraha*, a commentary on the *Tarkapáda* section only. It is not yet published. He is placed towards the close of the 14th century.

INDRAPATI ṬHAKKURA

Indrapati was a native of Mithilā. He was the son of Rucipati Upādhyāya, the famous commentator of the *Anargharāghava* of Murāri Mishra

I. Indrapati wrote only one work on Mīmāṁsā, named *Mīmāṁsāpalvala*. He was the pupil of Gopāla Bhaṭṭa. Rucipati was a protégé of Rājā Bhairavasimhadeva who ruled over Mithilā about 1450 A.D. So Indrapati can easily be placed in the second half of the 15th century.

Govinda Ṭhakkura

Govinda Ṭhakkura is the celebrated author of the *Kāvyapradīpa*. He flourished in Mithilā in the family of *Budhawāḍas*, in a village named Bhaḍaura. Keshava Ṭhakkura was his father and Sono Devī was his mother. he was born about 1478 A.D. On Mīmāṁsā he wrote a work called *Adhikaraṇamālā* (*vide* अनुरागिणां बुधानां भूषणार्थं सुरत्नकठिनानाम्। मालामधिकरणानां गोविन्दोऽतियत्नतस्तनुते).

Devanātha Ṭhakkura

Devanātha Ṭhakkura was the son of Govinda Ṭhakkura, the celebrated auther of the *Kāvyapradīpa* and the *Adhikaraṇamālā*. He had seven more brothers who were all great scholars. He was living in La. Saṁ. 443=1562 A.D. when under his orders a manuscript of Pakṣadhara Mishra's *Āloka* was transcribed (*vide* ल० सं ४४३ चैत्रवदि एकादश्यां चन्द्रे महामहाठक्कुरश्रीदेवनाथ-महाशयानुशासनात् राघवेण लिखितम्). His only work on Mīmāṁsā is the *Adhikaraṇakaumudī*. Here the author has explained the meaning of those *adhikaraṇas* which are very useful for the correct interpretation of the Principles of the Dharmashāstra (*vide* धर्मशास्त्रेऽधिकरणमविचारेषूपकारकम्। विदुषा देवनाथेन निर्बन्धेन निबध्यते). He was a native of Mithilā.

Rāmakṛṣṇa Bhaṭṭa

Rāmakṛṣṇa Bhaṭṭa was the son of Mādhava and Prabhāvatī. Mādhava left his native place and came to Benares along with his wife. Rāmakṛṣṇa was born at Benares. He became a great scholar of name and fame. He has given every detail of himself in the beginning of his commentary on the *Shāstradīpikā*. His only work on Mīmāṁsa is the *Siddhānta-candrikā*, a commentary on the *Shāstradīpikā* which he wrote at Benares in 1543 A.D. His was the earliest commentary written on the *Shāstradīpikā*. It is a very fine commentary but unfortunately, we have got it only up to the end of the *Tarkapāda*.

Raghunātha Bhaṭṭācārya and Annaṁ Bhaṭṭa

The only work of Raghunātha on Mīmāṁsā is the *Mīmāṁsāratna* which deals with *Pramāṇa*, *Prameya* and *Vidhi*. A manuscript of his *Prameya* section was found in the private library of Kavīndrācārya Saraswatī

of Benares, a contemporary of King Shah Jehan. So, he can be easily placed in the 16th century. He appears to be a Bengali Paṇḍita.

Annam Bhaṭṭa is wellknown for his small primer on Nyāya-Vaisheṣika, named *Tarkasaṅgraha* and its *Dīpikā*. He was the son of Tirumala Acāryā who was a great scholar of the *Advaita* system. On Mīmāṁsā he wrote 1) *Subodhinī*, a commentary on the *Tantravārttkā*, 2) *Rāṇakaphakkikāvyākhyā*, also known as the *Rāṇakojjīvinī*, a commentary on the *Nyāyasudhā* of Someshwara, and 3) *Rāṇakabhāvanākārikāvivaraṇa* in 54 verses only. None of these Mīmāṁsā works has been published. He was indeed a scholar of name and fame. That he lived at Benares is clear from the well-known line which has now passed into a proverb—'काशीगमनमात्रेण नान्नम्भट्टायते द्विज :—which means that a man does not become a great scholar like Annaṁ Bhaṭṭa simply by going to Benares.

VARADARĀJA

Varadarāja was a famous writer of the Prabhākara School. He was the son of Ranganātha, grandson of Devanātha and great-grandson of Praṇatārtihara. He lived on the bank of the river *Shukā* in the South. His *guru* was Sudarshana. His work on Mīmāṁsā is a commentary, called *Dīpikā*, also known as the *Arthadīpikā* or *Varadarājī*, on Bhavanātha Mishra's *Nayaviveka*. It is based on the tradition of the Prabhākara School. It is very easy and lucid. The author was well versed in Jyautisha, Vaidyaka and Vyākaraṇa (*vide*, गुरुणि गुरुमते ज्यौतिषे शास्त्रकेऽपि प्रथितविमलकीर्त्तिर्वैद्यके शब्दशास्त्रे etc.). He refers to Candra and has been himself referred to by Somanātha Dīkṣita of the 17th century. He is thus placed in the 16th century.

It appears that he was criticised for his commentary called *Dīpikā* which led him to remark at the end of his work, like Bhavabhūti's utterance —ये नाम केचिदिह, etc.—

अवज्ञां येऽस्माकं विदधति जनाः केचिदपि ते
विजानन्ते प्रायः स्वमतिपरिणामावधि कियत् ।
न तानुद्दिश्येयं कृतिरपि तु मत्तुल्यमहिमा
जनिष्यत्येकोऽपिऽस्वकृतगुरुसेवाहततमः ॥

APPAYYA DĪKṢTTA

There is hardly any important branch of Sanskrit Literature which was neglected by Appayya Dīkṣita. There are very few scholars to whose credit we can ascribe the authorship of over hundred works. He was indeed a great genius. He was the son of Raṅgarājādhvarin and grandson of

Acārya Dīkṣita. His younger brother was Accānā Dīkṣita. He belonged to the *Bhāradvāja-gotra*. His father was a contemporary of Kṛṣṇarāja, king of Vijayanagar.

His works on Mīmāṁsā are: 1) *Vidhirasāyana* in verse with a commentary in prose, called *Vivekasukhopayojanī*. This has been written according to the views of Kumārila (*vide* यत् कुमारिलमतानुसारिणा निर्मितं विधिरसायनं मया। पद्यरूपमनतिस्फुटाशयं तत्सुखावगतये विविच्यते). It has been published in the Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, Benares; 2) *Upakrama-parākrama*; 3) *Vādanaksatrāvalī*, which is also called *Vādanaksatramālā*, 4) *Mayukhāvalī*; a commentary on the *Shāstradīpikā*; 5) *Citrapata*; *and* 6) *Dharmamīmāṁsāparibhāṣā*.

It is said that after coming to Benares from his native place in the South when Appayya Dīkṣita showed his *Vidhirasāyana* to Khaṇḍadeva Mishra, the great Mīmāṁsaka, then living, the latter praised his scholarship very much. Mm. Paṇḍita Gopinatha Kavirājajī thinks that Bhaṭṭoji, the great grammarian, read Vedāntra under Appayya Dīkṣita. Scholars have now placed him between 1520 and 1593. Except the *Vidhirasāyana* the *Vādanakṣatramālā* (published from Madras) all the rest of his works are unpublished. Shaṅkara Bhaṭṭa wrote a criticism on the *Vidhirasāyana*, called *Vidhirasāyana-dūṣaṇa*.

References; 1) Life of Appayya Dīkṣita—Introduction to the Yādavābhyudaya, Vol II, Vanivilas Press, Madras; 2) Introduction to Purva-Mīmāṁsā by Ramaswami Shastri; 3) Catalogue of Mīmāṁsā Mss. in the Benares Sanskrit College Library.

Vijayīndra Tīrtha

Vijayīndra Tīrtha was a contemporary of Appayya Dīkṣita. His works on Mīmāṁsā are: 1) *Nyāyādhvadīpikā*, 2) *Mīmāṁsānaya--kaumudī*, and 3) *Upasaṁhāravijaya*. The first two are the commentaries on the Jaiminīya-sūtras. He was the pupil of Surendra Tīrtha. He is a very simple writer. None of his works is published.

Veṅkaṭeshwara Dīkṣita

Veṅkaṭeshwara Dīkṣita was the son of Govinda Dīkṣita and Nāgamāmbā and the teacher of Rājacūḍāmaṇi Dīkṣita. The only work of his on the system is the *Vārttikābharaṇa*, a running commentary on the *Tuptīkā*. This is said to be a very lucid and elaborate commentary. He was a contemporary of Appayya Dīkṣita. He was called 'सर्वतन्त्रस्वतन्त्र', अद्वैताचार्य', etc. Rājacūḍāmaṇi tells us about him in his *Tantrashikhāmaṇi*—अस्ति

गोविन्दयज्वेन्द्रनागमाम्बातप: फलम् । श्रीवेङ्कटेश्वरमुखी सर्वतन्त्रस्वतन्त्रधी: ॥...व्यतानि 'शुल्वमीमांसा' तथा 'कर्मान्तवार्त्तिकम्' । टुप्टीकाया: कृता टीका वार्त्तिकाभरणाभिधा' etc.

NĀRĀYAṆA BHAṬṬA I

Nārāyaṇa was the son of Mātṛdatta, a great Mīmāṁsaka. He was the follower of the Bhāṭṭa School and wrote two works on Mīmāṁsā : 1) *Tantravārttikanibandhana*, a commentary on the Tantravārttika, published and 2) the *Māna*-section of the work known as *Mānameyodaya*, published from Adyar, Madras. The latter deals with the *Pramānas* according to Kumārila. With its simple and easy flow of style the book is very interesting. It is mainly written in verses which have been also explained in simple prose. He quotes from *Bṛhattīkā* of Kumārila a line (*vide* p. 126). He was a devotee of Lord Viṣṇu and had a long life. He is placed between 1587 and 1656.

References ; 1) Indian Historical Quarterly, IX, 1933, 2) Introduction to the Prakriyāsarvasva by Nārāyaṇa, published in the Trivandrum Sanskrit Series, and 3) Introduction to Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā by Ramaswami Shastri.

LAUGĀKṢI-BHĀSKARA AND BHAṬṬA KESHAV

Bhāskara of the Laugākṣi family flourished towards the end of the 16th century. There has been a difference of opinion regarding the priority and posteriority of Laugākṣi and Āpadeva, the author of the *Nyāyaprakāsha*. Mm. Paṇḍita Cinnaswāmī Shāstrī and Dr. A. B. Keith are of opinion that Laugākṣi lived later than Apadeva and utilised freely the latter's work for his *Arthasaṅgraha*. But there are critics, like Paṇḍita Ramaswāmī Shāstri, Dr. F. Edgerton and others, who hold just the opposite view. In fact, there are several passages in the *Nyāyaprakāsha* which appear to have been copied *verbatim* from the *Arthasaṅgraha*. So it appears that Āpadeva was much influenced by Laugākṣi's work.

He was the son of Mudgala and grandson of Rudra (*vider Indian Logic* by Dr. Keith, p. 38). He was, perhaps, like so many other Bhāskaras, a native of Southern India. The only work of is on Mīmāṁsā is the *Arthsaṅgraha*. It is an elementary book which is so very useful for the beginners. Due to its easy and simple style the book has become so very popular amongst the Sanskritists.

It has been commented upon by Rāmeshwara Shivayogi Bhikṣu, pupil of Sadāshivendra Saraswatī who was the pupil of Gopālendra Saraswatī. This commentary was written at Benares. This commentary along with

the text has been published from Benares. Jīvānanda Vidyāsāgara also has written a comentary on it which too has been published from Calcutta. Another commentary on it is by Kṛṣṇanātha Nyāyapañcānana which also has been published from Calcutta. From Bombay and Benares also there have been other editions of this text. Dr. G. Thibaut had published his English Translation in 1882.

Bhaṭṭa Keshava flourished in the family of Laugākṣi who wrote *Mīmāṁsārthaprakāsha* which is a short summary of Mīmāṁsā. It has been published in the Grantha Pradarshani, N. S., Vizagapatam. He quotes the views of the *Utkala-mīmāṁsakas* (p. 14).

Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa II

The Bhaṭṭa family of the South domiciled at Benares became very famous by producing a number of scholars well versed in Mīmāṁsā and Dharmashāstra. Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa, son of Rāmeshwara Bhaṭṭa, was one of those celebrated Paṇḍitas of that family. His mother's name was Umā. Although he was one of the foremost scholars of Mīmāṁsā as described by his son' पदवाक्यप्रमाणपारावारधुरीण', –'मीमांसाद्वैतसाम्राज्यधुरन्धर', yet we do not know of his any other work except a commentary on the 8th Chapter of the *Shāstradīpikā*. He was born in 1513 A.D., and a manuscript copy of his commentary on the *Vṛttaratnākara* is dated 1546, and hence, he can easily be placed in the first half of the 16th century. He was a devotee of Raghupati. A very interesting and important incident of his life was that he was responsible for the re-consecration of the idol of Shrī Vishwanātha at Kāshī after it was demolished by the Muslims (*vide* काश्यां पातकिविद्रुतं भगवतो विश्वेश्वरस्याचलम् । लिङ्गं भाग्यवशात् सुखाय जगतां संस्थापयामास सः ॥)

Shaṅkara Bhaṭṭa I

Shaṅkara Bhaṭṭa I was the son of Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa, grandson of Rāmeshwara Bhaṭṭa and great-grandson of Govinda Bhaṭṭa, domiciled at Benares (*vide* P. V. Kane's *History of the Dharmashāstra*, Vol. I. He was the author of several works on Mīmāmsā : 1) *Prakāsha*, a commentary on the *Shāstradīpikā*. 2) *Mīmāmsā-Bāla-prakāsha*. It deals with all the topics of Mīmāmsā in brief. It has been published in the Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series. 3) *Mīmamsā-sārasaṅgraha* which is complete in 250 verses. The author says at the end of this work that the Acārya has described this *Shāstra* in one thousand *adhikaraṇas* which Bhaṭṭa Shaṅkara has described in one thousand *Pādas* in this work (*vide*— आचार्यैरधिकरणान्युक्तानि सहस्रसंख्यानि ।

तत् सिद्धान्तान् पादैस्तत्संख्यैर्भट्टशङ्करोऽबन्धात् ॥). It should be expressed that there is a belief that Jaimini wrote his Sūtra-work and divided it into one thousand *adhikaraṇas*. But the said number of the *adhikaraṇas* is not found in the Sūtra-work. Somehow this number is completed with the help of later works which is clear from this book. This has been published from Benarcs in the Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series. 4) *Vidhirasāyanadūṣaṇa*. It was written in refutation of the views of Appayya Dīkṣita as given in the *Vidhirasāyana*. The first and the last works are not yet published. He lived in the second half of the 16th century.

Nīlakaṇṭha Bhaṭṭa or Dīkṣita

Nīlakaṇṭha Bhaṭṭa was the son of Shaṅkara Bhaṭṭa I, grandson of Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa and great-grandson of Rāmeshwara Bhaṭṭa. He is well-known for his twelve *Mayūkhas* which are regarded as authoritative texts on Dharmashāstra in the South. In fact, he is the founder of the *Mayūkha* School in the South. This very fact makes it clear that he must have been a great Mīmāmsaka also. On Mīmāmsā, however, we have got only one work of his, called *Bhāttārka* or *Mīmāmsānyāyasangraha*. A manuscript of this work is in Dr. Jha's Library also. He may be placed in the beginning of the 17th century.

Shaṅkara Bhaṭṭa II

Shaṅkara Bhaṭṭa II was the son of Nīlakaṇṭha Bhaṭṭa and grandson of Shaṅkara Bhaṭṭa I. The only contribution by him to this system is the *Bhāttabhāskara*, a commentary on the Jaiminīya-sūtras. This work is also unpublished. He is placed in the beginning of the 17th century.

Dinakara Bhaṭṭa

Dinakara Bhaṭṭa was the son of Rāmakṛṣṇa Bhaṭṭa, the elder brother of Shaṅkara Bhaṭṭa I. Dinakara's younger brother was Kamalākara Bhaṭṭa, the celebrated author of the *Nirnayasindhu*. He is the author of a commentary, called *Bhaṭṭa-Dinakarī*, on the *Shāstradīpikā*. He was a great Dharmashāstrī and almost all his works are named after him. He wrote a comprehensive work on Dharmashāstra at the instance of Chatrapati Shivājī (1627-1680), which he named *Shivadyumanidipikā*, after his patron's name, which was left unfinished and which his son Gāgā Bhaṭṭa completed. Hence, he can be placed in the first half of the 17th century.

Nārāyana Paṇḍita

Nārāyaṇa Paṇḍita was the son of Vishwanātha Sūri and pupil of Nīlakaṇṭha Bhaṭṭa. He is the author of the *Pistapashumīmāṁsā*

both in prose and poetry (*vide* प्रणमन् गुरुभट्टनीलकण्ठं बुधनारायणद्वैववित् सहस्रम् । वरजैमिनिशास्त्रपूर्वपक्षान्परानप्यनुवक्ति कारिकाभिः). He is also the author of the *Meya* section of the *Mānameyodaya*, which he wrote under the patronage of king Mānaveda of Calicut. In *Meya* section, however, we find that his teachers in Mīmāṁsā were Subrahmaṇya and Rāma. A manuscript of his work in the Library, Sanskrit College, Calcutta, is dated 1822 A.D. Is he also the author of the *Bhāttanayodyota* which is a work on Mīmāmsā-topics? He is placed in the 17th century.

KAMALĀKARA ALIAS DADU BHAṬṬA

One of the greatest writers of the 17th century was Kamalākara Bhaṭṭa, the celebrated author of the *Nirnayasindhu*. He was the son of Rāmakṛṣṇa Bhaṭṭa who was also a great Mīmāṁsaka of the Bhaṭṭa School (*vide* यो भाट्टतन्त्रगहनार्णवकर्णधारः शास्त्रान्तरेषु निखिलेष्वपि मर्मभेत्ता—*Shūdra-kamalākara*). His pet name was Dādu Bhaṭṭa. He was a versatile scholar and wrote standard works on almost every branch of learning. He was a very bold writer. He wrote about 22 works, a list of which he himself gives at the end of his *Shāntiratna* in the order in which they were written. That he was well versed in both the schools of Mīmāmsā is clear from his own verse at the end of his commentary on the *Kāvyaprakāsha*—

तर्के दुस्तर्कमेधः फणिपतिभणितिः पाणिनीये प्रपञ्चे
न्याये प्रायः प्रगल्भप्रकटितपटिमा भाट्टशास्त्रप्रघट्टे ।
प्रायः प्राभाकरीये पथि प्रथितदुरूहान्तवेदान्तसिन्धुः
श्रौते साहित्यकाव्ये प्रचुरतरगतिधर्मशास्त्रेषु यश्च ॥

His works on Mīmāṁsā are: 1) *Bhāvārtha*, a commentary on the *Tantravārttika* where his chief object was to criticise *Rāṇaka* whom he describes as a plagiarist; 2) *Āloka*, a commentary on the *Shāstradīpikā*: and 3) *Shāstramālā*, an independent commentary on the Sūtras. His *Nirnayasindhu* was completed in 1668 *Samvat*=1612 A.D. So, he is placed in the first half of the 17th century.

ANANTA BHAṬṬA

Ananta Bhaṭṭa, son of Kamalākara Bhaṭṭa and grandson of Rāmakṛṣṇa Bhaṭṭa, was also a Mīmāṁsaka. He wrote a commentary on the Sūtras named *Nyāyarahasya* and a *Vṛtti* on the *Shāstramālā* of his father. This *Vṛtti* is called *Jyotsnā*. This was shown to Nīlakaṇṭha Dīkṣita after it was complete. So Paṇḍita Ramaswami Shastri, however, says that it is a brief commentary on the Sūtras. He is placed in the 17th century as a junior contemporary of Nīlakaṇṭha Dīkṣita.

VISHWESHWARA ALIAS GĀGĀ BHAṬṬA

Gāgā Bhaṭṭa was the son of Dinakara Bhaṭṭa and grandson of Rāmakṛṣṇa Bhaṭṭa. Gāgā was the pet name given by his father (*vide* गागाभट्ट इति प्रथां दिनकरात् प्राप्तः पितुर्लालनात्). e was the leading Mīmāmsaka of his time. He was the protégé of the great Chatrapati Shivājī who had appointed him to officiate at his own coronation in 1674 and at whose request Gāgā had to disturb his ascetic life (*vide* तस्यानुरोधादिह वादिवर्णाधिक्ये चतुर्थाश्रमभङ्गदोषः—Skt. Mss. Cat. Alwar State, No. 117).

He wrote an independent treatise on Mīmāmsā-sūtras and named it *Bhāttacintāmaṇi* of which the *Tarkapāda* section only is published in the Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, Benares. This is one of the best books on the literature. It deals with the philosophical topics from Kumārila's standpoint and discusses the views of Nyāya and Vyākaraṇa also. The topics discussed are : ज्ञानप्रामाण्य, प्रत्यक्ष, ईश्वरवाद, शक्तिवाद, सृष्टि-प्रलय, अनुमान, अर्थापत्ति, अभाव, शब्द, विधिभेदतत्प्रकार, धात्वर्थ, आख्यात, लकारार्थ, कारक, समास, and नञर्थ, etc. From the nature of the topics discussed one can understand the importance of the work and the great depth of learning of the author. He is very bold in all his assertions. He wrote this work for the beginners (शिशुप्रतिविबोधनार्थं, p. 88).

He refers to several authors amongst whom the following may be mentioned here : Someshwara, Murāri Mishra II, Udayanācārya, Gaṅgesha, Shiromaṇi (that is, Raghunāth), Pakṣadhara Mishra, Ratnakoshakāra and Dīdhitikāra. He quotes the views of his father in several places. Some of the noteworthy points from this work are :

1) There are thirty-one *Alaukika-pramāṇas*—six *Dharmapramāṇas*, six *Dharma-abhedaka*, six *Dharmāṅgatābodhaka*, six *Kramabodhaka*, three *atideshas*, three *Bādhapramāṇas* and one *Ūhapramāṇa* (p. 13).

2) There are seven categories according to him in Mīmāṁsā—substance, qualities, action, universal, inherence, energy (*shakti*) and negation (p. 22).

3) In place of the relation of Inherence the Nyāya-Vaishesika, he holds the relation of *Difference in Identity* (*Bhedābheda*) like Pārthasārathi Mishra (p. 23).

4) He does not believe in the *Yogajadharmapratyāsatti* of the Naiyāyikas (p. 29).

5) Though mainly he agrees with the processes of Creation and Destruction as held by Nyāya and Vaisheṣika, yet he denies the necessity of

postulating the Divine Desire and Effort for setting the ultimate particles into action. He holds that *Dharma* and *Adharma* alone will be able to produce the *vijātīya*-action in those particles (p. 46).

6) He does not believe in the *Mahāpralaya.*

The next work of his is the *Vṛtti*, called *Kusumāñjali* a commentary on the Jaiminīya-sūtras (*vide* इदं गुरुमतं नु मद्विहितसुत्रवृत्तौ मया, विचार्य कुसुमाञ्जलौ बहु च दूषितं भूषितम्, p. 88).

The third work which is of a great historical importance is the *Shivārkodaya* which, according to his own statement, was written at the instance of *Shiva* (*Shivājī*), called *Chatrapati* of the Bhonsala family, son of Sāhu (1627—1680). This work is in continuation of the *Vārttika* (*Shlokavārttika*) in verse which the *Āryavarya* (Kumārila), to the sorrow of all learned men, did not live to finish (*vide* the verses at the end of the Ms. No. 363, Skt. Mss. Cat., Alwar State)—

प्रारम्भि यत्न इह यः खलु कारिकाभि—
रद्धा प्रतिप्रतिभधामविदूषणाय ।
दुःखं सतां तदसमाप्तिकृतं शिवेन
छत्राधिपेन सुविचिन्त्य समापितः सः ॥
यत्तर्कपादे बहुनाग्रहेण
श्लोकैः कृतं वार्त्तिकमार्यवर्यैः ।
गागाभिधेनायमपूरि शेष—
स्तस्याज्ञया छत्रपतेः शिवस्य ॥

He is placed towards the middle of the 17th century.

Āpadeva II

Āpadeva II was domicile at Benares. He was the son of Anantadeva I, grandson of Āpadeva I, and great-grandson of Ekanātha who, according to Kāshīnātha, the author of the *Dharmasindhu*, is the same as the great Mahārāṣṭra saint Ekanātha, which equation Prof. F. Edgerton does not believe in. As his son Anantadeva II was a protégé of Baz Bahadur Candra (1645—1675), we may place Āpadeva II, his father, in the beginning of the 17th century.

His works on Mīmāṁsā are: 1) the *Mīmāṁsā Nyāya prakāsha*, popularly known as *Āpadevī*. It is a very popular text-book for the beginners. It has been already said that there is enough influence. Of the *Arthasaṅgrah* of Laugā Kṣibhāskara on this work. The book is quite interesting and helpful for understanding the topics of Mīmāṁsā. In the

first benedictory and the last concluding verses the author bows down to *Govinda*, his *upāsya deva*, which name has been wrongly understood by Dr. Keith to be his teacher's name (*vide* Karmamīmāṁsā, p. 13). In fact, his teacher was his own father whom also he mentions in the second benedictor verse. He was the follower of the Bhāṭṭa school (*vide* क्वाहं मन्दमतिः क्वेयं प्रक्रिया भट्टसम्मता । तस्माद्भक्तेर्विलासोऽयं गोविन्दगुरुपादयोः).

There have been several editions of this work along with the commentaries. It has been commented upon by 1) Ānantadeva II, author's son, which is called *Bhāṭṭālaṅkāra*. It has been published in the Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, Benares, and also from Bombay; 2) by Kṛṣṇanātha Nyāyapañcānana, which has been published from Calcutta; and 3) by Mm. Cinnaswāmī Shāstrī, which too has been published in the Kashi Sanskrit Series, Benares. All these commentaries have been written for the students, and as such, they are quite useful. Professor F. Edgerton, New Haven, America, has translated it into English with copious notes and Indices and has edited the text in Roman Script along with his translation etc. His is very useful edition for critical studies.

Another work of Āpadeva II is the *Adhikaraṇacandrikā*, which sumarises the *adhikaraṇas* of Mīmāṁsā (*vide* Dr. Mittra's Mss. Cat., Vol. III, 1911).

ANANTADEVA I AND JĪVADEVA

Anantadeva I, father of Āpadeva II, was undoubtedly a Mīmāṁsaka which is clear from the fact that Āpadeva II, according to the edition of Prof. Edgerton, refers to the views of his father in his *Nyāyaprakāsha* (*vide* अस्मत्तातचरणास्त्वेवमाहुः, Paragraph 143, although other editions read only 'अन्ये' in its place).

Anantadeva II is the son of Āpadeva II. He wrote a commentary on his father's *Nyāyaprakāsha*, called *Bhāṭṭālaṇkāra*, and also an independent treatise named *Phalasāṅkaryakhaṇḍana*. His *Bhaṭṭālaṇkāra* has been criticised by Khaṇḍadeva Mishra Anantadeva II is more known for his *Smṛtikaustubha* which he wrote at the instance of Baz Bahadur Candra who was his patron. In this *Kaustubha* he deals with the Principles of Mīmāṁsā as regards the doubtful points of Dharmashāstra. As his patron lived between 1645—1675, Anantadeva II also can be placed in the middle of the 17th century.

Jīvadeva was the younger brother and pupil of Anantadeva II. The only work of his on Mīmāṁsā is the *Bhāṭṭa-Bhāskara*. Khaṇḍadeva has

also criticised this work. Jīvadeva quotes from the *Nirṇayasindhu* of Kamalākara. He may be placed in the middle of the 17th century.

KOṆḌADEV

Koṇḍadeva was the pupil of Anantadeva II and the son of Rangoji Bhaṭṭa. From a verse in the beginning of the *Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇa* we learn that he was the nephew of Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita, the great grammarian (*vide* i) रङ्गौजिभट्टपुत्रेण कोण्डभट्टेन—*Tarkadīpikā*, p. 51 ; ii) भट्टोजिदीक्षितमहं पितृव्यं नौमि सिद्धये—*Bhūṣaṇa*). The only work of his on Mīmāṁsā known to us is the *Bhāṭṭamatapradīpikā*. He is placed in the 17th century.

KHAṆḌADEVA MISHRA ALĪAS SHRĪDHARENDRA

Khaṇḍadeva is an illustrious writer on Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā. He was the son of Rudradeva. Paṇḍitarāja Jagannātha says in his *Rasagaṅgādhara* that his father Peru Bhaṭṭa studied Mīmāmsā at Benares under *Deva*, who is the same as Khaṇḍadeva, as explained by Nāgesha in his commentary (*vide* "देवादेवाध्यगीष्ट स्मरहरनगरे शासनं जैमिनीयम्"—'देवादेव'—खण्डदेवादेवेत्यर्थः'—Nāgesha). Paṇḍitarāja had Shah Jehan and his son Dara Shikoh as his patrons. So Khaṇḍadeva must have lived in the middle of the 17th century. Khaṇḍadeva's pupil was Shambhu Bhaṭṭa, who wrote a commentary, called *Prabhāvalī*, on his teacher's *Bhāṭṭadīpikā*, wherein he tells us that Shrīdharendra was Khaṇḍadeva's another name and that he lived in the *Brahmanāla* muhallā of Benares and died at Benares in 'वर्षे नेत्रद्विसप्तद्विजपतिगणिते (1722 *Samvat*=1665 A.D.—काश्यां श्रीब्रह्मनाले निरुपमचरितः खण्डदेवाभिधानः । प्राप्तः श्रीब्रह्मभावं विबुधवरगुरुर्ब्रह्मचर्यो यतीन्द्रः. From all these it is clear that Khaṇḍadeva lived in the middle of the 17th century. Khaṇḍadeva has criticised the works of Apadeva II and his sons—Anantadeva II and Jīvadeva.

His works are: 1) *Mīmāṁsākaustubha* which has been published from Conjeevaram and Benares. This is perhaps the first work of the author. It extends up to the *Balābalādhikaraṇa* (III. iii.7) only. It is very elaborate and its style appears to have been influenced by *Navya-Nyāya*. 2) *Bhāṭṭadīpikā* is the *magnum opus* of Khaṇḍadeva. It occupies the same place amongst the Sanskritists in the South which the *Shāstradīpikā* does in the North. It is very popular amongst the Southerners. It is not so elaborate as the *Kaustubha*. It is brief. It has been published several times from Asiatic Society of Bengal, Calcutta, in the Mysore Oriental Library Series, Nirṇayasāgara Press, Bombay, and also from Madras.

There are several commentaries on this work: i) *Prabhāvalī* by Shambhu Bhaṭṭa, the pupil of Khaṇḍadeva and son of Bālakṛṣṇa. This was finished in 1764 *Saṁvat*=1707 A.D. It has been published from the Nirṇayasāgara Press, Bombay; ii) *Bhāṭṭakalpataru* by Rāmashubha Shāstrī, Madras; iii) *Candroḍaya* by Bhāskara Rāya; iv) *Bhāṭṭacintāmaṇi* by Vañceshwara which has been published from Madras; v) a recent commentary by Raṅgācārya, called the *Sutravṛtti Sārāvali*, which is also published in the Mysore Oriental Library Series.

His third work is the *Bhāṭṭarahasya*, which discusses the *Shābdabodhaprakriyā* according to the Mīmāṁsakas. Its method of treatment somewhat resembles the treatment of the *Vyutpattivāda* of Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya It has also been published several times. According to his pupil Shambhu Bhaṭṭa, Khaṇḍadeva did not comment upon the *Tarkapāda.*

Rājacūḍamaṇi Dikṣita alias Yajñānarayaṇa

Rājacūḍāmaṇi was the son of Ratnakheṭa Shrīnivāsa Dīkṣita. His another name was Yajñanārāyaṇa. He lost his parents very early and so he was brought up by his brother Ardhanārīshwara Dīkṣita. He was indeed a genius. In the Prologue of his *Nāṭikā Kamalinīkalahaṁsa*, it is said that he wrote it at the age of six only. He was the disciple of Veṅkaṭeshwara Dīkṣita. At the instance of his teacher he wrote a commentary on the Jaiminīya-sūtras and named it *Tantrashikhāmaṇi*, in *Shaka* 1559, that is, 1637 A.D. Another well-known work of his, on the system, is a commentary named *Karpuravārttikā*, on the Shāstradīpikā. It is also believed that he wrote also a commentary on the *Saṅkarṣakāṇḍa*, named *Saṅkarṣanyāyamuktāvalī* (*vide* E. Hultzsch's Report, No. II, Madras Sanskrit Mss.). He is placed in the middle of the 17th century.

Veṅkaṭādhvarin

Venkaṭādhvarin was the son of Raghunātha Dīkṣita and Sītāmbā and a contemporary of Nīlakaṇṭha Dīkṣita, the grandson of Accāna Dīkṣita, the younger brother of Appayya Dīkṣita, the son of Rangarājādhvarin. His works on the system are: the *Vidhitrayaparitrāṇa*, dealing with the three kinds of injunctions (*vidhi*) and *Mīmāṁsāmakaranda.* He is placed in the middle of the 17th century.

Gopāla Bhaṭṭa II

Gopāla Bhaṭṭa was the son of Maṅganātha Bhaṭṭa and grandson of Kṛṣṇa Bhaṭṭa, who was also a Mīmāṁsaka. Gopāla Bhaṭṭa's contribution to the system was the *Mīmāṁsāvidhibhuṣaṇa* which he wrote in defence of

the *Vārttika* of Kumārila against the unfair criticisms of Appayya Dīkṣita in the latter's *Vidhirasāyana*. He lived in the 17th century.

Rāghavendra Yati and Rāmakṛṣṇa Dīkṣita

Rāghavendra was the son of Timmaṇa Bhaṭṭa and Gopammā, grandson of Kaṅakācala Bhaṭṭa and great-grandson of Kṛṣṇa Bhaṭṭa. The only work of his on Mīmāṁsā is the *Bhāṭṭasaṅgraha*, a commentary on the Jaiminīyasūtras. He flourished in the middle of the 17th century.

Rāmakṛṣṇa Dīkṣita was the son of Dharmarājādhvarīndra, the celebrated author of the *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* and grandson of Venkaṭanātha. He has written *Mīmāṁsānyāyadarpaṇa* on the Jaiminīyasūtras. He is placed in the middle of the 17th century.

Somanātha Dīkṣita

Somanātha was the son of Sūtra Bhaṭṭa and the younger brother of Venkaṭādri Yajvan of the *Nittalakula-gotra*. He learnt all the branches of learning (*kalāmakhilām*) from his own elder brother. He called himself 'सर्वतोमुखयाजी' in the colophon of each of the chapters of his commentary. The only work of his is the commentary, called *Mayukhamālikā* on the Shāstradīpikā. It extends from the second *Pāda* of the first chapter to the end of the 12th chapter. It is a standard and very popular commentary on the *Shāstradīpikā*. It has been published from the Nirṇayasāgara Press, Bombay. It refers to Bhavanātha and Varadarāja and the *Vidhirasāyana* of Appayya amongst several others. He has been himself referred to by Shambhu Bhaṭṭa in his *Prabhāvalī*. From these references we conclude that he must have lived somewhere in the middle of the 17th century.

Yajñanārāyaṇa Dīkṣita

Yajñanārāyaṇa was the son of Koṇḍabhaṭṭāraka, also called Bhaṭṭopādhyāya, and Gangāmbikā, grandson of Yajñesha and Sarvāmbikā and great-grandson of Tirumala Yajvan. His elder brother also was named Tirumala Yajvan. He belonged to the *Kāshyapa-gotra* and *Ṛk-shākhā*. The only work of his is the commentary on the *Shāstradīpikā* called *Prabhāmandala*. It does not exist on the *Tarkapāda*. From the extracts found in the Mss. Catalogue it appears to be a good commentary. He is also placed in the middle of the 17th century.

Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya

Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya was a versatile scholar of Bengal. He was the son of Jīvācārya and a younger contemporary of Jagadīsha Bhaṭṭācārya.

He was the student of Harirāma Tarkavāgīsha of Navadwīpa. He was a great Naiyāyika and has written several standard works on Nyāya. His work on Mīmāṁsā is the *Vidhisvarupavicāra,* which has been published from Baroda and Calcutta. He is placed in the middle of the 17th century.

Vaidyanātha Tatsat

Vaidyanātha Tatsat was the son of Rāma Bhaṭṭa, also known as Rāmacandra Sūri of the *Tatsat* family, who was well versed in पद, वाक्य and प्रमाण. His works on Mīmāṁsā are: 1) *Prabhā,* a commentary on the *Shāstradīpikā,* and 2) *Nyāyabindu,* which is an *adhikaraṇa*-wise short commentary on the Jaiminīya-sūtras. The *Nyāyabindu* has been published from the Gujarati Press, Bombay, along with a very brief *Tippanī* by the late Paṇḍita Madanamohana Pāṭhaka, sometime a Professor of the Sanskrit College, Benares. He was a follower of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa. As regards his date we find that he wrote a commentary called *Udāharaṇacandrikā* on the *Kāvyapradīpa* in 1740 *Samvat* [*vide* वियद्वेदमुनिक्ष्माभिर्मितेऽब्दे (1740) कार्त्तिके सिते । बुधाष्टम्यामिदं ग्रन्थं वैद्यनाथोऽभ्यपूरयत्] , that is, 1683 A.D.which helps us to place him towards the end of the 17th century.

Kavimanḍana Shambhu Bhaṭṭ

He was the son of Bālakṛṣṇa and the pupil of Khaṇḍadeva. He lived at Benares. His main work is his commentary on the *Bhāttadīpikā* of his teacher, which he named *Prabhāvalī.* It is one of the best commentaries. This was written at Benares in 1764 *Samvat,* that is, 1707 A. D. (*vide* वेदर्तुमुनिवसुभिर्गणिते वत्सरे शुभे । ज्येष्ठे कृष्णे रुद्रतिथावियं टीका समापिता). It has been published from the Nirṇayasāgara Press, Bombay. Another work of his is a metrical summary of Mīmāṁsā, named *Purvamīmāṁsādhikaraṇasaṅkṣepa.* In his commentary, he refers to Somanātha Dīkṣita, the author of the *Mayukhamālikā* on the *Shāstradīpikā.* He lived towards the end of the 17th century and the beginning of the 18th century.

Murāri Mishra III

Murāri Mishra III was the author of the *Angattvanirukti,* which has been now published in the Anandāshrama Sanskrit Series, Poona. This treatise discusses the auxiliary nature of the various sacrifices. He says in the very beginning of his work that he is a follower of Kumārila. There are references to *Tantraratna, Shāstradīpikā, Vidhirasāyana* and *Bhāṭṭadīpikā* and also the *Mīmāṁsākaustubha* of Khaṇḍadeva in this treatise. There are several passages in it which closely follow the trend of

Khaṇḍadeva's works. He should be distinguished from the author of the *Tripādīnītinayanaṁ*. He should be placed towards the end of the 17th or the begininning of the 18th century (*vide* Dr. Umesha Mishra's article in the Proceedings of the Oriental Conference, Lahore).

BHĀSKARA RĀYA ALIAS BHĀSURĀNANDA DĪKṢITA

Bhāskara Rāya was the second son of Gambhīra Rāya and Koṇāmbikā. Nṛsimha Yajvan of Benares was his *guru*. He was a versatile scholar and contributed to almost every branch of learning. He was one of the greatest votaries of the *Shrīvidyā*, upon which also he wrote several works. His works on the *Tantrashāstra* are regarded very authoritative. His commentary, called *Setubandha*, on the *Nityāṣoḍashikārṇava* Tantra, published in the Anandāshrama Sanskrit Series, Poona, was written in *Samvat* 1789= 1732 A.D. and his *Saubhāgya-Bhāskara*, a commentary on the *Lalitāsahasranāma*, was composed at Benares in 1785 *Saṃvat*, that is, 1728 A.D. From these two references it is obvious that Bhāskara Rāya lived in the first quarter of the 18th centruy.

His works on Mīmāṁsā are: 1) *Vādakutuhala*, dealing with his controversy on the question of *lakṣaṇā* in *Matvartha* in the words—'*Pashu*', '*Soma*', etc., in the *vidhivākya*—'*Somena Yajet* ', *Pashunā Yajeta*, etc.; 2) *Candrikā*, also called *Bhāṭṭadīpikā*, by the author, is a commentary on the four chapters of the *Saṅkarṣakāṇḍa*, published from Benares in the *Pandit*, New Series, Vols. XIV-XV; and 3) *Candrodaya*, a commentary on the *Bhāṭṭadīpikā* of Khaṇḍadeva.

VĀSUDEVA DĪKṢITA

Vāsudeva was the son of Mahādeva Vājapeyin and Annapūrṇā. He was the *Adhvaryu*—priest in the Sacrifices performed by Ananda Rāya, the Minister of the Mahratha kings of Tanjore—Sarabhojī and Tukkojī Bhonsale about 1711 and 1735. So he may be placed in the first half oj the 18th century.

His only work on Mīmāṁsā is the *Adhvara-Mīmāṁsā-Kutuhalavṛtti*, which has been partly edited by Mm. S. Kuppuswāmī Shāstrī from the Vāṇīvilāsa Press, Madras. It is an elaborate commentary on the Jaiminīyasūtras.

VAIDYANĀTHA PĀYAGUṆḌA

Vaidyanātha Bhaṭṭa, popularly known as Bālambhaṭṭa, was the son of Mahādeva Bhaṭṭa and Veṇī. He was the pupil of the famous gra-

mmarian— Nāgesha Bhaṭṭa. He has written standard works on Vyākaraṇa and Dharmashāstra. His only work on Mīmāṁsā is the *Piṣṭapashunirṇaya.* His patroness was one Lakṣmī Devī of Mithilā, though he himself lived at Benares. As his teacher, Nāgesha, lived in 1714 A.D. when the latter was invited by Shrī Savaī Jayasimha Varman, ruler of Jaipur, we may place Vaidyanātha also in the middle of the 18th century.

RĀMĀNUJĀCĀRYA

Rāmānujācārya was a Mīmāṁsaka who wrote on both the schools of Mīmāṁsā. He wrote the *Tantrarahasya* on the Prabhākara School which deals with the *Mānas* and the *Meyas.* It has been published in the Gaekwad's Sanskrit Series, Baroda. It is very simple and lucid in its style. He wrote on the Bhāṭṭa school a commentary, called *Nāyakaratna* also called *Nyāyaratna,* on the *Nyāyaratnamālā* of Pārthasārathi Mishra. He lived on the banks of the Godavari; and as he refers to Khaṇḍadeva in his work, he may be placed in the 18th century.

NĀRĀYAṆA TĪRTHA

From the colophon of the first chapter of his *Bhāṭṭaparibhāṣā* (इति नीलकण्ठसूरिसूनुगोविन्दविरचिते भाट्टभाषाप्रकाशे प्रथमोऽध्यायः—p. 13), it is clear that he was the son of Nīlakaṇṭha Sūri of Benares and that his name during the *Gṛhasthāshrama* was Govinda Shāstrī. He was initiated into the *Sannyāsāshrama* by Shivarāma Tīrtha, and was named Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha. (*vide* भगवच्छिवरामतीर्थशिष्यो मुनिनारायणतीर्थनामधेयः । व्यतनोदधिकाशि भाट्टभाषाग्रथनं भाट्टनयप्रवेशहेतोः ॥—End of the *Bhāṭṭabhāṣāprakāsha,* p. 61). He was a versatile scholar (*vide* श्रीनारायणतीर्थानां षट्शास्त्रीपारमीयुषाम्—colophon of the *Laghucandrikā* by Brahmānanda) and wrote mainly on Vedānta. His only work on Mīmāṁsā is the *Bhāttaparibhāṣā* which was composed at Banaras and which has been published in the Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, Banaras. It is a good summary of all the twelve chapters of Mīmāṁsā. It is also clear from the text that the work was under-taken before he became a *Sannyāsin.* Perhaps, Vāsudeva Tīrtha was his teacher in Vedānta. (*vide* वासुदेवतीर्थविद्यशिष्यश्रीनारायणतीर्थविरचिता सिद्धान्तविन्दुलघुव्याख्या). Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha has commented upon the *Siddhāntabindu* of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī who must have lived after the middle of the 17th century, and so the former may be placed in the beginning of the 18th century.

BRAHMĀNANDA SARASWATĪ

He is more often called *Gauḍa*—Brahmānanda. He was the pupil of Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha (*vide*—i) श्रीनारायणतीर्थानां गुरूणां चरणाम्बुजम् colophon

of his commentary on the *Siddhāntabindu:* ii) श्रीनारायणतीर्थानां गुरूणां चरणस्मृतिः—the beginning verse of his commentary on the *Advaitasiddhi*). His another teacher was Paramānanda Saraswatī (*vide* भजे श्रीपरमानन्दसरस्वत्यंघ्रिपङ्कजम्—colophon of both the *Nyāyaratnāvali* and *Laghucandrikā*). Like his teacher he was also a great *Sannyāsin* living at Benares. He seems to have been a Bengali before entering into this *Āshrama.* He was a versatile scholar and wrote several standard works on Vedānta, of which the *Laghucandrikā* on the *Advaitasiddhi* and the *Nyāyaratnāvalī*, on the *Siddhāntabindu* of Madhusūdana Saraswatī are well known works. His only work on Mīmāṁsā is the *Mīmāṁsācandrikā*, a commentary on the Jaiminīyasūtras. Like his teacher he also might have been a follower of the Bhāṭṭa school; and in fact, 'व्यवहारे तु भाट्टनयः' has been the considered opinion of the *Advaitins* even including the great Shaṅkarācārya. He lived in the first quarter of the 18th century.

Rāghavānanda Saraswatī

Rāghavānanda, also known as Rāghavendra Saraswatī, was another great *Sannyāsin* who also contributed to the system of Mīmāṁsā. His works are: 1) *Mīmāṁsāsūtradīdhiti*, also known as the *Nyāyalīlavatī*, which is a commentary on the Jaiminīyasūtras; and 2) the *Mīmāṁsāstavaka.* We do not know exactly when he lived. For the time being, I place him in the 18th century.

Bālakṛṣṇānanda alias Bālakṛṣṇendra Saraswatī

He was the pupil of Rāghavendra Saraswatī. He is distinct from the author of the *Siddhasiddhāñjana* published in the Trivandrum Sanskrit Series, for the latter's teacher was Vāsudeva Yatīndra. His work on Mīmāṁsā is the *Nyāyāmoda* (*vide* Mss. Cat. Tanjore Library). He is placed in the 18th century.

Uttamashloka Tīrth

He is the celebrated author of a commentary, called *Laghunyāyasudhā* on the *Laghuvārttika* of Kumārila, which is perhaps the same as the *Ṭupṭīkā.* He lived at Benares (*vide* विश्वेश्वरप्रेरितेन श्रितविश्वेशमूर्त्तिना । उत्तमश्लोकतीर्थेन तत्प्रीत्यैग्रथिता स्फुटम्). He may be placed in the 18th century.

Kṛṣṇa Yajvan

Kṛṣṇa Yajvan was the celebrated author of the *Mīmāṁsāparibhāṣā*, an elementary primer which gives in short the entire contents of Mīmāṁsā.

It is a well read book and has been published several times from several places. Bhagavatīcaraṇa Smṛtitīrtha of Calcutta wrote very brief notes on the important points of the book. It has also been published from Calcutta.

RĀMESHWARA

Rāmeshwara was the son of Subrahmaṇya. He lived at Benares and wrote a *Vṛtti*, called *Vihāravāpī*, on the Mīmāṁsāsūtras in 1763 *Shāka*, that is, 1841 A.D. He should be identified with the author of the *Arthasaṅgraha-Kaumudī*, a commentary on the *Arthasaṅgraha* of Bhāskara. So, he was the pupil of Sadāshivendra Saraswatī and grand-pupil of Gopālendra Saraswatī. The *Vāpī* was written as an introduction to the work of Mādhava Sarvajña (*vide* i) श्रीमाधवसर्वज्ञो मीमांसाब्धिं सरश्चकारात्पम् । तत्राक्षमा विहारे वाप्यामस्यां विहृत्य दृढयत्नाः । पश्चात् सागरविहरणशीला लोके भवन्तु निःशङ्कम् । एवं जातमतिः काश्यां श्रीगुरोः कृपया मुदा । रामेश्वरः प्रयत्नेन वापीं रचितुमारभे—Beginning verses of the *Vihāravāpī*: ii) या काशी निखिलगुरोर्महेश्वरस्य प्राणान्ते सकलशिवप्रदा प्रसिद्धा । तत्राहं सकलसुरेशलब्धतत्त्वस्तत्रेयं सुजनहितप्रदा निबद्धा—Concluding verse of his *Kaumudī*). He lived in the middle of the 19th century.

It appears that there lived at Benares a Paṇḍita, named Shitikaṇṭha, who wrote a commentary (*vṛtti*), called *Subodhinī*, on the Jaiminīya-sūtras which was published in the *Pandit*. This author, later on, became a *Daṇḍī-Sannyāṣī* and became popular as Rāmeshwara. The late Babu Govind Das of Benares says in a note that "he is the author of the अर्थसंग्रहटीका also. (He) was a *Sannyāsī* (दण्डी) and lived in the *Maṭha* just beyond my garden in which my tutor Pandit Hari Shāstrī Manekar spent the later portion of his life. Shitikaṇṭha was probably his पूर्वाश्रम name while Rāmeshwara was his later name". Now, this *Subodhinī* was written at Benares in 1761 *Shāka*, that is, 1839 A.D. (*vide* क्ष्मर्त्वद्रिक्ष्मामिते शालिवाहशाकेऽविमुक्तके । सहस्यसितपक्षेऽथ द्वितीयायां रवौ निशि । रामेश्वरः सूत्रवृत्तिं निर्मायाथ यथामति । अन्नपूर्णाविश्वभर्तृचरणेऽर्पितवानिमाम्—Concluding verses). Again, the author says at the end of the 10th chapter that the book was complete in 1758 *Shāka*, that is 1836 A.D. (*vide* नन्दबाणाद्रिभूशाके शुच्यां भूते सिते रवौ । रचितो ग्रन्थसन्दर्भो विश्वेशचरणेऽर्पितः). So, he says at the end of the 11th chapter also. From the dates and their place of residence, it appears that the author of the *Vihāravāpī* is the same as the author of the *Subodhinī*. This Vṛtti is indeed very good and quite easy. He had studied the Shāstra under his father (*vide* पितृत्वं च यत्रैकत्र स्थितं मम—concluding verse).

Coming to the twentieth century we find that there have been several scholars who have devoted their energy and time to the study of Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā. Although there is very little encouragement for the study of our *Shāstras*, thes days, yet for the sake of learning only even such branches of our *Shāstra*, as the Pūrva-Mīmāmsā, are being studied unhampered. It will not be out of place to mention that it was due to the fresh impetus given to its study by the late Mahāmahopādhyāya Dr. Sir Gaṅgānātha Jhā in the North and Mm. Paṇḍita S. Kuppuswāmī Shāstrī in the South that the study of Mīmāṁsā is still found in flourishing condition. There are several good Mīmāṁsakas living, but they have not written, so far as it is known to me, any work on it and so I will confine myself to only such Paṇḍitas who have written something on the system.

Mahāmahopādhyāya Gaṅgānātha Jhā

Paṇḍita Gaṅgānātha Jhā was born on September 25, 1871, in a village, called *Gandhavārī* in the District of Darbhanga, in Mithilā. He was the third son of Paṇḍita Tīrthanātha Jhā and Rāmakāshī Devī. He was a versatile scholar and had studied almost all the branches of the *Shāstra* under the expert guidance of his teachers, amongst whom the names of Mahāmahopādhyāyas Jayadeva Mishra, Citradhara Mishra (*vide* श्रीचित्रधर-मिश्रस्य मीमांसापारदृश्वनः । सर्वतन्त्रस्वतन्त्रस्य जददेवस्य मद्गुरोः—Beginning verses of his Mīmāṁsā-Maṇḍana), Shivakumāra Mishra and Gaṅgādhara Shāstrī deserve mention. He came to Benares, and studied there for several years. He studied the *Shāstra* both on the orthodox and the Modern critical lines.

He was the head of several Institutions. He was a Professor of Sanskrit in the old Muir Central College, Allahabad, then the Principal of the Government Sanskrit College, Benares, and then the Vice-Chancellor of the Reorganised Allahabad University for over nine years. Though engaged in all these multifarious duties he was able to write more than fifty works on different subjects and in different languages. He was indeed a versatile scholar.

Regarding his contribution to Mīmāṁsā we may say without any hesitation that he occupied the same position in the country which the great Kumārila had occupied in his own days. Paṇḍita Gangānātha Jhā not only translated the two main *Vārttikas* of Kumārila and the *Bhāṣya* of Shabara into English but, in fact, he was responsible for the revival of its study in Northern India. He himself studied it under the late Mm. Paṇḍita Citradhara Mishra, a great Mīmāṁsaka of the time (*vide*...गुरोस्तथा ।

श्रीचित्रधरमिश्रस्य मीमांसापारदृश्वनः) and encouraged its study wherever he went in several ways. He was the first scholar to write a thesis on the *Prabhākara School of Purva-Mīmāṁsā*, for which the University of Allahabad conferred upon him its highest degree—the Doctor of Letters—in 1909. This was summarised by him into Sanskrit. Then he has translated the *Shlokavārttika* and the *Tantravārttika* of Kumārila for the Bibliotheca Indica Series and the *Bhāṣya* of Shabara for the Gaekwad's Sanskrit Series into English and has written a very comprehensive work named *Purva-Mīmāṁsā in Its Sources* to which this writer has the honour to add this critical Bibliography as an Appendix. In Sanskrit he has written a very easy and lucid commentary called *Mīmāṁsāmanḍana* on the *Mimāṁsānukramanika* of Manḍana Mishra. Besides, he has edited several works on Mīmāṁsā. He lived at Allahabad for over forty years and, to the sorrow of all, left his physical body on the 9th of November, 1941, on the banks of the *Triveṅī* at *Prayāga* like the great Kumārila Bhaṭṭa.

Paṅḍita Sudarshanācārya

Sudarshanācārya belonged to the Punjab (पञ्चनदीयश्रीसुदर्शनाचार्य etc.—*vide* the colophon of his *Prakāsha*). He was a follower of the Rāmānuja School. He lived at Allahabad and studied under the late Mm. Gaṅgādhara Shāstrī, C.I.E., Professor of the Sanskrit College, Benares. He wrote on Nyāya and Vedānta also. His work on Mīmāṁsā is the *Prakāsha*, a commentary on the *Tarkapāda* of the *Shāstradīpikā* which he wrote at Benares in 1964 *Samvat*, that is, 1907 A.D. Shrīnivāsācārya Deshika was his *Dīkṣāguru* (*vide* the concluding verses of his *Prakāsha*). This has been published from the Vidyavilas Press, Benares.

Kṛṣṇanātha Nyāyapañcānana

Kṛṣṇanātha was the son of Keshava and Kamalā. He lived in a village, named Pūrvasthalī, on the bank of the Bhāgīrathī, near Navadvīpa. He was a very good scholar and wrote easy commentaries on several important and useful works. On Mīmaṁsā, he wrote a commentary on the *Arthasaṅgraha* and also on the *Nyāyaprakāsha* of Āpadeva, called the *Arthadarshanī*. His commentaries are very useful for the beginners. Both of these have been published from Calcutta. His commentary on the *Nyāyaprakāsha* was completed in 1821 *Shāka*, that is, 1899 A.D. (*vide* चन्द्रद्विवसुभूमाब्दे शाके रविदिने निशि। ऊर्ज्वशुक्लतृतीयायां टीकेयं पूर्णतां गता—concluding verse of his *Arthadarshanī*).

MAHĀMAHOPĀDHYĀYA A. CINNASWĀMĪ SHĀSTRĪ

Paṇḍita Cinnaswāmī Shāstrī comes from the South and is a teacher in the Oriental College, Benares Hindu University. He is a specialist in Mīmāṁsā in the University. He is one of the students of Mm. Kuppuswāmī Shāstrī of Madras. He has written a commentary on the *Nyāyaprakāsha,* called *Sāravivecanī*, which has been published in the Kāshī Sanskrit Series. It is quite good for the beginners. He has also edited the *Tarkapāda* of the *Bṛhatī* along with the *Ṛjuvimalā* for the Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, Benares.

VĀMANA SHĀSTRĪ KINJAWADEKARA

Paṇḍita Vāmana Shāstrī was a very enthusiastic worker in the field of Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā. He lived at Poona and had founded an Institution for the publication of Mīmāṁsā works. He had begun to publish an old commentary on the *Prakaraṇapñncikā*, but unfortunately, he died soon. His *Pashvālambhana-mīmāṁsā* is the only work on Mīmāṁsā which has been published in the Ānandāshrama Sanskrit Series.

MAHĀMAHOPĀDHYĀYA S. KUPPUSWĀMĪ SHĀSTRĪ

Paṇḍita Kuppuswāmī Shāstrī is a nucleus for the study of Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā in the South. He has taught and produced several scholars in Mīmāṁsā. Mahāmahopādhyāyas Anantakṛṣṇa Shāstrī of Calcutta, Cinnaswāmī Shāstrī of Benares University, Dr. T. R. Cintamaṇi of Madras are some of his well-known students. He has written several papers on the system, mostly on the Prabhākara School (*vide* Proceedings of the Oriental Conferences at Calcutta and Allahabad). Besides, his big Introduction to his edition of the *Brahmasiddhi* by Maṇḍana Mishra throws much light on his views about certain historical aspects of Mīmāṁsā. He was for many years a Professor of Sanskrit at the Presidency College, Madras, and is now a retired I. E. S. He has worked in several capacities in several Institutions too.

MAHĀMAHOPĀDHYĀYA PAṆḌITA GOPĪNĀTHA KAVIRĀJA

He is indeed the greatest scholar of Indian Philosophy in all its aspects. He is perhaps the only scholar who has gone into the depth of Philosophical problems of India and has got his own experience in the subject. In him alone, we have got the most desired combination of the East and the West. Although he is so great a scholar, yet he has not been able to write much on Indian thought. But whatever he has written is enough to show his great learning and complete mastery over the subject. His contributions to Mīmāṁsā are: 1) Introduction to Dr. Jhā's English translation of the

Tantravārttika, and 2) Short descriptive catalogue of the Mīmāṁsā Manuscripts preserved in the Government Sanskrit College Library, Benares. He is a retired Principal of the Benares Sanskrit College.

Mahāmahopādhyāya P. V. Kane

It is needless to say how intimately the rules of Hindu Law are connected with the principles of the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā. Almost all who have written on Dharmashāstra must have been a good Mīmāṁsaka also. This is true of the orthodox Paṇḍitas also. Mr. Kane is one of those scholars who being a great Dharmashāstrī is also a good Mīmāṁsaka. His three volumes of the History of the Dharmashāstra give us enough proof as to the depth of his knowledge of the principles of Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā. Besides, his small, though very interesting, booklet on Mīmāṁsā is quite good for the beginners. It gives us, in brief, the gist of the contents of Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā. He is a practising advocate of Bombay.

Paṇḍita Pashupatinātha Shāstrī

Paṇḍita Pashupatinātha Bhaṭṭācārya was a Bengali scholar. He was a lecturer on Mīmāṁsā at the University of Calcutta. Unfortunately, he died before he could produce more work on the subject. The only work of his on Mīmāṁsā is his *Introduction to the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā,* which he published in 1923. It is a quite interesting book. In brief he discusses therein certain main topics of Mīmāṁsā very clearly. He refutes some of the views held by Paṇḍita S. Kuppuswāmī Shāstrī regarding the priority of Kumārila to Prabhākara. The book is good for the beginners.

Dr. T. R. Cintāmaṇī

He is one of the favourite students of Paṇḍita Kuppuswāmī Shāstr. He is the Senior Lecturer of Sanskrit at the University of Madras. He has written a thesis on the History of Mīmāṁsā for which he was awarded the degree of 'Doctor of Philosophy' by the University of Madras. The thesis is not yet published though a certain portion of it has appeared in the Oriental Research Journal from Madras. He has also written several papers on different authors of Mīmāṁsā, which have appeared from time to time in the Oriental Research Journal, Madras.

Dr. A. B. Keith

Dr. Keith is a versatile scholar of the West. He has written almost on every school of thought. It is not proper for us to expect much original contribution from Dr. Keith. But from whatever he has done for Indian

Philosophy and Literature we can know of his keen interest and devoted scholarship. He is a Professor of Sanskrit in the University of Edinburgh. His contribution to Mīmāṁsā is a volume on *Karma-Mīmāṁsā* which was published in the Heritage of India Series in 1921. In about 107 pages he has tried to give us an idea of the contents of Mīmāṁsā.

Col. G. A. Jacob

Col. Jacob, an officer in the army, was one of those Englishmen who had real love for Indian thought and have contributed to it even though engaged in non-scholarly field. He made a very good *Index to Shabara's Bhāṣya,* which has been published in the Saraswati-bhavana Studies, Benares (Vols. 2—6). It is a laboured work. The author has traced several references to other older authorities and given explanations of several terms in easy language. His *Laukikanyāyāñjali* is a proof of his varied interest and width of scholarship. He died after 1911.

Of the scholars who have written *History of Indian Philosophy,* which includes a chapter on Mīmāṁsā, we may mention the names of Dr. Sir S. Radhakrishnan, Vice-Chancellor of the Banaras Hindu University, Dr. S. N. Das Gupta, the Ex-Principal of the Calcutta Sanskrit College, and Professor Hiriyanna of Mysore. Their treatment, particularly that of Sir S. Radhakrishnan, is lucid and interesting. For the English knowing public the treatment of Sir S. Radhakrishnan is much more useful.

Besides these, several essays and articles dealing with the principles of Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā have been written though in different context from time to time. Some are mentioned here for reference—Colebrooke's Essay on the Mīmāṁsā, Hindu Law by Dr. J. N. Bhattacharya, Hindu Law by Mr. V. N. Mandalika, and Mīmāṁsā Rules of Interpretation by Mr. Kishorilal Sarkar.

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